Why Umno and PAS cannot work together: Ten political realities — Phar Kim Beng

Malaysian politics is increasingly influenced by the need for stable governance and institutional legitimacy, evident in the troubled Umno-PAS relationship.

The Unity Government under Anwar Ibrahim, combining PH and Umno, has shown effective cooperation, exemplified by a significant 2027 Budget.

Umno and PAS face internal contradictions and challenges in forming a stable alliance, while the Unity Government demonstrates practical cooperation across diverse political entities.

OCTOBER 11 — Malaysian politics has entered a phase where political cooperation is increasingly determined by institutional survival, constitutional legitimacy and the capacity to govern.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the troubled relationship between the United Malays National Organisation (Umno) and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS).

Both claim to represent Malay-Muslim interests.

Yet their competing ambitions, institutional predicaments and contrasting political priorities make durable cooperation exceedingly difficult.

Meanwhile, Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Umno have demonstrated that cooperation under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s Unity Government can produce tangible outcomes, including a 2027 Budget approaching half a trillion ringgit.

Ten political realities explain why an Umno-PAS partnership remains easier to advocate than implement.

First, Umno’s corruption baggage remains a structural obstacle.

Umno cannot escape corruption controversies involving several prominent leaders.

The controversy surrounding former Prime Minister Najib Razak’s conditional pardon has further complicated its political rehabilitation.

PAS has traditionally positioned itself as a party committed to Islamic governance and moral accountability.

Any renewed association with Umno would require PAS to reconcile its moral claims with Umno’s unresolved reputational problems.

Political expediency cannot automatically erase these contradictions.

Second, PN’s registration controversy complicates PAS’s political calculations.

The controversy surrounding Perikatan Nasional’s (PN) registration has introduced further uncertainty into opposition politics.

Whether through deregistration proceedings or their political consequences, the dispute raises questions about PN’s organisational coherence and future electoral arrangements.

PAS cannot easily negotiate a durable national partnership with Umno while its existing coalition relationships remain unsettled.

Umno likewise has little incentive to embrace another complicated political arrangement.

Third, Mohamad Hasan’s Terengganu proposal reveals mutual distrust.

Umno Deputy President Datuk Seri Mohamad Hasan’s suggestion that PAS demonstrate goodwill through a fresh election in one of its strongholds, particularly Terengganu, exposes the difficulties of power-sharing.

For Umno, the proposal tests PAS’s sincerity.

For PAS, surrendering an established electoral advantage merely to accommodate Umno would appear politically irrational.

An alliance requiring one partner to weaken itself before negotiations begin is unlikely to command lasting confidence.

Fourth, PAS’s four state strongholds cannot become bargaining chips.

Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis represent important territorial foundations of PAS and its coalition’s influence.

These states provide grassroots mobilisation, administrative experience and political legitimacy.

Umno may demand reciprocal arrangements, but PAS cannot casually redistribute electoral mandates through elite negotiations.

The contradiction is fundamental. Umno seeks greater influence, while PAS expects recognition of its existing strength. Umno wants to return to its own greatness and electoral preponderance while PAS wants the same.

Neither appears prepared to concede political primacy.

Fifth, Negeri Sembilan exposes Umno’s constitutional difficulties.

Umno’s political recovery in Negeri Sembilan should have strengthened its argument that the party can restore stability.

Instead, royal and constitutional tensions have complicated the state’s political environment.

These developments demonstrate that winning elections and consolidating legitimate authority are different exercises.

Umno cannot credibly demand that PAS reorganise its state governments while struggling with institutional complications within its own political stronghold.

Malaysia’s constitutional monarchy also requires restraint. Royal institutions cannot become instruments of partisan convenience.

Sixth, Malay-Muslim unity does not guarantee political compatibility.

Umno emerged from Malay nationalism and developmental statecraft. PAS derives much of its identity from Islamic mobilisation and religiously informed governance.

Their earlier Muafakat Nasional cooperation demonstrated tactical compatibility, not permanent ideological convergence.

Both parties compete for leadership of substantially overlapping Malay-Muslim constituencies.

Neither can indefinitely accept subordinate status without provoking internal resistance.

Political unity becomes especially difficult when both partners believe they deserve to lead.

Seventh, state-level cooperation cannot automatically become federal power-sharing.

State-level agreements can revolve around local electoral calculations and administrative compromises.

Federal government requires decisions over the prime ministership, Cabinet portfolios, economic management, foreign policy and federal resources.

Umno and PAS would also need to accommodate competing coalition partners.

Their difficulties would multiply when negotiations move beyond individual states.

Political arithmetic cannot substitute for institutional coherence.

Eighth, an Umno-PAS alliance could alarm Sabah, Sarawak and moderate Malaysians.

This is perhaps the most underestimated danger.

Sabah and Sarawak are indispensable components of Malaysia’s federation, with distinct religious, cultural and constitutional traditions protected through the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63).

An alliance perceived as consolidating Peninsular Malay-Muslim dominance could deepen suspicions among Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS), Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS) and their diverse constituencies.

Neither Sabah nor Sarawak wishes to become subordinate to an increasingly narrow interpretation of national political identity.

The repercussions would extend throughout Peninsular Malaysia.

Moderate Malays who value religious tolerance, constitutional governance and economic competence could become apprehensive about intensified religious-nationalist competition.

Chinese and Indian Malaysians may worry about cultural rights, equal citizenship and their place within national decision-making.

The Orang Asli, already confronting longstanding difficulties involving customary land, economic marginalisation and political representation, could fear further exclusion.

These reactions are not inevitable. Nevertheless, political perceptions carry consequences.

An alliance designed to consolidate Malay-Muslim support could simultaneously alienate moderate Malays, Chinese, Indians, indigenous communities and East Malaysian voters.

Such a partnership might strengthen one electoral constituency while weakening its capacity to command nationwide confidence.

Malaysia cannot be governed sustainably through Peninsular political arithmetic alone.

Ninth, the Unity Government has demonstrated the advantages of practical cooperation.

While Umno and PAS remain preoccupied with territorial influence and political sincerity, PH and Umno have demonstrated that ideological differences need not prevent governance.

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s 2027 Budget, approaching RM510 billion, when GLICs are included, offers a significant illustration.

Its people-friendly measures include assistance to civil servants, social protection, household support and development commitments.

The RM1,500 special assistance for eligible civil servants, payable in two instalments, demonstrates attention to public-sector welfare.

These commitments do not automatically guarantee electoral support or eliminate fiscal challenges.

Nevertheless, they provide concrete evidence of policy cooperation.

Crucially, the Unity Government also incorporates Sabah and Sarawak’s political representation, providing a broader platform for federal accommodation.

The contrast is striking.

One arrangement has produced a national budget.

The other remains preoccupied with negotiating the distribution of political power.

Tenth, Malaysia needs inclusive governance rather than endless political realignment.

The approaching 16th general election will not necessarily reward whichever coalition claims the strongest ethnic or religious credentials.

Malaysians face rising living costs, economic uncertainty, institutional tensions and geopolitical instability.

They require credible economic management, constitutional stability and political leadership capable of sustaining national confidence.

Umno and PAS may eventually establish another tactical understanding.

However, such cooperation would remain fragile without mutual trust, institutional clarity and assurances that Malaysia’s plural character would be respected.

The Unity Government is not without contradictions. Its durability depends on implementation, fiscal discipline and continued cooperation among its component parties.

Nevertheless, the central distinction is becoming clearer.

Umno and PAS are still negotiating how to divide power. PH and Umno, notwithstanding their differences, have demonstrated how power can be exercised together.

Malaysia’s political future cannot rest exclusively on Malay-Muslim consolidation while Sabah, Sarawak and the country’s diverse communities become increasingly apprehensive.

The ultimate test of political leadership is not merely the ability to win elections, but the capacity to govern a plural federation with competence, moderation and constitutional restraint.

Invariably, in PAS itself, while the Chief Minister of Kelantan welcomed the budget of Anwar, Fadhli Shaari of the same party disagreed with the former. Such contradictions in Umno and PAS are often very deeply embedded but not revealed openly.

* Phar Kim Beng, PhD is the Professor of Asean Studies at International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS).

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.

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马来西亚政治越来越受到稳定治理和制度合法性需求的影响，巫统与伊斯兰党之间紧张的关系就证明了这一点。

安华·易卜拉欣领导的由希望联盟和巫统组成的团结政府展现了有效的合作，2027 年财政预算案就是一个例证。

巫统和伊斯兰党在组建稳定联盟方面面临内部矛盾和挑战，而团结政府则展现了不同政治实体之间的务实合作。

10 月 11 日——马来西亚政治已进入一个阶段，在这个阶段，政治合作越来越取决于制度的生存、宪法的合法性和执政能力。

这一点在马来民族统一机构（巫统）和马来西亚伊斯兰党（PAS）之间紧张的关系中体现得最为明显。

双方都声称代表马来穆斯林的利益。

然而，它们相互竞争的抱负、制度困境和截然不同的政治优先事项使得持久合作极其困难。

与此同时，希望联盟（PH）和巫统已经证明，在安华·易卜拉欣总理领导的团结政府的领导下，合作可以产生切实可见的成果，包括2027年预算接近5000万亿令吉。

十个政治现实解释了为什么巫统与伊斯兰党的合作倡导起来比实施起来要容易得多。

首先，巫统的腐败问题仍然是一个结构性障碍。

巫统无法摆脱涉及多位知名领导人的腐败丑闻。

围绕前总理纳吉布·拉扎克有条件赦免的争议，进一步加剧了其政治平反的难度。

伊斯兰党历来将自己定位为致力于伊斯兰治理和道德责任的政党。

任何与巫统重新建立联系的举动，都将要求伊斯兰党调和自身的道德诉求与巫统尚未解决的声誉问题。

政治权宜之计并不能自动消除这些矛盾。

其次，国民联盟的注册争议使伊斯兰党的政治考量变得复杂。

国民联盟（PN）的注册争议给反对派政治带来了更大的不确定性。

无论是通过注销登记程序还是其政治后果，这场争端都引发了人们对国民党组织凝聚力和未来选举安排的质疑。

伊斯兰党与巫统的现有联盟关系仍不稳定，因此很难就持久的全国性伙伴关系进行谈判。

巫统同样没有多少动力去接受另一项复杂的政治安排。

第三，穆罕默德·哈桑提出的登嘉楼方案暴露出彼此间的不信任。

巫统副主席拿督斯里莫哈末哈山建议伊斯兰党通过在其大本营之一，特别是登嘉楼州，举行新的选举来展现善意，这暴露了权力分享的困难。

对巫统而言，这项提议考验着伊斯兰党的诚意。

对于伊斯兰党来说，仅仅为了迎合巫统而放弃既有的选举优势，在政治上似乎是不理智的。

要求一方在谈判开始前削弱自身实力的联盟不太可能赢得持久的信任。

第四，PAS 的四个州据点不能成为谈判筹码。

吉兰丹、登嘉楼、吉打和玻璃市是伊党及其联盟影响力的重要领土基础。

这些州提供了基层动员、行政经验和政治合法性。

巫统可能会要求对等安排，但伊斯兰党不能随意通过精英谈判重新分配选举授权。

这种矛盾根深蒂固。巫统寻求更大的影响力，而伊斯兰党则希望其现有实力得到认可。巫统想要重现昔日的辉煌和选举优势，伊斯兰党也抱有同样的愿望。

双方似乎都不愿让步，承认政治上的主导地位。

第五，森美兰暴露巫统的宪制困难。

巫统在森美兰州的政治复苏应该加强了该党能够恢复稳定的论点。

相反，王室和宪法方面的紧张关系使该州的政治环境变得更加复杂。

这些事态发展表明，赢得选举和巩固合法权力是两码事。

巫统自身政治堡垒内部都存在体制上的复杂问题，因此无法令人信服地要求伊斯兰党重组其州政府。

马来西亚的君主立宪制也需要克制。王室机构不能沦为党派谋利的工具。

第六，马来穆斯林团结并不能保证政治上的兼容性。

巫统源于马来民族主义和发展型国家治理理念。伊斯兰党则很大程度上源于伊斯兰教动员和宗教指导下的治理。

他们早期的“全民共识”合作展现了策略上的兼容性，而非永久的意识形态趋同。

两党都在争夺马来穆斯林选民群体中高度重叠的选区领导权。

两者都不能无限期地接受从属地位而不引发内部反抗。

当双方都认为自己应该领导时，政治团结就变得尤为困难。

第七，州级合作不能自动转化为联邦权力分享。

州级协议可能围绕地方选举考量和行政妥协展开。

联邦政府需要对总理人选、内阁职位、经济管理、外交政策和联邦资源做出决定。

巫统和伊斯兰党也需要顾及彼此竞争的联盟伙伴。

当谈判超出单个国家范围时，他们的困难将会成倍增加。

政治算计不能取代制度一致性。

第八，巫统-伊斯兰党联盟可能会让沙巴、砂拉越和马来西亚温和派人士感到担忧。

这或许是最被低估的危险。

沙巴和砂拉越是马来西亚联邦不可或缺的组成部分，它们拥有独特的宗教、文化和宪法传统，这些传统受到 1963 年马来西亚协议 (MA63) 的保护。

一个被视为巩固半岛马来穆斯林统治地位的联盟可能会加深砂拉越政党联盟（GPS）、沙巴人民联盟（GRS）及其不同选区之间的怀疑。

沙巴和砂拉越都不愿屈从于日益狭隘的国家政治认同解释。

其影响将波及整个马来西亚半岛。

重视宗教宽容、宪政和经济能力的温和派马来人可能会对日益激烈的宗教民族主义竞争感到担忧。

马来西亚的华裔和印度裔人士可能会担心文化权利、平等公民权以及他们在国家决策中的地位。

原住民长期以来在土地所有权、经济边缘化和政治代表权方面面临诸多困难，他们可能会担心进一步被排斥。

这些反应并非不可避免。然而，政治认知确实会产生后果。

旨在巩固马来穆斯林支持的联盟可能会同时疏远温和派马来人、华人、印度人、原住民社区和东马选民。

这样的合作关系可能会加强一个选民群体，同时削弱其在全国范围内赢得信任的能力。

单靠马来半岛的政治算计，无法对马来西亚进行可持续的治理。

第九，团结政府展现了务实合作的优势。

尽管巫统和伊斯兰党仍然专注于领土影响力和政治诚意，但希望联盟和巫统已经证明，意识形态分歧并不一定会阻碍治理。

安华·易卜拉欣总理的 2027 年预算案（含政府投资公司）接近 5100 亿令吉，这便是一个很好的例证。

其惠民措施包括向公务员提供援助、社会保障、家庭支持和发展承诺。

政府向符合条件的公务员提供 1500 令吉的特别援助，分两期支付，这体现了政府对公共部门福利的关注。

这些承诺并不能自动保证获得选民支持或消除财政挑战。

然而，它们为政策合作提供了具体证据。

至关重要的是，团结政府还纳入了沙巴和砂拉越的政治代表，为联邦政府的协调提供了更广泛的平台。

对比鲜明。

其中一项安排催生了国家预算。

另一方则仍然专注于协商政治权力的分配。

第十，马来西亚需要的是包容性治理，而不是无休止的政治重组。

即将到来的第16届大选未必会奖励那些声称拥有最强民族或宗教背景的联盟。

马来西亚人面临着生活成本上涨、经济不确定性、体制紧张局势和地缘政治不稳定等问题。

他们需要可信的经济管理、宪政稳定和能够维持国民信心的政治领导。

巫统和伊斯兰党最终可能会建立另一种策略上的默契。

然而，如果没有互信、制度上的清晰性以及对马来西亚多元特性的尊重保证，这种合作将依然脆弱。

联合政府并非没有矛盾。其稳定性取决于各成员党派的执行力、财政纪律和持续合作。

然而，两者之间的核心区别正变得越来越清晰。

巫统和伊斯兰党仍在就如何分配权力进行谈判。尽管希​​望联盟和巫统存在分歧，但它们已经展现了如何共同行使权力。

马来西亚的政治未来不能仅仅依靠马来穆斯林的团结，因为沙巴、砂拉越和该国多元化的社区越来越感到担忧。

对政治领导力的最终考验，不仅仅是赢得选举的能力，而是以胜任、温和、合宪的方式治理多元联邦的能力。

在伊斯兰党内部，经常会出现这样的情况：吉兰丹州首席部长对安华的预算案表示欢迎，而同党的法德利·沙里却持反对意见。巫统和伊斯兰党内部的这类矛盾往往根深蒂固，却鲜少公开暴露。

* Phar Kim Beng 博士是马来西亚国际伊斯兰大学东盟研究教授，也是国际与东盟研究所 (IINTAS) 所长。

**本文仅代表作者或刊物个人观点，并不一定代表《马来邮报》的立场。

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