Spending, troops and Asia: three ideas for Europe to stabilize NATO

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s Feb. 12 remarks to the Ukraine Defense Contact Group shook many Europeans into believing that America’s commitment to the alliance is wavering dangerously.

While Hegseth stressed that the United States remains committed to NATO – “full stop” – three points that he emphasized created greater doubts. The ball is now in Europe’s court to address those three points with initiatives at the NATO summit, to be held in the Hague this June.

If Europe responds positively, it can place NATO on a new healthy footing.

First, Hegseth reinforced President Trump’s demand that Europeans spend 5% of GDP on defense. A “Strategic Responsibility Initiative” at the Summit should address this demand. While stronger military capabilities are the important outcome, politically this percentage has become a visible measure of whether Europe is sharing enough of NATO’s burden.

NATO Europe in the aggregate now meets NATO’s benchmark floor of 2% spending, although important outliers like Italy and Spain are not yet there.

By comparison, the U.S. spends just under 3.5%. Reaching 5% for Europe could be a useful long term goal, which might allow Europe to defend itself without much U.S. assistance. But transitioning to that capability will take considerable time. Europe is nowhere near ready to defend itself.

A feasible goal for this Strategic Responsibility Initiative might be a European pledge to match in the aggregate the percentage of GDP that America spends on defense by the end of the decade.

Spending at the 3.5% level, which NATO’s leadership supports, would allow Europe to implement Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s new defense plan for Europe. Accomplishing that by the end of the decade would also address Russia’s expected military reconstitution after the Ukraine war ends.

The Strategic Responsibility Initiative could also begin to address Trump’s 5% demand by focusing on the most vulnerable front-line states. Trump has previously said he might not agree to defend nations who do not spend enough on their own defense.

The three Baltic states plus Poland are the most vulnerable NATO countries to Russian aggression. Together these four states might take the 5% pledge at the Hague summit. Poland is nearly there. Lithuania has pledged to spend 5% soon.

Latvia and Estonia are not far behind and should be encouraged to make such a joint pledge, together setting a good example to the rest of Europe.

Second, Hegseth said robust security guarantees underpinned by capable peacekeeping forces are needed for Ukraine. But he made clear that they should not be provided under NATO auspices or by the United States.

While he subsequently walked back a statement that Ukrainian membership in NATO was not a realistic outcome of negotiations, President Trump has also indicated that the U.S. was unlikely to support Ukrainian membership anytime soon.

Trump unfortunately seems determined to honor Putin’s veto on NATO membership for Ukraine.

Several major European states have taken up the challenge. A second NATO summit initiative should be built around security guarantees for Ukraine. This might take the form of a coalition of the willing. But a much more effective mechanism would be a robust EU-led peacekeeping force, augmented by other key nations.

The EU has its own military command and experience in over 40 small overseas operations. This would be the EU’s largest mission, but it would demonstrate Europe’s willingness to defend its own interests.

With such a deployment, the EU should also set aside complicated hurdles and rapidly embrace Ukrainian membership. That way the EU Article 42(7) mutual defense clause would extend to Ukraine, a linkage Russia would have to take seriously. Once this mechanism is in place, the U.S. should be encouraged to participate.

Third, Hegseth stressed that the Trump administration would prioritize deterring war with China. Given China’s aggressive military behavior in Asia and its rapid military modernization, deterring this peer competitor is not an unreasonable goal for the United States. But it need not come at the expense of instability and possible military miscalculation in Europe.

A third Hague Summit package – a NATO “Asian Partnership Initiative” – could make it clear to the Trump administration that NATO has a useful role in helping the United States deter Chinese aggression. Once this is recognized, the U.S. should be encouraged to retain a strong NATO alliance.

The 2024 NATO summit in Washington took several steps in this direction. It declared China a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war on Ukraine. It called China a systemic challenge to the Euro-Atlantic area. And it called the Into-Pacific region “important” to NATO’s security.

At The Hague, NATO needs to create specific actions to demonstrate NATO’s willingness to deal with an aggressive China, short of an Article 5 commitment. It might declare that the Into-Pacific region is “vital” to NATO’s security. It might create a formal NATO-Indo-Pacific Council linking America’s European and Asian allies, with ongoing consultations at the political and military level.

A new “coercion against one is coercion against all” standard could underpin the new Council. It might make clear that a Chinese military attack on Taiwan would have catastrophic global consequences for China.

NATO might establish new intelligence sharing mechanisms with Asian partners. It might create liaison offices in Brussels, Tokyo, Seoul and Canberra. It might create a NATO Center of Excellence in Asia on economic security challenges. It might establish formal NATO freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea.

While Hegseth’s remarks seemed at first to destabilize the Alliance, if Europe responds positively along the lines of the three summit initiatives discussed above, the net result could be a new and more stable Alliance.

The outcome is now in Europe’s hands.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served as NSC senior director for defense policy, director of NDU’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, and acting director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff.

Daniel S. Hamilton is senior non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution and senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins SAIS. He served as deputy assistant secretary of State for Europe and associate director of the policy planning staff for two U.S. secretaries of State.

美国国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯 2 月 12 日在乌克兰防务联络小组发表的讲话，让许多欧洲人感到不安，他们认为美国对联盟的承诺正在危险地动摇。

尽管赫格塞斯强调美国仍然坚定地致力于北约——“毋庸置疑”——但他强调的三点却引发了更大的疑虑。现在，球在了欧洲这边，他们需要在今年六月于海牙举行的北约峰会上提出相关倡议，以解决这三点问题。

如果欧洲做出积极回应，就能使北约走上新的健康发展道路。

首先，赫格塞斯重申了特朗普总统的要求，即欧洲国家应将国内生产总值的5%用于国防开支。峰会上的“战略责任倡议”应着重解决这一要求。虽然增强军事能力是重要的最终成果，但在政治上，这一比例已成为衡量欧洲是否承担了足够北约责任的重要指标。

北约欧洲成员国的总支出目前已达到北约2%的基准最低水平，但意大利和西班牙等重要国家尚未达到这一水平。

相比之下，美国的国防开支略低于3.5%。欧洲若能将国防开支提高到5%，或许是一个有益的长期目标，这将使欧洲能够在无需美国过多援助的情况下保卫自身。但要达到这种能力需要相当长的时间。欧洲目前距离具备自卫能力还很遥远。

这项战略责任倡议的一个可行目标可能是，欧洲各国承诺到本十年末，其国防开支占GDP的比重要与美国国防开支占GDP的比重持平。

北约领导层支持的3.5%的国防开支水平，将使欧洲能够实施欧洲盟军最高司令制定的欧洲新防御计划。如果在本十年末之前实现这一目标，也将有助于应对乌克兰战争结束后俄罗斯预期的军事重组。

战略责任倡议也可以着手解决特朗普提出的5%国防开支要求，重点关注最脆弱的前线国家。特朗普此前曾表示，他可能不会同意为那些国防开支不足的国家提供国防援助。

波罗的海三国加上波兰是北约成员国中最易受俄罗斯侵略的国家。这四个国家或许会在海牙峰会上共同做出5%的国防开支承诺。波兰已接近达成目标，立陶宛也承诺很快将达到这一目标。

拉脱维亚和爱沙尼亚也不甘落后，应该鼓励它们做出这样的联合承诺，共同为欧洲其他国家树立榜样。

其次，赫格塞斯表示，乌克兰需要强有力的安全保障，并以能力卓越的维和部队为支撑。但他明确指出，这些保障不应由北约或美国提供。

尽管特朗普总统后来收回了乌克兰加入北约并非谈判的现实结果的说法，但他同时也表示，美国不太可能很快支持乌克兰加入北约。

令人遗憾的是，特朗普似乎决心尊重普京对乌克兰加入北约的否决权。

几个欧洲主要国家已经接受了这一挑战。第二次北约峰会倡议应围绕保障乌克兰安全展开。这或许可以采取“自愿联盟”的形式。但更有效的机制是由欧盟领导、其他主要国家增援的强有力的维和部队。

欧盟拥有自己的军事指挥机构，并在40多项小型海外行动中积累了丰富的经验。这将是欧盟迄今为止规模最大的军事行动，但它将展现欧洲捍卫自身利益的决心。

通过这样的部署，欧盟也应该扫清重重障碍，迅速接纳乌克兰加入欧盟。这样一来，欧盟《条约》第42条第7款规定的共同防御条款将延伸至乌克兰，俄罗斯将不得不认真对待这一关联。一旦这一机制建立起来，就应该鼓励美国参与其中。

第三，赫格塞斯强调，特朗普政府将优先考虑遏制与中国的战争。鉴于中国在亚洲咄咄逼人的军事行为及其快速的军事现代化，遏制这一势均力敌的竞争对手对美国而言并非不合理的目标。但这不应以欧洲的不稳定和可能的军事误判为代价。

第三轮海牙峰会方案——北约“亚洲伙伴关系倡议”——或许能让特朗普政府清楚地认识到，北约在帮助美国遏制中国侵略方面发挥着重要作用。一旦这一点得到认可，美国就应该更有动力维持强大的北约联盟。

2024年华盛顿北约峰会朝着这个方向迈出了几步。峰会宣称中国是俄罗斯入侵乌克兰战争的“决定性推动者”，称中国对欧洲-大西洋地区构成系统性挑战，并称太平洋地区对北约安全“至关重要”。

在海牙，北约需要采取具体行动，以表明其应对咄咄逼人的中国的意愿，而无需履行第五条规定的义务。北约可以宣布印太地区对北约安全“至关重要”。北约还可以建立一个正式的北约-印太理事会，将美国的欧洲和亚洲盟友联系起来，并在政治和军事层面持续开展磋商。

“对一方施压即是对所有人施压”的新标准可能成为新安理会的基石。它或许能够明确表明，中国对台湾的军事攻击将给中国带来灾难性的全球后果。

北约可能会与亚洲伙伴建立新的情报共享机制。它可能会分别在布鲁塞尔、东京、首尔和堪培拉设立联络处。它可能会设立一个北约亚洲经济安全挑战卓越中心。它可能会在中国南海举行正式的北约航行自由演习。

虽然赫格塞斯的言论起初似乎会破坏联盟的稳定，但如果欧洲能够按照上述三项峰会倡议做出积极回应，最终结果可能会是一个全新的、更加稳定的联盟。

现在结果掌握在欧洲手中。

汉斯·宾内迪克是大西洋理事会的杰出研究员。他曾担任国家安全委员会国防政策高级主任、国防大学国家战略研究所所长以及国务院政策规划司代理司长。

丹尼尔·S·汉密尔顿是布鲁金斯学会高级非常驻研究员和约翰·霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院外交政策研究所高级研究员。他曾担任美国国务院负责欧洲事务的副助理国务卿，并曾担任两任美国国务卿的政策规划办公室副主任。