Troop cuts in Europe: Giving away something for nothing

Although some of the recently announced changes to U.S. troops levels in Europe have been signaled for a year or more, they have nonetheless unnerved America’s allies and potentially emboldened Moscow. American troops have been in Europe for decades not merely to underwrite NATO treaty commitments but more specifically to safeguard the country’s most important trading and investment relationship in the world.

Cutting U.S. troops in Europe places transatlantic trade and investment ties in jeopardy, but additionally, the decision represents a potential missed opportunity – Washington risks giving away something for nothing. Russia wants U.S. troop reductions in Europe, and it’s not too late for the United States to get something in return from Moscow.

Cutting U.S. troops in Europe now carries great risk, but if troops must leave, bargaining with Russia makes far more sense than cutting unilaterally. Doing so could reduce the threat posed by Russian forces to NATO, it could facilitate an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine, and it could lower the risk posed to the transatlantic trade and investment relationship.

Earlier this month, the United States notified its NATO allies that it would reduce the number of forces it makes available to NATO for the implementation of the alliance’s operations plans. These plans – approved by all allies – were developed by NATO’s American-led military headquarters in Mons, Belgium, and they are largely focused on the defense of allied territory against Russia. The alliance uses the plans to build a list of the required military forces, and then those requirements are apportioned among the individual allies, building a country-by-country capability target list.

The reduced commitments unveiled by the United States earlier this month were, in many ways, expected. They’ve been signaled by American leaders for at least a year, most notably in February 2025 when Secretary of Defense Hegseth announced that Europeans would need to take the lead in conventional defense of Europe.

But keen observers of NATO understand that this trend has been unfolding for years. Between 2017 and 2025, the proportion of all capability targets assigned to the United States dropped from 46 percent to 38 percent. At the same time, the number of high-end, “exquisite” capabilities provided by the United States, such as advanced air defense, were reduced from 13 (out of 26 total) to 5.

In other words, America has long been on the path of reduced commitments in European defense planning, in the name of fair burden-sharing as well as the shifting of U.S. resources to the Indo-Pacific. The latest changes are the result of dialogue between American and European defense planners as well as between U.S. military officials based in Europe and those based in the Indo-Pacific.

These latter discussions, and the analyses that informed them, were necessary to truly assess what was needed by American military leaders based in the Pacific. It should come as no surprise therefore to see that naval and air forces are reportedly on the list of what the United States will no longer make available to fulfill the NATO operations plans.

Coincidentally and largely unrelated to American capability targets and NATO plans, the United States also announced in early May that it would withdraw 5,000 troops from Europe. This decision, in contrast to the one described above, reportedly came as a surprise .

Initially, American military leaders decided that the largest portion of those 5,000 troops would come in the form of a 4,200-person tank brigade deployed to Poland on a rotational basis. However, that decision was quickly reversed following conversations between top American and Polish leaders. Now American military officials in the Pentagon and in Europe are wrestling with how to implement the cut, perhaps considering drawing down U.S. forces that are permanently stationed (usually with families) in places like Germany, Poland, Italy, Spain, Turkey or the U.K.

Reducing American troops stationed in or rotationally deployed to Europe makes little sense for several reasons. First, most of those troops are ground forces, which are unlikely to be as important for a conflict in the Indo-Pacific . Second, basing U.S. troops in Europe can be cheaper than stationing them in the United States, especially when European allies like Poland or Lithuania pick up the costs. And third, U.S. reductions while Russia’s war in Ukraine rages on sends the wrong message to allies and enemies alike.

Even if none of these things were true and it made great sense operationally, fiscally, and strategically to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe, doing so in exchange for nothing amounts to a very bad deal.

Moscow has made clear it doesn’t want U.S. forces based in Europe, so why not bargain with Russia and get something in exchange?

This is precisely what U.S. officials did a generation ago as the Cold War came to an end – they negotiated simultaneous reductions in conventional and nuclear arms with Moscow.

It’s not too late – if Washington is intent on reducing troop levels in Europe, it can still wield this bargaining chip. In exchange for a 5,000 troop cut in U.S. forces based in Europe, Washington could demand Russia end its war in Ukraine, eliminate the military bases it’s been building up near NATO borders, or cease its hybrid war against U.S. and European interests across Europe and North America.

Something – really, anything – is better than nothing.

John R. Deni is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a nonresident senior fellow at the NATO Defense College. The views expressed are his own.

尽管近期宣布的美国驻欧兵力调整措施中，有些早在一年多前就已有所预兆，但这些调整仍然令美国的盟友感到不安，并可能助长了莫斯科的气焰。几十年来，美军一直驻扎在欧洲，这不仅是为了履行北约条约义务，更重要的是为了维护美国在全球最重要的贸易和投资关系。

削减驻欧美军不仅危及跨大西洋贸易和投资关系，而且这一决定也可能错失良机——华盛顿冒着白白送出一些东西的风险。俄罗斯希望美军减少驻欧兵力，而美国现在从莫斯科那里获得一些回报还不算太晚。

现在削减驻欧美军风险巨大，但如果必须撤军，与俄罗斯谈判远比单方面削减更明智。这样做可以降低俄罗斯军队对北约构成的威胁，有助于结束俄罗斯在乌克兰的战争，并降低对跨大西洋贸易和投资关系构成的风险。

本月初，美国通知其北约盟国，将减少向北约提供的用于执行联盟作战计划的兵力。这些计划由北约位于比利时蒙斯的、由美国领导的军事总部制定，并已获得所有盟国的批准。这些计划主要侧重于防御盟国领土免受俄罗斯的威胁。北约根据这些计划制定所需军事力量清单，然后将这些需求分配给各个盟国，从而形成一份各国能力目标清单。

美国本月初公布的削减军费承诺在许多方面都在意料之中。美国领导人至少在一年前就已发出过这样的信号，尤其是在2025年2月，时任国防部长赫格塞斯宣布欧洲人需要在欧洲常规防御方面发挥主导作用。

但密切关注北约的人士都明白，这种趋势已经持续多年。2017年至2025年间，分配给美国的全部能力目标比例从46%下降到38%。与此同时，美国提供的高端“精湛”能力，例如先进的防空系统，也从13项（总共26项）减少到5项。

换言之，美国长期以来一直以公平分担责任以及将美国资源转移到印太地区为名，逐步减少其在欧洲防务规划中的投入。最新的变化是美欧防务规划人员以及驻欧美军官员和驻印太美军官员对话的结果。

后文的讨论及其背后的分析，对于真正评估驻太平洋美军领导人的需求至关重要。因此，毫不奇怪，据报道，美国将不再向北约提供海军和空军力量来执行作战计划。

巧合的是，与美国的能力目标和北约计划基本无关的是，美国还在5月初宣布将从欧洲撤出5000名士兵。据报道，与上述决定不同，这一决定令人意外。

最初，美国军方领导人决定，这5000名士兵中的大部分将以4200人的坦克旅的形式轮换部署到波兰。然而，在美波两国高层领导人进行磋商后，这一决定很快被推翻。现在，五角大楼和欧洲的美国军方官员正在努力商讨如何落实裁军计划，他们或许会考虑从德国、波兰、意大利、西班牙、土耳其或英国等地撤出常驻美军（通常他们携家属在内）。

出于几个原因，减少驻扎在欧洲或轮换部署到欧洲的美军兵力意义不大。首先，这些部队大多是地面部队，在印太地区的冲突中不太可能发挥重要作用。其次，美军驻扎在欧洲的成本可能低于驻扎在美国本土的成本，尤其是在波兰或立陶宛等欧洲盟友承担相关费用的情况下。第三，在俄罗斯乌克兰战争仍在持续之际，美国削减兵力会向盟友和敌人发出错误信号。

即使以上情况都不属实，从作战、财政和战略角度来看，从欧洲撤出美军都是非常明智的选择，但这样做却没有任何补偿，这无疑是一笔非常糟糕的交易。

莫斯科已经明确表示不希望美国军队驻扎在欧洲，那么为什么不与俄罗斯谈判，换取一些回报呢？

这正是上一代美国官员在冷战结束时所做的——他们与莫斯科谈判，同时削减常规武器和核武器。

现在还不算太晚——如果华盛顿决心削减驻欧美军人数，它仍然可以利用这一筹码。作为削减驻欧美军5000人的交换条件，华盛顿可以要求俄罗斯结束在乌克兰的战争，撤走其在北约边界附近修建的军事基地，或者停止其在欧洲和北美针对美国及欧洲利益发动的混合战争。

有东西总比没有强。

约翰·R·德尼是大西洋理事会非常驻高级研究员和北约国防学院非常驻高级研究员。文中观点仅代表他个人意见。