Korea-Central Asia Summit exposes limits of bloc diplomacy

Seoul hosted the inaugural Korea-Central Asia Summit last Wednesday, producing 74 bilateral agreements and MOUs and a unified Seoul Declaration. The summit elevated ties with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to a leaders’ level. The article says bloc diplomacy gives Korea symbolic reach, but it may also limit bilateral opportunities. It argues that the summit’s real value lies in the separate interests of each Central Asian state.

South Korea had contributed $6.4 billion in foreign direct investment to Central Asia by the end of last year.

Kazakhstan hosts 62 Korean franchises and accounted for more than 50 percent of Korea’s investment in Central Asia in 2025.

Uzbekistan accounted for nearly 30 percent of Korea’s investment in the region in 2025 and is the largest source country for labor migrants to Korea.

Central Asia is home to nearly a third of a million ethnic Koreans deported there in 1937, and about 100,000 of their descendants have moved to Korea on the overseas Koreans visa.

The article says Korea has courted the region with its K-Silk Road vision since former President Yoon Suk Yeol visited Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in 2024.

Published Sep 18, 2026 11:17 am KST

President Lee Jae Myung walks off the stage with the leaders of five Central Asian countries after the first Korea-Central Asia Summit at a hotel in Seoul, Wednesday. From left are Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon, Kazakhistan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Lee, Turkmenistan President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and Kyrgyzistan President Sadyr Japar. Yonhap

Seoul hosted the inaugural Korea-Central Asia Summit last Wednesday, with 74 bilateral agreements and MOUs signed and one unified “Seoul Declaration” given. This diplomatic gathering marked the first time all five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan — met in Korea, following a similar format to the United States’ “C5+1” initiative, last held in 2025.

The summit represents a significant elevation in relations between Korea and Central Asia. Korea first recognized the Central Asian states’ independence from the Soviet Union in 1992, and has been a consistent source of foreign direct investment (FDI) since. At the end of last year, South Korea contributed $6.4 billion in FDI to the region. An all head-of-state level gathering signals a new era of relations.

The region’s ties to Korea extend beyond the political to the personal as well. Central Asia is home to nearly a third of a million ethnic Koreans deported to the region in 1937 by Joseph Stalin, then leader of the Soviet Union. Today, around 100,000 of their descendants have moved to Korea on the overseas Koreans visa, pursuing higher education and jobs in manual labor, technology and import-export.

But Korea’s connections to Central Asia are much more developed than these surface-level figures suggest. Media coverage of the event can simplify the region's complexity, somewhat obscuring the interests and diversity of Korea's hundreds of thousands of Central Asian residents, too. Understanding the reach of Korean engagement in the region requires unpacking the five Central Asian states into their sovereign units.

Kazakhstan is by far Korea’s strongest partner in the region. It alone hosts 62 Korean franchises and claimed over 50 percent of Korea’s investments in the entirety of Central Asia in 2025. It operates over 1,000 joint ventures and factories with big Korean conglomerates. Kazakhstan has been able to leverage its significant natural resources, such as critical minerals and oil, in its partnership with Korea among other middle-power states looking to diversify their supply dependencies.

Uzbekistan follows with near 30 percent of Korea's investment in the region from 2025. Korea is in the list of top investors in Uzbekistan, which is also a significant base for Korean factories. Notably, Uzbekistan pledged to add the Korean language to its roster of national language competition tongues this week, as it represents the region's largest sending-country by numbers of labor migrants to Korea.

The other states have less a little mobility to negotiate bilateral relationships with Korea. Turkmenistan is a highly controlled, comparable to North Korea in some ways, although this summit may signal some thawing. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan both rely on China for trade, boasting less diverse trade portfolios compared to Uzbekistan, for example, whose largest trading partner is also China. The bilateral compatibility with Korea of each state varies widely.

In the interest of creating an image of unity, the “C5” format also lets all parties involved put aside the human rights records of each state, which vary but are poor across the board. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan rank lowest in the region, even as Uzbekistan is one of Korea’s stronger partners in the region. Korea has in recent years positioned itself as a leader in global human rights and is currently a member of the U.N. Human Rights Council.

Korea approaches these diverse partners as a group of five states in order to strengthen its symbolic position in the world order. The Central Asian region is often treated as the playing field of greater powers — such as China with its Belt and Road Initiative, or Russia’s overtures to its former satellites.

Korea is positioning itself as a safe, commercially driven alternative to regional hegemons by using the C5 framing. This is one of the country’s strongest appeals to the Central Asian states. It has been courting the region with its “K-Silk Road” vision since former President Yoon Suk Yeol visited Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in 2024.

However, by rhetorically grouping the five vastly different states together, Korea may limit bilateral opportunities in the long run. Framing the region as a unified whole with shared interests in Korea could lessen Seoul’s and the five states’ ability to break free of middle-power symbolism. If negotiating as a bloc protects both Korea and the Central Asian states from blowback from its bigger neighbors, then it also inherently admits the risk of striking out on a boldly bilateral path.

On the one hand, the actual outcomes of the summit — namely, the 74 bilateral agreements and MOUs signed — reflect the real economic priorities of Korea’s plans for the five states. But on the other hand, domestic media and official statements surrounding the high-level talks suggest that Seoul is softening its diplomatic aims with the C5 bloc format.

The framing of Central Asia as a bloc is not only reminiscent of Cold War politics, but also of “the Great Game,” or Great Britain’s competition with imperial Russia to dominate the region. Korea, itself a post-colonial state, is well-positioned to navigate the sensitivities of such rhetoric with empathy and generosity, having far outpaced predicted development trajectories since the 1970s during rapid industrialization.

The five Central Asian states have an interest in building an autonomous industrial capacity, much like Korea’s “Miracle on the Han River.” Korea is a politically safe partner to build this capacity alongside, and presents an opportunity to leave behind the transactionality of the “C5” bloc. On the back of this summit, Seoul is poised to engage with its Central Asian peers on a level playing field and leave behind the rhetoric of the past.

Nathalie M. Kwon is a visiting researcher at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Her specialty is in migration and exchange between Central Asia and Korea. The views expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect The Korea Times’ editorial stance.

上周三，首尔主办了首届韩国—中亚峰会，达成了74项双边协议和谅解备忘录，并发表了统一的《首尔宣言》。此次峰会将韩国与哈萨克斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦和土库曼斯坦的关系提升至领导人层面。文章指出，集团外交赋予韩国象征性的影响力，但也可能限制双边合作的机会。文章认为，此次峰会的真正价值在于体现中亚各国各自的利益。

截至去年年底，韩国已向中亚地区贡献了64亿美元的外国直接投资。

哈萨克斯坦拥有 62 支韩国球队，并占韩国 2025 年在中亚投资总额的 50% 以上。

到 2025 年，乌兹别克斯坦占韩国在该地区投资的近 30%，并且是韩国最大的劳务移民来源国。

中亚是近30万1937年被驱逐到那里的朝鲜族人的家园，他们的约10万后裔持海外朝鲜人签证移居韩国。

文章称，自前总统尹锡悦于 2024 年访问哈萨克斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦和土库曼斯坦以来，韩国一直以“朝鲜丝绸之路”愿景拉拢该地区。

发布于2026年9月18日上午11:17（韩国标准时间）

周三，在首尔一家酒店举行的首届韩国—中亚峰会结束后，韩国总统李在明与五位中亚国家领导人一同走下讲台。从左至右依次为：乌兹别克斯坦总统沙夫卡特·米尔济约耶夫、塔吉克斯坦总统埃莫马利·拉赫蒙、哈萨克斯坦总统卡西姆若马尔特·托卡耶夫、李在明、土库曼斯坦总统谢尔达尔·别尔德穆哈梅多夫和吉尔吉斯斯坦总统萨德尔·扎帕尔。（韩联社）

上周三，首尔主办了首届韩国—中亚峰会，签署了74项双边协议和谅解备忘录，并发表了统一的《首尔宣言》。此次外交会议标志着哈萨克斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦和土库曼斯坦这五个中亚国家首次齐聚韩国，其形式与美国发起的“C5+1”倡议类似，该倡议上次举行是在2025年。

此次峰会标志着韩国与中亚关系显著提升。韩国于1992年首次承认中亚各国脱离苏联独立，此后一直是该地区稳定的外国直接投资来源国。截至去年年底，韩国对该地区的投资额达64亿美元。此次各国元首级会晤预示着两国关系将迈入新时代。

该地区与韩国的联系不仅限于政治层面，也延伸至个人层面。中亚地区居住着近30万朝鲜族人，他们于1937年被时任苏联领导人约瑟夫·斯大林驱逐至此。如今，约有10万他们的后裔持海外朝鲜族签证移居韩国，从事高等教育、体力劳动、科技和进出口等工作。

但韩国与中亚的联系远比这些表面数据所显示的要深远得多。媒体对此次事件的报道可能会简化该地区的复杂性，同时也在一定程度上掩盖了韩国数十万中亚居民的利益和多元性。要了解韩国在该地区参与的程度，就需要将中亚五国拆解成一个个主权实体进行分析。

哈萨克斯坦是韩国在该地区迄今为止最强大的合作伙伴。仅哈萨克斯坦就拥有62家韩国特许经营企业，并声称在2025年，韩国在中亚地区的投资额占比超过50%。哈萨克斯坦与韩国大型企业集团合作运营着1000多家合资企业和工厂。哈萨克斯坦利用其丰富的自然资源，例如关键矿产和石油，与韩国以及其他寻求实现供应多元化的中等强国开展合作。

从2025年起，乌兹别克斯坦将占韩国在该地区投资总额的近30%。韩国是乌兹别克斯坦的主要投资国之一，乌兹别克斯坦也是韩国工厂的重要基地。值得注意的是，乌兹别克斯坦本周承诺将韩语纳入其国家语言竞赛语言名单，因为乌兹别克斯坦是该地区向韩国输送劳务移民人数最多的国家。

其他国家与韩国进行双边关系谈判的灵活性较低。土库曼斯坦是一个高度管控的国家，在某些方面与朝鲜类似，尽管此次峰会可能预示着某种程度的缓和。吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦都依赖中国进行贸易，与乌兹别克斯坦等最大贸易伙伴同样是中国的国家相比，它们的贸易结构较为单一。各国与韩国的双边关系契合度差异很大。

为了营造团结的形象，“C5”模式也让所有参与方搁置了各国的人权记录——尽管各国的人权状况不尽相同，但总体而言都很差。乌兹别克斯坦和土库曼斯坦在该地区排名垫底，而乌兹别克斯坦却是韩国在该地区的重要伙伴之一。近年来，韩国已将自身定位为全球人权领域的领导者，目前是联合国人权理事会成员。

韩国以五国联盟的名义与这些不同的伙伴国接触，旨在加强其在世界秩序中的象征性地位。中亚地区常常被视为大国博弈的舞台——例如中国提出的“一带一路”倡议，或是俄罗斯对其前卫星国的示好。

韩国正利用“五国集团”框架，将自身定位为安全、以商业为导向的地区霸权替代者。这是韩国对中亚国家最具吸引力的策略之一。自前总统尹锡悦2024年访问哈萨克斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦和土库曼斯坦以来，韩国就一直在推行其“韩丝之路”愿景，积极拉拢该地区。

然而，韩国将这五个截然不同的国家在修辞上归为一类，从长远来看可能会限制双边合作的机会。将该地区视为一个在韩国拥有共同利益的统一整体，可能会削弱首尔和这五个国家摆脱中等强​​国象征意义的能力。如果以集团形式进行谈判能够保护韩国和中亚国家免受其邻国的反制，那么这也必然承认了大胆走双边道路的风险。

一方面，峰会的实际成果——即签署的74项双边协议和谅解备忘录——反映了韩国对五国关系的真实经济优先事项。但另一方面，韩国国内媒体和官方围绕高级别会谈的声明表明，首尔正在通过C5集团机制软化其外交目标。

将中亚视为一个整体，不仅令人联想起冷战时期的政治格局，也让人想起“大博弈”，即英国与沙皇俄国争夺该地区霸权的竞争。韩国本身就是一个后殖民国家，自20世纪70年代快速工业化以来，其发展速度远远超出预期，因此韩国有能力以同理心和宽容的态度应对此类言论的敏感性。

中亚五国都希望建立自主的工业能力，就像韩国的“汉江奇迹”一样。韩国是政治上安全的合作伙伴，可以与中亚各国携手共建这一能力，并为摆脱“C5集团”的交易模式提供契机。此次峰会之后，首尔准备与中亚伙伴在公平的平台上展开合作，摒弃过去的陈词滥调。

Nathalie M. Kwon是韩国外国语大学的访问学者，她的研究专长是中亚与韩国之间的移民和交流。本专栏所表达的观点仅代表作者个人立场，并不一定反映《韩国时报》的编辑立场。