America’s arsenal is in need of life support

The United States is set to face a raft of consequences if urgent measures are not taken to expand its production capacity for military munitions.

For many years, the Defense Department and Congress together all but ignored the issue. Year after year, budgets were proposed and approved that saw crucial munitions purchased at the lowest possible rate companies could sustain, hollowing out the industrial base.

Now, with an extraordinary array of threats emerging, Washington can no longer disregard a munitions production shortfall that endangers U.S. military readiness and undercuts Washington’s ability to provide beleaguered democracies, such as Ukraine and Taiwan , with the combat capabilities they need.

The good news is that there are several steps Congress can take to begin to address the munitions crisis. Those include authorizing and funding major production increases of key munitions, supporting targeted measures to expand industrial capacity, and the provision of multiyear procurement authorities that incentivize private sector investment.

To begin to understand the challenge, consider the U.S. assistance provided to Ukraine. On Oct. 4, the Pentagon announced $625 million in additional security assistance for Ukraine , bringing the total to $17.5 billion since January 2021. Among other things, according the Pentagon, assistance provided to Ukraine by the U.S. has included roughly 8,500 Javelin anti-armor systems, 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems, 880,0000 155mm artillery rounds, 2,500 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds and an unknown quantity of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rounds used by the 38 U.S. High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems in or on their way to Ukraine .

While the Biden administration’s support for Ukraine represents a necessary step to secure core American interests, the laudable provision of these weapons to Kyiv has highlighted shortcomings when it comes to the Pentagon’s munitions arsenals and the capacity of the U.S. industrial base to produce them.

The Javelin anti-tank weapon that gained increased notoriety in the early days of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s latest invasion of Ukraine demonstrates the wider problem. According to Pentagon budget documents, the average rate of Pentagon procurement of the Javelin during fiscal 2020 to fiscal 2022 was about 675 annually. At that rate, it would take more than 12 years to replace the 8,500 Javelin systems sent to Ukraine.

In April, when the United States had sent only 5,000 Javelin missiles to Ukraine, lawmakers expressed concerns that this quantity amounted to one-third of U.S. stockpiles .

The Defense Department and Congress are taking belated steps to address the Javelin shortfall, and industry is looking to double production capacity — but that could take a couple years. There are also production capacity concerns related to the Stinger missiles, 155mm artillery rounds and GMLRS rounds.

Some might respond by arguing the United States should halt the provision of weapons to Kyiv. But that would be a penny-wise, pound-foolish move that both neglects the core American interests at stake on the battlefield in Ukraine and invites more aggression from autocrats.

These munitions challenges are not only relegated to ground warfare munitions or the situation in Ukraine. China now boasts the largest naval force in the world, and deterring or defeating an attack by Beijing on Taiwan would require the U.S. military to maintain the capability and capacity to sink an extraordinary number of Chinese vessels. Yet, once again, the U.S. military lacks the requisite number of munitions.

Chinese J-15 fighter jets are launched from the deck of the Liaoning aircraft carrier during military drills in the South China Sea in 2017. (STR/AFP via Getty Images)

The Long Range Anti-Ship Missile is a consummate example. The LRASM has a 500-mile-plus range that can launch from U.S. Air Force (B-1 and soon B-52) and Navy (F-18 and soon P-8) aircraft, placing China’s naval fleet at risk. Unfortunately, the Pentagon only has about 200 of these missiles today; recent war games consistently indicate the United States needs about 800-1,200 to deter or defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Despite that fact, the average annual LRASM procurement rate across FY20-FY22 was only 38 missiles (including both the U.S. Navy and Air Force). For FY23, the Pentagon requested a total of 88 missiles. At that rate, it would take until around 2032 to accumulate around 1,000 missiles in the U.S. inventory. Such a lethargic procurement plan is perilously disconnected from warnings that Beijing could conduct an attack long before that.

A Long Range Anti-Ship Missile launches from a U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancer during flight testing in 2013. (U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency)

To begin to address this dangerous shortfall, Washington should work with industry to get the LRASM production up to 200-250 a year as soon as possible. For FY23, production capacity could ideally be increased to at least 110-130 as an interim step.

Other high-end munitions with similar capacity shortfalls in war games include the Standard Missile-6, a multipurpose missile that can be used for countering cruise and ballistic missiles, sinking ships, land-attack operations, and potentially even hypersonic missile defense. The Navy is buying approximately 125 of these a year, but even double that rate would still not fulfill warfighter needs.

Across many of these munitions, the key problem has been the failure of Washington to procure the munitions in sufficient quantities in the form of signed contracts with industry. When the contracts and large quantity procurements weren’t forthcoming, industry predictably responded by permitting some industrial capacity to wither.

Thankfully, the solutions are simple if there is sufficient political will to pursue them. Congress should push to authorize and appropriate funding levels for key munitions that match the current maximum production rate. In the next breath, members would be wise to ask what more can be done to increase maximum production rates next year. Notably, the initial version of the Senate appropriations bill has $1 billion for industrial capacity expansion.

Congress should also establish multiyear purchasing agreements for vital munitions where possible; help defense manufacturers address weak points in their munition production workforces; and bolster smaller, secondary and tertiary subcontractors that may be slowing overall production rates.

The Senate just added more than a dozen authorizations for multiyear contracts during the chamber’s consideration of the annual defense authorization bill. In fact, the Senate’s version of the National Defense Authorization Act advances all of these priorities and hopefully will be supported by House leadership and included in the final conference report.

In addition to actions Washington can take, the United States can look to its allies for help. As the United States expands production capacity, it will be able to sell key munitions to capable allies, thus reducing the operational burden on U.S. forces and the financial burden on the American taxpayer. Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom should all be reviewing the LRASM and SM-6 for future procurement.

Washington should also explore co-production agreements with reliable allies and partners. That would build larger, combined production capacity over time and result in a more potent, combined, deterrent force.

The good news for Americans is that there is still time to act, but the window of opportunity may be closing.

Bradley Bowman is the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously served as a national security adviser to members of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees. Retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery is the senior director of FDD’s Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation.

如果美国不采取紧急措施扩大其军用弹药生产能力，将会面临一系列后果。

多年来，国防部和国会几乎完全忽视了这个问题。年复一年，提出的预算案都以企业所能承受的最低价格采购关键军需品，从而掏空了工业基础。

如今，随着一系列非同寻常的威胁出现，华盛顿再也不能忽视弹药生产短缺的问题了，这个问题危及美国的军事战备，并削弱了华盛顿向乌克兰和台湾等陷入困境的民主国家提供所需作战能力的能力。

好消息是，国会可以采取若干措施来着手解决军火危机。这些措施包括授权并资助大幅提高关键军火的产量，支持有针对性的措施来扩大工业产能，以及提供多年采购授权以激励私营部门投资。

要了解这一挑战，首先需要考虑美国向乌克兰提供的援助。10月4日，五角大楼宣布向乌克兰追加6.25亿美元的安全援助，使自2021年1月以来美国对乌克兰的援助总额达到175亿美元。据五角大楼称，美国向乌克兰提供的援助包括约8500套“标枪”反坦克导弹系统、1400套“毒刺”防空导弹系统、88万发155毫米炮弹、2500发精确制导155毫米炮弹，以及数量不明的制导多管火箭炮系统（GMRS）炮弹。这些火箭炮系统由部署在乌克兰境内或正在运往乌克兰的38支美国高机动性火箭炮部队使用。

虽然拜登政府对乌克兰的支持是保障美国核心利益的必要步骤，但向基辅提供这些武器这一值得称赞的举措，也凸显了五角大楼军火库和美国工业基础生产能力方面的不足。

在俄罗斯总统普京最近一次入侵乌克兰初期，标枪反坦克导弹系统声名鹊起，这也凸显了更广泛的问题。根据五角大楼的预算文件，2020财年至2022财年期间，五角大楼平均每年采购约675套标枪导弹系统。按照这个速度，替换已交付给乌克兰的8500套标枪导弹系统需要超过12年的时间。

今年 4 月，当美国仅向乌克兰运送了 5000 枚标枪导弹时，议员们表示担忧，认为这一数量相当于美国库存的三分之一。

国防部和国会正在采取姗姗来迟的措施来解决标枪导弹的短缺问题，业界也在寻求将产能翻番——但这可能需要几年时间。此外，毒刺导弹、155毫米炮弹和通用多管火箭炮的产能也令人担忧。

有些人可能会反驳说，美国应该停止向基辅提供武器。但这将是因小失大，既忽视了美国在乌克兰战场上的核心利益，又会招致独裁者更大的侵略。

这些弹药挑战不仅限于地面作战弹药或乌克兰局势。中国如今拥有世界规模最大的海军力量，要威慑或击败北京对台湾的攻击，美军就必须保持击沉数量惊人的中国舰艇的能力。然而，美军再次面临弹药短缺的问题。

2017年，中国歼-15战斗机在南海参加军事演习，从辽宁号航空母舰甲板上起飞。（STR/AFP via Getty Images）

远程反舰导弹就是一个绝佳的例子。远程反舰导弹射程超过500英里，可由美国空军（B-1轰炸机，即将装备B-52轰炸机）和海军（F-18战斗机，即将装备P-8反潜巡逻机）的飞机发射，对中国海军舰队构成威胁。然而，不幸的是，五角大楼目前仅拥有约200枚此类导弹；近期的军事演习一致表明，美国需要约800至1200枚此类导弹才能有效威慑或击败中国对台湾的入侵。

尽管如此，2020财年至2022财年期间，美国远程反舰导弹（LRASM）的年均采购量仅为38枚（包括美国海军和空军）。2023财年，五角大楼申请采购88枚导弹。按照这个速度，美国大约需要到2032年才能积累到约1000枚导弹。如此缓慢的采购计划与北京可能在此之前很久就发动袭击的警告严重脱节。

2013年，一枚远程反舰导弹从美国空军B-1B“枪骑兵”轰炸机上发射，当时正在进行飞行测试。（美国国防高级研究计划局）

为了着手解决这一危险的产能缺口，华盛顿应与业界合作，尽快将远程反舰导弹（LRASM）的年产量提升至200-250枚。作为过渡措施，2023财年的产能理想情况下可以至少提升至110-130枚。

其他在战争演习中也存在类似容量不足的高端弹药包括标准-6型导弹，这是一种多用途导弹，可用于对抗巡航导弹和弹道导弹、击沉舰船、对陆攻击，甚至可能用于高超音速导弹防御。海军每年采购约125枚，但即使采购量翻倍，仍然无法满足作战人员的需求。

在许多此类弹药中，关键问题在于华盛顿未能通过与业界签订合同的方式采购足够数量的弹药。当合同和大规模采购迟迟未能落实时，业界不出所料地采取了让部分产能萎缩的措施。

值得庆幸的是，只要有足够的政治意愿去推进，解决方案其实很简单。国会应该推动授权并拨款，确保关键军需品的资金水平与目前的最大产量相匹配。紧接着，议员们应该认真思考，明年还能采取哪些措施来提高最大产量。值得注意的是，参议院拨款法案的初稿中已经包含了10亿美元用于扩大工业产能。

国会还应尽可能为重要弹药制定多年采购协议；帮助国防制造商解决其弹药生产劳动力中的薄弱环节；并扶持可能拖慢整体生产速度的小型二级和三级分包商。

参议院在审议年度国防授权法案期间，新增了十几项多年期合同授权。事实上，参议院版本的《国防授权法案》推进了所有这些优先事项，希望能够得到众议院领导层的支持，并最终纳入两院协商会议报告。

除了华盛顿可以采取的行动外，美国还可以寻求盟友的帮助。随着美国扩大生产能力，它将能够向有能力的盟友出售关键弹药，从而减轻美军的作战负担和美国纳税人的财政负担。澳大利亚、日本和英国都应该重新评估远程反舰导弹（LRASM）和SM-6导弹，以备将来采购。

华盛顿还应探索与可靠的盟友和伙伴达成联合生产协议。这将随着时间的推移建立起更大规模的联合生产能力，并最终形成一支更强大的联合威慑力量。

对美国人来说，好消息是现在还有时间采取行动，但机会之窗可能正在关闭。

布拉德利·鲍曼是保卫民主基金会军事与政治力量中心的高级主任。他曾担任参议院军事委员会和外交关系委员会成员的国家安全顾问。美国海军退役少将马克·蒙哥马利是保卫民主基金会网络与技术创新中心的高级主任。