Should America’s military plan for a retreat from the Pacific?

When America goes to war, it likes to be on the offensive. “Nobody ever defended anything successfully,” Gen. George S. Patton famously said. “There is only attack and attack and attack some more.”

But for six months after Pearl Harbor, the U.S. military retreated and retreated some more. The U.S. garrison in the Philippines, under Gen. Douglas MacArthur, steadily retreated before the Japanese onslaught that culminated in the surrender at Bataan in May 1942. Isolated outposts at Wake Island and Guam fell, while the decimated and outnumbered U.S. fleet carefully stuck to hit-and-run as America mobilized for total war.

Today, a U.S. Army officer has a warning: In the face of growing Chinese military power, America needs to relearn how to conduct a fighting retreat in the Pacific.

“Fading advantages in firepower, distributed forces, and the growing operational reach of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) require an expansion of operational thought,” wrote Maj. Patrick Smith in a recent essay for Military Review, an Army professional publication. “The joint force must consider methods of retrograde to shape advantages in time, space, and force.”

Smith lists several factors that imperil America’s position in the Pacific.

“Small constellations of U.S. elements — ashore and afloat — encircle the looming mass of mainland China,” he wrote. “Operating on tenuous exterior lines, they are vulnerable to defeat in detail by a prodigious array of standoff munitions or blockade.” Resupply is difficult within range of Chinese weapons, reserves of personnel and munitions are scarce, and “regional partners can quickly about-face on support to U.S. forces, making presence in some locales untenable.”

Smith also worries that the U.S. lacks sufficient sealift, arguing that “glaring training shortfalls in crisis response, worsened by maintenance deficiencies, compromise U.S. capacity to conduct amphibious actions.”

Of all military operations, retreat under fire is probably the most difficult. Smith points to several historical examples where U.S. forces had to conduct fighting withdrawals, including the American Revolution, Civil War and World War II. Perhaps the most relevant example for the Pacific today is the 1941 Philippines campaign, where MacArthur planned a delaying action that called for U.S. and Filipino troops to gradually retreat from Manila south to the fortified Bataan peninsula — and then hold on until a relief force arrived from America. “Dugout Doug” MacArthur’s leadership in 1941 was controversial to say the least, but the six-month resistance until May 1942 did inflict some delay on Japanese operations.

Given that Manila was 2,000 miles from Tokyo and 5,000 miles from Pearl Harbor, choosing to conduct a retrograde operation while awaiting reinforcement was not an unreasonable strategy. The problem was that the relief force lay at the bottom of Pearl Harbor after the Japanese attack on December 7th. Not only didn’t the promised reinforcements arrive, but there was insufficient transport to evacuate the Philippines garrison.

“Strategic planners failed to prioritize sealift as the American Filipino force grimly gave way,” Smith noted. A similar fate nearly befell Washington’s army with its backs to the East River at the Battle of Long Island in August 1776, but for a regiment composed of Massachusetts fishermen who ferried the Continentals to safety.

A more successful example was Gen. Ulysses S. Grant’s 1864 campaign in Virginia, when the Army of the Potomac withdrew from Cold Harbor. Through an elaborate deception campaign, Grant diverted Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee’s attention by ordering the Army of the Shenandoah to make a feint attack toward Lynchburg 140 miles away. The Army of the Potomac then redeployed by crossing the James River, a potentially fatal operation if the Confederates had attacked.

Smith argues that the U.S. needs to relearn how to retreat.

“Fighting withdrawals and delays will be sharpened arrows in the quiver of operational leaders campaigning in the early stages of a Pacific fight,” he wrote. “In those precarious moments, the joint force should prudently select positions from which it can absorb repeated blows while degrading enemy means.”

Smith envisions a widely distributed joint force that would “confound the PLA with a targeting dilemma if it decides to switch to the offensive.” Deception operations would be key: “Similar to Grant’s illusory movements to confuse Lee, feints, demonstrations, and advances within and outside of theater may freeze enemy actions to create time and space for movement of friendly forces.”

Adroit maneuvers, well-timed withdrawals and clever deception operations would exploit American strengths and Chinese weaknesses, Smith argued.

Nonetheless, most Americans would probably agree with Patton that the best defense is a good offense. Knowing how to retreat is important, but it’s more important to be able to absorb the enemy’s blows while inflicting your own, Eric Heginbotham, a researcher at MIT’s Center for International Studies, told Defense News.

In contrast to 1941, the situation in the Pacific today “has to do largely with long-range fires and our ability to survive adversary ones while conducting our own,” Heginbotham said. The problem is that the U.S. has failed to harden its Pacific airbases against Chinese missile barrages, or ensure that U.S. forces enjoy flexible and redundant logistics that can function in the face of Chinese attacks.

“This has a bit less to do with retrograde per se, than not putting our forces forward in highly vulnerable positions,” said Heginbotham. Dispersing for distributed operations can help mitigate those vulnerabilities.

Nonetheless, Heginbotham agrees the U.S. military needs to know how to retrograde operations. Ironically, despite America’s distaste for retreat, the U.S. can do this better than China.

“One advantage we do enjoy in the Pacific is maritime depth and the ability to engage where and when we want,” Heginbotham said. “In contrast, the Chinese fleet is up against a continent. It has nowhere to run or hide and is, in effect, in the shooting gallery from day one.”

Michael Peck is a correspondent for Defense News and a columnist for the Center for European Policy Analysis. He holds an M.A. in political science from Rutgers University. Find him at theuncommondefense.com. His email is mikedefense1@gmail.com.

美国一旦发动战争，就喜欢采取进攻姿态。“从来没有人能成功地防守住任何东西，”乔治·S·巴顿将军曾说过一句名言，“只有进攻，进攻，再进攻。”

但珍珠港事件后的六个月里，美军节节败退。驻菲律宾的美军在道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟将军的指挥下，在日军猛烈进攻下节节败退，最终于1942年5月在巴丹半岛投降。威克岛和关岛的孤立据点相继陷落，而伤亡惨重、兵力处于劣势的美军舰队则小心翼翼地采取游击战术，而美国则动员起来投入全面战争。

今天，一位美国陆军军官发出警告：面对日益增长的中国军事力量，美国需要重新学习如何在太平洋地区进行战斗撤退。

“火力优势的减弱、兵力分散以及中国人民解放军作战范围的扩大，都要求我们拓展作战思路，”陆军少校帕特里克·史密斯在近期发表于陆军专业刊物《军事评论》的一篇文章中写道。“联合部队必须考虑采取后撤策略，以在时间、空间和力量上重新夺回优势。”

史密斯列举了几个危及美国在太平洋地区地位的因素。

他写道：“美国陆上和海上的小股部队包围着庞大的中国大陆。这些部队在脆弱的外围防线上作战，很容易被种类繁多的远程武器或封锁逐个击破。”在中国武器的射程内，补给十分困难，人员和弹药储备稀缺，“而且地区伙伴可以迅速改变对美军的支持立场，使得美军在某些地区的存在难以维系。”

史密斯还担心美国缺乏足够的海上运输能力，他认为“危机应对方面明显的训练不足，加上维护缺陷，损害了美国进行两栖作战的能力”。

在所有军事行动中，临阵脱逃或许是最艰难的。史密斯列举了美军不得不进行战斗撤退的几个历史案例，包括美国独立战争、南北战争和第二次世界大战。对于当今的太平洋战场而言，或许最相关的案例是1941年的菲律宾战役。当时，麦克阿瑟策划了一场拖延战，要求美菲联军从马尼拉逐步撤退到南部设防的巴丹半岛，并坚守阵地，直到美国援军抵达。“地堡道格”麦克阿瑟在1941年的指挥可谓备受争议，但长达六个月的抵抗（直至1942年5月）确实给日军的行动造成了一定的延误。

鉴于马尼拉距离东京2000英里，距离珍珠港5000英里，在等待增援期间选择撤退并非不合理的策略。问题在于，12月7日日军偷袭珍珠港后，救援部队沉没在海底。不仅承诺的增援部队未能抵达，而且也没有足够的运输工具撤离菲律宾守军。

“战略规划者未能优先考虑海上运输，导致美菲联军惨败，”史密斯指出。1776年8月，华盛顿的军队在长岛战役中背靠东河，险些遭遇同样的命运，幸亏一支由马萨诸塞州渔民组成的团及时摆渡，才将大陆军士兵安全送达。

尤利西斯·S·格兰特将军1864年在弗吉尼亚的战役就是一个更为成功的例子。当时，波托马克军团从冷港撤退。格兰特通过精心策划的欺骗行动，命令谢南多厄军团佯攻140英里外的林奇堡，从而转移了南方邦联将军罗伯特·E·李的注意力。随后，波托马克军团渡过詹姆斯河重新部署。如果南方邦联军队发起进攻，这次行动很可能是一次致命的。

史密斯认为，美国需要重新学习如何撤退。

他写道：“在太平洋战争初期，作战指挥官必须练就一身应对撤退和拖延战术的本领。在那些危急时刻，联合部队应谨慎选择能够承受反复打击并削弱敌方力量的阵地。”

史密斯设想组建一支广泛分布的联合部队，如果解放军决定转守为攻，这将“使其陷入目标选择困境”。欺骗行动至关重要：“类似于格兰特为迷惑李将军而进行的佯攻、佯装作战和在战区内外推进，可以冻结敌军行动，为友军的调动创造时间和空间。”

史密斯认为，巧妙的策略、适时的撤军和精明的欺骗行动将利用美国的优势和中国的弱点。

然而，大多数美国人可能都会同意巴顿的观点，即最好的防御就是进攻。麻省理工学院国际研究中心的研究员埃里克·赫金博瑟姆告诉《防务新闻》：“懂得如何撤退固然重要，但更重要的是能够在承受敌人打击的同时给予敌人反击。”

黑金博瑟姆表示，与1941年相比，如今太平洋局势“主要取决于远程火力以及我们在进行自身作战的同时抵御敌方火力的能力”。问题在于，美国未能加强其太平洋空军基地的防御能力，使其能够抵御中国的导弹袭击，也未能确保美军拥有灵活且冗余的后勤保障，以应对中国的攻击。

“这与其说是倒退，不如说是避免将我们的部队部署在高度脆弱的阵地上，”黑金博瑟姆说道。分散部署以进行分布式作战有助于降低这些风险。

然而，赫金博瑟姆也认为美军需要掌握撤退作战的技巧。具有讽刺意味的是，尽管美国不喜撤退，但美国在这方面却比中国做得更好。

“我们在太平洋地区的一大优势在于纵深，以及随时随地开展行动的能力，”黑金博瑟姆说。“相比之下，中国舰队面对的是整个大陆。它无处可逃，无处可藏，实际上从一开始就处于枪林弹雨之中。”

迈克尔·佩克是《防务新闻》的通讯员，也是欧洲政策分析中心的专栏作家。他拥有罗格斯大学政治学硕士学位。您可以在theuncommondefense.com找到他。他的邮箱是mikedefense1@gmail.com。