Washington should brace for new Polish preferences in arms suppliers

The recent ouster of Poland’s government at the ballot box signals some significant potential changes to the security posture of NATO’s strongest ally in Eastern Europe. Under the next Polish government, U.S. defense firms may find tougher competition from European industry for big-ticket arms purchases by Warsaw. The total size of Polish defense spending may be smaller. Washington should take note and respond.

Poland’s Law and Justice, the leading party within the country’s previous ruling coalition, won the most seats of any single party in the Oct. 15 election — but not enough to hang onto power. In claiming victory , opposition leader and former Polish President Donald Tusk celebrated his party’s success. “Never in my life have I been so happy about seemingly taking second place,” he said.

Tusk’s excitement might be short lived. Without an outright majority in parliament, a future government under his centrist Civic Coalition party is likely to be weak and wobbly. Tusk will need the support of smaller leftist parties to form a government — and their interests will not always be aligned with his. Keeping these bedfellows within his political fold will almost certainly require the dispensation of large domestic spending programs, likely at the cost of Poland’s mighty defense budget, which is currently 3.9 percent of the country’s GDP. It may also require a reversion to Poland’s previous preference for “splitting the baby” on arms deals between the United States and European firms.

On the campaign trail, Tusk promised voters a return to pro-European Union policies. The last time that his party was in power it regularly divided major defense purchases between American firms and their EU competitors. The practice was intentional. Mega-deals with the United States, like the fielding of the Patriot air defense system, maintained a strong link with Washington. Other purchases from the EU allowed Warsaw to burnish its reputation as a “team player” in Brussels. While the outgoing government broke with this approach, Poland’s next government will likely return to it. As the former president of the European Council, Tusk might even have a greater affinity for the EU than before.

In the near term, the greatest potential for a change in Polish defense could occur in the air. Under the outgoing government, Warsaw spent big to purchase 32 F-35 fighters from the United States in 2020. It is now looking to acquire two additional squadrons of multi-role fighter aircraft. The lead candidates in this competition are the Eurofighter Typhoon, made by a consortium led by Europe’s Airbus, and the F-15EX Eagle II, made by America’s Boeing. If the next government decides to proceed with this purchase, the two companies will need to make a compelling political and geostrategic case for their option in addition to the capabilities of their aircraft.

On the ground, additional changes could be coming for Poland’s ambitious plans to field state-of-the-art main battle tanks. Earlier this year, the outgoing government signed a $5.8 billion deal with South Korea to acquire 1,000 K2 tanks from that country. This was in addition to $6.1 billion in deals with Washington to acquire hundreds of America’s M1A2 Abrams tanks over the next two years. While this sizable expansion of Poland’s heavy armor was meant to bolster Warsaw’s plans for a 300,000-person military in the coming years, the total bill might be too large for the incoming government to stomach.

New Polish governments traditionally revel in axing or modifying the defense decisions of their predecessors. When the Law and Justice party came to power in 2015, Poland incurred the “ fury ” of France when it cancelled a multibillion-dollar deal to purchase 50 Caracal multi-role helicopters from Airbus. Warsaw opted instead to build a Polish-made version of America’s Blackhawk. While major reversals in Poland’s strategic approach to its defense are not in the cards, it’s very possible that the incoming government will reshuffle Poland’s defense-industrial ties and scale down plans for a military buildup.

What is unlikely to change under the next government is Poland’s broader geopolitical orientation. The country will continue to take seriously threats from dangerous and destabilizing neighbors like Russia and Belarus. Meanwhile, it will remain a constant target for malign Chinese influence. For decades, Poland has leaned on its security relationship with the United States to mitigate these risks. That relationship benefits both sides. The White House can and should use all available diplomatic leverage with Poland to ensure that our defense-industrial relationship remains ironclad.

Meanwhile, Washington can expect Warsaw to maintain its support for Kyiv. However, a major test could occur if Ukraine faces stronger pressure to negotiate a settlement with Russia in the months ahead. In that event, the next Polish government may align closer with the positions of Germany or France instead of the expected strong line taken by allies like the United Kingdom, Lithuania, and Romania. Navigating these tensions will not be easy for Warsaw, and it will look to the United States for guidance.

Having won victory, the challenge for Tusk’s party will not only be in keeping it — but also paying for it.

Peter Doran is Senior Adjunct Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

波兰政府近期在选举中落败，预示着北约在东欧最强盟友的安全态势可能发生重大变化。在新一届波兰政府执政后，美国国防企业在华沙的大宗武器采购中可能会面临来自欧洲企业的更激烈竞争。波兰的国防开支总额也可能缩减。华盛顿应该注意到这一点并做出应对。

波兰法律与公正党是该国前执政联盟中的领头羊，在10月15日的选举中赢得了所有政党中最多的席位，但不足以保住政权。反对党领袖、波兰前总统唐纳德·图斯克在宣布胜利时，庆祝了其所在政党的胜利。他说：“我这辈子从未如此高兴过，感觉自己好像只拿到了第二名。”

图斯克的兴奋之情或许难以持久。由于无法在议会中获得绝对多数席位，他领导的中间派公民联盟党未来组建的政府很可能软弱无力、摇摇欲坠。图斯克需要一些较小的左翼政党的支持才能组建政府——而这些政党的利益并非总是与他一致。为了维系这些盟友，几乎肯定需要推出大规模的国内支出计划，这很可能是以牺牲波兰庞大的国防预算为代价的，该预算目前占波兰国内生产总值的3.9%。此外，波兰可能还需要恢复以往在美欧军售问题上“各取所需”的做法。

在竞选期间，图斯克向选民承诺将回归亲欧盟政策。他所在的政党上次执政时，经常将重大国防采购项目分配给美国公司及其欧盟竞争对手。这种做法并非偶然。与美国达成的巨额交易，例如部署“爱国者”防空系统，维持了波兰与华盛顿的紧密联系。而从欧盟采购其他产品则帮助华沙在布鲁塞尔树立了“团队成员”的形象。尽管即将卸任的政府放弃了这种做法，但波兰下一届政府很可能会重拾这一策略。作为前欧洲理事会主席，图斯克对欧盟的亲近程度甚至可能超过以往。

短期内，波兰国防领域最大的变革可能出现在空中。在上届政府的领导下，华沙于2020年斥巨资从美国购买了32架F-35战斗机。如今，波兰正寻求再采购两个中队的多用途战斗机。此次竞标的领先机型分别是欧洲空客公司牵头的财团生产的“台风”战斗机和美国波音公司生产的F-15EX“鹰II”战斗机。如果下届政府决定推进此次采购，除了飞机的性能之外，这两家公司还需要就其方案的政治和地缘战略意义提出令人信服的理由。

在地面层面，波兰雄心勃勃的部署最先进主战坦克的计划可能面临更多变数。今年早些时候，即将卸任的波兰政府与韩国签署了一项价值58亿美元的协议，从韩国采购1000辆K2坦克。此外，波兰还与美国签署了价值61亿美元的协议，将在未来两年内采购数百辆美国M1A2艾布拉姆斯主战坦克。尽管波兰大规模扩充重型装甲力量旨在支持华沙未来几年内组建一支30万人的军队的计划，但如此庞大的开支或许会让即将上任的波兰政府难以承受。

波兰新政府历来热衷于废除或修改前任政府的国防决策。2015年，法律与公正党上台后，波兰取消了一项价值数十亿美元的从空客公司购买50架“狞猫”（Caracal）多用途直升机的交易，此举激怒了法国。华沙转而选择自行研发美国“黑鹰”（Blackhawk）直升机的波兰版本。虽然波兰国防战略不太可能发生重大转变，但新政府很可能会重新调整波兰的国防工业关系，并缩减军备建设计划。

波兰下一届政府不太可能改变的是其更广泛的地缘政治方向。波兰将继续严肃对待来自俄罗斯和白俄罗斯等危险且具有破坏性的邻国的威胁。与此同时，它仍将是中国恶意影响的持续目标。几十年来，波兰一直依靠与美国的安全关系来降低这些风险。这种关系对双方都有利。白宫可以而且应该利用一切可用的外交手段与波兰进行沟通，以确保我们与波兰的国防工业关系牢不可破。

与此同时，华盛顿可以预期华沙将继续支持基辅。然而，如果乌克兰在未来几个月面临更大的压力，被迫与俄罗斯进行谈判以达成和解，则可能面临重大考验。在这种情况下，下一届波兰政府的立场可能会更接近德国或法国，而不是像英国、立陶宛和罗马尼亚等盟友那样采取强硬路线。应对这些紧张局势对华沙来说并非易事，它将寻求美国的指导。

取得胜利后，图斯克的政党面临的挑战不仅在于保住胜利，还在于如何为胜利买单。

Peter Doran 是保卫民主基金会的高级兼职研究员。