Suppressed GPS in Ukraine fuels development of US Army navigation tech

WASHINGTON — The suppression of GPS signals in Ukraine amid Russia’s ongoing invasion is informing the development of next-generation U.S. Army navigation and targeting technologies.

The service is investing in alternative sources of situational awareness — where troops are and where they are headed, for example — in anticipation of future fights and digital interference at a massive scale .

The jamming and spoofing seen in Eastern Europe provides an “incredible learning environment,” according to Michael Monteleone, the director of the Army’s Assured Positioning, Navigation and Timing/Space Cross-Functional Team. The U.S. considers Russia a top-tier national security hazard.

“You can see real-world, potential-adversary capabilities, and then we can put that up and measure how we’re doing on our side,” Monteleone said in an interview with Defense News . “Underpinning everything we do, whether its a signal, a sensor, whatever it may be, is continuous experimentation in a realistic threat environment.”

The cross-functional team participates in the so-called PNT Assessment Experiment, which puts both emerging and established tech through the wringer. The experiment in 2020 looked at dozens of systems including Stryker combat vehicles and the M777 howitzer.

“I talk about resiliency via diversity. That’s one of the things that we can measure up and say: ‘Hey, in these types of environments, one, are we experimenting correctly, and, if GPS isn’t there, can we still operate? How long can we operate? And how confidently can we operate?’ ” Monteleone said . “We need that human factor of what it’s going to mean to the soldier on the ground to operate in an environment or to not have a weapon system work the way, perhaps, that they expected it to.”

The Army in recent months dedicated hundreds of millions of dollars to jam-resistant navigation gear.

The service in late September inked a $318 million deal with BAE Systems for embeddable M-code GPS cards.

In April, the Army tapped TRX Systems to produce second-generation Dismounted Assured Positioning, Navigation and Timing Systems , which soldiers can carry in the field. That deal was worth $402 million.

“Across the board, GPS isn’t the only game in town,” Monteleone said. “You have to have other capabilities to achieve [assured positioning, navigation and timing].”

Colin Demarest was a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covered military networks, cyber and IT. Colin had previously covered the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — namely Cold War cleanup and nuclear weapons development — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina. Colin is also an award-winning photographer.

华盛顿——在俄罗斯持续入侵乌克兰期间，乌克兰境内GPS信号的压制正在为美国陆军下一代导航和目标定位技术的研发提供参考。

该部门正在投资于替代态势感知来源——例如，部队在哪里以及他们要去哪里——以应对未来大规模的战斗和数字干扰。

美国陆军定位、导航和授时/空间跨职能团队主任迈克尔·蒙特莱昂表示，东欧发生的干扰和欺骗事件提供了一个“绝佳的学习环境”。美国将俄罗斯视为最高级别的国家安全威胁。

蒙特莱昂在接受《防务新闻》采访时表示：“你可以看到潜在对手的真实能力，然后我们可以将其纳入考量，衡量我们自身的表现。我们所做的一切，无论是信号、传感器，还是其他任何东西，都建立在持续的、模拟真实威胁环境下的实验之上。”

这个跨职能团队参与了所谓的“定位、导航和授时（PNT）评估实验”，该实验旨在对新兴技术和成熟技术进行全面测试。2020年的实验考察了数十种系统，包括“斯特瑞克”装甲车和M777榴弹炮。

蒙特莱昂说：“我谈到韧性是通过多样性来实现的。这是我们可以衡量的一个方面，我们可以说：‘嘿，在这些环境下，首先，我们的试验是否正确；其次，如果没有GPS信号，我们还能行动吗？我们能行动多久？我们行动的信心有多强？’” “我们需要考虑士兵在特定环境下作战，或者武器系统无法按预期工作时，会面临怎样的人为因素。”

近几个月来，陆军投入数亿美元用于研发抗干扰导航设备。

9 月下旬，该机构与 BAE Systems 签署了一项价值 3.18 亿美元的合同，采购可嵌入式 M 码 GPS 卡。

今年4月，美国陆军委托TRX系统公司生产第二代单兵携带式可靠定位、导航和授时系统（DPNATS），该合同价值4.02亿美元。

蒙特莱昂说：“总的来说，GPS并不是唯一的解决方案。你还需要其他能力来实现（可靠的定位、导航和授时）。”

科林·德马雷斯特曾是C4ISRNET的记者，负责报道军事网络、网络安全和信息技术方面的新闻。此前，他曾为南卡罗来纳州的一家日报报道美国能源部及其下属的国家核安全管理局，主要关注冷战后的清理工作和核武器研发。科林还是一位屡获殊荣的摄影师。