China studied US stealth aircraft — and learned the wrong lessons中国研究了美国的隐形飞机——却吸取了错误的教训。
An Air Force researcher said China's assessments of U.S. stealth capabilities "diverge from technical reality and operational practice."

If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then China’s embrace of stealth aircraft technology is a compliment to American ingenuity.
Both awed by — and apprehensive about — U.S. stealth capabilities, China has invested heavily in developing stealth aircraft, as well as anti-stealth air defenses.
But China has learned the wrong lessons from America’s stealth program, according to U.S. Air Force analysis released this month. China is convinced that advanced technology is the foundation of U.S. stealth capabilities.
But in reality, the key to American success has been treating stealth as just one component of integrated aerial warfare, the report said.
China’s “assessments of U.S. stealth often diverge from technical reality and operational practice,” said Maj. Derek Ecklebe, a U.S. Air Force officer and a fellow at the Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute.
The reality is that the U.S. treats stealth “as a multifaceted capability that integrates technology with operational tactics to maintain air superiority,” he said. “Stealth technology, while expensive, complex, and important, is only part of the equation.”
China is responding to U.S. stealth warfare with a mixture of fear and confidence.
“Chinese views of stealth as an asymmetric yet counterable U.S. advantage have driven a bifurcated strategy: robust investments in layered air defenses and a rapid program to field domestically developed [low observability] aircraft,” Ecklebe said.
Ironically, the U.S. military and intelligence agencies are often depicted as being fixated on technology at the expense of strategy and tactics. But in Ecklebe’s view, it is China that is overemphasizing tech.
Because Chinese experts believe that technology is at the heart of American stealth warfare, then it follows that the best defense against stealth is also technological. Thus, China has poured resources into developing anti-stealth sensors.
Chinese media and military journals suggest that better sensors, such as low-frequency radar, are the best countermeasure against stealth.
“These sources treat stealth as a technical problem to solve with new detection tools,” Ecklebe said. “They present low-frequency radars, passive sensors, and terahertz sensors as potential solutions that could soon counter U.S. advantages.”
But these stealth-busting technologies are either unproven or have limitations, such as accuracy, filtering out clutter or vulnerability to electronic warfare.
“In practice, these systems face significant physical and operational constraints,” said Ecklebe.
Nonetheless, Chinese air defenses should not be underestimated, even against stealth aircraft like the F-35 and B-2.
“What makes China’s defenses formidable is not any single radar or missile, but rather their integration into a unified IADS [integrated air defense system],” Ecklebe warned. “The PLA [People’s Liberation Army] has prioritized multi-domain integrated operations, pulling data from low-frequency early-warning systems, passive detectors, and even satellites into shared command centers at the corps level. ”
Viewers observe China's J-35A stealth fighter model at the 2026 National Defense Military Technology Carnival in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, China, on April 25, 2026. (Costfoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
This same enchantment with technology applies to China’s own stealth aircraft.
China’s J-35 — which looks remarkably like the U.S. F-35 — “replicates features of the U.S. F-35 platform but prioritizes hardware metrics over U.S.-style software-defined adaptability coupled with [tactics, techniques and procedures] modernization,” said Ecklebe.
Ecklebe suggests that China’s perceptions of U.S. stealth aircraft — and their vulnerabilities — may be influenced by problems with Chinese stealth planes, which suffer from issues, such as unreliable engines.
“Mirror-imaging may further contribute to these distortions, as PLA planners project domestic constraints, such as WS-10 and AL-31F engine reliability and modernization issues that limit J-10 and J-20 sortie rates, onto U.S. systems,” he said.
One question is whether Chinese misconceptions of U.S. stealth could increase the chance of war. If Chinese leaders are convinced that better sensors can neutralize American stealth airpower, then they may feel more emboldened to invade Taiwan.
“Chinese strategists appear to view stealth not as an insurmountable barrier but as a factor that can be managed through overwhelming volume and integrated networks, leading to a deterrence posture that emphasizes rapid, decisive action to limit U.S. involvement,” Ecklebe said.
Michael Peck is a correspondent for Defense News and a columnist for the Center for European Policy Analysis. He holds an M.A. in political science from Rutgers University. Find him at theuncommondefense.com. His email is mikedefense1@gmail.com.
如果模仿是最高形式的赞美,那么中国对隐形飞机技术的接受就是对美国创造力的赞扬。
中国既对美国的隐形能力感到敬畏,又对此感到担忧,因此在研发隐形飞机以及反隐形防空系统方面投入了巨资。
但根据美国空军本月发布的一份分析报告,中国从美国的隐形战机项目中吸取了错误的教训。中国坚信,先进技术是美国隐形战机能力的基础。
但报告指出,实际上,美国取得成功的关键在于将隐身技术视为综合空中作战的一个组成部分。
美国空军少校、空军中国航天研究所研究员德里克·埃克尔贝表示,中国“对美国隐身技术的评估往往与技术现实和作战实践不符”。
他说,事实上,美国将隐身技术视为“一种多方面的能力,它将技术与作战战术相结合,以维持空中优势”。“隐身技术虽然昂贵、复杂且重要,但这只是等式的一部分。”
中国对美国的隐蔽战争既感到恐惧又充满信心。
埃克尔贝说:“中国将隐身技术视为美国不对称但可对抗的优势,这促使中国采取了分而治之的战略:大力投资多层防空系统,并迅速推进国产[低可探测性]飞机的部署计划。”
具有讽刺意味的是,美国军方和情报机构经常被描绘成过于注重技术而忽视战略和战术。但在埃克尔贝看来,真正过分强调技术的是中国。
由于中国专家认为技术是美国隐形战的核心,因此,对抗隐形战的最佳防御手段也必然是技术手段。正因如此,中国投入大量资源研发反隐形传感器。
中国媒体和军事期刊认为,更好的传感器,例如低频雷达,是应对隐身技术的最佳反制措施。
埃克尔贝说:“这些消息来源将隐身视为一个技术问题,需要用新的探测工具来解决。他们认为低频雷达、被动传感器和太赫兹传感器是潜在的解决方案,这些方案可能很快就能抵消美国的优势。”
但这些破除隐身技术要么未经证实,要么存在局限性,例如准确性、过滤杂波或易受电子战攻击。
“实际上,这些系统面临着重大的物理和操作限制,”埃克尔贝说。
尽管如此,即使是面对 F-35 和 B-2 这样的隐形飞机,也不应低估中国的防空能力。
埃克勒贝警告说:“中国防御体系的强大之处不在于任何单一的雷达或导弹,而在于它们被整合到一个统一的综合防空系统(IADS)中。解放军优先发展多域一体化作战,将来自低频预警系统、被动探测器甚至卫星的数据整合到军级共享指挥中心。”
2026年4月25日,在浙江省杭州市举行的2026年国防军工科技嘉年华上,参观者们正在观看中国歼-35A隐形战斗机模型。(图片来源:Costfoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
中国对科技的这种迷恋也体现在其隐形飞机上。
埃克尔贝说,中国的歼-35战斗机——外形与美国的F-35非常相似——“复制了美国F-35平台的特点,但优先考虑硬件指标,而不是美国式的软件定义适应性以及战术、技术和程序现代化。”
埃克尔贝认为,中国对美国隐形飞机及其弱点的看法可能受到中国隐形飞机问题的影响,因为中国隐形飞机存在发动机不可靠等问题。
“镜像效应可能会进一步加剧这些扭曲,因为解放军规划人员会将国内的限制因素,例如 WS-10 和 AL-31F 发动机的可靠性和现代化问题(这些问题限制了歼-10 和歼-20 的出动率),投射到美国系统上,”他说。
一个问题是,中国对美国隐形技术的误解是否会增加战争爆发的可能性。如果中国领导人确信更先进的传感器可以抵消美国的隐形空中力量,那么他们可能会更有胆量入侵台湾。
埃克尔贝说:“中国战略家似乎并不把隐蔽性视为不可逾越的障碍,而是将其视为可以通过压倒性的数量和一体化的网络来控制的因素,从而形成一种强调迅速、果断行动以限制美国介入的威慑态势。”
迈克尔·佩克是《防务新闻》的通讯员,也是欧洲政策分析中心的专栏作家。他拥有罗格斯大学政治学硕士学位。您可以在theuncommondefense.com找到他。他的邮箱是mikedefense1@gmail.com。