US defense industry vulnerable to China, government watchdog warns

The U.S. defense industrial base and all branches of the U.S. military depend heavily on materials produced by China to make and use critical weapon systems, creating national security risks, a government watchdog warned in a recent report.

The Defense Department relies on a global network of over 200,000 suppliers for its weapon systems and military equipment and uses the Federal Procurement Data System database to flag materials and components originating from hostile countries.

However, this database currently “provides limited information about the countries of origin,” a July 24 Government Accountability Office report found, and federal contractors are not currently contractually obligated to tell DOD where all of their manufacturing components originate from.

Of over 99 materials total identified by DOD in shortfall for fiscal 2023, none were made in the U.S., GAO noted.

The result is that many components used in key weapon systems and military equipment are being manufactured by China and other countries with adversarial aims to the United States.

“These suppliers may cut off U.S. access to critical materials or provide ‘back doors’ in their technology that serve as intelligence pathways,” GAO said.

China, a global supplier of critical mineral components used in microelectronics and battery production, illustrated that risk in 2024 when it imposed export restrictions on gallium and germanium — two minerals described by GAO as “critical for military-grade electronics.”

In another instance cited by the watchdog, manufacturing of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was brought to a standstill due to the discovery of Chinese components during production. Although the fighter is being produced with the aid of seven allied partner nations — including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and several European Union countries — magnets included in the warplanes originated from China.

“The F-35 prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, identified prohibited Chinese magnets in the F-35 supply chain and notified DOD in 2023 and 2024. DOD subsequently paused manufacturing for several months to identify alternative suppliers,” according to the report.

Meanwhile, the U.S. naval shipbuilding industry — particularly with regard to submarine production — is also being impacted by its reliance on foreign supplies, GAO found. Submarines require titanium casting for critical vessel components, but the U.S. at present lacks the capacity to cast titanium due to limited supply as well as outdated equipment to forge it into weapon systems.

“The U.S. has only one foundry that can produce large titanium casting required for some key weapons systems,” the report noted.

Although DOD has noted the risk of foreign dependency, GAO said, it has taken no action to implement any recommended improvements, which would include efforts toward more detailed and transparent tracking of the country of origin of critical military components.

“One untested approach that DOD officials stated could give DOD more visibility into foreign dependency risks is to contractually require suppliers to provide the information,” the report said. “While some DOD officials assert the information is readily available, others stated this approach may be too costly or that suppliers may not be willing to provide information.”

Zita Ballinger Fletcher previously served as editor of Military History Quarterly and Vietnam magazines and as the historian of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. She holds an M.A. with distinction in military history.

美国政府监督机构在最近的一份报告中警告称，美国国防工业基础和美国所有军种严重依赖中国生产的材料来制造和使用关键武器系统，这造成了国家安全风险。

美国国防部依靠一个由 20 多万家供应商组成的全球网络为其提供武器系统和军事装备，并使用联邦采购数据系统数据库来标记来自敌对国家的材料和组件。

然而，美国政府问责局 7 月 24 日的一份报告发现，该数据库目前“提供的关于原产国的信息有限”，而且联邦承包商目前没有合同义务告知国防部其所有制造部件的来源地。

美国政府问责局指出，国防部在 2023 财年确定的 99 种短缺材料中，没有一种是在美国制造的。

结果是，许多关键武器系统和军事装备中使用的零部件都是由中国和其他对美国怀有敌对目的的国家制造的。

美国政府问责局表示：“这些供应商可能会切断美国获取关键材料的渠道，或者在其技术中提供‘后门’，作为情报泄露的途径。”

中国是微电子和电池生产中使用的关键矿物部件的全球供应商，2024 年，中国对镓和锗（美国政府问责局称这两种矿物“对军用级电子产品至关重要”）实施了出口限制，这说明了这种风险。

监督机构还列举了另一个案例：由于在生产过程中发现了中国制造的零部件，F-35联合攻击战斗机的生产被迫停止。尽管这款战斗机是由包括英国、加拿大、澳大利亚和几个欧盟国家在内的七个盟国协助生产的，但战机中使用的磁铁却来自中国。

报告称，“F-35主承包商洛克希德·马丁公司在F-35供应链中发现了被禁用的中国磁铁，并在2023年和2024年通知了国防部。国防部随后暂停了生产数月，以寻找替代供应商。”

与此同时，美国政府问责局（GAO）发现，美国海军造船业——尤其是潜艇制造——也因其对外国供应的依赖而受到影响。潜艇的关键部件需要钛合金铸件，但由于钛合金供应有限以及锻造设备陈旧，美国目前缺乏钛合金铸造能力，无法将其锻造成武器系统。

报告指出，“美国只有一家铸造厂能够生产一些关键武器系统所需的大型钛铸件。”

美国政府问责局表示，尽管国防部已经注意到对外国的依赖风险，但尚未采取任何行动来实施任何建议的改进措施，包括努力更详细、更透明地追踪关键军事部件的原产国。

报告指出，“国防部官员表示，一种未经检验的方法可以让国防部更清楚地了解对外依赖风险，那就是通过合同要求供应商提供相关信息。虽然一些国防部官员坚称这些信息唾手可得，但另一些官员则表示，这种方法成本可能过高，或者供应商可能不愿意提供信息。”

齐塔·巴林格·弗莱彻曾任《军事史季刊》和《越南》杂志的编辑，以及美国缉毒署的历史学家。她拥有军事史硕士学位（成绩优异）。