How far will Egypt go to help Saudi Arabia secure the Red Sea?

Regional analysts highlight the growing security alignment between Cairo and Riyadh amid escalating Red Sea tensions.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi shakes hands with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during a welcoming ceremony at Cairo International Airport on September 15, 2026 [Ahmed Nureldine/AFP]

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s latest meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi this week came at a highly sensitive moment for both countries.

Mere days before Tuesday’s meeting, Iran-aligned Houthi rebels seized Yemen’s Red Sea coast, gaining significant control over the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the southern gateway to the Suez Canal.

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This precipitated a Saudi air campaign over Yemen and repeated attacks by the Houthis on the kingdom’s oil infrastructure.

Analysts say Riyadh is looking for help to protect the kingdom and Red Sea shipping, and that Egypt, whose Suez Canal revenue depends on the same traffic, is an obvious partner.

The deepening bilateral relationship carries significant implications for the region, from the conflicts in Yemen and Sudan to Egypt’s close ties with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia’s new defence pact with Turkiye and Pakistan.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman shakes hands with Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi during a meeting in Cairo [File: AFP]

Purpose of the visit

Abdel Monem Said, a member of Egypt’s Senate who is close to decision-making circles in Cairo, told Al Jazeera the visit had political, economic, strategic and military dimensions.

He said it came as Iran escalated regional conflicts through what he called its proxies, chief among them the Houthis. Their advance directly threatened Egypt’s economy and the Suez Canal, he said.

Said stressed the need for joint strategic and military thinking between Egypt and Saudi Arabia that would act as a strong deterrent against Iran-backed groups from Iraq to Yemen.

He added that Egypt is eager to prevent Iran and its allies from imposing control over the region, especially over maritime traffic in the Red Sea, given the direct repercussions this has for the Suez Canal.

Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at King’s College London, said Cairo increasingly sees one continuous security space stretching from the Suez Canal to Bab al-Mandeb.

If that southern gateway becomes unreliable, he said, Egypt stands to lose shipping, hard currency and strategic leverage.

“I do think Cairo now has a very strong interest in substantive cooperation with Saudi Arabia on Red Sea security,” he told Al Jazeera over email.

A United States Navy guided missile destroyer in the Suez Canal, en route to support the Operation Epic Fury attack on Iran, in Egypt, on March 5, 2026 [Reuters]

In the lead-up to the meeting, the chairman of the Arab Affairs Committee in Egypt’s House of Representatives, Mohamed Salah Abu Hemila, told Al Jazeera that the Saudi crown prince’s visit may produce a new roadmap for political and strategic cooperation on a number of Arab and regional issues.

The alliance between the two nations would serve as the cornerstone for building a new Arab order — more robust, cohesive, and capable of safeguarding its interests and defending its just causes, he said.

The foremost issues would be Red Sea security and freedom of international navigation, but they would also include the Palestinian cause and the situations in Yemen, Libya and Sudan.

A statement released by el-Sisi’s office after the meeting also affirmed that “relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia can only be exemplary within the Arab framework,” and linked Egyptian and Gulf security.

Tarek Fahmy, professor of international relations at Cairo University, told Al Jazeera that Saudi Arabia is increasingly acting within an Arab framework after the United States’s reaction to the Houthi escalations fell short of what the kingdom expected. Reports suggest that Saudi Arabia asked the Trump administration for military help in combatting the Iran-backed group, but that Trump refused. Neither Saudi Arabia nor the US has officially commented on these reports.

No details of specific military cooperation between the two countries were announced during or after the meeting.

However, Egypt is already a party to a Saudi-led coalition for Red Sea maritime security launched in August. The grouping was created as a consequence of international fears that the Houthis could close Bab al-Mandeb while Iran had the Strait of Hormuz choked off.

The coalition, whose founding document stresses it is purely defensive in nature, has not taken military action against the Houthis so far. The rebel group, too, has not taken measures to shut down shipping after its recent advances.

Krieg says Saudi-Egyptian military cooperation is likely to entail intelligence sharing, maritime surveillance, protection of commercial shipping and greater coordination around the Red Sea.

But there is a “very hard ceiling” on how far Egypt will involve itself inside Yemen, he said. “The Egyptian preference will be to defend the maritime system without becoming responsible for Yemen.”

Historical memory likely plays a role in that preference. In the 1960s, Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser sent tens of thousands of Egyptian soldiers to participate in the North Yemen Civil War, a long and costly endeavour that yielded few results and many casualties.

“Yemen taught Egypt that an apparently limited intervention can become a strategic trap very quickly,” Krieg said.

A broader convergence

It’s no surprise that the two nations should seek to deepen cooperation at this moment, say analysts. The Iran war is only the latest – and perhaps greatest – in a series of regional crises that the two states have found themselves roughly aligned on.

In January, weeks before the war began, el-Sisi met Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud in Cairo. Afterwards, the Egyptian presidency said the two countries held “identical” views on solutions to regional crises that focus on preserving the unity and sovereignty of states.

This was reiterated on Tuesday, when the two sides “stressed that any threat to Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity poses a danger to the collective security of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and all countries of the region”, according to Egypt’s State Information Service.

“Both are deeply uncomfortable with the fragmentation of states and the rise of militias, separatist movements and externally sponsored sub-state actors,” Krieg said. “You can see that in Sudan, Libya, Somalia and increasingly Yemen.”

A satellite image shows an airfield in East Owainat, Egypt, allegedly used for Egyptian covert strikes in Sudan [File:Planet Labs/Reuters]

However, this strategic vision for the region has run contrary to Abu Dhabi’s preferences and policies.

That pre-war meeting between el-Sisi and Prince Faisal came only days after Saudi Arabia launched strikes on a United Arab Emirates-backed separatist group in Yemen, which was widely received as a repudiation of Abu Dhabi.

The UAE is long faced accusations of sponsoring the Rapid Support Forces rebel group in Sudan, driving a devastating civil war that has negative ramifications for Egyptian security. Cairo has supported Khartoum’s efforts to combat the group and restore its sovereignty. The UAE has rejected accusations that it has provided military, logistical, financial or political support to the RSF.

At the same time, the UAE is far and away the largest investor in the Egyptian economy. In 2025, its net investments in the country were more than double that of the second-biggest investor, the United States.

“This is where the Saudi-UAE rivalry becomes difficult for Egypt. Cairo does not want to choose between Saudi Arabia and the UAE,” Krieg says.

Instead, Krieg expects Egypt to compartmentalise, siding with Riyadh on security matters while preserving its economic relationship with Abu Dhabi.

Riyadh “does not need Cairo to publicly attack Abu Dhabi”, he said, but to use its geography, intelligence and influence to make certain regional strategies harder.

A Royal Saudi Naval Forces frigate sails with US Fifth Fleet ships on operations to help ensure maritime security and stability in the Middle East region, in the Red Sea, in August 2023 [Reuters]

Saudi Arabia’s urgent need to contain the fallout from the US-Iran war has led it to embrace an increasing number of partners and allies.

Since the war began, it has signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement to include Turkiye in a bilateral mutual defence treaty it had with Pakistan.

It has organised a multilateral maritime security coalition for the Red Sea, sought assurances from the United States and the European Union and signed a defence agreement with Ukraine .

These measures, however, have been more form than function, say analysts. They have not deterred Iran and its regional allies from launching direct attacks on the kingdom, nor have they empowered Yemeni allies to keep the Houthis in check.

Tuesday’s meeting seemed to tacitly acknowledge the lack of a ready military solution for Yemen. Egypt expressed support for “efforts to reach a comprehensive and sustainable political solution to the Yemen crisis”.

They may, however, indicate the kind of security architecture that will emerge once the war is over.

区域分析人士指出，随着红海局势日益紧张，开罗和利雅得之间的安全合作正在不断加强。

2026年9月15日，埃及总统阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·塞西在开罗国际机场举行的欢迎仪式上与沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼握手。[艾哈迈德·努雷尔丁/法新社]

沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼本周与埃及总统阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·塞西的最新会晤正值两国局势高度敏感之际。

就在周二会议召开前几天，伊朗支持的胡塞武装占领了也门红海沿岸，对通往苏伊士运河的南门曼德海峡取得了重大控制权。

埃及总统塞西会见穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼，支持沙特关于保障红海航行安全的呼吁（共2条，此为第1条）。

列表 2/2 “他们呼唤我们”：特朗普是否已将曼德海峡拱手让给胡塞武装？

这引发了沙特阿拉伯对也门的空袭行动，以及胡塞武装对沙特石油基础设施的反复袭击。

分析人士称，利雅得正在寻求帮助以保护沙特王国和红海航运，而埃及的苏伊士运河收入依赖于同样的航运，因此埃及显然是一个合作伙伴。

不断深化的双边关系对该地区具有重大影响，从也门和苏丹的冲突到埃及与阿拉伯联合酋长国的密切关系，再到沙特阿拉伯与土耳其和巴基斯坦的新防务条约。

沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼在开罗会见埃及总统阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·塞西时握手。[图片：法新社]

访问目的

与开罗决策圈关系密切的埃及参议院议员阿卜杜勒·穆奈姆·赛义德告诉半岛电视台，此次访问具有政治、经济、战略和军事意义。

他表示，伊朗通过其代理人（其中最主要的是胡塞武装）加剧地区冲突，而这正是伊朗局势恶化的原因。他说，胡塞武装的推进直接威胁到埃及的经济和苏伊士运河。

赛义德强调，埃及和沙特阿拉伯之间需要进行联合战略和军事思考，这将对从伊拉克到也门的伊朗支持的组织起到强有力的威慑作用。

他还补充说，鉴于伊朗及其盟友对苏伊士运河的直接影响，埃及急于阻止他们控制该地区，特别是控制红海的海上交通。

伦敦国王学院高级讲师安德烈亚斯·克里格表示，开罗越来越呈现出从苏伊士运河到曼德海峡的连续安全区域。

他表示，如果南部门户变得不可靠，埃及将失去航运、外汇和战略影响力。

“我认为开罗现在对与沙特阿拉伯在红海安全问题上开展实质性合作有着非常浓厚的兴趣，”他通过电子邮件告诉半岛电视台。

2026年3月5日，一艘美国海军导弹驱逐舰在苏伊士运河航行，前往埃及支援对伊朗的“史诗狂怒”行动。[路透社]

在会晤前夕，埃及众议院阿拉伯事务委员会主席穆罕默德·萨拉赫·阿布·赫米拉告诉半岛电视台，沙特王储的访问可能会为阿拉伯和地区一系列问题的政治和战略合作制定新的路线图。

他表示，两国结盟将成为构建新的阿拉伯秩序的基石——一个更加强大、更加团结、更有能力维护自身利益和捍卫自身正义事业的阿拉伯新秩序。

首要问题是红海安全和国际航行自由，但也包括巴勒斯坦问题以及也门、利比亚和苏丹的局势。

会后，塞西办公室发表声明，重申“埃及和沙特阿拉伯之间的关系只有在阿拉伯框架内才能成为典范”，并将埃及和海湾国家的安全联系起来。

开罗大学国际关系学教授塔里克·法赫米告诉半岛电视台，在美国对胡塞武装升级行动的反应未能达到沙特阿拉伯的预期后，沙特正日益在阿拉伯世界的框架内行事。有报道称，沙特阿拉伯曾向特朗普政府寻求军事援助以打击这个伊朗支持的组织，但遭到特朗普的拒绝。沙特阿拉伯和美国均未对此事作出官方回应。

会晤期间及会后，两国均未公布任何具体的军事合作细节。

然而，埃及已是沙特阿拉伯领导的红海海上安全联盟的成员之一，该联盟于8月成立。该联盟的成立源于国际社会的担忧，即胡塞武装可能封锁曼德海峡，而伊朗则可能封锁霍尔木兹海峡。

该联盟的创始文件强调其纯粹的防御性质，迄今为止尚未对胡塞武装采取军事行动。同样，胡塞武装在近期取得进展后，也未采取措施切断航运。

克里格表示，沙特阿拉伯和埃及的军事合作可能包括情报共享、海上监视、保护商船以及加强在红海周边的协调。

但他表示，埃及介入也门事务的程度存在“非常严格的上限”。“埃及的意愿是捍卫海上体系，但又不愿承担也门事务的责任。”

历史记忆很可能在这种偏好中发挥了作用。上世纪60年代，埃及领导人贾迈勒·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔派遣数万名埃及士兵参与北也门内战，这是一场旷日持久、代价高昂的战争，最终收效甚微，伤亡惨重。

克里格说：“也门事件让埃及明白，看似有限的干预行动很快就会变成战略陷阱。”

更广泛的融合

分析人士指出，两国此时寻求深化合作并不令人意外。伊朗战争只是两国在一系列地区危机中立场大致一致的最新一次——或许也是最严重的一次。

1月份，也就是战争爆发前几周，塞西在开罗会见了沙特外交大臣费萨尔·本·法尔汉·阿勒沙特亲王。会后，埃及总统府表示，两国在解决地区危机方面持有“相同”的观点，即都应着重维护国家统一和主权。

周二，双方重申了这一立场，埃及国家新闻服务处称，双方“强调任何对苏丹统一和领土完整的威胁都会对埃及、沙特阿拉伯和该地区所有国家的集体安全构成危险”​​。

克里格说：“他们都对国家分裂、民兵组织、分离主义运动和外部支持的非国家行为体的崛起深感不安。在苏丹、利比亚、索马里，以及日益严重的也门，你都能看到这种情况。”

卫星图像显示，埃及东奥瓦伊纳特的一个机场据称被用于埃及对苏丹的秘密袭击。[文件：Planet Labs/路透社]

然而，这一区域战略愿景与阿布扎比的偏好和政策背道而驰。

塞西与费萨尔王子的那次战前会晤发生在沙特阿拉伯对也门一个由阿联酋支持的分离主义组织发动袭击几天之后，这被广泛视为对阿布扎比的否定。

阿联酋长期以来一直面临支持苏丹快速支援部队（RSF）叛军组织的指控，该组织引发了一场破坏性极强的内战，对埃及安全造成了负面影响。开罗方面支持喀土穆打击RSF并恢复国家主权的努力。阿联酋否认曾向RSF提供军事、后勤、财政或政治支持。

与此同时，阿联酋是埃及经济中遥遥领先的最大投资国。到2025年，阿联酋在埃及的净投资额将是第二大投资国——美国的两倍多。

“沙特和阿联酋之间的竞争让埃及感到棘手，原因就在于此。开罗不想在沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋之间做出选择，”克里格说。

相反，克里格预计埃及会采取分工合作的方式，在安全问题上站在利雅得一边，同时维持与阿布扎比的经济关系。

他说，利雅得“不需要开罗公开攻击阿布扎比”，而是利用其地理位置、情报和影响力来阻碍某些区域战略的实施。

2023年8月，一艘沙特皇家海军护卫舰与美国第五舰队舰艇在红海执行任务，以帮助确保中东地区的海上安全与稳定。[路透社]

沙特阿拉伯迫切需要遏制美伊战争的后果，因此它正在寻求越来越多的合作伙伴和盟友。

自战争开始以来，土耳其签署了《麦加联合防御协定》，将其纳入与巴基斯坦签订的双边共同防御条约中。

它组织了红海多边海上安全联盟，寻求美国和欧盟的保证，并与乌克兰签署了防务协议。

分析人士指出，这些措施形式大于实质。它们既没有阻止伊朗及其地区盟友对沙特王国发动直接攻击，也没有赋予也门盟友遏制胡塞武装的能力。

周二的会议似乎默认了也门问题缺乏现成的军事解决方案。埃及表示支持“为达成全面、可持续的也门危机政治解决方案所做的努力”。

然而，它们或许能够预示战争结束后将会出现的安全架构类型。