F FEICELL News全球新闻 · 本地动态 · 实时更新
← 返回新闻首页
军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 5, 2026

The US delegation arrived in Moscow City on September 5 as Ukraine and Russia reached a temporary agreement to halt long-range strikes.

ISWNate Ha查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年9月5日

The US delegation arrived in Moscow City on September 5 as Ukraine and Russia reached a temporary agreement to halt long-range strikes against Kyiv and Moscow cities for three days to facilitate the delegation’s travel. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner arrived in Moscow City on September 5, and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev greeted them upon arrival.[1] US President Donald Trump stated on September 4 that Witkoff’s and Kushner’s visit to Russia aims to discuss a proposal to end the war in Ukraine.[2] Sources close to the Kremlin reported on September 4 that the Kremlin’s expectations for the US delegation’s visit to Russia are extremely low as Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to end the war only on his increasingly tough terms, according to Bloomberg.[3]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 5 that Ukraine will adhere to a long-range strikes ceasefire covering Kyiv and Moscow cities until the end of the day on September 7 after Zelensky spoke with Witkoff and Kushner on September 5.[4] Putin met with Witkoff and Kushner on September 5 and confirmed that he also ordered Russian forces to halt strikes against Kyiv City for three days starting at midnight on September 5.[5] Putin acknowledged that Ukrainian forces reduced the number of their strikes against Russia during Witkoff’s and Kushner’s visit to Russia. The long-range strikes ceasefire for Kyiv and Moscow cities comes as Ukraine expects Witkoff and Kushner to arrive in Kyiv City on September 6.

Putin rejected a broader frontline ceasefire proposed by Ukraine during the US delegation’s visit. Ukrainian forces received orders on September 4 to observe a ceasefire along the frontline from midnight on the night of September 4 to 5 until the end of the day on September 8, according to sources within several Ukrainian brigades.[6] Sources added that Ukraine proposed the frontline ceasefire but noted that Russia and Ukraine have not reached a formal agreement at the time of writing. Putin acknowledged during his meeting with Witkoff and Kushner on September 5 that Ukraine proposed a broader three-day ceasefire but noted that Russia did not agree to it.[7]

Russian officials continue discussing efforts to strengthen Russian air defense systems in order to defend against Ukraine’s long-range strikes. Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed on September 5 his support for United Russia Party candidate Yevgeny Poddubny’s proposal to allow Russian volunteers with fitness category D (unfit for military service) to serve in regional air defense units, such as the BARS (Combat Reserve) formations, and protect Russian facilities from Ukrainian drone strikes.[8] Putin promised to discuss ways to improve Russian air defense with the General Staff and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and noted that Russian air defense units require a single commander rather than a unified coordination center.[9] Russian air defenses have repeatedly struggled to defend Russia’s vast rear against Ukrainian long-range strikes due to the lack of air defense systems, manpower shortages, and civil-military coordination challenges, particularly as the Russian government attempts to further deflect the responsibility for providing air defense protection onto private businesses.[10]

The US delegation arrived in Moscow City on September 5 as Ukraine and Russia reached a temporary agreement to halt long-range strikes against Kyiv and Moscow cities for three days to facilitate the delegation’s travel.

Putin rejected a broader frontline ceasefire proposed by Ukraine during the US delegation’s visit.

Russian officials continue discussing efforts to strengthen Russian air defense systems in order to defend against Ukraine’s long-range strikes.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on September 5.

Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M or KN-23 ballistic missiles and 167 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 4 and 5 but did not advance.[11] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Ukrainian forces are advancing along the railway between Taratutyne and Ryasne (both southeast of Sumy City).[12]

Ukrainian officials continue to deny official Russian claims of Russian advances in northern Sumy Oblast. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Sumy direction refuted on September 5 Russian President Vladimir Putin’s September 1 claim that Russian forces are 12 kilometers from the Sumy City ring road.[13] The commander noted that Putin claimed on June 29 that Russian forces were about 10 kilometers from Sumy City.[14] The commander also denied Russian claims that Russian forces seized Khrapivshchyna (north of Sumy City).[15] The commander added that Russian forces have not advanced in the unit’s area of responsibility since wintertime despite repeated infiltration attempts in groups of two to three.[16]

Ukrainian forces struck Russian military infrastructure in border areas of Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian radar station in Kartushyn (roughly 22 kilometers from the border), an electronic warfare (EW) system near Pogar (roughly 20 kilometers from the border), and a mesh network repeater in Zlynka (roughly 35 kilometers from the front) on September 4.[17]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 4 and 5 but did not advance.[18] A source reporting on the Russian Northern GoF claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking and regaining lost positions near Hoptivka and Kudiivka (both north of Kharkiv City).[19]

Russian milbloggers continued to baselessly claim that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces between the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions but did not present any evidence of the alleged encirclement.[20]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 4 and 5 but did not make confirmed advances.[21] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Petro-Ivanivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) and Dvorichne (northeast of Kupyansk).[23]

The area between Ridkodub and Nove (both southeast of Borova) is reportedly a contested “gray zone.”[24] A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that there is no clear frontline in the area between Ridkodub and Nove (both southeast of Borova) due to constant fighting.

Russian forces are reportedly tailoring their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaigns to each direction within the Russian Western GoF’s area of responsibility. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Kupyansk and Borova directions have been focusing on striking Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in both the near and deep rears, whereas those in the Lyman direction are more focused on near rear strikes, including strikes against crossings over the Siverskyi Donets River.[25] The milblogger assessed that the different strike priorities depend on the terrain and the configuration of the front but that all the strike campaigns aim to restrict Ukrainian forces’ movement and ability to supply their forward units.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian repair base in Sokolohirsk (roughly 50 kilometers from the front) on September 4.[26]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on September 4 and 5 but did not advance.[27]

Russian milbloggers continue to contest official Russian claims of advances north of Slovyansk amid continued cognitive warfare efforts to aggrandize Russian advances in the area. A Russian source published footage on September 5 purporting to show a Russian servicemember walking through Svyatohirsk (north of Slovyansk), which Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed Russian forces seized on September 1.[28] This footage was archival and doctored, however, including a voiceover that was not featured in the original footage.[29] A Russian milblogger acknowledged on September 5 that Russian personnel doctored the archival footage by including a voiceover and removing the original watermark.[30] The milblogger also acknowledged that there is no credible evidence that Russian forces seized Svyatohirsk and that the nearest Russian positions are about 10 kilometers from the settlement across rough terrain. A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF also claimed on September 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks near Drobysheve (northeast of Slovyansk and east of Svyatohirsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions significantly east of Svyatohirsk and that Russian forces have likely not advanced west of Drobysheve.[31] Doctored and AI-generated footage is a core element of Moscow’s cognitive warfare effort that aims to project an inflated image of Russian advances in Ukraine.[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 4 and 5 but did not make confirmed advances.[33] The Russian MoD claimed on September 5 that Russian forces seized Kurtivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka).[34] A Russian milblogger assessed that Russian forces aim to use Kurtivka to cut off Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka from Druzhkivka, enabling the seizure of Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka and Osykove (all northwest of Kostyantynivka).[35] ISW has not assessed evidence that Russian forces have advanced anywhere near Kurtivka, and the closest assessed Russian-controlled areas are roughly 10 kilometers away from Kurtivka.

Russian forces continue infiltration missions in the Dobropillya tactical area. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian soldier in southeastern Matyasheve (south of Dobropillya), according to geolocated footage published on September 5, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[36] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have seized half of the buildings in Matyasheve and that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Novohryshyne (just west of Matyasheve).[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the direction of Matyasheve and Shevchenko (south of Chernihivka).[38] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced from Chernihivka (southeast of Dobropillya) into Dobropillya, south of Vesele (northeast of Dobropillya), and to eastern Dobropillya (a smaller settlement south of the town of Dobropillya).[39]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger emphasized the importance of securing supply lines for Russian efforts both south and east of Dobropillya. The milblogger assessed that Russian forces aim to secure the flanks of the units attacking Hannivka (just east of Dobropillya) while enveloping Ukrainian positions near Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya) from the east.[40] The milblogger claimed that Russian advances between Novohryshyne (south of Dobropillya) and Myrne (south of Novohryshyne) aim to secure rear logistics near Shevchenko (southwest of Novohryshyne), a major supply hub for Russian forces attacking the Dobropillya area from the south.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Oleksandrivka directions on September 4 and 5 but did not advance.[41]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Kamaz truck along the M-14 Rostov-on-Don-Crimea highway northwest of Demyanivka (roughly 93 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 4.[42]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on September 4 and 5 but did not advance.[43]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv), according to geolocated footage published on September 5, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[44]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel truck near occupied Novobohdanivka, Zaporizhia Oblast (approximately 51 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 4.[45]

A localized ceasefire took effect on September 5 to allow power line repairs to the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi announced on September 5 that a localized ceasefire near the ZNPP took effect to enable Ukrainian technicians to conduct power line damage repairs necessary for the restoration of the off-site power connection to the plant.[46] The IAEA stated that the ZNPP lost its external power connectivity on August 20, 2026 due to military activity on the north (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[47]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 5.

Russian forces continued to employ “human safari” tactics targeting civilians in Kherson City. Russian forces struck a civilian in Kherson City with drone-dropped munitions, according to geolocated footage published on September 5.[48]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[49]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 4 to 5 . The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces overnight launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M or KN-23 ballistic missiles from Rostov and Voronezh oblasts; and 167 Shahed- (about half of which were jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[50] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 128 Shahed- and Gerbera-type and other drones; that an unspecified number of drones and missiles struck 23 locations; and that drone debris fell on one location. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that some Russian strike vehicles did not reach their targets. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and industrial infrastructure in Kherson, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Odesa, Kharkiv, Poltava, Kyiv, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[51]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/2096196488879644825 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putins-envoy-dmitriev-meet-witkoff-kushner-upon-their-arrival-moscow-sources-say-2026-09-05/ ; https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/20527 ; https://t.me/SolovievLive/383934 [2] https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/05/europe/witkoff-kushner-moscow-kyiv-proposal-war-intl; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xHSKMevaFIc; https://suspilne dot media/1396028-tramp-ne-virit-so-rosia-atakue-teritoriu-nato/ [3] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-04/us-envoys-to-make-new-ukraine-peace-push-with-russia-pessimistic; https://meduza dot io/feature/2026/09/05/voyna [4] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/ukrayina-gotova-dotrimuvatisya-rezhimu-pripinennya-povitryan-106265 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20715 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2096242248291701130 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2096242251508719877 [5] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80699 [6] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/rus/news/2026/09/04/8051977/; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/09/04/ukrainskaya-pravda-vsu-poluchili-prikaz-soblyudat-rezhim-tishiny-s-5-po-8-sentyabrya; [7] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80699 [8] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/28083337 [9] https://t.me/zarubinreporter/5165; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/28083389 [10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/ https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2026/ [11] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42123; https://t.me/wargonzo/36706; https://t.me/severnnyi/9235 [12] https://t.me/severnnyi/9235 [13] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/05/u-chervni-putin-zayavlyav-shho-do-sum-zalyshylosya-10-kilometriv-a-u-serpni-shho-12-rosiyany-zaplutalysya-u-vlasnij-brehni/; https://youtu.be/qx9fuhA0As0; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80665 [14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/ [15] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/05/u-chervni-putin-zayavlyav-shho-do-sum-zalyshylosya-10-kilometriv-a-u-serpni-shho-12-rosiyany-zaplutalysya-u-vlasnij-brehni/; [16] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/05/malo-yakyj-rosijskyj-shturmovyk-na-sumshhyni-mozhe-dijty-blyzhche-anizh-na-2-kilometry-do-perednogo-krayu/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/05/u-chervni-putin-zayavlyav-shho-do-sum-zalyshylosya-10-kilometriv-a-u-serpni-shho-12-rosiyany-zaplutalysya-u-vlasnij-brehni/; [17] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42126 [18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42121; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42123; https://t.me/wargonzo/36706; https://t.me/dva_majors/98543; https://t.me/severnnyi/9235 [19] https://t.me/severnnyi/9235 [20] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/26417; https://t.me/wargonzo/36706; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2026/ [21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42121; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42123; https://t.me/wargonzo/36706;; https://t.me/dva_majors/98543; https://t.me/grvZapad/19674 [22] https://t.me/rybar/82904 [23] https://t.me/wargonzo/36706; https://t.me/rybar/82904 [24] https://t.me/grvZapad/19674 [25] https://t.me/notes_veterans/29633; https://t.me/red_war_machina/892 [26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42126 [27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42121 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42123 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98543 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36706 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/29633 ; https://t.me/red_war_machina/892 [28] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/ ; https://t.me/operationall_space/13076 [29] https://t.me/donbass24_7/85121 ; https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/2096203338329047183 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/3476 [30] https://t.me/milinfolive/178967 [31] https://t.me/grvZapad/19674 [32] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/ [33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42121 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42123 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36706 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98543 [34] https://t.me/mod_russia/67057 [35] https://t.me/sashakots/64243 [36] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2096146949208498623; https://t.me/ywjQfBTXyys5YWQy/905; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12889 [37] https://t.me/rybar/82900; https://t.me/tass_agency/393832 [38] https://t.me/arx_spn/30943 [39] https://t.me/wargonzo/36706; https://t.me/z_arhiv/33817; https://t.me/rybar/82900 [40] https://t.me/rybar/82900 [41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42121; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42123 [42] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30386; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30366; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2095941127601832215 [43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42121; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42123; https://t.me/wargonzo/36706; https://t.me/voin_dv/20985 [44] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2096192335423979775; https://t.me/intelligencecompany/256 [45] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2096121173574664589; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30386 [46] https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2096135832998387745 [47] https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2096135832998387745 [48] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2096159876594446601; https://t.me/zona_Red/1175 [49] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [50] https://t.me/kpszsu/76541 [51] https://t.me/Koretskyi_official/399; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31847 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31845 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31843 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31842 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31841 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28491 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28500; https://t.me/dtek_ua/4523; https://t.me/mykolaiv_ova/3519; https://t.me/mykolaiv_ova/3547; https://t.me/odeskaODA/19677

手机左右滑动，电脑按 ← → 键，也能切换新闻