Russia is escalating its attacks on Europe. The risk of a misstep is growing every day

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It is a strategy built around a contradiction. Russia’s attacks on Europe aim to make war feel closer, without starting it. To provoke, without forcing a response. To alarm, without causing a real change in behavior.

Moscow has palpably escalated its “grey-zone” conflict with NATO in Europe in the past week. Since late Sunday, a railway on which top former Western officials were traveling has been attacked by a Russian drone, another drone of likely Russian origin has been shot down in Lithuania, a third has washed up on Polish shores, a Danish helicopter has narrowly been missed by a Russian flare, and Dutch trains have been paralyzed by an as-yet unclaimed act of sabotage.

None of this is by accident. And it comes after weeks of warnings Moscow would seek to escalate with NATO – but perhaps not because it seeks or can afford a full-on conflict with the largest military alliance in history.

Instead, Russian President Vladimir Putin , has two goals, expedited by a Trump administration loathed to upset him having half a term left, and Ukraine’s air defenses being in a woefully undersupplied state.

First is to make the cost of supporting Ukraine feel real and growing, and weigh on the minds of European voters, as pro-Russian right-wing parties vie for electoral power in several countries in the region. The second is to test Article 5 – the bedrock of the NATO alliance, in which an attack on one member is an attack on all, and Putin’s long-term bugbear. Be in no doubt, Russia is getting away with sabotage, border violations and assassination plots that in the Cold War would have sparked existential angst. Now it seems commonplace.

As one European diplomat told me: “What’s happening now would have triggered NATO’s Article 4 just a few months ago,” referring to the clause in the alliance’s treaty calling for an emergency meeting over a crisis. “Now, it’s becoming almost a daily occurrence.” Speaking on the condition of anonymity for discussing a sensitive matter, the diplomat added Russia’s goal was “to scare Europe away from supporting Ukraine,” and “play with the fear of escalation.”

NATO’s major problem is that this is likely not the peak of Russian malice, but opening salvos.

Sebastian Elias Uth/Ritzau Scanpix/AFP/Getty Images

A peace deal seems more than distant, with the United States ineffective in its pressure, and Putin clearly set on the goal of taking the eastern Donbas region , then perhaps more of Ukraine. And while Russia’s horrific squandering of human capital in frontline “meat wave” infantry attacks somewhat curbs its ambitions, the Kremlin’s military-industrial complex is providing new, real options: a cheap and highly effective form of air power its adversaries struggle to defeat, and which it can increasingly mass-produce.

Russia’s Geran 4 and 5 drones are powered by Chinese-made turbojet engines, which cost about $40,000, according to Ukrainian officials and media reports, with each device retailing at about $70,000. Their Banderol cruise missile can reach speeds of 375 mph, and may reportedly cost as little as $100,000. Anything these weapons lack in polish or accuracy is made up for in sheer volume. And again, Moscow is just getting started, with its Alabuga drone factory adapting fast to flood the front lines and beyond with this new threat.

Production is key. Dr. Marina Miron, from the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London, said that “adaptation when it comes to production, supply chains, logistics, doctrine” was a vital part of any strategy, even if it grabbed less headlines than the integration of AI into Ukraine and Russia’s battlefield reconnaissance and attack. “And both sides are trying to adapt and innovate, to benefit from a short window… while the adversary designs countermeasures” to stop the new advances, she told me.

“NATO is well behind when it comes to readiness to deal with these changes,” Miron added. “It is not just about building drone defenses… [but] about rethinking the entire doctrine.” She said ideally NATO would not copy Ukraine or Russia, but adapt to “the lessons from both sides.”

Miron said the probability of conventional war was “low,” but what NATO would instead “be facing are ‘events’ below threshold as we have witnessed in Poland, Romania, Denmark, etc.”

In this brewing crisis, part of the challenge for NATO members is how to convey to its public the gravity of the threat they are now continually facing, without causing panic and granting a psychological win to Moscow. It is a near-impossible needle to thread. A near-miss drone attack at a German airport, a ballistic missile landing in open-ground in Poland, assassination plots alleged in indictments filed in New York’s Southern District. The list grows from the late summer, as does its potential lethality and geographical spread.

Moscow may be better suited to this sort of precarious dance. A senior European official said the Russian mindset was better adjusted than NATO’s to erratic escalation. “The Russians have since Soviet times theorized the flexible adjustment of power and aggression,” he noted. “ For NATO, escalation management in this way is more of a new thing. So there are things for NATO to learn.”

He added: “Overreaction is not useful, but turning the other cheek is not either.”

At some point, Moscow will misfire, overstep and oblige a NATO member to respond with force in some way. It is not unprecedented: In Syria, a 2018 attack on US positions by Russian Wagner mercenaries drew a ferocious US military response. We should also not forget that European NATO arms and intelligence are assisting Ukraine daily to hit Russia. This is often weaponry bought and supplied by NATO, but with Ukrainians pressing the trigger. Moscow – in its warped perspective as the invader – perhaps feels as though it is pushing back.

But when Russia’s misstep occurs, the jump-step in confrontation that it will bring is one NATO’s military and public are not ready for. It is likely closer by the day.

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这是一种建立在矛盾之上的战略。俄罗斯对欧洲的攻击旨在制造战争迫在眉睫的假象，却不真正发动战争；旨在挑衅，却不迫使对方做出回应；旨在制造恐慌，却不促使对方的行为发生真正的改变。

过去一周，莫斯科与北约在欧洲的“灰色地带”冲突明显升级。自周日晚间以来，一架载有西方前高级官员的铁路遭到俄罗斯无人机袭击；另一架疑似俄罗斯制造的无人机在立陶宛被击落；第三架无人机被冲上波兰海岸；一架丹麦直升机险些被俄罗斯照明弹击中；荷兰的火车也因一起尚未有人认领的破坏事件而瘫痪。

这一切绝非偶然。此前数周，莫斯科不断发出警告，称其将寻求与北约升级冲突——但或许并非因为莫斯科想要或能够承受与历史上规模最大的军事联盟爆发全面冲突。

相反，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京有两个目标，这得益于特朗普政府不愿惹恼他（因为普京还有半个任期），以及乌克兰的防空力量严重不足。

首先，要让支持乌克兰的成本切实感受到其不断增长，并让欧洲选民感到压力，因为亲俄右翼政党正在该地区多个国家争夺选举权力。其次，要考验北约第五条款——北约联盟的基石，该条款规定攻击一个成员国即等同于攻击所有成员国，而这正是普京长期以来的一大痛点。毋庸置疑，俄罗斯正在逍遥法外地进行破坏、侵犯边境和暗杀阴谋，这些行为在冷战时期会引发生存危机，而现在却似乎司空见惯。

一位欧洲外交官告诉我：“几个月前，现在发生的事情就会触发北约第四条款，”他指的是北约条约中关于危机情况下召开紧急会议的条款。“而现在，这种情况几乎每天都在发生。”这位外交官因讨论敏感问题而要求匿名，他补充说，俄罗斯的目标是“吓唬欧洲，使其不再支持乌克兰”，并“利用局势升级的恐惧”。

北约面临的主要问题是，这可能并非俄罗斯恶意行为的顶峰，而仅仅是开端。

塞巴斯蒂安·埃利亚斯·尤斯/Ritzau Scanpix/法新社/盖蒂图片社

和平协议似乎遥遥无期，美国的施压收效甚微，而普京显然已将目标锁定在顿巴斯东部地区，甚至可能进一步吞并乌克兰。尽管俄罗斯在前线“肉搏战”步兵进攻中对人力资本的惊人浪费在一定程度上抑制了其野心，但克里姆林宫的军工复合体正在提供新的、切实可行的选择：一种廉价且高效的空中力量，其对手难以匹敌，而且俄罗斯还能日益大规模地生产这种力量。

据乌克兰官员和媒体报道，俄罗斯的“格兰4”和“格兰5”无人机采用中国制造的涡轮喷气发动机，每台发动机成本约为4万美元，而每架无人机的零售价约为7万美元。其“班德罗尔”巡航导弹的飞行速度可达每小时375英里，据报道成本可能低至10万美元。这些武器虽然在精细度和精度方面有所欠缺，但其数量优势弥补了这些不足。而且，莫斯科的攻势才刚刚开始，其“阿拉布加”无人机工厂正在迅速调整生产，以便将这种新型威胁倾泻到前线及其他地区。

生产是关键。伦敦国王学院国防研究系的玛丽娜·米隆博士表示，“在生产、供应链、物流和作战理论方面的适应性”是任何战略的重要组成部分，即便它不像人工智能融入乌克兰和俄罗斯战场侦察与攻击那样引人注目。“双方都在努力适应和创新，以期在短暂的窗口期内获益……而对手则在设计应对措施”来阻止这些新进展，她告诉我。

米隆补充说：“北约在应对这些变化方面准备不足。这不仅仅是建立无人机防御系统的问题……而是需要重新思考整个战略。”她表示，理想情况下，北约不应照搬乌克兰或俄罗斯的做法，而应吸取“双方的经验教训”。

米龙表示，发生常规战争的可能性“很低”，但北约将“面临的是低于阈值的‘事件’，就像我们在波兰、罗马尼亚、丹麦等地看到的那样”。

在这场酝酿中的危机中，北约成员国面临的挑战之一是如何向公众传达他们目前持续面临的威胁的严重性，同时又不引起恐慌，避免让莫斯科在心理上取得胜利。这几乎是不可能完成的任务。德国机场险些遭遇无人机袭击，波兰空旷地带落入弹道导弹，纽约南区法院起诉书中指控的暗杀阴谋……自夏末以来，此类事件不断增加，其潜在致命性和地理范围也在扩大。

莫斯科或许更擅长这种微妙的博弈。一位欧洲高级官员表示，俄罗斯的思维方式比北约更能适应这种反复无常的局势升级。“自苏联时期以来，俄罗斯就一直在理论层面灵活调整力量和侵略手段，”他指出，“对北约而言，这种升级管理方式则更为新颖。因此，北约还有很多东西需要学习。”

他补充道：“反应过度无济于事，但以德报怨也无济于事。”

莫斯科迟早会失控，越界行事，迫使北约成员国以某种方式进行武力回应。这种情况并非史无前例：2018年，俄罗斯瓦格纳雇佣兵在叙利亚袭击美军阵地，引发了美国的猛烈反击。我们也不应忘记，欧洲北约的武器和情报每天都在协助乌克兰打击俄罗斯。这些武器往往由北约购买和提供，但扣动扳机的却是乌克兰人。莫斯科——在其扭曲的侵略者视角中——或许觉得自己是在反击。

但一旦俄罗斯犯下错误，由此引发的对抗升级将是北约军方和公众都始料未及的。而且，这种情况可能正日益逼近。