Here’s America’s Plan for Nuking its Enemies, Including North Korea

By Joseph Trevithick

Updated Jul 3, 2020 4:17 AM EDT

The United States had terse and cryptic words for North Korea’s reclusive communist regime after it tested yet another ballistic missile on April 4, 2017. Unnamed White House officials said the “clock has now run out” for authorities in Pyongyang and reiterated a previous threat that “all options are on the table.”

“The United States has spoken enough about North Korea,” Secretary of State Rex Tillerson wrote in an unusual three sentence statement .

The curt remarks were the latest in a string of increasingly tough rhetoric between American and North Korean officials beginning in March 2017 , including a Pyongyang spokesman’s threat of “ a preemptive nuclear attack ” if the United States resorted to unilateral military action. But how might the United States actually respond to these provocations and potential doomsday scenarios? Well, we’ve found some answers inside the U.S. Strategic Command’s (STRATCOM) Operations Plan (OPLAN) 8010. While it doesn’t explicit allow for an American preemptive strike, it is the literal nuclear option.

“With the end of the Cold War the international landscape has changed,” the July 2012 version of the document explains in a section called “framing the problem.” “The global security landscape is marked by protracted conflict, constant change, enormous complexity, and increased uncertainty.”

“While dynamic security concerns in space and cyberspace evolve, traditional threats to national security continue to be presented by sovereign states, both the peer and near-peer and those regional adversary states with emerging WMD [weapons of mass destruction] capabilities,” the authors wrote, adding their own emphasis.

We obtained a heavily redacted portion of this document through the Freedom of Information Act, as well as a similarly censored excerpt from a previous, February 2008 edition. The 2012 version wouldn’t otherwise have been up for its first declassification review until 2022.

There is a section that details “countries that present global threats,” but the un-redacted portions of the document do not describe North Korea by name. Unclassified text specifically mentions Russia and China, but to does not suggest either one is an imminent danger to Americans.

“The term ‘enemy’ is used in the singular form throughout this document for simplicity,” the OPLAN says. “However, because of the global view of this plan and the varied nature of the adversary set, multiple enemies are addressed.”

Though not necessarily surprising, “normally they don’t like to list any names,” Hans Kristensen, head of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project, told The War Zone in an Email. “It looks like there are now (2012) five adversaries in the plan: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Syria,” he posited, based on the number of redacted paragraphs.

This would make sense, given that officials in Washington see all of these as potential adversaries who either have nuclear arsenals or are seeking to obtain them. Russia and China both maintain stockpiles with hundreds of warheads, as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the United States. The U.S. government believes Iran’s nuclear program is focused on weapons development, despite repeated denials from their counterparts in Tehran. And in 2007, Israeli warplanes bombed an apparent covert nuclear reactor in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor governorate.

Kim Jong-Un makes regular and well documented visits to the country’s nuclear sites., North Korean State Media

Of course, it’s possible that instead of Syria and Iran, the paragraphs could have mentioned nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, who continue to experience significant tensions, linked in no small part to the continuing disagreement over the final status of the Kashmir region. The publicly released portions only refer to actors seeking WMD, too, which could encompass countries or non-state groups seeking to build up large stockpiles of chemical, biological, or radiological weaponry.

“Rapid technological evolution and the wide civil availability of formerly advanced military capabilities have reduced ‘entry costs,’ making available completely new weapons and enabling actors to access capabilities that would not have been available to them in the past without significant investment,” STRATCOM’s plan says. “Blurred boundaries and overlapping claims to sovereignty in global domains will continue to present national security challenges.”

But it seems unlikely North Korea hasn’t made the list. Under the helm of its young leader Kim Jong-Un, the country routinely declares its intention to build nuclear weapons—ostensibly as a deterrent to the U.S. military and its allies in South Korea and Japan—describes itself as a nuclear state equal to America, and repeatedly threatens to use these arms in a confrontation with its sworn enemies. Since 2006, it has detonated at least five suspected nuclear devices of varying strengths. The fifth test in September 2016 involved a nuclear warhead small enough to fit on a missile, according to North Korean state-run media.

“We don’t really know how big North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is, or will be once the ‘standardized’ warheads are deployed to the missile forces,” Jeffery Lewis, who runs the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, wrote at the time for Foreign Policy . “But its not a small number, and certainly not just a handful. And it’s likely to keep growing.”

On top of its nuclear warheads, North Korea has been steadily improving and expanding its ballistic missiles with an eye toward being able to threaten the United States, or its territories in the Pacific Ocean such as Guam and Hawaii. In the April 2017 instance, U.S. Pacific Command initially said it believed the country had launched an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) called the KN-15 . Two months earlier , Pyongyang’s forces had debuted this weapon , known inside the country as Pukkuksong-2, which appeared to be an advanced version of an earlier missile intended for the North Korean navy’s submarines.

Later, other reports suggested the weapon fired just days ago might actually have been a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) known as the Hwasong-7, also called the Scud-Extended Range or Scud-D. In March 2017, North Korea fired four of those weapons toward Japan.

North Korean State Media

MRBMs generally feature ranges between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometers. IRBM class weapons have ranges between 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers, according to the Pentagon. A missile in this second, longer range category would be able to hit American military facilities in Guam from anywhere in North Korea.

If officials in Pyongyang resort to WMD attacks for any reason, OPLAN 8010 swings from “deter” to “defeat,” stressing in its text the need for American political will to employ “strategic forces if deterrence fails.” As part of a standing mission dubbed Operation Global Citadel, the Pentagon maintains a so-called “Nuclear Triad” of nuclear-armed heavy bombers, land- and sea-based ballistic missiles. Smaller fighter jets can carry the B61 thermonuclear gravity bomb, if necessary.

The United States is deeply invested in a multi-year effort to both upgrade its nuclear weapons and delivery platforms. At separate events in 2016, the Air Force announced it would call its future stealth bomber the B-21 Raider . Northrop Grumman is planning to build dozens of the flying-wing style stealth aircraft, hopefully delivering the first examples sometime in the mid-2020s. The Air Force is also exploring plans to replace its Minuteman III ballistic missiles, amid reports of delays over costs . The U.S. Navy is working toward beginning construction of its new Columbia -class ballistic missile submarines . The service expects to buy the first boat, the first-in-class USS Columbia , in 2021. A new nuclear bomb and cruise missile are also in the works.

Whatever weapons STRATCOM employs, the goal is clear: “attack the appropriate enemy ‘system’ to eliminate the enemy’s capability to fight and influence key decision makes to cease hostilities.”

B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers sit next to each other at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam., USAF

Unsurprisingly, specific details about the actual missions for any of these weapons, current or planned, are still classified. Reliable deterrence is a balancing act between giving potential opponents just enough information to be scared, but not enough to develop safeguards that would make the strikes ineffective.

That means there are still important elements that are free to share. The most important is that the United States does not have a policy of “no first use” when it comes to thermonuclear war. Most of the specific thresholds are redacted, but the OPLAN specifically says the president can order STRATCOM to respond “in the event of a hostile act or intent.”

“There is nothing in this [OPLAN] that indicates a constraint on potential nuclear use, except that strikes have to comply with the Law of Armed Conflict, etc,” Kristensen explained. “That is in and of itself important, not least because the 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy explicitly states that the United States does not target civilians.”

But that leaves open a lot of room for interpretation. While the United States does not deliberately target civilians, it still kills them accidentally in conventional strikes, as have been reported in Iraq , Syria, and Yemen . The presence of innocent bystanders is not necessarily enough to abort a strike.

“The implication is nuclear use only in extreme conditions,” Dr. William Burr, who runs the nuclear history documentation project at the National Security Archive at The George Washington University, told The War Zone in an email. “I would say that in such a circumstance, the decision would be left to the president and his advisers. One size would not fit all so to speak.”

Given the immense power of America’s nuclear weapons, one might hope that the danger of causing massive collateral damage would be major factor, but it’s not a given. That’s where the OPLAN’s specific mention of “proportionality” comes into play.

“The use of any weapon, kinetic or non-kinetic, must comply with the key principles of [the Law of Armed Conflict]: military necessity, avoidance of unnecessary suffering, proportionality, and discrimination or distinction,” the document explains. “All of these principles will be taken into account when developing and executing courses of action.”

The ballistic missile submarine USS Maryland fires an unarmed Trident II D5 during a training exercise. , USN

Taken together, these factors “all mean—to the extent they are followed and not watered down by operational considerations—that there is at least an intent to try to limit collateral damage and civilian suffering that presumably is reflected in the strike plans,” Kristensen says. “The requirement in OPLAN 8010-12 for “proportionality” raises the issue of how a nuclear response to a conventional attack could ever be proportional?

However, in 2010 and again in 2013, U.S. government reviews on how and when to employ nuclear weapons concluded that they were not “sole-purpose,” meaning the President should only be able to authorize their use during an all-out nuclear conflict. From the parts of OPLAN 8010 that are available to us, the United States has and continues to leave open the possibility of using these weapons in response to a conventional or non-nuclear WMD attack on Americans or allies covered by mutual defense treaties, such as South Korea and Japan. If North Korea were to launch a nuclear-tipped barrage of missiles, a U.S. military strike in kind would hardly be disproportionate.

“The use of WMD by any state has impacts to international security,” a declassified portion notes. “Strategies for one adversary will not necessarily be appropriate for another adversary.”

In addition, it is possible that STRATCOM’s “proportional” strikes could involve conventional rather than nuclear weapons. Though the headquarters has operational control over America’s nuclear arsenal, its aircraft in particular could carry conventional payloads. Since 2014, first B-1 and then B-52 strategic bombers demonstrated this dual ability as they pounded Islamic State terrorists in Iraq and Syria. In January 2017, B-2 stealth bombers flew all the way from the United States to drop smart bombs with high-explosive warheads on one of the group’s camps in Libya .

In this vein, it’s important to note that the official title of the 2008 edition of the OPLAN was “Global Deterrence and Strike.” STRATCOM changed this to “Strategic Deterrence and Force Employment” four years later. This change in phrasing could have something to do with plans for the employment of conventionally-armed bombs and missiles, or not .

The handy “classification guide” – a comprehensive table of what is and isn’t secret – from the 2008 version says “that OPLAN 8010 consists of various attack options” can be unclassified, secret, or top secret depending on the details. “The fact that OPLAN 8010 consists of various nuclear attack options is unclassified. The number of nuclear attack options is secret. The details of nuclear attack options are top secret,” an additional note explains. This would seem to imply the plan covers nuclear options only.

During the administration of President George W. Bush, there was another plan that appeared to cover global, strategic conventional strikes, including pre-emptive operations, called OPLAN 8022 . A separate nuclear plan, OPLAN 8044, also existed. Pentagon efforts to create a capability called “Prompt Global Strike” created confusion about whether this involved nuclear or conventional arms, or both, and whether it would be dangerously difficult to tell the two apart. A ballistic missile carrying a high-explosive payload wouldn’t necessarily look different from one with a thermonuclear warhead at the tip.

“Eventually, the two missions merged to some extent into OPLAN 8010,” Kristensen noted. “It is a fuller strategic plan that attempts to incorporate more elements of national power to apply pressure and achieve strategic effects on specific adversaries.”

An unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile rockets away from a launch site at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California during a test., USAF

Unfortunately, there’s no guarantee North Korea will get the desired message. The pariah state has long defined itself by its opposition to intimidation and pressure and as we at The War Zone have already reported , the stern American rhetoric may only validate their opinions and propaganda, pushing them further toward a rash decision.

OPLAN 8010 specifically mentions this and six other risks. Four of the others are almost completely censored. And what do you do when “adversaries misperceive messages?” The plan recommends nuclear commanders “constantly assess culturally appropriate strategic communication strategy, tightly integrated through the interagency process.”

Regardless, “we’ve always had all options on the table,” former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said on CBS’ “ This Week ” earlier in April 2017. “I wouldn’t take any off.”

One of those options available to Trump and his administration is definitely the strike plans inside OPLAN 8010.

Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

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作者：约瑟夫·特雷维西克

更新于美国东部时间2020年7月3日凌晨4:17

2017 年 4 月 4 日，朝鲜再次试射弹道导弹后，美国对这个封闭的共产主义政权发表了措辞简短而含糊的声明。白宫匿名官员表示，平壤当局的“时间已经到了”，并重申了之前的威胁，即“所有选项都在考虑之中”。

“美国已经就朝鲜问题发表了足够多的言论，”国务卿雷克斯·蒂勒森在一份罕见的三句话声明中写道。

这些简短的言论是自2017年3月以来美朝官员之间一系列日益强硬的言辞中的最新一起，其中包括平壤发言人威胁称，如果美国诉诸单边军事行动，朝鲜将进行“先发制人的核打击”。但美国究竟会如何应对这些挑衅和潜在的末日情景呢？我们在美国战略司令部（STRATCOM）的作战计划（OPLAN）801​​0中找到了一些答案。虽然该计划没有明确允许美国进行先发制人的打击，但它实际上就是核选项。

“随着冷战的结束，国际格局发生了变化，”2012年7月版的文件在题为“问题框架”的章节中解释道。“全球安全格局的特点是旷日持久的冲突、持续不断的变化、巨大的复杂性和日益加剧的不确定性。”

“尽管太空和网络空间的动态安全问题不断演变，但主权国家，包括势均力敌和接近势均力敌的国家，以及拥有新兴大规模杀伤性武器能力的地区敌对国家，仍然对国家安全构成传统威胁，”作者写道，并补充了自己的强调。

我们通过《信息自由法》获得了这份文件的部分删节版，以及一份同样经过审查的2008年2月版本的摘录。否则，2012年版要到2022年才会进行首次解密审查。

文件中有一个章节详细列出了“构成全球威胁的国家”，但未删节的部分并未提及朝鲜。非机密文本特别提到了俄罗斯和中国，但并未暗示两国对美国人构成迫在眉睫的威胁。

“为简便起见，本文件中‘敌人’一词均采用单数形式，”作战计划指出。“然而，鉴于本计划的全球视野以及敌方势力的多样性，计划中也考虑到了多个敌人。”

虽然这并不令人意外，但“他们通常不喜欢列出任何名字，”美国科学家联盟核信息项目负责人汉斯·克里斯滕森在给《战区》的一封电子邮件中表示。“根据被删减的段落数量，他推测，该计划目前（2012年）涉及五个对手：俄罗斯、中国、朝鲜、伊朗和叙利亚。”

考虑到华盛顿官员将所有这些国家都视为潜在对手，它们要么拥有核武库，要么正试图获取核武库，这种做法也就不难理解了。俄罗斯和中国都拥有数百枚核弹头的库存，以及能够打到美国的洲际弹道导弹。尽管德黑兰方面一再否认，但美国政府仍然认为伊朗的核计划侧重于武器研发。2007年，以色列战机轰炸了叙利亚代尔祖尔省一座疑似秘密的核反应堆。

据朝鲜官方媒体报道，金正恩定期视察该国的核设施，这些视察都有详细记录。

当然，这些段落也可能提及拥有核武器的印度和巴基斯坦，而不是叙利亚和伊朗。印巴两国关系持续紧张，这在很大程度上与克什米尔地区最终地位的争议有关。已公开的部分仅提及寻求大规模杀伤性武器的行为体，这可能包括试图建立大量化学、生物或放射性武器储备的国家或非国家行为体。

美国战略司令部（STRATCOM）的计划指出：“技术的快速发展以及以往先进军事能力的广泛民用化降低了‘准入门槛’，使得全新的武器得以普及，并使各方能够获得过去需要大量投资才能获得的能力。全球范围内边界的模糊化和主权主张的重叠将继续对国家安全构成挑战。”

但朝鲜似乎不太可能不在名单之列。在其年轻领导人金正恩的领导下，朝鲜经常宣称有意发展核武器——表面上是为了威慑美国及其在韩国和日本的盟友——并自诩为与美国平起平坐的核国家，还一再威胁要在与宿敌的对抗中使用核武器。自2006年以来，朝鲜至少引爆了五枚威力不等的疑似核装置。据朝鲜官方媒体报道，2016年9月的第五次试验使用了一颗小型核弹头，足以装载在导弹上。

“我们并不真正了解朝鲜的核武库规模有多大，或者一旦‘标准化’核弹头部署到导弹部队后会有多大，”蒙特雷米德尔伯里国际研究学院詹姆斯·马丁防扩散研究中心东亚防扩散项目主任杰弗里·刘易斯当时在《外交政策》杂志上撰文写道。“但数量肯定不少，绝非寥寥无几。而且很可能会继续增长。”

除了核弹头之外，朝鲜一直在稳步改进和扩充其弹道导弹，意图威胁美国及其在太平洋的领土，例如关岛和夏威夷。2017年4月，美国太平洋司令部最初表示，他们认为朝鲜发射了一枚名为KN-15的中程弹道导弹（IRBM）。两个月前，平壤方面首次展示了这种武器，在朝鲜国内被称为“北极星-2”（Pukkuksong-2），它似乎是早期一款导弹的改进型，该导弹原本是为朝鲜海军潜艇设计的。

后来，其他报道指出，几天前发射的武器实际上可能是一枚名为“火星-7”的中程弹道导弹（MRBM），也称“飞毛腿增程型”或“飞毛腿-D”。2017年3月，朝鲜曾向日本发射了四枚该型导弹。

朝鲜官方媒体

根据五角大楼的数据，中程弹道导弹（MRBM）的射程通常在1000至3000公里之间。中程弹道导弹（IRBM）的射程则在3000至5500公里之间。属于后一类射程更远的导弹，能够从朝鲜境内的任何地点打击位于关岛的美国军事设施。

如果平壤官员出于任何原因诉诸大规模杀伤性武器，作战计划8010将从“威慑”转向“击败”，并在其文本中强调，如果威慑失败，美国需要展现出动用“战略力量”的政治意愿。作为一项名为“全球堡垒行动”的常设任务的一部分，五角大楼维持着所谓的“核三位一体”力量，包括携带核武器的重型轰炸机、陆基和海基弹道导弹。如有必要，小型战斗机也可以携带B61热核重力炸弹。

美国正大力投入一项为期多年的核武器及其运载平台升级计划。2016年，美国空军在不同的场合宣布，其未来的隐形轰炸机将命名为B-21“突袭者”。诺斯罗普·格鲁曼公司计划建造数十架这种飞翼式隐形飞机，并有望在2020年代中期交付首批飞机。与此同时，由于成本问题导致交付延迟，美国空军也在探索替换其“民兵III”型弹道导弹的方案。美国海军正着手建造其新型“哥伦比亚”级弹道导弹潜艇。海军预计将于2021年接收首艘潜艇——“哥伦比亚”号。此外，新型核弹和巡航导弹也在研发之中。

无论战略司令部使用何种武器，其目标都很明确：“攻击敌方相应的‘系统’，以消除敌方的作战能力，并影响关键决策者，从而停止敌对行动。”

在关岛安德森空军基地，美国空军的B-52、B-1和B-2轰炸机并排停放。

不出所料，无论是现役还是计划中的武器，其具体任务细节仍然属于机密。可靠的威慑力在于如何在给予潜在对手足够的信息以使其感到畏惧，但又不至于让他们发展出足以使打击失效的防御措施之间取得平衡。

这意味着仍有一些重要信息可以公开。其中最重要的是，美国在热核战争方面并没有“不首先使用”的政策。虽然大多数具体阈值已被隐去，但作战计划明确指出，总统可以命令战略司令部在“发生敌对行为或意图”时做出回应。

克里斯滕森解释说：“这份作战计划中没有任何内容表明对潜在的核武器使用有所限制，除了打击行动必须遵守武装冲突法等规定。这一点本身就很重要，尤其因为2013年的《核武器运用战略》明确指出，美国不会以平民为目标。”

但这留下了很大的解读空间。虽然美国不会故意以平民为目标，但在常规打击中仍然会造成平民误伤，伊拉克、叙利亚和也门等地均有相关报道。无辜旁观者的存在并不一定足以中止打击行动。

“这意味着只有在极端情况下才会使用核武器，”乔治·华盛顿大学国家安全档案馆核历史文献项目负责人威廉·伯尔博士在给《战区》的一封电子邮件中写道。“我认为，在这种情况下，最终决定权将交给总统及其顾问。不能一概而论。”

鉴于美国核武器的巨大威力，人们或许会认为造成大规模附带损害的风险会是一个主要考量因素，但这并非必然。而这正是作战计划中特别提及“相称性”原则的原因所在。

文件解释说：“使用任何武器，无论是动能武器还是非动能武器，都必须符合[武装冲突法]的关键原则：军事必要性、避免不必要的痛苦、相称性以及区别对待。在制定和执行行动方案时，所有这些原则都将予以考虑。”

美国海军“马里兰”号弹道导弹潜艇在训练演习中发射了一枚未装弹头的“三叉戟II D5”型导弹。

克里斯滕森说，综合来看，这些因素“都意味着——只要它们得到遵循，并且没有被作战考量所削弱——至少存在着尽量减少附带损害和平民伤亡的意图，而这大概也体现在打击计划中。” “作战计划8010-12中关于‘相称性’的要求引发了一个问题：对常规攻击的核回应如何才能做到相称？”

然而，美国政府在2010年和2013年两次对如何以及何时使用核武器进行审查后得出结论，认为核武器并非“单一用途武器”，这意味着总统只有在全面核冲突爆发时才能授权使用核武器。从我们目前掌握的8010号作战计划部分内容来看，美国过去和现在都保留了在遭受针对美国公民或受共同防御条约保护的盟国（例如韩国和日本）的常规或非核大规模杀伤性武器攻击时使用核武器的可能性。如果朝鲜发射一连串携带核弹头的导弹，美国进行相应的军事打击也绝非不成比例。

“任何国家使用大规模杀伤性武器都会对国际安全造成影响，”一份解密文件指出。“对付一个对手的战略未必适用于另一个对手。”

此外，战略司令部的“比例性”打击行动有可能使用常规武器而非核武器。尽管该司令部对美国的核武库拥有作战指挥权，但其飞机尤其能够携带常规武器载荷。自2014年以来，B-1和B-52战略轰炸机先后在伊拉克和叙利亚对伊斯兰国恐怖分子进行轰炸时，展现了这种双重能力。2017年1月，B-2隐形轰炸机从美国远赴利比亚，向该组织在利比亚的一个营地投掷了装有高爆弹头的智能炸弹。

由此可见，2008年版作战计划的正式名称是“全球威慑与打击”。四年后，战略司令部将其改为“战略威慑与武力运用”。这种措辞上的变化可能与常规武装炸弹和导弹的使用计划有关，也可能无关。

2008 年版的实用“分类指南”（一份详尽的表格，列出了哪些内容属于机密，哪些内容不属于机密）指出，“作战计划 8010 包含多种攻击选项”，根据具体细节，其保密级别可能为非机密、机密或绝密。“作战计划 8010 包含多种核攻击选项这一事实属于非机密。核攻击选项的数量属于机密。核攻击选项的细节属于绝密，”一份补充说明解释道。这似乎暗示该计划仅涵盖核选项。

在乔治·W·布什总统执政期间，还有一项名为“作战计划8022”（OPLAN 8022）的计划，似乎涵盖了全球战略常规打击，包括先发制人的作战行动。此外，还有一项独立的核打击计划，即“作战计划8044”（OPLAN 8044）。五角大楼试图建立一种名为“全球快速打击”（Prompt Global Strike）的能力，但这引发了人们对该能力究竟包含核武器还是常规武器，抑或两者兼有，以及区分两者是否极其困难等问题的困惑。一枚携带高爆炸药的弹道导弹与一枚顶端装有热核弹头的弹道导弹，在外观上未必有太大区别。

克里斯滕森指出：“最终，这两项任务在某种程度上融合为作战计划8010。这是一个更全面的战略计划，试图融入更多国家力量要素，以对特定对手施加压力并取得战略效果。”

一枚未携带弹头的“民兵III”型洲际弹道导弹在加利福尼亚州范登堡空军基地的发射场进行测试时发射升空。（美国空军）

不幸的是，我们无法保证朝鲜能够接收到我们想要传达的信息。这个被国际社会孤立的国家长期以来一直以反对恐吓和施压而著称，正如我们“战区”网站此前报道的那样，美国强硬的言辞可能只会印证他们的观点和宣传，从而进一步促使他们做出草率的决定。

作战计划8010明确提及了这一风险以及其他六项风险。其余四项风险几乎完全被审查。如果“对手误解了信息”，又该如何应对？该计划建议核武器指挥官“不断评估符合文化背景的战略沟通策略，并通过跨部门流程将其紧密整合”。

尽管如此，“我们始终把所有选项都摆在桌面上，”前国防部长阿什顿·卡特在2017年4月初接受哥伦比亚广播公司“本周”节目采访时表示。“我不会放弃任何一个选项。”

特朗普及其政府可选择的方案之一，肯定是 OPLAN 8010 中的打击计划。

联系作者：joe@thedrive.com

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