‘Each country goes its own way’: How Balkan politics shape ties with Israel

Balkan countries’ ties with Israel reflect domestic politics, defence deals and strategic interests rather than a united regional position.

Delegates from Serbia attend an address by Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during the 81st United Nations General Assembly at UN headquarters, as many other delegates walk out, in New York City, the United States, September 24, 2026 [Jeenah Moon/Reuters]

Throughout Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, Europe’s position has, to an extent, been aligned.

Outliers such as Spain and the Republic of Ireland have long been more vocal in condemning Israel, but overall, the shift from unconditional solidarity with Israel to concern over its conduct has taken hold in much of the continent.

list 1 of 4 Photos: Thousands march across Europe to demand end to Israel’s war on Gaza

list 2 of 4 ‘Kosovo’s moves towards Israel are the price of aligning with US policy’

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Across the Balkans, divergent policies towards Israel reflect domestic calculations, transactional diplomacy, and unresolved identity politics rather than a shared vision for the Middle East, according to experts.

“The Balkan countries have almost no common positions at all, and so it’s not surprising their positions towards Israel and Gaza are all over the map,” Marko Prelec, analyst at the International Crisis Group, told Al Jazeera. “Each country goes its own way.”

Prelec noted that while there is genuine revulsion towards Israeli policy in Gaza and sympathy for Palestinians – particularly among Bosnian Muslims – most countries in the region take their positions based on unrelated interests.

Florian Bieber, professor of Southeast European history and politics at Austria’s University of Graz, said regional consensus is nearly impossible.

“The position towards Israel is strongly shaped by domestic politics and also national narratives, which makes a regional or even a country-specific position unlikely,” Bieber told Al Jazeera.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Differences from one entity to another

Nowhere is this fragmentation more evident than in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the war in Gaza has deepened existing ethno-national divisions.

Bosniak political representatives and much of the public in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina have expressed strong solidarity with Palestinians, while leaders in Republika Srpska have been openly pro-Israel, and some Croat political figures have also adopted a more sympathetic tone towards Israel.

“Bosniak solidarity with Palestinians is often seen not just through an ideological lens, but also from the perspective of war and being a victim of Serb nationalist aggression, comparing the Palestinian experience with the Bosniak experience in the 1990s,” Bieber explained.

Conversely, leaders in the Serb-majority entity, Republika Srpska, led by former President Milorad Dodik, have openly embraced Israel.

Foreign policy analyst and journalist Bosko Jaksic told Al Jazeera that for Dodik, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend – Jews and Orthodox Serbs against Muslims. This religious and ethnic factor allows him to maintain an Israeli connection parallel to his closeness with Russia, while simultaneously performing a new American flip by glorifying [US President] Donald Trump .”

Prelec added that Bosnian Serb outreach to Israel and specifically Likud, the ruling Israeli party, represents “an attempt to find allies for its internationally unpopular flirtation with separatism, and an indirect way to strengthen ties with parts of the MAGA [Make America Great Again] movement and the Trump administration”.

Serbia: Arms sales and multi-vector balancing

In Serbia, the approach to Israel blends defence economics with foreign policy.

Despite historically friendly relations with Palestine and voting in favour of Palestinian membership in international bodies, Belgrade has exported ammunition and arms to Israel since October 2023.

The relationship has also moved beyond exports. In September, Serbia opened an Israeli-linked drone assembly plant , underlining the growing practical dimension of bilateral defence cooperation.

Vuk Vuksanovic, lecturer in foreign policy and grand strategy at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera that Serbia’s defence industry “has not been particularly picky when it comes to its customers, and the desire for profit has been one of the factors”.

However, he emphasised broader geopolitical ambitions.

“In the past three years, there has been a tilt towards Israel regarding security cooperation, while diplomatically Serbia tries to be cautious in multilateral institutions due to its ties with the wider Islamic world,” he said.

Vuksanovic noted that Belgrade views Israel as a partner to “acquire the protection of Israeli lobby groups and access to the Trump administration in the US”, especially as the Serbian government faces domestic political opposition.

Meanwhile, Jaksic warned of the international risks involved.

“Due to the significant increase in ammunition exports to Israel during the war in Gaza, Serbia risks being accused of complicity in genocide,” he said. “Beyond financial calculations, the Serbian president attempts to use closeness with his ideological, authoritarian, and nationalist ally, [Israeli Prime Minister] Benjamin Netanyahu, to get closer to Trump.”

Kosovo, Albania, and the Washington anchor

For Kosovo and Albania, foreign policy regarding Israel remains anchored to security alliances with Washington.

Under the 2020 Washington Agreement, Kosovo recognised Israel in exchange for Israeli recognition of Kosovo’s independence, subsequently opening its embassy in Jerusalem. Serbia, which had pledged in 2020 to move its embassy to Jerusalem, ultimately did not do so.

Pristina opened its Jerusalem embassy “defying the stance of the wider international community”, said Jaksic.

“Israel’s growing influence in the Western Balkans is evident,” he noted. “That includes investments, and in the case of Serbia, especially military cooperation. This absolutely does not exclude personal attempts to buy political impunity from American sanctions, or to ease diplomatic pressure.”

In neighbouring Albania, Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government has preserved warm political ties with Israel.

Driven partly by operational defence needs, Albania deepened cooperation with Israeli cybersecurity companies after cyberattacks, while aligning broader diplomacy with Washington and Brussels.

Executive rifts and ideological turnarounds

In Croatia, foreign policy on Gaza has been paralysed by a sharp executive rift between conservative Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic and President Zoran Milanovic of the Social Democratic Party.

Plenkovic’s government has followed a cautious, mainstream European Union approach, while Milanovic has openly condemned Israel’s military conduct in Gaza, labelling it disproportionate and creating a public fracture in the country’s foreign policy leadership.

Further north in Slovenia , there are ideological shifts.

The previous centre-left government adopted firm measures against Israel – such as an arms embargo, a ban on imports from illegal settlements, and a ban on the entry of top officials like Netanyahu – as well as recognising Palestinian statehood.

Conservative forces under Prime Minister Janez Jansa have sought to reverse these policies.

“In Slovenia, we can see the classic left-right division where populist and far-right parties support Israel because of Netanyahu as a similar political actor,” said Bieber. “They recognise him as ideologically aligned, which helps reinforce their view of Islam as a threat, fitting their own narratives.”

Quiet alignment and strategic alliances

Smaller NATO members like Montenegro and North Macedonia have chosen a path of quiet alignment.

Both adhere to standard EU and NATO statements, calling for ceasefires and humanitarian aid while carefully avoiding high-profile bilateral disputes or bold independent diplomatic initiatives.

Further east, Romania and Bulgaria maintain a cautious tone that sometimes leans towards Israel. Grounded in historic bilateral relations and deep strategic defence partnerships with the United States, Bucharest and Sofia balance carefully worded statements at the United Nations with ongoing military and intelligence coordination.

Meanwhile, in Greece, consecutive governments in Athens have maintained a robust strategic military and energy partnership with Israel; Athens recently signed a $3.5bn missile deal with Israel. Originally forged alongside Cyprus to balance regional maritime rivalries in the Eastern Mediterranean, this alliance has held firm despite significant domestic public backlash and protests over the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

Ultimately, the disparate responses across the Balkans demonstrate that Middle Eastern policy in the region is rarely about the Middle East itself.

Whether driven by defence profits, constitutional rivalries, or the search for political backing in Washington, regional actors continue to view Israel almost exclusively through a transactional lens.

巴尔干国家与以色列的关系反映的是国内政治、国防协议和战略利益，而不是统一的地区立场。

2026年9月24日，在美国纽约联合国总部举行的第81届联合国大会上，塞尔维亚代表聆听以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡的讲话，而许多其他代表则离场。[Jeenah Moon/路透社]

在以色列对加沙发动的种族灭绝战争中，欧洲的立场在某种程度上是一致的。

西班牙和爱尔兰共和国等少数例外国家长期以来对以色列的谴责更为公开，但总体而言，从无条件声援以色列到对其行为表示担忧的转变已经在欧洲大陆的大部分地区扎根。

图1/4：数千人游行穿越欧洲，要求以色列停止对加沙的战争

列表 2/4 “科索沃向以色列靠拢是与美国政策保持一致的代价”

列表 3/4：加沙种族灭绝如何效仿波斯尼亚的痛苦模式

列表 4（共 4 项）：特朗普的特工在波斯尼亚为亲俄政治家多迪克做了什么？

专家表示，巴尔干地区各国对以色列政策的分歧反映的是国内的考量、交易型外交和尚未解决的身份政治，而不是对中东的共同愿景。

国际危机组织分析师马尔科·普雷莱克告诉半岛电视台：“巴尔干国家几乎没有任何共同立场，因此它们在对待以色列和加沙问题上的立场五花八门也就不足为奇了。每个国家都走自己的路。”

普雷莱克指出，虽然人们对以色列在加沙的政策确实感到反感，并且对巴勒斯坦人表示同情——尤其是在波斯尼亚穆斯林中——但该地区的大多数国家都是基于不相关的利益来表明立场的。

奥地利格拉茨大学东南欧历史与政治学教授弗洛里安·比伯表示，达成区域共识几乎是不可能的。

比伯告诉半岛电视台：“对以色列的立场深受国内政治和国家叙事的影响，因此不太可能采取区域性甚至针对特定国家的立场。”

波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那：不同实体之间的差异

在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那，这种分裂现象表现得最为明显，加沙战争加剧了当地现有的民族分裂。

波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那联邦的波斯尼亚克族政治代表和大部分民众都对巴勒斯坦人表示了强烈的声援，而塞族共和国的领导人则公开支持以色列，一些克罗地亚族政治人物也对以色列采取了更为同情的态度。

比伯解释说：“人们往往不仅从意识形态的角度看待波斯尼亚人与巴勒斯坦人的团结，而且还从战争和作为塞尔维亚民族主义侵略受害者的角度看待，将巴勒斯坦人的经历与波斯尼亚人在 20 世纪 90 年代的经历进行比较。”

相反，以塞族共和国（塞尔维亚共和国）为首的塞族共和国领导人，在前总统米洛拉德·多迪克的领导下，公开拥抱以色列。

外交政策分析师兼记者博斯科·雅克西奇告诉半岛电视台，对多迪克而言，“敌人的敌人就是朋友——犹太人和东正教塞尔维亚人对抗穆斯林。这种宗教和种族因素使他能够与以色列保持密切联系，同时又与俄罗斯保持密切关系，并同时通过赞扬（美国总统）唐纳德·特朗普来上演一出新的美国式转变。”

普雷莱克补充说，波斯尼亚塞族与以色列，特别是与以色列执政党利库德集团接触，代表着“试图为其在国际上不受欢迎的分裂主义倾向寻找盟友，以及间接加强与MAGA（让美国再次伟大）运动和特朗普政府部分成员联系的一种方式”。

塞尔维亚：武器销售与多方平衡

在塞尔维亚，对以色列的政策是将国防经济与外交政策相结合。

尽管贝尔格莱德与巴勒斯坦有着历史上的友好关系，并且投票支持巴勒斯坦加入国际组织，但自 2023 年 10 月以来，贝尔格莱德一直向以色列出口弹药和武器。

两国关系已超越出口领域。今年9月，塞尔维亚开设了一家与以色列有关联的无人机组装厂，凸显了双边防务合作日益增长的务实层面。

伦敦国王学院外交政策和大战略讲师武克·武克萨诺维奇告诉半岛电视台，塞尔维亚国防工业“在选择客户方面并不特别挑剔，而追求利润是其中一个因素”。

然而，他强调了更广泛的地缘政治抱负。

他说：“过去三年，塞尔维亚在安全合作方面倾向于以色列，而由于与更广泛的伊斯兰世界的关系，塞尔维亚在外交上试图在多边机构中保持谨慎。”

武克萨诺维奇指出，贝尔格莱德将以色列视为合作伙伴，以便“获得以色列游说团体的保护以及与美国特朗普政府接触的机会”，尤其是在塞尔维亚政府面临国内政治反对的情况下。

与此同时，雅克西奇警告说，其中涉及国际风险。

他说：“由于加沙战争期间塞尔维亚向以色列大幅增加弹药出口，塞尔维亚有可能被指控参与种族灭绝。除了经济考量之外，塞尔维亚总统还试图利用与他在意识形态上同属威权主义和民族主义阵营的盟友——以色列总理内塔尼亚胡的密切关系，来拉近与特朗普的距离。”

科索沃、阿尔巴尼亚和华盛顿主播

科索沃和阿尔巴尼亚对以色列的外交政策仍然以与华盛顿的安全联盟为基础。

根据2020年《华盛顿协议》，科索沃承认以色列，以换取以色列承认科索沃独立，随后在耶路撒冷开设了大使馆。塞尔维亚曾在2020年承诺将其大使馆迁至耶路撒冷，但最终并未履行承诺。

雅克西奇说，普里什蒂纳开设耶路撒冷大使馆“无视了国际社会的普遍立场”。

他指出：“以色列在西巴尔干地区的影响力日益增强，这一点显而易见。这包括投资，尤其是在塞尔维亚的军事合作。但这绝不排除以色列试图通过个人手段来规避美国制裁或减轻外交压力。”

在邻国阿尔巴尼亚，总理埃迪·拉马领导的政府与以色列保持着良好的政治关系。

部分原因是出于作战防御需要，阿尔巴尼亚在遭受网络攻击后深化了与以色列网络安全公司的合作，同时在更广泛的外交上与华盛顿和布鲁塞尔保持一致。

高层分歧和意识形态转变

在克罗地亚，由于保守派总理安德烈·普伦科维奇与社会民主党总统佐兰·米拉诺维奇之间存在严重的行政分歧，加沙外交政策陷入瘫痪。

普连科维奇政府一直奉行谨慎的、主流的欧盟方针，而米拉诺维奇则公开谴责以色列在加沙的军事行为，称其不成比例，并在该国外交政策领导层中造成了公开的分裂。

在斯洛文尼亚更北部的地区，出现了意识形态的转变。

前中左翼政府对以色列采取了强硬措施，例如武器禁运、禁止从非法定居点进口商品以及禁止内塔尼亚胡等高级官员入境，同时承认巴勒斯坦建国。

在总理亚内兹·扬沙的领导下，保守势力试图扭转这些政策。

比伯说：“在斯洛文尼亚，我们可以看到典型的左右翼分歧，民粹主义和极右翼政党支持以色列，因为内塔尼亚胡与他们的政治立场相似。他们认为内塔尼亚胡在意识形态上与他们一致，这有助于强化他们将伊斯兰教视为威胁的观点，符合他们自身的叙事。”

悄然结盟与战略联盟

像黑山和北马其顿这样的小型北约成员国选择了一条低调结盟的道路。

双方都遵循欧盟和北约的标准声明，呼吁停火和人道主义援助，同时小心翼翼地避免高调的双边争端或大胆的独立外交举措。

再往东，罗马尼亚和保加利亚则保持着谨慎的态度，有时甚至倾向于以色列。布加勒斯特和索非亚与美国有着悠久的双边关系和深厚的战略防务伙伴关系，两国在联合国发表措辞谨慎的声明的同时，也保持着持续的军事和情报协调。

与此同时，在希腊，雅典历届政府都与以色列保持着稳固的战略军事和能源伙伴关系；雅典最近还与以色列签署了一项价值35亿美元的导弹协议。该联盟最初是与塞浦路斯共同建立的，旨在平衡东地中海地区的海上竞争，尽管在国内引发了强烈的公众反对和因加沙人道主义危机而进行的抗议，但这一联盟依然稳固。

最终，巴尔干地区各国截然不同的反应表明，该地区的中东政策很少真正关注中东本身。

无论是出于国防利益、宪法上的竞争，还是为了寻求华盛顿的政治支持，地区各方仍然几乎完全从交易的角度看待以色列。