US seizes initiative on space security for the first time in decades

Something very interesting has happened recently in the usually staid diplomatic world of outer space security. Part of it was almost expected: A two-yearlong, major multilateral process to discuss what to do about threats to space systems came to a conclusion without agreement on a way forward, or even on a summary report, partially due to bombastic diplomatic language from the Russian delegation. But along the way, a large number of countries outside the West, who have normally been critical of the U.S. position on these issues, responded positively to efforts from Washington to reshape the conversation out of the long-standing deadlock and toward progress on space security and stability.

For decades, the global diplomatic debate on space security issues has been stuck in neutral, going nowhere. The root cause was opposing views between the major players on what the biggest threat was to space security and stability, and how to address it. Russia and China argued that it was weapons placed in outer space, and proposed a new treaty banning them. The United States and its allies strongly opposed the draft treaty on the grounds that it was unverifiable and that there was no weaponization of space taking place.

In this debate, most developing countries tended to side with the Russian and Chinese position that weapons in space were the biggest issue, with the United States being cast as the main protagonist for the weaponization of outer space. Russia and China had the diplomatic upper hand, as they had proffered a draft treaty and could portray themselves as at least attempting to help, whereas the United States’ position was to oppose the draft Russia-China treaty without offering any alternatives.

As a result, the United States often found itself playing diplomatic defense on major votes on space security within the United Nations General Assembly.

That all began to change several years ago when the United States and its allies changed tack and began talking about space security not in terms of how to classify space objects as weapons but in terms of identifying behaviors deemed responsible — or not. That new approach helped lead to the creation of a new open-ended working group within the U.N. to discuss potential norms, principles and rules of behavior to reduce space threats that had widespread participation from more than 70 countries.

In April 2022, the discussion was really shaken up when the United States announced a voluntary commitment not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite, or DA-ASAT, missile tests. Since then, 34 additional countries have joined in this voluntary commitment, and it has gained widespread international support.

In December 2022, the United States led a U.N. General Assembly resolution supporting the commitment not to conduct DA-ASAT missile tests, which overwhelmingly passed by a vote of 155 in favor, 9 against, and 9 abstentions. In this case, Russia and China, two of those voting against, were on the losing side of a major U.N. vote on space security.

This growing global focus on destructive DA-ASAT testing is in large part due to the long-lasting threat orbital debris from such tests pose to satellites operated by all nations. In the annual Global Counterspace Capabilities report that we co-edit, we document the more than 6,850 pieces of orbital debris created by destructive anti-satellite testing in space over approximately the last 60 years, of which more than 3,400 pieces are still in orbit and pose daily risks to critical satellites and human spaceflight. These tests have also created thousands of additional pieces of debris too small to be tracked that still could damage other spacecraft.

Destructive DA-ASAT testing is also an example of irresponsible behavior discussed by the open-ended working group on reducing space threats, which took place over four weeklong sessions in 2022 and 2023. While the group was unable to reach consensus on the final report, largely due to intransigence by the Russian delegation, the process had significant success. It socialized the idea of focusing on behavior. It brought many more countries into the discussion and popularized the role of non-legally binding instruments as one tool in an overall toolkit to bulwark space security.

And for the United States, it showed the value of participating in these discussions and putting legitimate proposals on the table, instead of just saying no to proposals it could not support.

It’s unclear what comes next for formal negotiations of space threats. Another U.N. process, this one focused firmly on the old-school space weaponization approach favored by Russia and China, gets underway in November and is unlikely to yield meaningful results. But for the United States, there is a clear opportunity to build on the growing global momentum created by its ground-breaking pledge. For the first time in decades, the world is on Washington’s side to help make space more secure and sustainable, if only it has the political will to lead.

Victoria Samson is a director at the Secure World Foundation. She previously served as a senior analyst for the Center for Defense Information. Brian Weeden is the director of program planning at the Secure World Foundation. He served as an officer in the U.S. Air Force working in space and intercontinental ballistic missile operations.

在通常较为沉稳的外层空间安全外交领域，近期发生了一件非常有趣的事情。部分原因几乎在意料之中：历时两年的旨在探讨如何应对空间系统威胁的大型多边进程最终未能就未来方向达成一致，甚至连一份总结报告都未能出炉，部分原因是俄罗斯代表团使用了夸张的外交辞令。但在此过程中，许多通常对美国在这些问题上的立场持批评态度的非西方国家，对华盛顿为打破长期僵局、推动空间安全与稳定进程所做的努力做出了积极回应。

几十年来，全球关于太空安全问题的外交辩论一直陷入僵局，毫无进展。其根本原因在于主要参与者对太空安全与稳定面临的最大威胁及其应对方式存在分歧。俄罗斯和中国认为威胁在于外层空间部署武器，并提议制定一项新的条约禁止此类行为。美国及其盟友强烈反对该条约草案，理由是其无法核查，而且目前并不存在太空武器化问题。

在这场辩论中，大多数发展中国家倾向于支持俄罗斯和中国的立场，认为太空武器是最大的问题，而美国则被视为外层空间武器化的主要推手。俄罗斯和中国在外交上占据了上风，因为它们提出了条约草案，并能展现出至少在尝试提供帮助的姿态，而美国的立场则是反对俄中条约草案，却没有提出任何替代方案。

因此，美国经常发现自己在联合国大会上就太空安全问题进行重大投票时，不得不进行外交防御。

这一切在几年前开始发生变化，当时美国及其盟友改变了策略，不再从如何将太空物体归类为武器的角度讨论太空安全，而是从识别哪些行为应被视为负责任的行为（或不应被视为负责任的行为）的角度来讨论太空安全。这种新方法促成了联合国内部一个开放式工作组的成立，该工作组旨在讨论减少太空威胁的潜在规范、原则和行为准则，并得到了70多个国家的广泛参与。

2022年4月，美国宣布自愿承诺不再进行破坏性直接上升式反卫星导弹（DA-ASAT）试验，这一举措极大地推动了相关讨论。此后，又有34个国家加入这一自愿承诺，并获得了广泛的国际支持。

2022年12月，美国牵头在联合国大会上提出一项决议，支持不进行反卫星导弹试验的承诺，该决议以155票赞成、9票反对、9票弃权的压倒性优势获得通过。在此次联合国太空安全重要投票中，投反对票的俄罗斯和中国均处于劣势。

全球对破坏性反卫星试验日益关注，很大程度上是因为此类试验产生的轨道碎片对各国运行的卫星构成长期威胁。在我们共同编辑的年度《全球反太空能力报告》中，我们记录了过去约60年间，破坏性反卫星试验在太空产生的超过6850块轨道碎片，其中超过3400块仍在轨道上，对关键卫星和载人航天飞行构成日常威胁。这些试验还产生了数千块体积过小而无法追踪的碎片，这些碎片仍然可能对其他航天器造成损害。

破坏性的反卫星武器试验也是不负责任行为的一个例证，该不限成员名额的减少太空威胁工作组在2022年和2023年举行了四次为期一周的会议，讨论了这一问题。尽管该工作组最终未能就报告达成共识（这主要是由于俄罗斯代表团的顽固不化），但这一过程取得了显著成效。它普及了关注行为的理念，促使更多国家参与讨论，并推广了非法律约束性文书作为维护太空安全整体工具之一的作用。

对于美国而言，这表明参与这些讨论并提出合理的建议的价值，而不是对无法支持的提议一概拒绝。

目前尚不清楚太空威胁正式谈判的下一步走向。另一项联合国进程将于11月启动，该进程主要关注俄罗斯和中国所支持的传统太空武器化方案，但不太可能取得实质性成果。然而，对于美国而言，这是一个绝佳的机会，可以利用其开创性承诺所带来的日益增长的全球势头。几十年来，世界首次站在华盛顿一边，共同致力于使太空更加安全和可持续，前提是美国拥有引领这一进程的政治意愿。

维多利亚·萨姆森是安全世界基金会的董事。她此前曾担任国防信息中心的高级分析师。布莱恩·韦登是安全世界基金会的项目规划主管。他曾在美国空军服役，从事太空和洲际弹道导弹作战工作。