Extending New START is a good start for Biden

The news that the Biden administration will seek a five-year extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, is a welcome change from the Trump administration’s assault on nuclear arms control. But the Biden team should not be afraid to keep going and push arms control further .

Extending New START is an important win for U.S.-Russia strategic stability, which has frayed due to increasing animosity in the relationship. The bilateral agreement places limitations on the number of strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems for both countries, but just as importantly contains provisions for inspections and information sharing that allow the two countries to keep tabs on one another’s nuclear arsenals and verify that the other is complying with the treaty.

While the prospects of a wholesale turnaround in U.S.-Russia relations is unlikely, the new administration’s willingness to buttress nuclear diplomacy so soon in its tenure is a promising sign. The treaty’s combination of limitations and transparency creates a degree of mutual trust between Washington and Moscow that has otherwise been in perilously short supply. Moreover, New START creates some predictability about the future size and composition of the Russian nuclear arsenal, which helps with U.S. nuclear planning and reins in arms-racing behavior.

In essence, the treaty creates conditions in which neither country has the incentive to build out its nuclear forces to gain an advantage over the other. New START does not prevent U.S.-Russia nuclear competition, but it sets guardrails that prevent that competition from spiraling out of control.

Like all treaties, New START is not without its faults. Shorter-range “tactical” nuclear weapons are not covered, and some critics have argued that New START’s verification regime is not as robust as the one established by the treaty that preceded it. The Trump administration seized on these faults as well as fears about China’s growing nuclear arsenal as New START’s expiration date drew closer.

Instead of offering Russia a five-year extension, the Trump administration’s negotiating team proposed a shorter extension that would buy time for the United States and Russia to negotiate a more extensive treaty that addressed New START’s perceived shortcomings. If Moscow refused a short-term extension, New START would simply expire without a replacement in place. President Donald Trump’s withdrawals from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Iran nuclear deal and Open Skies Treaty lent credibility to U.S. threats to walk away from New START, but the administration failed to get Russia to agree to its terms.

With the offer to seek a five-year extension to New START, the Biden administration is signaling a clear departure from Trump’s approach to arms control, which emphasized tearing up agreements rather than creating new ones. While no treaty is without faults, New START effectively advances U.S. security interests and reduces nuclear risks with Russia in ways that supporters of a grand strategy of restraint should support.

While today is a good day for arms control, its future is far murkier. Extending New START and returning to some agreements that the Trump administration left — especially the Iran nuclear deal — are good, early priorities for the Biden administration. However, moving arms control into the future will require more creative thinking and a willingness for the United States to consider potentially painful trade-offs in the pursuit of nuclear stability.

If the Biden administration wants to make progress on nuclear diplomacy with North Korea, for example, it will have to move away from the denuclearization-or-bust approach favored by previous administrations. Adjusting U.S. expectations and strategy away from denuclearization and toward arms control has a greater likelihood of putting limits on North Korea’s nuclear program than continuing to focus on complete denuclearization. Yet in the process, President Joe Biden would likely have to make concessions on important U.S. interests such as military exercises and sanctions, and consider ending the Korean War.

Similarly difficult trade-offs will likely be required if the Biden administration wants to begin working with Russia to lay the groundwork for New START’s successor treaty. Securing future limitations on Russian nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles will likely require the United States to consider limitations on its missile defense capabilities. The United States has been categorically opposed to missile defense limitations since leaving the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, but such capabilities play a major role in encouraging Russia’s development of new nuclear weapons.

A five-year extension of New START is an encouraging sign that the Biden administration will try to repair the damage that Trump did to arms control. Extending the treaty will remove a looming foreign policy crisis from Biden’s list of concerns at a time when the new administration’s attention must be on ending the COVID-19 pandemic. If Biden is bold, this can be the beginning of a new era of U.S. interest in arms control.

Eric Gomez is the director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.

拜登政府将寻求把《新削减战略武器条约》（简称“新START条约”）延长五年，这一消息令人欣喜，也与特朗普政府对核军控的攻击形成了鲜明对比。但拜登团队不应畏惧继续推进军控进程。

延长《新削减战略武器条约》对美俄战略稳定而言是一项重要胜利，此前由于两国关系日益紧张，这种稳定已受到威胁。这项双边协议限制了两国战略核弹头和运载系统的数量，但同样重要的是，它包含核查和信息共享条款，使两国能够相互监督对方的核武库，并核实对方是否遵守条约。

尽管美俄关系全面扭转的可能性不大，但新政府上任伊始就愿意加强核外交，这无疑是一个令人鼓舞的迹象。该条约兼具限制性和透明度，在华盛顿和莫斯科之间建立了一种此前极其匮乏的互信。此外，《新削减战略武器条约》也使俄罗斯未来核武库的规模和构成具有一定的可预测性，这有助于美国的核计划，并遏制军备竞赛行为。

从本质上讲，该条约创造了一种环境，使两国都没有动机通过发展核力量来获取对另一方的优势。新削减战略武器条约并不能阻止美俄之间的核竞争，但它设置了防止这种竞争失控的保障措施。

如同所有条约一样，《新削减战略武器条约》并非完美无缺。它并未涵盖短程“战术”核武器，一些批评人士也指出，《新削减战略武器条约》的核查机制不如其前身条约所建立的机制健全。随着《新削减战略武器条约》到期日的临近，特朗普政府利用了这些缺陷以及对中国日益增长的核武库的担忧。

特朗普政府的谈判团队没有向俄罗斯提出五年延期，而是提议短期延期，以便为美俄争取时间，就一项更广泛的条约进行谈判，以解决《新削减战略武器条约》（New START）被认为存在的缺陷。如果莫斯科拒绝短期延期，《新削减战略武器条约》将自动失效，而没有替代方案。特朗普总统退出《中导条约》、伊朗核协议和《开放天空条约》的做法，增强了美国退出《新削减战略武器条约》威胁的可信度，但美国政府未能促使俄罗斯同意其条款。

拜登政府提出寻求将《新削减战略武器条约》（New START）延长五年，这表明其在军控问题上与特朗普政府截然不同。特朗普政府的方针强调撕毁现有协议，而非缔结新协议。尽管任何条约都并非完美无缺，但《新削减战略武器条约》有效地促进了美国的国家安全利益，并降低了与俄罗斯的核风险，这值得奉行克制大战略的人士支持。

尽管今天对军控而言是个好日子，但其未来却远不明朗。延长《新削减战略武器条约》并恢复特朗普政府退出的一些协议——尤其是伊朗核协议——是拜登政府早期优先考虑的重要事项。然而，要推动军控走向未来，需要更具创造性的思维，以及美国在追求核稳定的过程中，愿意考虑可能带来痛苦的权衡取舍。

例如，如果拜登政府希望在与朝鲜的核外交方面取得进展，就必须放弃以往几届政府奉行的“要么无核化，要么失败”的策略。调整美国的预期和战略，从无核化转向军控，比继续专注于彻底无核化更有可能限制朝鲜的核计划。然而，在此过程中，拜登总统可能不得不对美国的重要利益做出让步，例如军事演习和制裁，并考虑结束朝鲜战争。

如果拜登政府希望与俄罗斯合作，为《新削减战略武器条约》的后续条约奠定基础，那么同样需要做出艰难的权衡。确保未来对俄罗斯核武器及其运载工具的限制，很可能需要美国考虑限制自身的导弹防御能力。自2002年退出《反弹道导弹条约》以来，美国一直坚决反对限制导弹防御能力，但这种能力在鼓励俄罗斯发展新型核武器方面发挥着重要作用。

将《新削减战略武器条约》延长五年是一个令人鼓舞的信号，表明拜登政府将努力弥补特朗普对军控造成的损害。延长该条约将使拜登政府摆脱一项迫在眉睫的外交政策危机，而此时新政府的注意力必须集中在结束新冠疫情上。如果拜登采取果断行动，这可能标志着美国对军控的关注进入一个新时代。

埃里克·戈麦斯是卡托研究所外交政策研究主任。