The Russian Military Campaign Against Europe: Current Objectives and Efforts

Russia is operating within a war framework against Europe while Europe continues to function within a peace framework. It does not follow that a full-scale war between Russia and NATO is inevitable, let alone imminent. NATO and European states must recognize the framework the Kremlin is using in order to enable European states to make appropriate, calm, but determined efforts to deter Russian escalation and avoid full-scale war. It is difficult to strike the necessary balance between openly acknowledging Russia’s war framework and hyperbole or alarmism. European leaders have — with some exceptions — gone too far in obfuscating the reality of the Russian approach, however, to the detriment of Europe’s ability to develop coherent and sensible policy responses. This report does not aim to stoke war fever in Europe, still less to encourage European states to seek conflict with Russia. It instead aims to present the suite of Russian actions in Europe within the framework ISW assesses that the Kremlin is using. Europe can develop and execute policy responses to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian escalation and war. Europe can only do so, however, if it recognizes the coherence binding Russian actions together and speaks frankly but deliberately about the challenge it faces.

NATO and European states must orient their policy planning on the coherence of the Kremlin’s kinetic and informational campaigns against Europe and the objectives of these campaigns, instead of seeing a disconnected series of various sorts of Russian kinetic and cognitive actions. The Kremlin is conducting several mutually supporting campaigns against Europe in order to support its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and advance its longstanding grand strategic objectives of breaking NATO and reestablishing dominant influence over former Soviet states. Each of the Kremlin’s individual lines of effort — such as airspace incursions or sabotage against European industrial base facilities — supports several Kremlin campaigns. NATO and European states must understand the overall objectives of Russia’s campaigns in order to understand the context of individual Russian actions and develop and execute appropriate responses. This report presents an initial assessment of the objectives of Russia’s military campaign against Europe and their constituent lines of effort, expanding on ISW’s September 16 report “The Russian Military Campaign Against Europe: Defining the Threat.”[1] ISW will assess each of Russia’s campaigns against Europe in forthcoming reports building on this report.

Russian Grand Strategic Objectives Toward Europe

The Kremlin has long considered itself to be in a protracted conflict with the West and is waging this conflict in support of several longstanding grand strategic aims, which have remained largely the same throughout Putin’s rule. [2] The Kremlin is conducting its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its ongoing kinetic campaigns against Europe to advance these grand strategic objectives. The Kremlin’s individual campaigns against Ukraine and NATO do not each nest one-to-one under the Kremlin’s grand strategic objectives, but understanding the long-term end state Putin is working towards is essential to properly assessing the Kremlin’s campaigns against Europe and planning proper policy responses to them.

ISW assesses that the Kremlin has four primary strategic objectives:

Reestablish Russia as a great power, which requires subjugating Ukraine and Belarus: For all the Kremlin’s varied justifications for its invasion of Ukraine and soft annexation of Belarus, the Kremlin rejects the reality that Belarus and Ukraine are legitimate states and independent peoples, and its efforts proceed from the conviction that Russia will not be whole until Ukraine and Belarus are brought back under Moscow’s control.[3] Putin’s worldview contains a circular argument — Russia cannot be a great power without control of its “ancestral” lands in Belarus and Ukraine; Russia is a great power, so it has the right to control Belarus and Ukraine. The Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine is fundamentally an imperial project. Putin has made his war with Ukraine an existential issue for his regime’s survival and Russia’s place in the world, and he regards Russia’s status as a superpower and his regime’s survival as inextricably linked. Many of the Kremlin’s ongoing campaigns against Europe directly support its war in Ukraine as well as the pursuit of its larger objectives, as discussed below, and thus support achieving this objective.

Regain dominant influence over the former Soviet states, specifically including the Baltics and Moldova: Putin desires dominant influence over the former Soviet states. His aims go beyond suzerainty — the control of the foreign affairs of a vassal state while allowing it sovereign internal authority — and into direct influence over aspects of the internal policies of post-Soviet states, which the Kremlin views as rightful parts of its sphere of influence.[4] The Kremlin does not inherently seek to regain full, sovereign control over every former constituent entity of the Soviet Union or former Warsaw Pact member states. The Kremlin rather intends to establish the norm that these states have only truncated sovereignty and should at most be “neutral,” by which the Kremlin means that they cannot join alliances such as NATO or economic blocs such as the EU; and that Russia has a special right to protect “Russian speakers” (a nebulous, Kremlin-defined category not recognized under international law) using military force.[5] The Kremlin is therefore working to divide NATO and the EU. It specifically aims to separate the Baltic States and Poland from the rest of Europe to strip them of the protections and benefits of NATO and EU membership.

Establish a world order in which US influence is diminished, NATO’s unity is broken, and Russia has decisive influence: The Kremlin desires to create a multipolar world order in which it is one of a few key poles, crucially by diminishing US influence and ensuring that NATO and the EU — which collectively vastly overmatch Russia’s economic and military potential — cannot act as unified blocs. The Kremlin is therefore striving to ensure that the United States largely withdraws from Europe; to break NATO as a cohesive alliance; to end Russia’s partial diplomatic and economic isolation; and to establish the norm that Russia must at minimum be consulted on all major geopolitical issues around the world.[6]

Preserve Putin’s regime: Putin is an autocrat, and his paramount strategic objective is his own personal survival — and by extension, the survival of his regime. Putin relies on a complex series of narratives to justify his continued rule and to deflect criticism of Russia’s problems onto the West by claiming that the West is waging a coherent, aggressive campaign to keep Russia down, and to argue that Putin himself is the only man who can lead Russia in this conflict.[7] Putin and many senior Russian political and military officials additionally genuinely believe their own narratives that the West is actively plotting a “color revolution” in Russia and that NATO could conduct a preemptive war against Russia, and therefore the Kremlin must break NATO as an Alliance.[8] This report is in no way intended to support this Kremlin framing or even to treat it as understandable, but it is important for European policymakers to keep in mind Putin’s decision making framework based on a deeply flawed view of history and current reality.

Russian Objectives Against Europe and Current Lines of Effort

The Kremlin is conducting a series of coordinated, mutually supporting kinetic and cognitive campaigns against Europe in pursuit of its strategic objectives. ISW assesses that the Kremlin is conducting a series of overlapping campaigns to achieve at least two overarching strategic objectives in the Ukrainian and European theaters:

Reduce or eliminate European military and diplomatic support for Ukraine to enable the Kremlin to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine; and

Neutralize NATO as a unified alliance capable of opposing Russia to regain dominant influence over the post-Soviet space and establish a multipolar world order.

The Kremlin is conducting numerous lines of effort in support of these campaigns. Many Russian lines of effort support multiple objectives — the Kremlin’s campaign to sabotage Polish railways is intended to interdict Western aid to Ukraine as well as to raise the threshold of what NATO considers “normal” Russian kinetic actions, for example, and this report discusses some Russian lines of effort in the context of multiple Russian objectives. This report presents ISW’s assessment of the Kremlin’s objectives vis-à-vis Europe and surveys the Kremlin’s lines of effort in support of these objectives, which ISW’s recently launched Defense of Europe Project will assess in greater detail in forthcoming reports.

Reduce or eliminate European military and diplomatic support for Ukraine

The Kremlin’s theory of victory in Ukraine is dependent on Russia outlasting Western support for Ukraine, which the Kremlin correctly assesses is essential to enable Ukraine to militarily defeat Russia’s full-scale invasion and achieve an end to the war acceptable for Kyiv and its supporters.[9] The Kremlin seeks to reduce or eliminate European support for Ukraine by physically impeding Europe’s means and ability to provide those means to Ukraine and to coerce European states into halting their support for Ukraine with cognitive effects.

The Kremlin is conducting a campaign of sabotage efforts, primarily arson attacks, targeting European defense factories and warehouses to degrade the ability of European defense companies and governments to produce aid and transport it to Ukraine. Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal announced on August 18, for example, that Estonian investigators were examining a possible Russian-linked arson attack on August 14 against Estonian defense technology company Milrem Robotics, which provides drones to Ukraine’s Armed Forces.[10] Lithuanian authorities arrested six suspects in January 2026 linked to Russia’s Main Directorate (GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service) for a September 17, 2024, arson attack against a facility operated by Lithuanian defense company TVC Solutions, which produces signals intelligence systems for Ukraine’s Armed Forces.[11] Russian intelligence services predominantly execute these actions by recruiting disposable proxies through online platforms and local criminal networks, rather than through direct action by Russian personnel. Russian handlers often target financially vulnerable individuals, low-level local criminals, Ukrainian refugees, or local youths looking for a quick way to make money.[12] Russian intelligence services use these disposable proxies to achieve effects at low risk to Russian personnel, to maintain the pretense of plausible deniability, and as an adaptation to Europe’s previous mass expulsions of Russian intelligence agents operating under diplomatic cover.[13] Russian-instigated arson attacks and other sabotage efforts provide the Kremlin a low-cost method of disrupting the production and transport of Western aid to Ukraine (particularly drones) and are functionally tactical activities that are part of a larger disruption campaign. These attacks additionally force European companies to spend more time and effort protecting their facilities.

The Kremlin is taking advantage of the fact that European states are treating these activities as primarily law enforcement problems. Europe’s lengthy timelines for investigating, prosecuting, and attributing individual actions to the Kremlin additionally increase the difficulty of designing and executing effective European responses. European states must of course uphold the rule of law and provide due process to individuals accused of crimes, but they must also develop coherent mechanisms for assessing these activities in a timely fashion as part of the concerted Russian campaign to disrupt European defense industrial support to Ukraine and design appropriate countermeasures.

Kremlin-linked agents are also conducting higher profile efforts to disrupt Europe’s defense industrial base, such as drone attacks, attempts to plant explosives on civilian aircraft, and plots to assassinate European defense industry executives — all predominantly tied to European support for Ukraine. The August 5 drone attack against a Ukrainian cargo plane at Germany’s Leipzig/Halle airport was intended to directly target a nexus of European aid to Ukraine.[14] Russian-linked operators previously attempted to smuggle incendiary devices onto US and Canadian cargo and passenger planes in Europe in July 2024, which caused fires at logistics hubs in Poland, the UK, and Germany, including at Leipzig/Halle airport.[15] Both the July 2024 and August 2026 incidents showcase Russia’s willingness to target the civilian aviation network in ways that risk civilian casualties. European intelligence agencies and European defense companies have warned of repeated Russian-linked efforts to assassinate executives of European defense companies that produce material supplied to Ukraine. The most notable of these was the US intelligence community’s disclosure of a 2024 plot by Russian intelligence agencies to assassinate the CEO of German defense company Rheinmetall, Armin Papperger.[16] None of Russia’s higher profile attacks or assassination attempts have fully succeeded to date, but the Kremlin is clearly willing to take actions that — if they achieved their intended effects — would result in civilian casualties in a NATO member state. NATO member states are generally downplaying these Russian actions because they have not fully succeeded, but NATO must not wait for a large-scale Russian sabotage or assassination attempt to succeed, potentially with civilian casualties, before it formulates and executes a response. NATO officials, including Secretary General Mark Rutte, have said that NATO has, in fact, responded, but covertly.[17] NATO’s covert responses so far have apparently been insufficient to deter continued Russian escalation in attacks of these kinds.

The Kremlin has extended its military strike campaign from Ukraine to other operational theaters in Europe in three coordinated military campaigns that aim to interdict aid and to preclude Ukraine’s use of drone routes near Baltic airspace. These three military campaigns target the airspace and territory of NATO member states and Moldova but are primarily planned and conducted as elements and, in some cases, extensions of the Russian military’s strike campaign against Ukraine (and efforts to defend against Ukrainian strikes), unlike the other Russian campaigns discussed in this report.

First, the Kremlin’s campaign of strikes on the Polish/Ukrainian border and sabotage efforts against Polish railways are coordinated elements of the Russian military’s campaign to interdict Western aid to Ukraine. The Kremlin has sought to interdict Western aid to Ukraine within Ukraine since 2022 and is increasingly expanding this campaign beyond Ukraine itself. Russian-directed networks have repeatedly targeted key Polish rail networks that transport Western military deliveries to Ukraine. Russian-linked actors most notably targeted Polish train tracks along the Dorohusk Poland-Ukraine crossing using explosives and physical barriers on November 15, 2025.[18] Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated that the targeted rail line is crucially important for delivering aid to Ukraine and called the attack an unprecedented act of sabotage aimed at the security of the Polish state and its citizens.[19] Russia has increasingly hit Ukrainian border crossings and targets along the Ukrainian-Polish border with drone strikes in September 2026.[20] Russia conducted a drone strike against a passenger train in Volyn Oblast, Ukraine, two kilometers from the Polish border on September 13, 2026, likely intending to injure or kill European officials who were crossing the border at the same time in another train.[21] All three of these lines of effort — sabotage against Polish railways; strikes on the Ukrainian/Polish border; and the Kremlin’s willingness to injure or kill Western officials entering or leaving Ukraine, or at minimum intimidate them into reducing their travel to Ukraine — are part of the Kremlin’s campaign to interdict Ukraine’s ground lines of communication with Europe.

Second, the Russian military is conducting a coordinated campaign of strikes against Ukraine’s borders with Romania and Moldova. Russia has increasingly targeted Ukrainian-Moldovan border infrastructure along key import and export routes since August 2026, likely in an effort to isolate Ukraine from Europe and to deter Romania and Moldova from supporting Ukraine.[22] Russian forces struck crossings along the Moldova-Odesa Oblast border three times from August 20 to August 25.[23] ISW assesses that the Kremlin has at minimum accepted the risk that drones and other munitions used in these strikes would enter NATO airspace and potentially injure or kill NATO civilians, and some of these incidents are almost certainly intentional to advance the wider objectives of Russian aerial incursions discussed below. A Russian military drone most notably entered Romanian airspace on May 29 and crashed into an apartment building in Galati, Romania, injuring two civilians.[24] Russia has repeatedly struck targets in Ukraine near the Moldovan border and has risked Moldovan civilian casualties, including on July 13 when a Russian military drone armed with 40 kilograms of explosives violated Moldovan airspace.[25] These strikes increase regional political and commercial risks and are intended to deter Romania and Moldova from supporting Ukraine.

Third, the Kremlin is conducting a campaign of airspace violations against the Baltic states and Finland as part of its effort to reduce the impact of Ukrainian strikes against targets in Russia. The Kremlin assesses that the Baltic states are at minimum facilitating Ukraine’s campaign of strikes against targets in Russia, particularly around St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast. The Kremlin is taking advantage of Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russia to redirect Ukrainian drones into Baltic and Finnish airspace with electronic warfare (EW). More than a dozen Ukrainian drones have entered Baltic or Finnish airspace since March 2026 due to Russian EW.[26] These Russian efforts to redirect Ukrainian drones result in airspace violations that advance Russia’s Europe-focused objectives discussed below, but they are also a direct component of Russian air defense efforts. The Kremlin seeks to coerce Baltic and Scandinavian states into forcing restrictions on Ukrainian strikes in order to mitigate the risk of Ukrainian drones entering NATO airspace — or to coerce Ukraine to do so itself in order to avoid angering its partners. The Baltic states and Finland are maintaining strong responses to these instances, however, correctly blaming them on Russia and declining to overtly criticize Ukraine, but the Kremlin seeks to create further tensions.[27]

The Kremlin is conducting a cognitive campaign to convince the West that Russian victory against Ukraine is inevitable and that the United States and Europe should force Ukraine to accept a Kremlin favorable settlement and re-normalize relations with Russia on the Kremlin’s terms, a series of false narratives that ISW has repeatedly documented and debunked.[28] The Kremlin conducts many of its kinetic actions to support informational objectives, and individual Russian kinetic attacks should be understood in the context of the information campaigns they support, rather than as scattered individual events. The Kremlin seeks to coerce European states to reduce aid to Ukraine by achieving three effects: fix European air defenses in place; encourage the existing tendency for Western states to reserve equipment and capabilities for a future war with Russia instead of providing it to Ukraine immediately; and facilitate Russia-amenable European actors who claim that Europe, and European aid to Ukraine, is provoking Russia. These Russian cognitive campaigns pose a particular challenge, as NATO states must walk a fine line — Russian airspace violations do impose a requirement for more robust air defenses in the Baltic States, Poland, and Romania, for example, and NATO states must think about their own capabilities — but the Kremlin is successfully keeping the amount of aid European states provide Ukraine far below what Europe could comfortably provide.

Ukraine desperately needs additional air defenses and munitions stockpiles, particularly prior to what will be a challenging Russian strike campaign in Winter 2026-2027, and the Kremlin seeks to functionally achieve the military effects of fixing these European capabilities in place through a low-cost series of airspace incursions in European states. Russian drone incursions into NATO airspaces (and Russian efforts to redirect Ukrainian drones into NATO airspace using electronic warfare) are in part intended to put the governments and populations of frontline NATO states on edge and spur them to withhold air defenses and munitions. Airspace incursions have already imposed costs on Baltic states and have been effective in shaping frontline states’ priorities. Lithuanian Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas confirmed that Lithuania is prioritizing air defense procurement in an interview on September 20, 2026, five days after a NATO fighter jet shot down a drone in Lithuanian territory.[29] The Kremlin is successfully imposing a conundrum on NATO, as frontline states do need to prioritize their own air defenses in response to Russian aerial incursions while NATO as a whole continues to support Ukraine. The Baltic States are meeting this challenge admirably, however, and no Baltic official has stated they need to retain systems for their own use at the expense of Ukraine. The Polish response to this Russian effort has been particularly prudent — Polish leaders have repeatedly noted that strengthening Ukrainian air and missile defense is the best way to protect Poland, even as the Polish military has raised its air defense alert status and lowered its threshold for scrambling air defense aircraft.[30]

Russia’s campaign of threats to Europe, both kinetic and informational, is also intended to coerce the United States and non-frontline NATO states into withholding capabilities from Ukraine in order to reserve them for a potential NATO war with Russia. This Russian campaign has unfortunately achieved substantial successes delaying Western aid to Ukraine since 2022, as ISW has documented.[31] The United States and NATO justified withholding crucial aid to Ukraine for long stretches of the war by arguing that NATO needed to retain that equipment to fight a potential war with Russia — ignoring the reality that Ukraine is actively fighting a war with Russia, and that the best way to limit the Russian military threat to Europe is to enable Ukraine to defeat the Russian military now. This Russian campaign continues to have effects in 2026. Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitar Stoyanov announced in early June 2026 that Bulgaria will stop donating weapons to Ukraine from its military stockpiles, citing in part concerns about the Bulgarian Armed Forces’ own inventory.[32] The global shortage of US-supplied air defense interceptors and other munitions is also having compounding effects that the Kremlin is exploiting, as many European states are prioritizing withholding increasingly scarce interceptors for their own use.[33] German Brigadier General Jurgen Schrodl, Deputy Chief of Staff Strategic Plans and Policy in the Supreme Allied Command Transformation, stated at a July 9 panel hosted by the German Atlantic Society that Germany is “really reaching our limits here” in terms of providing Ukraine more of Germany’s stockpile of Patriot interceptors and must also ensure its own protection.[34]

Finally, the Kremlin’s kinetic actions and narratives support a cognitive campaign to intimidate European states by showing them that they are under threat (such as from drone incursions) due to their support for Ukraine, and that the threat will end if they stop supporting Ukraine. The Kremlin relies on Russia-amenable or overtly pro-Russian parties in Europe to espouse and magnify these messages. The governments of the Baltic States and Poland have correctly unified around the framing that drone incursions, even by Ukrainian drones under the effect of Russian electronic warfare (EW), are consequences of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and that the quickest way to halt these threats is for Putin to end his war.[35] Russia’s actions have supported the narrative in some European states, however, that European states are under threat due to their support for Ukraine, and that the quickest way to end the threat is to coerce Ukraine to accept Moscow’s terms. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico warned on September 17, 2026 that a drone could enter NATO territory and kill civilians and stated that he does not want Slovakia drawn into a war “because of some Article 5.”[36] Kremlin propagandists intentionally advance this narrative, such as when Russian Deputy Security Council Chairman Dmitry Medvedev amplified a Russian Ministry of Defense list of European factories and locations that produce drones for Ukraine and said on April 17, 2026, “when strikes ⁠become a reality depends on what comes next. Sleep well, European partners.”[37]

Russia’s incursions are also eroding public confidence in NATO’s ability to protect frontline populations. A POLITICO poll from December 2025 found that more French and German respondents wanted their governments to decrease rather than increase aid to Ukraine.[38] Respondents listed domestic issues, fears that providing support to Ukraine risks provoking Russia, and concerns that providing aid to Ukraine negatively impacts domestic security as reasons to decrease support.[39] After a Russian drone struck an apartment building in Galati, Romania, on May 29, 2026, one resident told the BBC that “they told us we are protected by NATO, not to worry. But look where we are now!”[40] The vast majority of European governments remain committed to supporting Ukraine, but the Kremlin hopes that popular perceptions such as these will generate European apathy and enable the election of Russia-amenable parties — an explicit Russian line of effort discussed further below.

Neutralize NATO as a unified alliance capable of opposing Russia

The Kremlin seeks to divide and neutralize NATO, facilitate a US withdrawal from Europe, and fragment the European Union to grant itself a free hand in the post-Soviet space and create a global state of multipolarity. The Kremlin is setting conditions to potentially wage a future conventional war with one or more NATO member states, though ISW does not assess that the Kremlin has decided that a conventional war would be the best — or even necessarily a favorable — method to achieve its strategic objectives. The Kremlin’s calculus at this time differs from that in summer 2021, when Putin seemingly decided that invading and occupying Ukraine would more effectively achieve his objectives than his then-ongoing information and pressure campaigns against Ukraine.[41] The Kremlin seeks to achieve its objectives against NATO and Europe at low cost by fragmenting the Alliance without a substantial conventional escalation, as well as to set conditions for potential future limited or full-scale conventional aggression against NATO.

The Kremlin’s primary campaign against Europe is its efforts to ensure that NATO cannot promptly and cohesively respond to Russian actions and ideally to fragment NATO entirely by neutralizing Article 5. The Kremlin seeks to create differing perceptions of risk and urgency between NATO states (and within the political discourses of individual states) and to exacerbate policy divides through targeted information campaigns and carefully scoped kinetic actions. The Kremlin’s kinetic lines of effort, including airspace violations by drones; aggressive posturing by Russian military aircraft; sabotage and arson attacks; and information campaigns, mutually support this objective, and this report focuses on assessing the holistic intent of Russian actions rather than examining each type of Russian action in detail, which ISW will do in forthcoming reports.

The growing pace of Russian kinetic actions against Europe is intended to cause two cognitive effects: to raise NATO’s threshold of what actions are considered worthy of a response by individual states or NATO as a whole versus what constitutes “normal” Russian actions; and to inure NATO governments and populations to constant alerts to increase the likelihood that they do not respond to any individual Russian action seriously, potentially granting the Kremlin greater freedom to escalate without triggering a NATO response. European officials increasingly treat escalating Russian activity (such as airspace incursions, discussed further below) as normal while avoiding defining what would warrant a collective response. Finnish President Alexander Stubb, for example, explicitly characterized increased Russian attacks as the “new normal” in January 2025.[42] Lithuanian presidential advisor Deividas Matulionis stated on September 4 that NATO’s Article 5 threshold is difficult to predict.[43] German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated on July 15 that Europe is “not yet living in a state of war, but we are already not in peace.”[44] Unnamed NATO diplomats similarly told POLITICO in early September 2026 that the Alliance has no formal response plans for “sub-threshold” incidents and no consensus on whether a series of such attacks could justify invoking Article 5.[45] Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned on September 17 that Russia may attempt to exploit this ambiguity in order to show that Article 5 is more “theoretical than practical.”[46] NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said on September 22 that the alliance is being deliberately ambiguous to avoid greenlighting Russian actions below a certain threshold.[47] That argument makes sense, except that it has apparently left the Russians considerable latitude to push the Kremlin’s perception of NATO’s limits in a dangerous escalation pattern.

The Kremlin also intends to accustom NATO militaries and governments to a baseline level of Russian activity and airspace violations in an effort to create tactical surprise if or when the Kremlin conducts further escalations — such as direct drone strikes on NATO targets. The clearest historical comparison is Egypt’s actions in the leadup to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when it conducted regular military exercises near the Israeli border that initially prompted Israeli reactions but were gradually treated as routine –with the result that the Israeli military partially dismissed Egypt’s actual deployments to invade as just another exercise.[48] The Russian military is not conducting a rapid military buildup on NATO’s borders, to be clear, and this is an inexact analogy — but NATO must ensure that it does not relax into treating Russian drone incursions and aggressive flight paths by Russian military aircraft as routine and unimportant occurrences, either in terms of raising the threshold of what Russian action merits a NATO response (a fight the Kremlin has unfortunately already partially won) or in terms of reducing the urgency with which NATO states and populations respond to individual Russian actions.

The Kremlin’s kinetic actions and supporting information operations are also intended to exacerbate existing debates among NATO members on the nature of the Russian threat and necessary responses. Officials from several states, notably Poland, have begun to directly label Russian actions as part of a war with Europe, but most NATO state officials use euphemistic and unclear language to refer to Russian actions.[49] Lithuanian Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevičius stated on July 6, 2026, that “Russian aggression continues, we see various situations not only in Lithuania, we also see them in Germany, at the airport, drones, explosives.”[50] Latvian Defense Minister Raivis Melnis stated on July 29 that Latvia is “preparing our forces for both provocations and for defending the country,” explicitly bifurcating Russian actions into “provocations” and a conventional attack that would require defense activities.[51] UK Member of Parliament Graeme Downie stated on July 8 that the UK is in a “sustained confrontation” with Russia, describing it as a “prolonged campaign of hostile activity” rather than “a conventional shooting war.”[52] ISW will assess the implications of different European perceptions of the Russian threat and the language used to discuss it in a forthcoming report.

The Kremlin is conducting numerous lines of effort intended simply to disrupt European civilian life and to cause anxiety and unease in European populations. Russian electronic warfare activity consistently disrupts civil aviation and public transport and degrades mobile networks and GPS services across Poland and the Baltic states.[53] Russian and pro-Russian hackers consistently target European civilian infrastructure and public services. Various Russian-linked hacking groups attacked Polish heating and power plants in December 2025, conducted a cyber-attack against a Danish water utility in 2024, and attacked Norwegian government digital services in August 2026, for example.[54]

Increasingly frequent Russian actions are additionally designed to make NATO civilians and governments grow accustomed to regular alerts, in the hope that they will not respond to potential future Russian actions with sufficient urgency. Between September 1 and September 21, 2026, frontline NATO states have issued a substantial number of alerts related to potential airspace threats. For example, Poland issued emergency warnings to residents in eastern Poland on September 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, and 21; and Romania issued RO-alert (emergency alert) warnings on September 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, and 21 in response to air threats in Ukraine that approached or crossed into Romanian or Polish national airspace.[55] Romanian public broadcaster Radio Romania News published a report on August 17 stating that many residents of Tulcea county, Romania, where most RO-ALERT messages have been issued, have disabled the alerts and have told reporters that they no longer care about the warnings.[56]

The Kremlin is creating a conundrum for frontline governments, who must keep their civilians at the proper state of readiness to respond to Russian actions without (as frontline governments see it) overly alarming their populations and creating panic or unwanted economic shocks. Western analysts and policymakers must similarly ensure they treat the Russian threat with urgency but not scaremongering, and the Kremlin seeks to polarize perceptions of its own actions. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna warned in April 2026 that speculation about a Russian attack on the Baltics served Moscow’s goal of stoking fear.[57] It is a reductionist argument, however, to assert that discussing Russian attacks advances the Kremlin’s objectives, creating a circular logic that Europe should not frankly discuss the Russian threat out of fear of stoking fear. It is certainly true that the Kremlin seeks to provoke alarmist warnings of an imminent Russian invasion. The Kremlin also benefits, however, from European underreaction to the Kremlin’s ongoing campaigns, and particularly from the analysts and public officials who reject any discussion of ongoing Russian kinetic campaigns against Europe or warnings of the near-term Russian threat out of hand. The Finnish government is working hard to message the need for concern and preparation without panic: President Alexander Stubb told the Finnish public on September 18 to “prepare mentally” for the possibility of Russian drone incursions into Finland and increased “hybrid operations,” but also reminded the public in a separate statement on September 21 that Russia will “continue to intimidate and we just have to be… calm and collected.”[58] Finding a balance between these two poles will be incredibly challenging in the face of both Russian information operations and good faith policy disagreements, but it must be addressed.

The Kremlin seeks to create and exploit divisions over politically charged issues to cause crises in NATO governments. Many European leaders and parties are unfortunately already aligned with the Kremlin’s desired end state of NATO skepticism, such as Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, who said on September 17 that he does not want Slovakia drawn into a conflict “because of some Article 5” and stated on September 20 that the West’s “military rhetoric and the search for a pretext for a military conflict with Russia” represent Western attempts to distract from “basic challenges” like gas prices.[59] Debates over air defense responses to Russian and stray Ukrainian drones have also cost Baltic officials their positions: Latvian Defense Minister Andris Spruds resigned on May 10, 2026, after two drones struck an oil storage facility in Rezekne, Latvia; and Latvian Prime Minister Evika Silina resigned several days later due to political fallout.[60] Baltic states have also struggled to contain weaponized migration from Belarus throughout 2026, a campaign that supports Russian objectives by straining resources and testing burden-sharing among the affected frontline states.[61] Latvian Interior Minister Janis Dombrava asked Lithuania in late July 2026 to deploy roughly 100 border guards to Latvia’s border with Belarus.[62] Lithuania declined, citing insufficient capacity.[63] Lithuania has sent limited rotations of Lithuanian personnel to the Latvian border since July 1 and has argued that Latvia must first commit more of its own resources, including Latvian military personnel, to support its own border guard.[64]

The Kremlin additionally seeks to provide Russia-amenable European officials and political parties (such as the German political party the Alternative for Deutschland [AfD] or Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico) opportunities and arguments with which to criticize and impede NATO efforts to defend against Russia.[65] Kinetic Russian actions are primarily intended to support other objectives, to be sure, but secondarily provide Russia-amenable parties rhetorical ammunition to advance the Kremlin’s objectives. AfD party members have stated that Germany should reconsider its NATO membership, falsely asserted that Russia has already won the war in Ukraine, and advocated that Europe should stop supporting Ukraine and remove sanctions targeting Russia.[66] Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico stated on September 19 that a drone incursion could start a war between NATO and Russia and asserted that “certain war hawks within NATO are trying, any ⁠cost, to turn this war [in Ukraine] into a conflict between Russia and NATO.”[67] The Kremlin’s efforts to exacerbate political divisions have limits, however. French politician Marine Le Pen and members of her National Rally party are campaigning on drastically cutting aid to Ukraine, but Le Pen and her political partner Jordan Bardella released a formal statement on September 19 that “these debates [over aid to Ukraine] are legitimate” but “foreign pressure is not,” and asserted that “we will never tolerate a foreign power, in this case Russia, hoping to dictate our country’s policy directly or indirectly.”[68] Le Pen and Bardella reaffirmed French unity with allied European states “that have been the targets of hostile acts or stabilization campaigns,” even while disagreeing on the scale of aid to Ukraine.

Finally, the Kremlin is conducting information campaigns targeting European electoral processes that have long been documented.[69] The Kremlin is currently focusing on influencing the Latvian 2026 parliamentary elections, French 2027 presidential election, and Estonian 2027 parliamentary election, in addition to expending significant effort on the recent German regional elections.[70] Russian information operations have targeted the Latvian public in the run-up to the October 3, 2026 election by asserting that Latvian independence is illegitimate and stating that Latvia has failed since moving away from Russia.[71] French authorities have publicly disclosed information campaigns targeting specific French candidates and linked the efforts to Russia with a high degree of confidence.[72] The Kremlin’s efforts are intended to get Russia-favorable candidates elected, as well as simply to cast doubt on the efficacy of European democratic processes.

The Kremlin’s kinetic campaigns against Europe are also intended to set conditions for a potential conventional war with one or more NATO states. ISW does not currently assess that the Kremlin has explicitly decided that it is in its best interests to fight a conventional war with NATO, to be clear, but the Kremlin is undoubtedly setting conditions to do so in the future if it so chooses. Many of the Kremlin’s lines of effort discussed previously — namely its efforts to fragment NATO and sabotage attacks against defense industrial base targets — secondarily support preparations for a future conventional war, but the Kremlin is additionally conducting several lines of effort more directly intended to support a future war.

Kremlin-linked agents conduct regular land and air reconnaissance of sensitive European locations such as military bases or defense industrial base infrastructure. An Estonian court found dual Estonian and Russian citizen Nikita Kuzmin guilty of espionage on August 25, 2026, for collecting information on military and civilian objects in and around Narva, Estonia, on behalf of the GRU during an unspecified time period during and after 2024, for example.[73] Moldovan police announced that they detained an Azerbaijani citizen on September 8 for illegally collecting information on military facilities in Moldova on behalf of Russian intelligence services.[74] European authorities regularly report overflights by unidentified drones near military facilities and defense industrial base facilities, including an explosive laden drone that crashed near the German Bundeswehr’s Wunstorf Air Base on September 14; a drone that was identified near USA Naval Support Activity Naples’ Support Site on August 13; and at least two drones identified flying over a German Bundeswehr site in Mechernich on August 6.[75] European states have not publicly attributed all of these actions to Russian, but the pattern indicates that an actor — almost certainly Russia — is using drones to obtain information on European military and military support assets. These reconnaissance efforts set conditions for Russian strikes against these targets in a future conventional war and additionally support further near-term sabotage efforts.

The Kremlin’s ongoing campaigns of drone incursions and aggressive actions by Russian military aircraft and naval vessels near NATO airspace are intended to test NATO reactions and defenses, in addition to advancing the previously discussed objectives of dividing NATO policymaking.[76] The UK Ministry of Defense reported a 25 percent increase in Russian ship activity in UK territorial waters and the North Atlantic from January 1, 2026, to July 31, 2026, compared to the same period in 2025.[77] Russian drones violated Romanian airspace at least 23 times between January 1, 2026, and August 17, 2026, compared to only 18 violations between the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 and the end of 2025.[78] NATO Military Committee Chairman Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone stated on September 7 that NATO fighter jets scrambled approximately 700 times to intercept Russian aircraft from September 2024 to September 2026, almost once per day.[79] Every time NATO aircraft conduct an “alpha scramble,” NATO forces activate air defense radars, or conduct other military actions, the Russian military can collect data on responses. The Russian military likely already knows the locations and capabilities of the vast majority of frontline NATO systems but can gather valuable intelligence on response thresholds and communication patterns of NATO air defenses, as well as additional data to enable low-altitude drone strikes as opposed to missile or airstrikes. The need to respond to Russian actions also runs up NATO’s operational tempo, though this is likely an added benefit to the Kremlin rather than the main objective of its actions.

The Kremlin’s campaign of sabotage against critical infrastructure targets is likely primarily intended to set conditions for potential attacks in the future, either as individual escalations or as part of a conventional war, though it partially supports the Kremlin’s previously discussed efforts to disrupt European civilian life and test NATO’s response thresholds. Efforts by Russia-linked agents to damage European power stations and other civilian infrastructure are unlikely to have an immediate kinetic effect on either NATO capabilities or Europe’s ability to support Ukraine. These attacks are likely probing actions to set conditions for more expansive attacks in the future, such as putting capabilities in place to take down European power grids either as major escalatory actions or as part of a conventional war. European and US authorities have repeatedly identified Russian efforts to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage related to undersea cables.[80] The US Congressional Research Service identified six suspected undersea cable disruptions in the Baltic Sea from December 2025 to January 2026.[81] These Russian actions are likely intended to enable Russia to target European communications on day zero of a conventional war, rather than trying to fully disrupt European communications at this time. Chairman of the board of the Latvian Transatlantic Organization, Jānis Karlsbergs, stated on July 23 that NATO has recorded a significant decrease in undersea cable damage in the Baltic Sea since the beginning of NATO enhanced vigilance activity Baltic Sentry, however.[82] Previously discussed Russian efforts against European defense industrial base targets naturally indirectly degrade NATO’s capabilities as well, but ISW assesses these ongoing efforts are primarily focused on interdicting support to Ukraine rather than directly degrading NATO’s ability to rearm its own militaries.

Europe has the resources to handle the Russian threat at this stage. Russian ground forces cannot conduct a large-scale invasion of a European state while the war in Ukraine continues and for some time after it concludes. Even then, European states have the wherewithal needed to defeat a Russian invasion if they cannot deter it. It is common to criticize Europe in general or particular European states for lacking the will or willingness to mobilize the resources necessary to deter and defeat Russian aggression, but that criticism (which is not entirely accurate) misses an important point. A state cannot effectively mobilize resources to confront an adversary without understanding what the adversary is actually trying to do and how. An essential first step is understanding the coherence of the efforts Russia is directing at Europe and the objectives those efforts are meant to achieve. Europe must take that step now.

The difficulty European governments face in acknowledging that Russia is operating within a war framework and pursuing actual military lines of effort against and within European states is proof of the success of Russian cognitive warfare efforts. It now requires great courage for European leaders, especially leaders of states that do not border Russia directly, to say that Russia is engaging in a military campaign against them. Russian cognitive warfare efforts have created antibodies to any such statements. European leaders who call Russian actions what they are are called warmongers, accused of scaremongering to distract from domestic failures, blamed for “provoking” Russia, or charged with trying to go to war with Russia. European political parties and populations must understand the degree to which they have been conditioned by extensive Russian efforts to avoid calling Russian actions what they are — parts of a military campaign intended to achieve discrete effects.

No one desires a war with Russia. The purpose of describing the Russian war framework and advocating for responses to it is to avoid escalation and conventional war. Europe (and the United States) must find a way to open their discourse to the idea that they must recognize the war framework under which Russia is operating in order to pursue peace.

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俄罗斯在针对欧洲的战争框架下行事，而欧洲则继续在和平框架下运作。但这并不意味着俄罗斯与北约之间爆发全面战争不可避免，更遑论迫在眉睫。北约和欧洲国家必须认清克里姆林宫所使用的框架，以便欧洲国家能够采取适当、冷静但坚定的努力，遏制俄罗斯的升级行动，避免全面战争。在公开承认俄罗斯的战争框架与夸大其词或危言耸听之间找到必要的平衡点并非易事。然而，除少数例外，欧洲领导人在掩盖俄罗斯的真实意图方面走得太远，损害了欧洲制定连贯且明智的政策应对措施的能力。本报告的目的并非煽动欧洲的战争狂热，更不是鼓励欧洲国家寻求与俄罗斯发生冲突。相反，本报告旨在根据ISW评估的克里姆林宫所使用的框架，阐述俄罗斯在欧洲的一系列行动。欧洲可以制定并执行相应的政策应对措施，以遏制俄罗斯的升级行动，并在必要时击败俄罗斯的战争。然而，只有当欧洲认识到俄罗斯的行动具有内在一致性，并坦率而审慎地谈论其面临的挑战时，欧洲才能做到这一点。

北约和欧洲各国必须将政策规划的重点放在克里姆林宫针对欧洲的军事和信息战的连贯性及其目标上，而不是将其视为一系列互不关联的俄罗斯军事和认知行动。克里姆林宫正在对欧洲开展多项相互支持的行动，以支持其全面入侵乌克兰，并推进其长期以来旨在瓦解北约、重建对前苏联国家主导地位的宏伟战略目标。克里姆林宫的每一项行动——例如侵犯欧洲领空或破坏欧洲工业基地设施——都支持着克里姆林宫的多项行动。北约和欧洲各国必须了解俄罗斯行动的总体目标，才能理解俄罗斯各项行动的背景，并制定和执行相应的应对措施。本报告对俄罗斯针对欧洲的军事行动的目标及其组成方针进行了初步评估，扩展了ISW于9月16日发布的报告《俄罗斯针对欧洲的军事行动：界定威胁》[1]。ISW将在后续报告中，根据本报告对俄罗斯针对欧洲的每项行动进行评估。

俄罗斯对欧洲的宏伟战略目标

克里姆林宫长期以来一直认为自己与西方处于一场旷日持久的冲突之中，并为了支持其几项长期存在的宏大战略目标而发动这场冲突，这些目标在普京执政期间基本保持不变。[2] 克里姆林宫正在对乌克兰进行全面入侵，并持续对欧洲发动军事行动，以推进这些宏大战略目标。克里姆林宫针对乌克兰和北约的各项行动并非都与其宏大战略目标一一对应，但了解普京所追求的长期最终目标，对于正确评估克里姆林宫针对欧洲的行动以及制定相应的政策应对措施至关重要。

ISW评估认为，克里姆林宫有四个主要战略目标：

重塑俄罗斯大国地位需要征服乌克兰和白俄罗斯：尽管克里姆林宫为其入侵乌克兰和软吞并白俄罗斯的行为提出了种种理由，但它否认白俄罗斯和乌克兰是合法国家和独立民族的事实，其行动源于一种信念：只有将乌克兰和白俄罗斯重新置于莫斯科的控制之下，俄罗斯才能完整。[3] 普京的世界观包含一个循环论证——俄罗斯若不控制其在白俄罗斯和乌克兰的“祖传”领土，就无法成为大国；俄罗斯是大国，因此它有权控制白俄罗斯和乌克兰。克里姆林宫入侵乌克兰本质上是一个帝国主义计划。普京将与乌克兰的战争视为其政权存亡和俄罗斯世界地位的生死攸关的问题，他认为俄罗斯的超级大国地位与其政权的存亡密不可分。克里姆林宫针对欧洲发起的许多持续行动，直接支持其在乌克兰的战争以及追求其更大的目标（如下所述），从而支持实现这一目标。

重新掌控前苏联加盟共和国，特别是波罗的海三国和摩尔多瓦：普京渴望掌控前苏联加盟共和国。他的目标超越了宗主权——即在允许附庸国拥有主权内政的同时控制其外交事务——而是直接影响后苏联国家内部政策的某些方面，克里姆林宫认为这些国家理应属于其势力范围。[4] 克里姆林宫并非寻求完全掌控前苏联所有加盟共和国或前华沙条约成员国。克里姆林宫的意图是确立这样一种规范：这些国家的主权受到限制，至多只能保持“中立”。克里姆林宫所说的“中立”是指它们不能加入北约等联盟或欧盟等经济集团；并且俄罗斯拥有使用武力保护“俄语使用者”（一个模糊不清、由克里姆林宫定义的类别，国际法不予承认）的特殊权利。[5]因此，克里姆林宫正致力于分裂北约和欧盟。其具体目标是将波罗的海国家和波兰与欧洲其他国家隔离开来，剥夺它们作为北约和欧盟成员国所享有的保护和利益。

建立一个削弱美国影响力、瓦解北约团结、俄罗斯拥有决定性影响力的世界秩序：克里姆林宫希望建立一个多极世界秩序，使其成为少数几个关键极点之一，其关键在于削弱美国的影响力，并确保北约和欧盟——二者加起来的经济和军事实力远远超过俄罗斯——无法作为一个统一的集团采取行动。因此，克里姆林宫正努力确保美国基本撤出欧洲；瓦解北约作为一个凝聚力强的联盟；结束俄罗斯在外交和经济上的部分孤立；并确立一项准则，即在世界所有重大地缘政治问题上，至少必须与俄罗斯进行磋商。[6]

维护普京政权：普京是一位独裁者，他最重要的战略目标是确保自身生存——进而确保其政权的存续。普京依靠一系列复杂的叙事来为其继续统治辩护，并将对俄罗斯问题的批评转移到西方身上，声称西方正在发动一场有组织的、咄咄逼人的行动来压制俄罗斯，并辩称只有他自己才能领导俄罗斯应对这场冲突。[7] 普京和许多俄罗斯高级政治和军事官员还真心相信他们自己编造的叙事，即西方正在积极策划在俄罗斯发动一场“颜色革命”，北约可能对俄罗斯发动先发制人的战争，因此克里姆林宫必须瓦解北约。[8] 本报告绝非意在支持克里姆林宫的这种论调，甚至并非认为这种论调可以理解，但欧洲决策者必须牢记普京的决策框架是基于对历史和现实的严重误解。

俄罗斯对欧洲的目标和当前行动路线

克里姆林宫正针对欧洲开展一系列协调一致、相互支持的军事和认知行动，以实现其战略目标。ISW评估认为，克里姆林宫正在乌克兰和欧洲地区开展一系列相互重叠的行动，以实现至少两个总体战略目标：

减少或取消欧洲对乌克兰的军事和外交支持，以使克里姆林宫能够实现其在乌克兰的军事目标；

削弱北约作为能够对抗俄罗斯、重新夺回对后苏联空间的主导地位并建立多极世界秩序的统一联盟的能力。

克里姆林宫正开展多项行动以支持这些行动。许多俄罗斯行动旨在实现多重目标——例如，克里姆林宫破坏波兰铁路的行动意在阻断西方对乌克兰的援助，并提高北约对俄罗斯“正常”军事行动的界定标准。本报告将结合俄罗斯的多重目标，探讨其部分行动。本报告阐述了ISW对克里姆林宫针对欧洲的目标的评估，并概述了克里姆林宫为实现这些目标而采取的行动。ISW近期启动的“欧洲防御项目”将在后续报告中对此进行更详细的评估。

减少或取消欧洲对乌克兰的军事和外交支持

克里姆林宫关于乌克兰战争胜利的理论取决于俄罗斯能否比西方更持久地支持乌克兰。克里姆林宫正确地评估认为，这种支持对于乌克兰能否在军事上击败俄罗斯的全面入侵，并最终实现基辅及其支持者都能接受的战争结局至关重要。[9] 克里姆林宫试图通过实际阻挠欧洲向乌克兰提供援助的手段和能力，以及通过认知手段胁迫欧洲国家停止对乌克兰的支持，来减少或消除欧洲对乌克兰的支持。

克里姆林宫正在开展一系列破坏活动，主要手段是纵火，目标是欧洲的国防工厂和仓库，旨在削弱欧洲国防企业和政府生产援助物资并将其运往乌克兰的能力。例如，爱沙尼亚总理克里斯滕·米哈尔于8月18日宣布，爱沙尼亚调查人员正在调查8月14日针对爱沙尼亚国防技术公司Milrem Robotics的一起可能与俄罗斯有关的纵火袭击事件。该公司为乌克兰武装部队提供无人机。[10] 2026年1月，立陶宛当局逮捕了六名与俄罗斯总参谋部情报总局（GRU，俄罗斯军事情报机构）有关联的嫌疑人，他们涉嫌于2024年9月17日对立陶宛国防公司TVC Solutions的一处设施实施纵火袭击。该公司为乌克兰武装部队生产信号情报系统。[11] 俄罗斯情报机构主要通过网络平台和当地犯罪网络招募一次性代理人来执行这些行动，而不是由俄罗斯人员直接行动。俄罗斯幕后操纵者通常以经济脆弱的个人、低级地方罪犯、乌克兰难民或寻求快速致富的当地青年为目标。[12] 俄罗斯情报机构利用这些可随意处置的代理人，以在俄罗斯人员面临较低风险的情况下达到目的，维持表面上的否认，并以此应对欧洲此前大规模驱逐以外交掩护身份活动的俄罗斯情报人员的做法。[13] 俄罗斯策划的纵火袭击和其他破坏活动为克里姆林宫提供了一种低成本的手段，可以扰乱西方对乌克兰援助物资（特别是无人机）的生产和运输，这些行动实际上是更大规模破坏行动的一部分。此外，这些袭击还迫使欧洲公司花费更多的时间和精力来保护其设施。

克里姆林宫正利用欧洲各国将这些活动主要视为执法问题的现状。欧洲在调查、起诉和将个人行为归咎于克里姆林宫方面耗时过长，这进一步增加了制定和执行有效欧洲应对措施的难度。欧洲各国当然必须维护法治，并给予被指控犯罪的个人正当程序，但它们也必须建立连贯的机制，以便及时评估这些活动，作为俄罗斯旨在破坏欧洲对乌克兰国防工业支持的协同行动的一部分，并制定相应的反制措施。

与克里姆林宫有关联的特工也在进行更高调的行动，以破坏欧洲的国防工业基础，例如无人机袭击、试图在民用飞机上安放爆炸物以及密谋暗杀欧洲国防工业高管——所有这些都主要与欧洲对乌克兰的支持有关。8月5日，一架乌克兰货机在德国莱比锡/哈勒机场遭到无人机袭击，其目的就是直接打击欧洲对乌克兰援助的枢纽。[14] 与俄罗斯有关联的特工此前曾试图在2024年7月将燃烧装置走私到美国和加拿大的货机和客机上，导致波兰、英国和德国的物流枢纽发生火灾，其中包括莱比锡/哈勒机场。[15] 2024年7月和2026年8月的这两起事件都表明，俄罗斯愿意以可能造成平民伤亡的方式攻击民用航空网络。欧洲情报机构和欧洲国防公司多次警告称，俄罗斯方面屡次试图暗杀为乌克兰提供物资的欧洲国防公司高管。其中最引人注目的是美国情报界披露的俄罗斯情报机构计划在2024年暗杀德国莱茵金属公司首席执行官阿明·帕佩格尔。[16] 迄今为止，俄罗斯所有较为引人注目的袭击或暗杀企图均未完全成功，但克里姆林宫显然愿意采取一些行动——如果这些行动达到预期效果，将导致北约成员国平民伤亡。北约成员国普遍淡化俄罗斯的这些行动，因为这些行动尚未完全成功，但北约绝不能等到俄罗斯大规模破坏或暗杀企图成功（并可能造成平民伤亡）才制定并执行应对措施。包括秘书长马克·吕特在内的北约官员表示，北约实际上已经做出了回应，但行动是秘密进行的。[17]北约迄今为止采取的秘密应对措施显然不足以阻止俄罗斯继续升级此类袭击。

克里姆林宫已将其军事打击行动从乌克兰扩展到欧洲其他战区，开展了三项协调一致的军事行动，旨在切断援助物资并阻止乌克兰使用波罗的海空域附近的无人机航线。这三项军事行动的目标是北约成员国和摩尔多瓦的领空和领土，但与本报告中讨论的其他俄罗斯军事行动不同，它们主要是作为俄罗斯对乌克兰打击行动（以及防御乌克兰打击行动）的组成部分，在某些情况下甚至是其延伸。

首先，克里姆林宫对波兰/乌克兰边境的袭击以及对波兰铁路的破坏行动，是俄罗斯军方旨在切断西方对乌克兰援助的协调行动的一部分。自2022年以来，克里姆林宫一直试图在乌克兰境内切断西方对乌克兰的援助，并且正日益将这一行动扩展到乌克兰境外。受俄罗斯控制的网络多次袭击波兰关键铁路网，这些铁路网负责向乌克兰运送西方军事物资。其中最引人注目的是，与俄罗斯有关联的行动者于2025年11月15日使用炸药和物理障碍物袭击了波兰多罗胡斯克-波兰边境口岸的铁路线。[18] 波兰总理唐纳德·图斯克表示，这条被袭击的铁路线对于向乌克兰运送援助至关重要，并称此次袭击是针对波兰国家及其公民安全的史无前例的破坏行为。[19] 2026年9月，俄罗斯越来越多地使用无人机袭击乌克兰边境口岸和乌克兰-波兰边境沿线的目标。[20] 2026年9月13日，俄罗斯在乌克兰沃伦州，距离波兰边境两公里处，对一列客运列车发动无人机袭击，其目的很可能是伤害或杀死当时正乘坐另一列火车过境的欧洲官员。[21] 这三项行动——破坏波兰铁路；袭击乌克兰/波兰边境；以及克里姆林宫不惜伤害或杀死进出乌克兰的西方官员，或至少恐吓他们减少前往乌克兰的行程——都是克里姆林宫切断乌克兰与欧洲陆路交通线行动的一部分。

其次，俄罗斯军方正在对乌克兰与罗马尼亚和摩尔多瓦的边境地区进行协调一致的打击行动。自2026年8月以来，俄罗斯不断加大对乌克兰-摩尔多瓦边境重要进出口路线沿线基础设施的打击力度，这很可能是为了孤立乌克兰，使其与欧洲脱钩，并阻止罗马尼亚和摩尔多瓦支持乌克兰。[22] 8月20日至25日期间，俄罗斯军队三次袭击了摩尔多瓦-敖德萨州边境的过境点。[23] 情报与安全研究所（ISW）评估认为，克里姆林宫至少已经接受了无人机和其他弹药可能进入北约领空并造成北约平民伤亡的风险，而且几乎可以肯定，其中一些事件是俄罗斯为推进下文将要讨论的更广泛的空中入侵目标而故意为之。最引人注目的是，一架俄罗斯军用无人机于5月29日进入罗马尼亚领空，并在罗马尼亚加拉茨坠毁在一栋公寓楼内，造成两名平民受伤。[24]俄罗斯多次袭击乌克兰靠近摩尔多瓦边境的目标，造成摩尔多瓦平民伤亡，其中包括7月13日一架携带40公斤炸药的俄罗斯军用无人机侵犯摩尔多瓦领空。[25] 这些袭击增加了地区政治和商业风险，其目的是阻止罗马尼亚和摩尔多瓦支持乌克兰。

第三，克里姆林宫正在对波罗的海国家和芬兰进行一系列侵犯领空的行动，以此削弱乌克兰对俄罗斯境内目标发动的袭击的影响。克里姆林宫评估认为，波罗的海国家至少在为乌克兰对俄罗斯境内目标的袭击提供便利，尤其是在圣彼得堡和列宁格勒州周边地区。克里姆林宫正利用乌克兰对俄罗斯的袭击，通过电子战手段将乌克兰无人机引导至波罗的海和芬兰领空。自2026年3月以来，已有十几架乌克兰无人机因俄罗斯的电子战手段进入波罗的海或芬兰领空。[26] 俄罗斯这些引导乌克兰无人机的行动导致了侵犯领空的行为，这不仅推进了俄罗斯在下文将要讨论的以欧洲为中心的战略目标，也是俄罗斯防空行动的直接组成部分。克里姆林宫试图胁迫波罗的海国家和斯堪的纳维亚国家限制乌克兰的空袭行动，以降低乌克兰无人机进入北约领空的风险——或者胁迫乌克兰自行进入北约领空，以避免激怒其盟友。然而，波罗的海国家和芬兰对这些事件保持着强烈的反应，正确地将这些事件归咎于俄罗斯，并拒绝公开批评乌克兰，但克里姆林宫却试图制造进一步的紧张局势。[27]

克里姆林宫正在开展一场认知战，试图让西方相信俄罗斯战胜乌克兰已成定局，美国和欧洲应该迫使乌克兰接受克里姆林宫提出的有利方案，并按照克里姆林宫的条件与俄罗斯恢复关系正常化。ISW（国际社会主义组织）已多次记录并驳斥了这些虚假叙事。[28] 克里姆林宫的许多军事行动都是为了支持其信息目标，因此，我们应该将俄罗斯的个别军事袭击置于其所支持的信息战背景下理解，而不是将其视为孤立的事件。克里姆林宫试图通过以下三个目的来胁迫欧洲国家减少对乌克兰的援助：巩固欧洲的防空系统；强化西方国家将装备和能力保留用于未来与俄罗斯的战争而非立即提供给乌克兰的现有倾向；以及为亲俄的欧洲势力提供便利，这些势力声称欧洲及其对乌克兰的援助正在挑衅俄罗斯。俄罗斯的这些认知攻势构成了一项特殊的挑战，因为北约国家必须小心谨慎——例如，俄罗斯侵犯领空的行为确实要求波罗的海国家、波兰和罗马尼亚加强防空能力，北约国家也必须考虑自身的防空能力——但克里姆林宫成功地将欧洲国家向乌克兰提供的援助金额控制在远低于欧洲能够轻松提供的水平。

乌克兰迫切需要额外的防空系统和弹药储备，尤其是在2026-2027年冬季俄罗斯即将发起的严峻打击行动之前。克里姆林宫试图通过一系列低成本的入侵欧洲国家的空域行动，在军事上达到巩固这些欧洲能力的目的。俄罗斯无人机入侵北约空域（以及俄罗斯利用电子战手段将乌克兰无人机引导至北约空域）的部分目的在于使北约前线国家的政府和民众感到不安，并促使它们扣留防空系统和弹药储备。空域入侵已经给波罗的海国家造成了损失，并有效地影响了前线国家的优先事项。立陶宛国防部长罗伯塔斯·考纳斯在2026年9月20日的一次采访中证实，立陶宛正在优先采购防空系统。此前五天，一架北约战斗机在立陶宛领空击落了一架无人机。[29]克里姆林宫成功地给北约制造了一个难题：一方面，前线国家需要优先发展自身的防空能力以应对俄罗斯的空中入侵；另一方面，北约整体上仍需继续支持乌克兰。然而，波罗的海三国应对这一挑战的表现令人钦佩，没有一位波罗的海国家官员表示，他们需要为了自身利益而牺牲乌克兰的利益。波兰对俄罗斯此举的回应尤为谨慎——波兰领导人多次指出，加强乌克兰的防空和导弹防御是保护波兰的最佳途径，与此同时，波兰军方也提高了防空警戒级别，并降低了防空飞机紧急升空的门槛。[30]

俄罗斯对欧洲发起的军事和信息威胁行动，其目的还在于胁迫美国和非前线北约国家扣留对乌克兰的援助能力，以便将其保留用于可能发生的北约与俄罗斯的战争。正如ISW所记录的那样，俄罗斯的这一行动不幸地取得了显著成效，自2022年以来，西方对乌克兰的援助一直被拖延。[31] 美国和北约以北约需要保留这些装备以应对可能发生的与俄罗斯的战争为由，为长期扣留对乌克兰的关键援助辩护——却忽视了乌克兰正在与俄罗斯进行战争的现实，以及限制俄罗斯对欧洲军事威胁的最佳途径是帮助乌克兰现在就击败俄罗斯军队。俄罗斯的这场行动在2026年仍在持续产生影响。保加利亚国防部长迪米塔尔·斯托亚诺夫于2026年6月初宣布，保加利亚将停止向乌克兰捐赠其军火库中的武器，部分原因是出于对保加利亚武装部队自身库存的担忧。[32] 美国提供的防空拦截器和其他弹药的全球短缺也产生了叠加效应，克里姆林宫正在利用这一点，因为许多欧洲国家优先考虑将日益稀缺的拦截器留给自己使用。[33] 德国最高盟军转型司令部战略计划与政策副参谋长尤尔根·施罗德尔准将在7月9日由德国大西洋协会主办的一个小组讨论会上表示，德国在向乌克兰提供更多德国爱国者拦截器库存方面“确实已经接近极限”，并且必须确保自身的安全。[34]

最后，克里姆林宫的行动和叙事旨在通过向欧洲国家展示其因支持乌克兰而面临威胁（例如无人机入侵）来恐吓它们，并声称如果它们停止支持乌克兰，这种威胁就会消失。克里姆林宫依靠欧洲亲俄或公开亲俄的政党来宣扬和放大这些信息。波罗的海国家和波兰政府正确地统一了这一观点，即无人机入侵，即使是乌克兰无人机在俄罗斯电子战的影响下进行的入侵，也是俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰的后果，而阻止这些威胁的最快方法是普京结束战争。[35] 然而，俄罗斯的行动也强化了一些欧洲国家的观点，即欧洲国家因支持乌克兰而面临威胁，而消除威胁的最快方法是胁迫乌克兰接受莫斯科的条件。 2026 年 9 月 17 日，斯洛伐克总理罗伯特·菲佐警告说，无人机可能会进入北约领土并杀害平民，并表示他不希望斯洛伐克“因为某些第五条条款”而被卷入战争。[36] 克里姆林宫的宣传人员有意推进这一叙事，例如，俄罗斯联邦安全会议副主席德米特里·梅德韦杰夫在 2026 年 4 月 17 日放大了俄罗斯国防部列出的为乌克兰生产无人机的欧洲工厂和地点的名单，并表示“打击何时成为现实取决于接下来会发生什么。欧洲伙伴们，安心睡觉吧。”[37]

俄罗斯的入侵也正在削弱公众对北约保护前线民众能力的信心。POLITICO 2025年12月的一项民调显示，更多法国和德国受访者希望本国政府减少而非增加对乌克兰的援助。[38] 受访者列举了减少援助的理由，包括国内问题、担心向乌克兰提供支持会激怒俄罗斯，以及担心向乌克兰提供援助会对国内安全产生负面影响。[39] 2026年5月29日，一架俄罗斯无人机袭击了罗马尼亚加拉茨的一栋公寓楼后，一位居民告诉BBC：“他们告诉我们，我们有北约保护，不用担心。但看看我们现在身处何地！”[40] 绝大多数欧洲国家政府仍然致力于支持乌克兰，但克里姆林宫希望，诸如此类的公众看法会引发欧洲的冷漠情绪，从而使亲俄政党得以当选——这是俄罗斯的一项明确策略，下文将对此进行更详细的讨论。

削弱北约作为统一联盟对抗俄罗斯的能力。

克里姆林宫试图分裂和削弱北约，促成美国从欧洲撤军，并瓦解欧盟，从而在后苏联空间获得更大的自主权，并建立一个全球多极格局。克里姆林宫正在为未来可能与一个或多个北约成员国发动常规战争创造条件，尽管ISW评估认为，克里姆林宫并未认定常规战争是实现其战略目标的最佳方式，甚至未必是有利的方式。克里姆林宫目前的考量与2021年夏季有所不同，当时普京似乎认为，入侵和占领乌克兰比他当时正在进行的针对乌克兰的信息战和施压行动更能有效地实现其目标。[41] 克里姆林宫试图通过瓦解北约，在不发生实质性常规战争升级的情况下，以低成本实现其针对北约和欧洲的目标，并为未来可能对北约发动有限或全面常规侵略创造条件。

克里姆林宫针对欧洲的主要行动是确保北约无法迅速、协调地应对俄罗斯的行动，并最终通过削弱第五条来彻底瓦解北约。克里姆林宫试图在北约成员国之间（以及在各个成员国的政治话语中）制造对风险和紧迫性的不同认知，并通过有针对性的信息宣传和精心策划的军事行动加剧政策分歧。克里姆林宫的军事行动，包括无人机侵犯领空、俄罗斯军机进行挑衅性姿态展示、破坏和纵火袭击以及信息宣传，都相互支持这一目标。本报告侧重于评估俄罗斯行动的整体意图，而非详细分析每一种俄罗斯行动类型，后者将由ISW在后续报告中进行。

俄罗斯针对欧洲日益频繁的军事行动旨在产生两种认知效应：一是提高北约对俄罗斯行动的回应门槛，使其认为哪些行动值得单个成员国或整个北约做出回应，而哪些行动则被视为“正常”的俄罗斯行为；二是使北约各国政府和民众对持续不断的警报习以为常，从而降低他们对任何俄罗斯个别行动不予认真回应的可能性，这可能使克里姆林宫在不触发北约反应的情况下，拥有更大的行动升级自由。欧洲官员越来越倾向于将俄罗斯不断升级的活动（例如下文将进一步讨论的侵犯领空行为）视为正常现象，同时回避明确界定何种行为才需要采取集体回应。例如，芬兰总统亚历山大·斯图布在2025年1月明确表示，俄罗斯袭击事件的增加是“新常态”。[42] 立陶宛总统顾问戴维达斯·马图利奥尼斯在9月4日表示，北约第五条款的触发门槛难以预测。[43]德国总理弗里德里希·默茨于7月15日表示，欧洲“尚未处于战争状态，但已不再和平”。[44] 2026年9月初，一些不愿透露姓名的北约外交官也向POLITICO透露，北约没有针对“低于阈值”事件的正式应对计划，也未就一系列此类袭击是否足以启动《北约》第五条达成共识。[45] 波兰总理唐纳德·图斯克于9月17日警告称，俄罗斯可能会试图利用这种模糊性，以表明第五条“理论性大于实践性”。[46] 北约秘书长马克·吕特于9月22日表示，北约故意含糊其辞，以避免为俄罗斯在低于特定阈值的情况下采取的行动开绿灯。[47] 这种说法看似合理，但显然也给了俄罗斯相当大的回旋余地，使其能够以一种危险的升级模式挑战克里姆林宫对北约界限的认知。

克里姆林宫还意图让北约各国军队和政府逐渐习惯俄罗斯的活动和侵犯领空的行为，以便在克里姆林宫进一步升级行动（例如直接对北约目标发动无人机袭击）时，能够出其不意地打击北约。最明显的历史对比是埃及在1973年赎罪日战争前夕的行动。当时，埃及在以色列边境附近进行例行军事演习，起初引起了以色列的反应，但逐渐被视为例行公事——结果，以色列军方在某种程度上将埃及实际的入侵部署视为又一次演习。[48]需要明确的是，俄罗斯军队并没有在北约边界进行快速的军事集结，而且这种类比也不完全准确——但北约必须确保不会放松警惕，将俄罗斯无人机入侵和俄罗斯军机的挑衅性飞行路线视为例行公事和无关紧要的事件，无论是提高俄罗斯行动引发北约反应的门槛（不幸的是，克里姆林宫在这场斗争中已经部分获胜），还是降低北约成员国和民众对俄罗斯个别行动做出反应的紧迫性。

克里姆林宫的军事行动和配套的信息战也旨在加剧北约成员国之间关于俄罗斯威胁性质和必要应对措施的现有争论。一些国家的官员，特别是波兰的官员，已经开始直接将俄罗斯的行动称为与欧洲的战争，但大多数北约国家官员在提及俄罗斯的行动时使用委婉含糊的语言。[49] 立陶宛总理明道加斯·辛克维丘斯于2026年7月6日表示，“俄罗斯的侵略仍在继续，我们不仅在立陶宛看到了各种情况，在德国也看到了，比如在机场，无人机和爆炸物。”[50] 拉脱维亚国防部长赖维斯·梅尔尼斯于7月29日表示，拉脱维亚正在“为应对挑衅和保卫国家做好准备”，明确地将俄罗斯的行动分为“挑衅”和需要防御的常规攻击。[51]英国议员格雷姆·唐尼 (Graeme Downie) 于 7 月 8 日表示，英国正与俄罗斯进行“持续对抗”，并将其描述为“一场旷日持久的敌对活动”，而不是“一场常规的枪战”。[52] ISW 将在即将发布的报告中评估欧洲对俄罗斯威胁的不同看法以及讨论该威胁所使用的语言的影响。

克里姆林宫正开展多项行动，其目的仅仅是为了扰乱欧洲平民生活，并在欧洲民众中制造焦虑和不安。俄罗斯的电子战活动持续干扰波兰和波罗的海国家的民用航空和公共交通，并削弱移动网络和GPS服务。[53] 俄罗斯及其亲俄黑客持续攻击欧洲的民用基础设施和公共服务。例如，多个与俄罗斯有关联的黑客组织在2025年12月攻击了波兰的供暖和发电厂，在2024年对丹麦一家水务公司发动了网络攻击，并在2026年8月攻击了挪威政府的数字服务。[54]

俄罗斯日益频繁的行动旨在使北约平民和政府习惯于定期警报，希望他们不会对俄罗斯未来可能采取的行动做出足够及时的反应。2026年9月1日至21日期间，北约前线国家发布了大量与潜在空域威胁相关的警报。例如，波兰于9月5日、7日、8日、10日、12日、14日、16日、17日和21日向波兰东部居民发布了紧急警报；罗马尼亚于9月5日、8日、10日、11日、12日、15日和21日发布了RO警报（紧急警报），以应对来自乌克兰的接近或越过罗马尼亚或波兰领空的空中威胁。[55]罗马尼亚公共广播电台罗马尼亚新闻于 8 月 17 日发布报道称，罗马尼亚图尔恰县（RO-ALERT 警报信息发布最多的地区）的许多居民已经关闭了警报，并告诉记者他们不再关心这些警告。[56]

克里姆林宫给前线各国政府制造了一个难题：他们必须让民众保持适当的戒备状态，以便应对俄罗斯的行动，同时又不能（在他们看来）过度引起民众恐慌，造成不必要的经济冲击。西方分析人士和政策制定者同样必须确保他们以紧迫感应对俄罗斯的威胁，但又不能散布恐慌。而克里姆林宫则试图使人们对其自身行动的看法两极分化。爱沙尼亚外交部长马尔古斯·察赫纳在2026年4月警告说，关于俄罗斯可能袭击波罗的海国家的猜测正符合莫斯科煽动恐惧的目的。[57] 然而，断言讨论俄罗斯的袭击会推进克里姆林宫的目标是一种简化论断，它造成了一种循环论证，即欧洲不应该坦率地讨论俄罗斯的威胁，以免加剧恐慌。克里姆林宫试图引发关于俄罗斯即将入侵的危言耸听的警告，这当然是事实。然而，克里姆林宫也受益于欧洲对其持续行动反应不足，尤其是一些分析人士和政府官员断然拒绝讨论俄罗斯针对欧洲的军事行动，或拒绝就俄罗斯近期威胁发出警告。芬兰政府正努力传达需要关注和做好准备，但又不至于恐慌的信息：总统亚历山大·斯图布于9月18日告诉芬兰民众，要“做好心理准备”，应对俄罗斯无人机入侵芬兰和增加“混合行动”的可能性；但他在9月21日的另一份声明中也提醒民众，俄罗斯将“继续恐吓，我们只需……保持冷静和镇定”。[58] 面对俄罗斯的信息战和出于善意的政策分歧，在这两种极端之间找到平衡将极其困难，但这个问题必须得到解决。

克里姆林宫试图在政治敏感问题上制造和利用分歧，以在北约成员国政府中引发危机。不幸的是，许多欧洲领导人和政党已经认同克里姆林宫所期望的对北约持怀疑态度的最终结果，例如斯洛伐克总理罗伯特·菲佐，他于9月17日表示，他不希望斯洛伐克“因为某些第五条条款”而被卷入冲突，并在9月20日表示，西方的“军事言论和寻找与俄罗斯发生军事冲突的借口”是西方试图转移人们对天然气价格等“基本挑战”的注意力。[59] 关于如何应对俄罗斯和乌克兰无人机的防空措施的争论也导致波罗的海国家官员丢掉了工作：拉脱维亚国防部长安德里斯·斯普鲁兹在两架无人机袭击拉脱维亚雷泽克内的一个石油储存设施后于2026年5月10日辞职；几天后，拉脱维亚总理埃维卡·西利娜因政治后果辞职。[60] 2026年全年，波罗的海三国也一直在努力遏制来自白俄罗斯的武装移民，这场行动通过消耗资源和考验受影响前线国家之间的负担分担，支持了俄罗斯的目标。[61] 2026年7月下旬，拉脱维亚内政部长亚尼斯·东布拉瓦要求立陶宛向拉脱维亚与白俄罗斯的边境部署约100名边防人员。[62] 立陶宛以能力不足为由拒绝了这一请求。[63] 自7月1日起，立陶宛已向拉脱维亚边境派遣了有限的人员轮换，并认为拉脱维亚必须首先投入更多自身资源，包括拉脱维亚军事人员，来支持其边防力量。[64]

克里姆林宫还试图为亲俄的欧洲官员和政党（例如德国另类选择党[AfD]或斯洛伐克总理罗伯特·菲佐）提供机会和论据，以便他们批评和阻挠北约防御俄罗斯的努力。[65] 诚然，俄罗斯的军事行动主要旨在支持其他目标，但其次也是为了向亲俄政党提供宣传弹药，以推进克里姆林宫的目标。德国另类选择党成员曾表示，德国应该重新考虑其北约成员国身份，错误地断言俄罗斯已经赢得了乌克兰战争，并主张欧洲应该停止支持乌克兰并取消对俄罗斯的制裁。[66]斯洛伐克总理罗伯特·菲佐于 9 月 19 日表示，无人机入侵可能会引发北约和俄罗斯之间的战争，并断言“北约内部某些鹰派人士正不惜一切代价，试图将这场（乌克兰的）战争变成俄罗斯和北约之间的冲突。”[67] 然而，克里姆林宫加剧政治分裂的努力也是有限度的。法国政治家玛丽娜·勒庞及其国民联盟党成员正大力推动大幅削减对乌克兰的援助，但勒庞和她的政治伙伴乔丹·巴尔德拉于9月19日发表正式声明称，“这些（关于对乌克兰援助的）辩论是合法的”，但“外国压力是不合法的”，并断言“我们绝不容忍任何外国势力，比如俄罗斯，企图直接或间接地左右我国的政策”。[68] 勒庞和巴尔德拉重申了法国与“遭受敌对行为或稳定行动”的欧洲盟国的团结，尽管他们在对乌克兰的援助规模上存在分歧。

最后，克里姆林宫针对欧洲选举进程开展的信息战早已被记录在案。[69] 除了在近期德国地方选举中投入大量精力外，克里姆林宫目前正着力影响2026年拉脱维亚议会选举、2027年法国总统选举和2027年爱沙尼亚议会选举。[70] 在2026年10月3日大选前夕，俄罗斯的信息战针对拉脱维亚公众，声称拉脱维亚独立不合法，并表示拉脱维亚自脱离俄罗斯以来就一蹶不振。[71] 法国当局已公开披露针对特定法国候选人的信息战，并高度确信这些行动与俄罗斯有关。[72] 克里姆林宫的这些努力旨在帮助亲俄候选人当选，同时也旨在质疑欧洲民主进程的有效性。

克里姆林宫针对欧洲的军事行动也旨在为未来可能与一个或多个北约国家爆发常规战争创造条件。需要明确的是，ISW目前并未评估克里姆林宫是否已明确决定与北约进行常规战争符合其自身利益，但克里姆林宫无疑正在为未来可能爆发常规战争创造条件。此前讨论过的克里姆林宫的许多行动——即其瓦解北约和破坏针对国防工业基地目标的袭击——都间接支持着未来常规战争的准备工作，但克里姆林宫还在开展一些更直接地旨在支持未来战争的行动。

与克里姆林宫有关联的特工定期对欧洲敏感地点（例如军事基地或国防工业基地基础设施）进行陆空侦察。例如，2026年8月25日，爱沙尼亚一家法院裁定拥有爱沙尼亚和俄罗斯双重国籍的尼基塔·库兹明犯有间谍罪，罪名是他在2024年及之后的一段时间内，代表俄罗斯总参谋部情报总局（GRU）在爱沙尼​​亚纳尔瓦及其周边地区收集有关军事和民用目标的信息。[73] 摩尔多瓦警方宣布，他们于9月8日拘留了一名阿塞拜疆公民，罪名是代表俄罗斯情报机构非法收集有关摩尔多瓦军事设施的信息。[74] 欧洲当局经常报告不明无人机飞越军事设施和国防工业基地附近，其中包括9月14日一架装载爆炸物的无人机在德国联邦国防军温斯托夫空军基地附近坠毁；以及8月13日在美国海军那不勒斯支援基地附近发现的一架无人机。 8月6日，至少有两架无人机被发现飞越位于梅赫尼希的德国联邦国防军基地。[75] 欧洲各国尚未公开将所有这些行动都归咎于俄罗斯，但这种模式表明，某个行为体——几乎可以肯定是俄罗斯——正在利用无人机获取欧洲军事和军事支援资产的信息。这些侦察行动为俄罗斯在未来的常规战争中对这些目标发动打击创造了条件，同时也为近期进一步的破坏活动提供了支持。

克里姆林宫持续不断的无人机入侵行动以及俄罗斯军用飞机和海军舰艇在北约空域附近的挑衅行为，旨在测试北约的反应和防御能力，并推进此前讨论过的分裂北约决策的目标。[76] 英国国防部报告称，从2026年1月1日至2026年7月31日，俄罗斯舰船在英国领海和北大西洋的活动比2025年同期增加了25%。[77] 2026年1月1日至2026年8月17日期间，俄罗斯无人机至少23次侵犯罗马尼亚领空，而从2022年2月乌克兰战争爆发到2025年底，侵犯领空的事件仅有18次。[78]北约军事委员会主席朱塞佩·卡沃·德拉戈内海军上将9月7日表示，从2024年9月到2026年9月，北约战斗机紧急升空拦截俄罗斯飞机约700次，几乎每天一次。[79] 每次北约飞机进行“紧急升空”（即启动防空雷达或采取其他军事行动）时，俄罗斯军方都可以收集有关北约反应的数据。俄罗斯军方可能已经掌握了绝大多数北约一线系统的位置和性能，但仍然可以收集有关北约防空系统反应阈值和通信模式的宝贵情报，以及其他有助于其进行低空无人机打击（而非导弹或空袭）的数据。应对俄罗斯行动的需求也加快了北约的作战节奏，但这很可能是克里姆林宫的额外好处，而非其行动的主要目的。

克里姆林宫针对关键基础设施目标的破坏行动，其主要目的很可能是为未来可能发动的攻击创造条件，无论是作为单独的升级行动，还是作为常规战争的一部分。尽管如此，该行动也在一定程度上支持了克里姆林宫此前讨论过的扰乱欧洲平民生活、试探北约反应阈值的举措。与俄罗斯有关联的特工破坏欧洲发电站和其他民用基础设施的行动，不太可能对北约的能力或欧洲支持乌克兰的能力产生直接的军事影响。这些攻击很可能是试探性行动，旨在为未来更大规模的攻击创造条件，例如建立瘫痪欧洲电网的能力，无论是作为重大升级行动，还是作为常规战争的一部分。欧洲和美国当局已多次确认俄罗斯试图对海底电缆进行侦察和破坏活动。[80] 美国国会研究服务处确认，2025年12月至2026年1月期间，波罗的海发生了六起疑似海底电缆中断事件。[81]俄罗斯的这些行动很可能是为了使其能够在常规战争爆发之初就对欧洲通信系统发起攻击，而不是试图在当前阶段全面瘫痪欧洲的通信系统。然而，拉脱维亚跨大西洋组织董事会主席亚尼斯·卡尔斯贝格斯于7月23日表示，自北约启动“波罗的海哨兵”强化警戒行动以来，波罗的海海底电缆损坏数量已显著下降。[82] 此前讨论过的俄罗斯针对欧洲国防工业基地目标的行动自然也会间接削弱北约的能力，但ISW评估认为，这些持续的行动主要集中于切断对乌克兰的支持，而不是直接削弱北约重新武装自身军队的能力。

欧洲目前有能力应对俄罗斯的威胁。在乌克兰战争持续期间以及战争结束后的一段时间内，俄罗斯地面部队无法对欧洲国家发动大规模入侵。即便如此，欧洲各国也拥有击败俄罗斯入侵所需的资源，即便无法有效阻止其入侵。人们常常批评欧洲整体或某些欧洲国家缺乏调动必要资源来阻止和击败俄罗斯侵略的意愿，但这种批评（虽然并不完全准确）忽略了一个重要方面。一个国家如果不了解对手的实际意图和行动方式，就无法有效地调动资源来对抗对手。至关重要的第一步是了解俄罗斯针对欧洲的行动的连贯性及其旨在实现的目标。欧洲必须立即采取这一步骤。

欧洲各国政府难以承认俄罗斯正在战争框架内运作，并针对欧洲国家及其境内采取实际军事行动，这恰恰证明了俄罗斯认知战的成功。如今，欧洲领导人，尤其是那些与俄罗斯没有直接接壤的国家的领导人，需要极大的勇气才能承认俄罗斯正在对他们发动军事行动。俄罗斯的认知战已经使欧洲各国对任何此类言论都产生了抵触情绪。那些直言不讳地指出俄罗斯行动本质的欧洲领导人，会被贴上“战争贩子”的标签，被指责散布恐慌以转移人们对国内失败的注意力，被控“挑衅”俄罗斯，甚至被指控试图与俄罗斯开战。欧洲各政党和民众必须认识到，他们受到俄罗斯广泛影响的程度，以至于无法将俄罗斯的行动视为旨在达成特定目标的军事行动的一部分。

没有人希望与俄罗斯开战。阐述俄罗斯的战争框架并倡导应对措施，其目的在于避免局势升级和常规战争。欧洲（以及美国）必须找到一种方法，使其对话能够接受这样一个观点：为了追求和平，他们必须承认俄罗斯所遵循的战争框架。

[1] Mason Clark，“俄罗斯对欧洲的军事行动：界定威胁”，战争研究所，2026年9月16日，https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-defining-the-threat/。[2] Nataliya Bugayova 和 Kateryna Stepanenko，“俄罗斯认知战入门”，战争研究所，2025年6月30日，https://understandingwar.org/research/cognitive-warfare/a-primer-on-russian-cognitive-warfare/。[3] Vladimir Putin，“论俄罗斯人和乌克兰人的历史统一性”，克里姆林宫，2021年7月21日，https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181； https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/；Nicole Wolkov、Chirstina Harward 等，“俄罗斯进攻战役评估，2025 年 5 月 22 日”，战争研究所，2025 年 5 月 22 日，https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2025/。[4] Frederick W. 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