Morocco’s PJD: what has the party learned from its dramatic fall

After its 2021 fall, the party with an Islamic reference is rebuilding under Abdelilah Benkirane. Can it regain trust?

Abdelilah Benkirane, who served as Morocco’s head of government from 2012 to 2017, now leads the PJD as it seeks to recover from its 2021 electoral defeat [Al Jazeera]

Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD) went from a decade of being the main political beneficiary of the country’s post-2011 reforms to suffering a dramatic electoral defeat in 2021.

The party won 107 of the 395 seats in Parliament in the November 2011 election, after protests that year called for political reform, greater accountability and a more responsive government. Its leader, Abdelilah Benkirane, became head of government.

Morocco’s 2011 constitutional changes expanded the formal powers of Parliament and government while retaining significant authority for the monarchy. The king appoints the head of government from the party that comes first in the House of Representatives, while he chairs the Council of Ministers, where strategic orientations of state policy are considered.

In the 2016 election, the PJD increased its seats to 125, but Benkirane spent months unable to form a governing coalition. In March 2017, King Mohammed VI ended his mandate and appointed Saadeddine Othmani to replace him. The PJD remained in government until its electoral collapse four years later.

In the September 2021 election, the party fell from 125 seats to just 13, losing 112. The National Rally of Independents (RNI) won 102 seats and became the largest party.

How much of the comeback rests on Benkirane?

Benkirane’s return raises another question: How much of the PJD’s comeback is being built around him?

A recent Al Jazeera Studies analysis describes Benkirane as a political “brand” whose long public career, media presence and direct communication style have created a personal profile that can function as electoral capital for the party.

It examines whether his visibility and personal appeal can help the PJD rebuild after its 2021 collapse.

Benkirane remains one of Morocco’s most recognisable political figures. But his return does not by itself show that the PJD has rebuilt its support.

The party lost 112 seats in 2021; its task now is to turn the attention generated by its leader into support for the party itself.

The PJD’s 2026 programme contains 467 measures across five broad areas: identity and family; political and institutional reform; public services and social protection; the economy and employment; and foreign policy.

It calls for greater transparency in public procurement, rules addressing conflicts of interest and illicit enrichment, and improvements to public services. It also highlights housing, social protection, food, water and energy sovereignty.

Its programme foregrounds practical issues such as prices, jobs, schools, hospitals and corruption.

The PJD is campaigning on public services, jobs, purchasing power and political reform as it seeks to rebuild after its 2021 electoral collapse [Abdel Majid Bziouat/AFP]

Saad al-Sabahi, 38, who works with the PJD’s regional secretariat in Casablanca-Settat, said the programme was developed through studies, consultation meetings and proposals submitted through an online platform.

“These commitments cover a range of sectors and areas affecting the lives of the Moroccan people,” he told Al Jazeera, pointing to political participation, fighting corruption, public education, healthcare, employment and economic sovereignty.

“These commitments, among others, form the basis of the agreement between the party and voters. We will work to fulfil and implement them with integrity and competence,” al-Sabahi said.

What changed after 2021?

The PJD says one of its main lessons from the 2021 defeat has been the need to reorganise internally and examine more critically its years in government.

“The party was able to overcome its crisis following its extraordinary and regular congresses, and after Secretary-General Abdelilah Benkirane took over the leadership,” al-Sabahi said. “The party also reorganised its internal affairs through communication and the renewal of its structures.”

The party’s own assessment of the 2021 defeat includes criticism of its political and organisational choices. It has also accused unnamed actors of undermining democratic choice and pointed to what it describes as electoral corruption and disinformation.

Those are the PJD’s explanations for the result, rather than independently established findings. But the scale of its losses forced the party to confront how far its record in government had separated it from parts of its former support base.

That matters particularly when it comes to younger voters.

Imane Traifi, 37, of the PJD Youth, said the party needed to create sustained opportunities for young people to take part in political life rather than treating them simply as voters during election campaigns.

“We are keen to ensure that young people move from being recipients to becoming participants, initiators and people who take on responsibility,” she told Al Jazeera.

The ghosts and crocodiles

However, a question for any future PJD government is not only what it would seek to change, but what it could change once in office.

Benkirane repeatedly referred to “ghosts and crocodiles” as a metaphor for powerful or hidden interests that he said had obstructed his government when it was in power.

The clearest example is the party’s position on Israel.

The PJD has campaigned against Morocco’s normalisation with Israel and continues to support the Palestinian cause. Its 2026 programme explicitly calls for opposition to normalisation. Yet Morocco restored diplomatic ties with Israel in 2020 while the PJD was in government and Saadeddine Othmani was head of government.

The PJD opposed the move, while Othmani later defended it as a state decision and said Morocco’s support for the Palestinian cause remained unchanged. The agreement went ahead in December 2020 as part of a US-brokered deal that included Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.

Six years later, the relationship has moved further. On September 16, Morocco and Israel agreed to elevate their diplomatic missions to embassy level and appoint ambassadors, while also expanding air travel and advancing economic and trade agreements.

The PJD reaffirmed its opposition to normalisation and cooperation with Israel the following day, describing its position as longstanding.

But it also leaves a question for the party’s return: If such forces were powerful enough to constrain the government then, what has changed?

Has the PJD developed a different understanding of the limits of government authority or will it find itself once again beset by “ghosts and crocodiles”?

The limits of government power

The PJD has made clear on several occasions that the change it seeks is from within Morocco’s existing political and constitutional system, rather than a challenge to the monarchy itself.

Benkirane has repeatedly reaffirmed his support for the monarchy while arguing that elected institutions should play their role in governing and improving the country.

That distinction is important to understanding the PJD’s return. Its opposition to policies such as normalisation with Israel sits alongside its acceptance of a constitutional and political framework in which the monarchy retains a central role in strategic state decisions.

Under the constitution, the king chairs the Council of Ministers, which considers the strategic orientations of state policy.

That applies not only to Israel but to other areas where major policy decisions remain closely tied to the monarchy.

For the PJD, rebuilding means more than recovering the seats it lost in 2021. It means showing what it learned from a decade in government, what it can deliver and how it would avoid the political costs of its collapse.

Al-Sabahi said the party wanted to regain what he described as the gains citizens had previously enjoyed.

“We will work to restore the gains that citizens previously enjoyed and to restore their dignity and rights,” he told Al Jazeera.

Yassine Elachiri, a member of the National Bureau of PJD Youth and the party’s National Council, said the relationship with younger Moroccans had to be built over time rather than during campaigns.

“Earning the trust of a new generation of young people cannot be reduced to electoral mobilisation or short-term campaigns in the run-up to voting day,” he said. “Rather, it is a cumulative process built on sustained engagement, guidance, training and creating opportunities for young people to participate actively in public affairs.”

“Our goal is not simply to reach young people at the moment of an election, but to build a lasting relationship with them based on trust, training and active participation,” Elachiri said.

这个具有伊斯兰背景的政党在2021年垮台后，正在阿卜杜拉·本·基兰的领导下重建。它能重新赢得信任吗？

阿卜杜拉·本·基兰曾于 2012 年至 2017 年担任摩洛哥政府首脑，如今领导正义与发展党 (PJD) 力图从 2021 年的选举失败中恢复过来。[半岛电视台]

摩洛哥正义与发展党（PJD）曾是该国 2011 年后改革的主要政治受益者长达十年之久，但在 2021 年的选举中遭遇惨败。

该党在2011年11月的议会选举中赢得了395个席位中的107个。此前，当年爆发的抗议活动呼吁进行政治改革，加强问责制，并建立一个更能回应民众诉求的政府。该党领导人阿卜杜拉·本·基兰出任政府首脑。

摩洛哥2011年的宪法修正案扩大了议会和政府的正式权力，同时保留了君主制的重大权力。国王从众议院得票最多的政党中任命政府首脑，同时他主持内阁会议，该会议负责审议国家政策的战略方向。

在2016年的选举中，正义与发展党（PJD）的席位增至125席，但本·基兰却数月未能组建执政联盟。2017年3月，穆罕默德六世国王结束了他的任期，并任命萨阿德丁·奥斯曼尼接任。正义与发展党继续执政，直到四年后选举失败。

在 2021 年 9 月的选举中，该党席位从 125 个锐减至仅 13 个，失去了 112 个席位。独立人士全国联盟 (RNI) 赢得了 102 个席位，成为最大党。

本基拉内对球队的复出有多大贡献？

本基拉内的回归引发了另一个问题：PJD的复出有多少是围绕他展开的？

半岛电视台最近的一项研究分析将本基兰描述为一个政治“品牌”，他漫长的公共生涯、媒体曝光度和直接的沟通风格，为他打造了一个可以作为政党选举资本的个人形象。

它探讨了他的知名度和个人魅力能否帮助正义党在 2021 年倒闭后重建。

本·基兰仍然是摩洛哥最知名的政治人物之一。但他的回归本身并不能表明正义与发展党已经重建了其支持率。

该党在 2021 年失去了 112 个席位；它现在的任务是将领导人引起的关注转化为对党本身的支持。

正义与发展党的 2026 年计划包含 467 项措施，涵盖五大领域：身份与家庭；政治与体制改革；公共服务与社会保障；经济与就业；以及外交政策。

它呼吁提高公共采购的透明度，制定规则应对利益冲突和非法致富行为，并改善公共服务。它还强调了住房、社会保障、食品、水和能源主权的重要性。

其节目重点关注物价、就业、学校、医院和腐败等实际问题。

正义与发展党（PJD）正以公共服务、就业、购买力和政治改革为竞选纲领，力图在2021年选举惨败后重建。[Abdel Majid Bziouat/AFP]

38 岁的 Saad al-Sabahi 在卡萨布兰卡-塞塔特的 PJD 地区秘书处工作，他表示，该计划是通过研究、磋商会议和通过在线平台提交的提案制定的。

“这些承诺涵盖影响摩洛哥人民生活的各个领域，”他告诉半岛电视台，并指出政治参与、打击腐败、公共教育、医疗保健、就业和经济主权。

“这些承诺以及其他一些承诺构成了本党与选民之间协议的基础。我们将努力以诚信和能力履行和落实这些承诺，”萨巴希说。

2021年之后发生了哪些变化？

正义与发展党表示，2021 年的失败给该党带来的主要教训之一是，需要进行内部重组，并更加批判性地审视其执政多年的情况。

“在召开特别代表大会和例行代表大会，以及总书记阿卜杜拉·本·基兰接管领导权之后，该党成功克服了危机，”萨巴希说。“该党还通过沟通和组织架构的更新，重组了内部事务。”

该党对2021年败选的评估包括对其政治和组织选择的批评。它还指责一些未具名的人士破坏民主选择，并指出存在所谓的选举舞弊和虚假信息。

这些是正义与发展党对选举结果的解释，而非独立调查结果。但惨败的规模迫使该党正视其执政记录与部分昔日支持者之间的巨大鸿沟。

这一点对于年轻选民来说尤其重要。

37岁的伊曼·特拉菲（Imane Traifi）是正义与发展党青年团的成员，他表示，该党需要为年轻人创造持续参与政治生活的机会，而不是在竞选期间仅仅把他们当作选民。

她告诉半岛电视台：“我们热切希望确保年轻人从接受者转变为参与者、发起者和承担责任的人。”

鬼魂和鳄鱼

然而，对于未来的正义与发展党政府而言，不仅要考虑它会寻求改变什么，还要考虑一旦执政它能够改变什么。

本基兰多次提到“鬼魂和鳄鱼”，以此比喻在他执政期间阻碍政府的强大或隐秘的利益集团。

最明显的例子就是该党对以色列的立场。

正义与发展党（PJD）一直反对摩洛哥与以色列关系正常化，并持续支持巴勒斯坦事业。该党2026年纲领明确呼吁反对关系正常化。然而，在正义与发展党执政、萨阿德丁·奥斯曼尼担任政府首脑期间，摩洛哥于2020年恢复了与以色列的外交关系。

正义与发展党（PJD）反对这一举动，而奥斯曼尼后来辩称这是国家决定，并表示摩洛哥对巴勒斯坦事业的支持没有改变。该协议于2020年12月达成，是美国斡旋的一项协议的一部分，该协议包括华盛顿承认摩洛哥对西撒哈拉的主权。

六年过去了，两国关系更进一步。9月16日，摩洛哥和以色列同意将两国外交使团提升为大使馆级别并互派大使，同时扩大航空旅行，推进经贸协定的签署。

第二天，正义与发展党重申了其反对与以色列实现关系正常化与合作的立场，并称其立场由来已久。

但这也给该党的回归留下了一个问题：如果当时有如此强大的力量能够制约政府，那么现在又发生了什么变化呢？

正义与发展党是否对政府权力的界限有了不同的理解，还是会再次发现自己被“幽灵和鳄鱼”所困扰？

政府权力的局限性

正义与发展党已多次明确表示，它所寻求的变革来自摩洛哥现有的政治和宪政体制内部，而不是对君主制本身的挑战。

本基兰多次重申他对君主制的支持，同时认为民选机构应该在治理和改善国家方面发挥作用。

这一区别对于理解正义与发展党（PJD）的回归至关重要。该党一方面反对与以色列关系正常化等政策，另一方面又接受君主制在国家战略决策中保持核心地位的宪政和政治框架。

根据宪法规定，国王担任部长会议主席，部长会议负责考虑国家政策的战略方向。

这不仅适用于以色列，也适用于其他一些重大政策决定仍然与君主制密切相关的地区。

对于正义与发展党（PJD）而言，重建不仅仅意味着夺回2021年失去的席位，更意味着展现其从十年执政中学到的东西，能够取得的成就，以及如何避免垮台带来的政治代价。

萨巴希表示，该党希望重新获得他所说的公民先前享有的成果。

“我们将努力恢复公民先前享有的权益，恢复他们的尊严和权利，”他告诉半岛电视台。

正义与发展党青年团全国委员会和全国委员会成员亚辛·埃拉奇里表示，与摩洛哥年轻人的关系必须随着时间的推移而建立，而不是在竞选活动中建立。

他说：“赢得新一代年轻人的信任不能仅仅依靠选举动员或投票日前的短期竞选活动。相反，这是一个循序渐进的过程，需要持续的参与、指导、培训，并为年轻人创造积极参与公共事务的机会。”

“我们的目标不仅仅是在选举之际接触年轻人，而是要与他们建立基于信任、培训和积极参与的持久关系，”埃拉奇里说。