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军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 27, 2026

Putin's new theory of victory relies on long-range combined missile and drone strikes to force Ukraine to capitulate over Winter 2026-2027.

ISWJordan Glynn查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年9月27日

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger is embracing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s new theory of victory that relies on expansive long-range combined ballistic missile and jet-powered drone strikes against Ukraine to force Ukraine to capitulate over Winter 2026-2027. [1] The milblogger acknowledged that the frontline is “static” — a tacit acknowledgement of Russia’s near-zero net battlefield advances in recent months — and called on Russia to intensify and expedite its strike campaign against Ukraine while resources are plentiful. The milblogger warned against relying on the assumption that Russia can sustain its strike indefinitely and incrementally increase its pressure on Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 26 that Russia plans to spend $12 billion on the production of jet-powered drones and loitering munitions.[2] Putin may be reevaluating his theory of victory that had previously relied on the assumption that the Russian military could continue advancing indefinitely until it achieved its goals or Ukraine surrendered in favor of relying on a Russian long-range strike campaign because of Ukraine’s 2026 battlefield successes.[3]

Putin’s modified theory of victory heavily relies on Russia’s ability to launch cheap jet-powered Geran-type drones at scale and with relatively high penetration rates – requirements that Ukraine’s interceptor program is aimed at attacking. The prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on September 27 that Russian forces launched mostly jet-powered Geran-5 drones against Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kyiv cities on the night of September 26 to 27 and that Russia’s diverse strike arsenal and Ukraine’s air defense shortages allow Russian forces to maintain the current pace of strikes and expand their target types.[4] The milblogger stated that the current Russian strike strategy imposes significant economic costs on Ukraine but warned that the cost of sustaining the strike campaign could exceed the campaign’s immediate effects if continued over the long term.[5] Russian forces began intensifying their use of jet-powered drones in late April 2026.[6] Zelensky stated on September 26 that Ukraine’s interception rate of jet-powered Shahed drones is now 55 percent, as Ukrainian air defenses intercepted more than 1,500 such drones out of 2,730 that Russia launched in September 2026 thus far.[7] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Kyrylo Budanov stated on September 27 that Ukraine is testing prototypes of interceptor drones in combat conditions and that Ukraine’s mass use of interceptor drones capable of downing jet-powered Gerans may begin within a few months.[8] Ukrainian companies have already successfully field-tested several interceptor drones that can intercept Russian jet-powered drones.[9] It remains unclear if Ukraine’s interceptor program can be scaled up and successful in time to disrupt the intensifying Russian campaign over the winter.

Putin likely does not envision Russia’s long-range strike campaign against Ukraine to last indefinitely as he is likely attempting to force Ukraine to capitulate before Spring 2027. The milblogger noted on September 27 that a Russian strategy of heavily relying on long-range strikes is expensive and cannot last indefinitely, especially given that Ukrainian forces are also escalating their strikes against Russia.[10] The ongoing Russian strike campaign relies on Ukraine’s inability to intercept Russian jet-powered drones, paired with its shortage of Patriot interceptors to defend against ballistic missiles in Winter 2026-2027, and assumes that Ukraine’s energy and other critical infrastructure will not be able to withstand Russian strikes over the next few months. Putin stated on September 25 that Ukraine “must feel” Russia’s “retaliatory” strikes, suggesting that he intends to escalate his campaign into winter, which he has done in previous winters.[11] Putin may not be considering the long-term costs of the Russian strike campaign if he expects that Ukraine will crumble and surrender this winter. Putin remains unlikely to compromise his demands or engage in serious ceasefire negotiations until his new theory has run its course.[12]

The prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also claimed on September 27 that expanding Russia’s strike arsenal is cheaper than conducting a second mobilization from economic, military, and social perspectives.[13] Putin may seek to delay ordering a large-scale involuntary mobilization, for which his officials have been setting conditions despite Kremlin denials, until he has seen whether his long-range strike campaign is sufficient to achieve his aims.[14] Demand for replacements for enormous Russian losses on the frontlines, however, may push him to order such a mobilization this fall, as Ukrainian and other sources have frequently reported that he has been preparing to do.[15]

Russian forces appear to be actively interfering with Ukrainian efforts to provide food to residents of occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast (southeast of Kherson City and on the left bank of the Dnipro River), threatening to prolong and intensify an already dire humanitarian crisis. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha reported on September 25 that residents in occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, have no food and must eat grass and weeds due to Russian negligence and refusal to provide humanitarian aid per its obligations under international humanitarian law.[16] Russian occupation authorities stopped delivering food and supplies to occupied Oleshky in late December 2025, and in Spring 2026, Russian occupation authorities left Oleshky, effectively removing themselves from the humanitarian crisis.[17] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on September 26 that Ukrainian forces have been delivering food to occupied Oleshky since March 2026 and recently conducted an operation using drones to drop 4,000 kilograms of food to 100 designated locations in Oleshky.[18] Prokudin noted that Russian forces intentionally shot down the drones carrying these provisions to prevent residents from obtaining the food or to enable Russian soldiers to take the food for themselves. Russia’s chronic mismanagement, deliberate disruption of humanitarian aid and evacuation efforts, and denial of its responsibilities under international law have led to a prolonged and now increasingly dire humanitarian crisis.[19] The Kremlin has so far shown no interest in working with Ukraine or other international authorities to establish a local humanitarian ceasefire in the Oleshky area to resolve the crisis and now appears to be actively hindering Ukrainian efforts to provide food to local residents.[20] Russia continues to demonstrate that its relationship with occupied Ukraine is extractive, brutal, and self-serving as Russia’s war restricts consumer logistics routes and limits the goods and services available to occupied Ukrainians.[21]

An unidentified aerial object that was likely a Russian drone entered Romanian airspace on the night of September 26 to 27, as Russia continues to normalize its violations of European airspace. The Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported on September 27 that Romanian radar systems detected an unknown aerial vehicle flying near Chilia Veche, Romania, on Romania’s river border with Ukraine on the evening of September 26.[22] The Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported that the drone entered Romanian airspace near Chilia Veche and flew parallel to the Chilia branch of the Danube Delta before Romania lost the aerial vehicle’s signal near Pardina. Two Spanish F-18 fighter jets and a Romanian IAR-330 SOCAT helicopter scrambled to monitor the aerial vehicle. Romanian authorities have not publicly attributed the incursion to Russia, but the incident is likely part of the Kremlin’s continued efforts to normalize European airspace violations.[23]

European security officials continue to investigate incidents of sabotage, some already attributed to Russia, against European defense and logistical infrastructure. German newswire FAZ reported on September 25 that it obtained information from German security officials that German investigators suspect the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) of using incendiary devices to attack the headquarters of technology and defense companies Rohde & Schwarz and Helsing in Munich, Germany, on September 3.[24] FAZ reported that Helsing supplies the Ukrainian military, that the GRU team was operating out of Slovakia, and that authorities recently thwarted a suspected GRU sabotage attempt in Slovakia. The German security services also reportedly assess that the GRU’s purported Head of Sabotage Operations, Denis Smolyaninov, is likely responsible for the attacks on Leipzig Airport on August 5, an incident that German authorities have publicly attributed to Russia.[25] The German security sources indicated that the GRU is using teams of specialists for sabotage attacks in Europe and organizes the teams on a per-mission basis. The security sources reported that the GRU has further developed its infamous Unit 29155 to become more professional and established the Department for Special Tasks to oversee operations.

Danish South Zealand and Lolland-Falser Police District Chief Kim Skov stated on September 26 that Danish police are investigating an attempted arson attack against the wing of a plane at Lolland-Falster Airport but have not yet linked the incident to Russia.[26] Both the German and Danish incidents fall within Russia’s wider pattern of sabotaging European defense and logistical infrastructure in order to interdict Europe’s will and ability to provide aid to Ukraine.[27]

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger is embracing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s new theory of victory that relies on expansive long-range combined ballistic missile and jet-powered drone strikes against Ukraine to force Ukraine to capitulate over Winter 2026-2027.

Putin’s modified theory of victory heavily relies on Russia’s ability to launch cheap jet-powered Geran-type drones at scale and with relatively high penetration rates – requirements that Ukraine’s interceptor program is aimed at attacking.

Putin likely does not envision Russia’s long-range strike campaign against Ukraine to last indefinitely as he is likely attempting to force Ukraine to capitulate before Spring 2027.

Russian forces appear to be actively interfering with Ukrainian efforts to provide food to residents of occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast (southeast of Kherson City and on the left bank of the Dnipro River), threatening to prolong and intensify an already dire humanitarian crisis.

An unidentified aerial object that was likely a Russian drone entered Romanian airspace on the night of September 26 to 27, as Russia continues to normalize its violations of European airspace.

European security officials continue to investigate incidents of sabotage, some already attributed to Russia, against European defense and logistical infrastructure.

Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure continue to restrain Russia’s oil processing capacity. Russia launched 170 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar tactical area and the Oleksandrivka direction.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

An open-source channel provided updated battlefield damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes in Rostov Oblast. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source published satellite imagery on September 27 showing damage to multiple buildings at the Azov Optical-Mechanical Plant in Azov, Rostov Oblast (roughly 200 kilometers from the frontline) after Ukrainian strikes against the facility on September 25 or the night of September 25-26.[28] The OSINT source stated that the imagery indicates Ukrainian strikes damaged at least five production shops across six buildings, including the plant’s foundry, optics production, assembly, electroplating, and mechanical processing shops.

Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure continue to constrain Russia’s oil processing capacity. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on September 26 that recent Ukrainian strikes against the Perm and Novoshakhtynsk oil refineries, likely referring to Ukrainian strikes from September 25 and 26, caused both refineries to cease operations.[29]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced in eastern Novodmytrivka (southeast of Sumy City) based on geolocated footage published on August 19.[30]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 26 and 27 but did not make confirmed advances. [31] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 27 that Russian forces seized Khrypuny (northeast of Kharkiv City).[32] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces credited elements of the Russian 126th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the claimed seizure of Khrypuny.[33]

The Russian MoD continues to present false evidence to make claims of advance. The Russian MoD published footage on September 26 to make claims that Russian forces seized Petropavlivka (northeast of Kharkiv City and south of Vovchansk) and Lozova (east of Petropavlivka and northwest of Velykyi Burluk).[34] The Russian MoD previously published the same footage on September 21 to make claims that Russian forces had seized Novooleksandrivka (east of Petropavlivka and southwest of Lozova).[35]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military targets in Russia’s border regions. Ukrainian forces struck a reported Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC, LMD) logistics hub, ammunition depot, and drone operator post in Novaya Tavolzhanka, Belgorod Oblast (roughly six kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 27.[36]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 27.

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Ukrainian forces recently either advanced or maintained positions southeast of Kupyansk. Russian forces shelled Ukrainian positions east of Hlushkivka and Novoosynove (both southeast of Kupyansk) – in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintain positions – according to geolocated footage published on September 25.[37] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on September 27 that a high volume of Ukrainian drones is complicating Russian offensive operations and logistics in the Kupyansk direction.[38]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 27 but did not advance.[39]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 27 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian ammunition depots in Kripenskyi and Luhansk City (both roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline) and a fuel and lubricants depot in Rovenky (roughly 125 kilometers from the frontline) on September 26 or overnight September 26 to 27.[40]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks in the Lyman tactical effort, as Russian forces continue efforts to stymie Ukrainian advances and conduct a fighting withdrawal across the Zherebets River.[41] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces stated that Russian forces are struggling to conduct a fighting withdrawal across the Zherebets River while simultaneously attempting to hold positions on the west (right) bank of the river.[42] The source stated that Russian forces hold isolated positions near Ivanivka and Zarichne (both northeast of Lyman).

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions east and southeast of Slovyansk. Russian forces struck Ukrainian positions south and east of Yurkivka (southeast of Slovyansk) in areas where Russian forces previously conducted infiltration missions, according to geolocated footage published on September 26.[43] Russian forces also struck Ukrainian positions east of Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions, according to geolocated footage published on September 26.[44]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southwestern Chasiv Yar, as Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the area. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position in southwestern Chasiv Yar, according to geolocated footage published on September 24, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[45] Russian forces also struck a Ukrainian position in central Virolyubivka (northwest of Chasiv Yar) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions, according to geolocated footage published on September 24.[46] The presence of Ukrainian forces in Virolyubivka and Chasiv Yar indicates that Russian forces do not maintain positions in Podilske and Mykolaivka (both west of Chasiv Yar and southeast of Virolyubivka). Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position between western Mykolaivka and Chasiv Yar, according to geolocated footage published on September 26, after what ISW assesses was a marginal Russian infiltration mission.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in eastern Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian forces cleared a Russian-occupied building in eastern Kostyantynivka, according to geolocated footage published on September 27, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[48]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a limited clearing operation likely south of Dobropillya as Russian forces continued infiltration missions in the Dobropillya tactical area. The Ukrainian Navy reported on September 26 that Ukrainian marines cleared Russian infiltrators from about five square kilometers of territory in the Pokrovsk (south of Dobropillya) direction during an unspecified timeframe.[49] Russian forces have likely infiltrated along the T-0515 highway north of Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya), based on geolocated footage published on September 27.[50]

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian long-range drone and logistics infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast in their intermediate range strike campaign. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a storage, preparation, and launch site for Russian strike drones in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline) and a fuel and lubricants depot in occupied Novoamvrosiivske (roughly 92 kilometers from the frontline) on September 26 or overnight on September 26 to 27.[51]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 26 and 27 but did not advance. [52]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Oleksandrivka. Russian milbloggers acknowledged on September 26 that Ukrainian forces liberated Perebudova (east of Oleksandrivka) and that Ukrainian forces entered Komar (east of Oleksandrivka) and are contesting Russian control over the settlement.[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to penetrate several portions of the frontline in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and that Russian forces are having the most difficulty advancing along the Piddubne-Myrne-Komar line (east of Oleksandrivka).[54]

Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian military assets in the Russian rear in the Oleksandrivka direction. A Ukrainian drone unit reported on September 27 that Ukrainian forces struck and destroyed three Russian tanks hidden 65 kilometers from the frontline in the Oleksandrivka direction.[55] The unit noted that Russian forces dug the tanks into the ground and built shelters above to protect the tanks, but that Ukrainian forces successfully identified and destroyed the targets.

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 26 and 27 but did not advance. [56]

Russian forces continued to target civilian infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City. Russian forces struck a hospital in eastern Zaporizhzhia City, according to geolocated footage published on September 26.[57]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 27.

Russian forces continue using “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Kherson City. Russian forces struck a woman and two other civilians in southern Kherson City using drone-dropped munitions, according to geolocated footage published on September 26 and 27.[58]

See topline text for reports on the situation in occupied Oleshky.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11. [59]

See topline text for Russia’s usage of jet-powered Shahed drones in its long-range strike campaign.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 170 Shahed- (including 76 jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[60] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 147 drones, that an unspecified number of aerial vehicles struck 18 locations, and that debris fell on eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck logistical, civilian, critical, industrial, energy, and medical infrastructure in Odesa, Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, and Kyiv oblasts.[61]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on September 27 that Russian forces launched over 2,200 long-range strike drones, 1,650 glide bombs, and 38 missiles (most of which were ballistic) against Ukraine in the past week (since about September 20).[62] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Kyrylo Budanov stated that Ukraine is interested in expanding the coverage of Starlink and Starshield to augment its counter-ballistic capabilities, as the current amount of coverage is insufficient during the global Patriot interceptor shortage.[63]

Russian forces are targeting Ukrainian drone manufacturers with ballistic missiles. Ukrainian drone manufacturer Pegasus ARMS reported on September 26 that Russian ballistic missile strikes on the night of September 23 to 24 significantly damaged its drone production workshop, forcing Pegasus ARMS to indefinitely suspend production.[64] Pegasus ARMS noted that Russian strikes on September 2 damaged the workshop it had previously been using, also forcing the manufacturer to suspend production and move to a new production site.

Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov warned on September 27 that Russian jet-powered Shahed drones occasionally turn off their engines and glide before striking their targets. [65] Beskrestnov noted that it is unclear if the gliding is a deliberate strike tactic or if the gliding drones are a technical failure.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-current-objectives-and-efforts/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/ [26] https://www.berlingske dot dk/indland/politi-efterforsker-mulig-ildspaasaettelse-ved-udspringsflygaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AXbw80R4dc88Lh_dNLZXcsFzWg96MPmhG0IzgPGksUSe1zQ7INmqVXeVVLKnKJj3BE0%3D&gaa_ts=6ab99262&gaa_sig=cp31ZlNxc82pux_lWWM952VRjiCav5FQjtMzKVztt4bu9GRiTh3ESy_fOEscRb27cgSuR4aHvECt-SToGmO_UA%3D%3D; https://www.tv2east dot dk/lolland/politi-efterforsker-mulig-ildspasaettelse-ved-udspringsfly-42877 [27] https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-current-objectives-and-efforts/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ [28] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/; 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https://t.me/grvZapad/19900; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/75630 [42] https://t.me/grvZapad/19900 [43] https://t.me/omsbr_88_official/608 ; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2103915875782775207; https://x.com/meowqai/status/2103930459428413569 [44] https://t.me/specnazahmat/2407 ; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2103985174296002720 [45] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2103869783988965797; https://t.me/frontline_pvt/22879 [46] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2103869787033993702; https://t.me/frontline_pvt/22876 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2103869783988965797; https://t.me/frontline_pvt/22879 [47] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13056 ; https://t.me/talion_army/355 [48] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2104187394685542528 ; https://t.me/ab49ks/956 [49] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1760467398562149 [50] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2104164727249383494; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2852 [51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42388 [52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42383 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42387 [53] https://t.me/zovpobedy/19060 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/99606 [54] https://vk dot ru/wall-211956454_7766?w=wall-211956454_7766 ; https://t.me/ags_chat123/1411286 ; https://t.me/Ags_Donbass/413830 ; https://t.me/zovpobedy/19060 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/99606 [55] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1DnarmbCNe/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/27/sami-vyryly-sobi-mogylu-okupanty-zakopaly-try-tanky-za-65-km-vid-frontu-lasars-group-distaly-yih-i-tam/ [56]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42383 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42387 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37221 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37237 ; [57] https://x.com/giK1893/status/2103975199896940820 ; https://t.me/five_redakcia/109899 ; https://t.me/five_redakcia/109901 [58] https://x.com/giK1893/status/2103956388171186656 ; https://t.me/zona_Red/1728 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2104114719640457291 ; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/38072 [59] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [60] https://t.me/kpszsu/80510 [61]https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21097 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/75880 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7649 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7647 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7652 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7653 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/58978 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2972 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/75918 ; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1413274-ataka-bpla-na-poltavsinu-u-mirgorodskomu-rajoni-evlucanna/ ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20947 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20960 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20964 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67940 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67938 ; https://t.me/zhytomyrskaODA/18561 [62] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21097 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2104120829826981973 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2104120826345758874 [63] https://suspilne dot media/1413468-budanov-ukraini-brakue-dostupu-do-starlink-dla-protidii-rosijskim-raketnim-kompleksam/ ; https://t.me/Kyrylo_Budanov_Official/875 ; https://suspilne dot media/1413468-budanov-ukraini-brakue-dostupu-do-starlink-dla-protidii-rosijskim-raketnim-kompleksam/ [64] https://www.facebook.com/pegasusarms/posts/pfbid024d69KFB3jL58jQyYQZqtLvDjNKNX575E1kKD3ut81HXiVQiU92CRfeXmJT8zdcFFl; https://t.me/bazabazon/49458 https://t.me/astrapress/126494 [65] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1068483676083328/? cft [0]=AZjmEWSoQpRTQUFiMoS6ZiC98nf9w1iQzobnET3aoim7up-2KeVm8b06ETL5cgH-Eia133TKA1rlL-Fhm_oyJY6OfLkjF2LtgtM5ZGKFSnstTWZTDgeCNO8rk1Sx7_vA1kAOHR9OoDR5WcofQtf-pZLMMG4sfPA_3FYUyqdNBG1AoX4ID6NfqpE-mAn9dj2QU5qsZdk-& tn =%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/serhii_flash/7774

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