Mirror life and why we should avoid creating it

The Helix Bridge, a pedestrian bridge in the Marina Bay Area in Singapore, was designed to mirror the double-helix structure of DNA.

Published Oct 19, 2026, 05:00 AM

Updated Oct 19, 2026, 05:00 AM

Mirror life uses reversed biology, unlike natural life's handedness. Scientists warn it could escape control and cause severe infections and ecological harm.

Progress in synthetic biology and AI is bringing mirror life closer. Experts say the window to set safeguards is still open, but may not stay open for long.

The article calls for global rules, screening of synthetic DNA and RNA orders, and limits on work aimed at mirror life. Useful mirror molecules should still be allowed.

SINGAPORE – The iconic Helix Bridge in Marina Bay, an eye-catching tourist attraction and Singapore’s longest pedestrian bridge, was inspired by the double helix of DNA.

Less well known is that it is left-handed by design (the two twisted strands spiral in an anti-clockwise direction), unlike the familiar form of DNA found in living organisms, which twists to the right.

Most of the essential molecules of life, including the building blocks of DNA and RNA, most amino acids, sugars, and even some lipids, exhibit “handedness”. This property – first demonstrated by the father of modern immunology Louis Pasteur in 1848 – is known as chirality.

An object is chiral if it cannot be superimposed on its mirror image, much like our left and right hands.

Life on Earth overwhelmingly favours one configuration over the other – a phenomenon termed homochirality. Proteins are built almost entirely from “left-handed” amino acids, while most of life’s key sugars are “right-handed”. Why life settled on this specific dominant configuration remains a great scientific puzzle.

But the consequences are far-reaching: The enzymes that bind and break down molecules, the receptors on our cells, and even key facets of our immune system are highly shape-specific. They often cannot recognise or act on mirror-image molecules. We humans cannot metabolise “left-handed” glucose, although curiously, we can taste it just fine.

The case against creating mirror life

Scientists have worked on mirror-image biological molecules for decades, creating many useful products and drugs.

They show promise in creating drugs or biomaterials that do not break down, and because the immune system does not recognise them, they do not prompt immune reactions and could work in the body for much longer.

However, in December 2024, a group of prominent scientists published a Policy Forum article in the journal Science warning about the risks of creating “mirror life” – mirror-image organisms capable of reproduction and expansion – accompanied by a 299-page technical report examining the evidence and possible consequences.

The group included many who work at the frontiers of synthetic biology and mirror-image biological molecules, as well as experts in immunology, ecology and biosecurity. Several had previously regarded creating mirror-image organisms as a long-term scientific goal, but their own analysis persuaded them of the danger.

The scientists estimated then that the capability to create “mirror life” – a mirror-image bacterium being the most plausible first such construct – was “at least a decade away” and would require major technical advancements as well as large-scale investment.

For policymakers and the scientific community, this lead time is valuable: It creates an opportunity to develop proportionate safeguards alongside scientific progress, rather than trying to impose them retrospectively.

It also offers an opportunity to better understand and pre-empt the risk, rather than kick the can down the road while dealing with more exigent challenges.

The scientists’ case, built largely on existing experimental evidence and established principles of biology, laid out why a sufficiently robust mirror-image bacterium, once created, might survive and even thrive in our world if it was accidentally (or deliberately) released from the laboratory.

Although it would start with a metabolic disadvantage – there being fewer nutrients that it could use – the constraints that keep natural bacteria in check, such as viruses that could infect and predators that could prey on them, might have limited effect, because the reverse chirality could result in the bacterium not being recognised and targeted.

More concerning is what might happen should the bacterium invade living organisms. The likely inability of life’s immune systems – in plants, animals and humans alike – to recognise and react effectively against such a bacterium would mean that it could have a broad host range, plausibly resulting in severe or lethal infections across many species.

Most of the antibiotics we use to treat bacterial infections today are also chiral, and they are expected to have limited or no effect on a mirror-image bacterium. Even if we were to synthesise mirror-image antibiotics – a far less difficult challenge compared with creating mirror life – the lack of an adequate immune response would dramatically reduce the efficacy of these drugs.

The science has not stood still

Progress has continued on several fronts since the Science article. Chemical synthesis of large mirror enzymes and proteins has become more efficient, while parallel advances in synthetic biology have demonstrated increasingly sophisticated production and assembly of the components of the cellular machinery that make proteins.

Earlier in 2026 , researchers at the University of Minnesota reported assembling a synthetic cell – nicknamed SpudCell – from non-living chemical components that could copy its own genome, grow and divide for a few generations.

Scientists at the University of Minnesota have created SpudCell, the first synthetic cell to complete a full life cycle – from birth to division into next-generation cells – after being made from lifeless chemicals. PHOTO: ADAMALA LAB

Scientists at the University of Minnesota have created SpudCell, the first synthetic cell to complete a full life cycle – from birth to division into next-generation cells – after being made from lifeless chemicals.

SpudCell is neither mirror life nor even alive as we understand the term, but these advances collectively demonstrate that scientists are rapidly learning to integrate individual molecular components into increasingly life-like systems.

Artificial intelligence could add a new wrinkle.

Dario Amodei, chief executive of AI company Anthropic, argued in his January essay on the risks of AI that a sufficiently powerful AI model – more capable than any today – could considerably shorten the time to creating a mirror-image bacterium.

None of the above means that mirror life is imminent, but the window to act may not be as comfortably long as originally believed.

Should there be guard rails on creating mirror life?

Many of the risks raised in the Science article are scientific extrapolations, not settled science. Some – such as whether mirror-image bacteria will outcompete other bacteria and expand unchecked in the environment, causing widespread ecological disruption, or cause deadly infections in a wide variety of living organisms including humans – cannot be confirmed without their actual creation.

But the potential consequences are extreme, while there are hardly any real benefits to the creation of mirror life itself beyond the unique scientific achievement of having done so.

International, national and private institutions have begun to respond.

In March , the UN Secretary-General’s Scientific Advisory Board issued a Brief warning that the “risks associated with self-replicating mirror life are extraordinarily high” and recommended a global forum to proactively develop governance frameworks.

UNESCO’s International Bioethics Committee has gone further, joining many scientists in calling for a precautionary global moratorium. In July , the United States classified the creation of mirror organisms as dangerous gain-of-function research for which federal funding is prohibited.

Multiple scientific forums and dialogues have been held worldwide, most recently in Singapore on Sept 28 and 29, which we at the National University of Singapore co-hosted, to disseminate knowledge and develop governance recommendations.

However, there is no globally binding prohibition, and privately funded work remains outside many funding-based restrictions.

Importantly, any moratorium on creating mirror life should not be bluntly targeted at mirror biology research in general. The aim should be to prevent the creation of self-replicating mirror organisms while still allowing beneficial research on mirror-image molecules to continue .

Because our enzymes cannot easily degrade them and our immune systems largely ignore them, mirror-image molecules have considerable biomedical potential.

Etelcalcetide was the first drug built almost entirely from “right-handed” amino acids and is currently used in dialysis patients with overactive parathyroid glands. More than 20 approved medicines now contain at least one “right-handed” amino acid. Mirror-image DNA and RNA have been developed as degradation-resistant diagnostic probes.

Decades ago, even “left-handed” glucose was patented for use as a zero-calorie sweetener but never made it to market because of high production costs.

This, however, creates an issue where there is no consensus among scientists – how far back along the path to a mirror-image bacterium should a red line be drawn, given that the enabling technologies are also the ones delivering the benefits of mirror molecules and synthetic biology in general?

Perhaps the harder question is not simply where to draw one red line, but how closely we should watch different stages along the path towards it.

Research on useful mirror-image biological molecules should continue. But as research begins to combine capabilities that could bring us materially closer to a self-replicating mirror organism, the level of scrutiny should increase accordingly. The precise boundaries will need to evolve as the science develops.

What should Singapore do?

Although Singapore has not researched mirror-life creation, synthetic biology and biotechnology are national research priorities and areas of strength that contribute to our emerging bioeconomy.

Singapore can contribute towards building international consensus by convening further dialogues among global scientists, funders and policymakers. But we are also able to act independently at home: Our research funders could announce that they will not support work aimed at creating mirror life – a commitment with limited downside that sets a clear norm.

Given the Republic’s established biomedical research ecosystem and reputation for strong governance, such a signal could carry influence beyond our shores and encourage others to follow suit.

Singapore could also establish a process mandating the screening of synthetic nucleic acid orders (short sequences of DNA and RNA manufactured artificially which are used for research or other commercial purposes).

Such a measure would guard against a wider range of biological risks rather than mirror life alone, by making it harder for individuals or organisations to acquire genetic material that could be used to create or modify dangerous pathogens.

It would also demonstrate how scientific progress and responsible governance should go hand in hand.

Finally, AI may eventually ease the technological path towards mirror life creation.

Appropriate biorisk assessments and safeguards should therefore accompany AI development and use in the life sciences, particularly where they could lower technical barriers to dangerous biological capabilities.

Singapore has already taken a step in this direction in proposing a UN framework convention on AI safeguards, where we identified the potential misuse of AI to develop biological weapons as a major emerging risk.

Act while we still can

Mirror life can be viewed as an unusual opportunity for joint governance and decision in an increasingly fragmented world. We do not yet possess the technical capability to develop it, and there is little practical benefit identified with its creation.

We still have some years to establish guard rails and even red lines before scientific progress closes the window of opportunity.

With appropriate vigilance, trusted international partnerships and safeguards that evolve with the science, we should be able to pursue the considerable benefits of mirror biology while ensuring that progress does not inadvertently take us across a threshold from which there may be no easy return.

Hsu Li Yang is director of the Asia Centre for Health Security at the Saw Swee Hock School of Public Health at the National University of Singapore.

Eddie Tan Han Pin is co-lead of the Centre of Regulatory Excellence at Duke-NUS Medical School at NUS.

They were among the experts gathered at NUS on Sept 28 for the Singapore Conference on Mirror Life. The event was part of an ongoing global effort to set international safeguards and ban mirror-image synthetic organisms that pose severe biosecurity risks.

Duke-NUS Medical School

新加坡滨海湾地区的螺旋桥是一座人行桥，其设计灵感来源于 DNA 的双螺旋结构。

发布于 2026 年 10 月 19 日上午 5:00

更新于2026年10月19日凌晨5:00

镜像生命采用与自然界生物相反的生物学机制，这与自然界生物的左右手特性截然不同。科学家警告说，镜像生命可能失控，造成严重的感染和生态破坏。

合成生物学和人工智能的进步正使镜像生命离我们越来越近。专家表示，目前仍有机会设置保障措施，但这窗口可能不会持续太久。

文章呼吁制定全球性规则，对合成DNA和RNA订单进行筛选，并限制旨在复制生命的研究。但有用的镜像分子仍应被允许。

新加坡——滨海湾标志性的螺旋桥是新加坡最长的步行桥，也是引人注目的旅游景点，其设计灵感来源于 DNA 的双螺旋结构。

鲜为人知的是，DNA的设计是左旋的（两条扭曲的链以逆时针方向螺旋），这与生物体中常见的DNA形式不同，后者是向右扭曲的。

大多数生命必需分子，包括DNA和RNA的组成单元、大多数氨基酸、糖类，甚至一些脂质，都表现出“手性”。这种特性——最早由现代免疫学之父路易·巴斯德于1848年发现——被称为手性。

如果一个物体不能与其镜像重合，那么它就是手性的，就像我们的左手和右手一样。

地球上的生命绝大多数都倾向于一种特定的构型——这种现象被称为同手性。蛋白质几乎完全由“左旋”氨基酸构成，而生命体中的大多数关键糖类则是“右旋”的。生命为何最终选择这种特定的优势构型，至今仍是一个巨大的科学谜题。

但其后果影响深远：结合和分解分子的酶、细胞上的受体，甚至免疫系统的关键组成部分都具有高度的形状特异性。它们通常无法识别或作用于镜像分子。我们人类无法代谢“左旋”葡萄糖，但奇怪的是，我们却能正常品尝到它的味道。

反对创造镜像生活的理由

几十年来，科学家们一直在研究镜像生物分子，创造出了许多有用的产品和药物。

它们有望用于制造不会分解的药物或生物材料，而且由于免疫系统无法识别它们，因此不会引发免疫反应，并且可以在体内发挥更长时间的作用。

然而，2024 年 12 月，一群杰出的科学家在《科学》杂志上发表了一篇政策论坛文章，警告人们注意创造“镜像生命”（能够繁殖和扩张的镜像生物）的风险，并附上了一份 299 页的技术报告，审查了相关证据和可能的后果。

该小组成员包括许多从事合成生物学和镜像生物分子前沿研究的科学家，以及免疫学、生态学和生物安全领域的专家。此前，他们中的一些人曾将创造镜像生物体视为一项长期的科学目标，但他们自身的分析使他们意识到其中的危险性。

当时科学家们估计，创造“镜像生命”（最有可能的第一个此类构造是镜像细菌）的能力“至少还需要十年时间”，并且需要重大的技术进步以及大规模的投资。

对于政策制定者和科学界而言，这段提前期是宝贵的：它创造了一个机会，可以随着科学的进步制定相应的保障措施，而不是试图事后强加这些措施。

它还提供了一个机会，让我们更好地了解和预先防范风险，而不是在应对更紧迫的挑战时把问题拖延下去。

科学家们主要依据现有的实验证据和已确立的生物学原理，阐述了为什么一旦创造出足够强大的镜像细菌，即使意外（或故意）从实验室释放出来，也可能在我们的世界中生存甚至繁衍。

虽然一开始会面临代谢劣势——可利用的营养物质较少——但限制天然细菌生存的因素，例如可能感染它们的病毒和可能捕食它们的捕食者，可能影响有限，因为反向手性可能导致细菌无法被识别和攻击。

更令人担忧的是，如果这种细菌侵入活体生物会发生什么。由于植物、动物和人类的免疫系统很可能无法识别并有效对抗这种细菌，这意味着它可能具有广泛的宿主范围，并可能导致许多物种发生严重甚至致命的感染。

我们目前用于治疗细菌感染的大多数抗生素也都是手性的，预计它们对镜像细菌的疗效有限或无效。即使我们能够合成镜像抗生素——与创造镜像生命相比，这要容易得多——缺乏足够的免疫反应也会显著降低这些药物的疗效。

科学并未停滞不前。

自《科学》杂志发表文章以来，多个领域都取得了持续进展。大型镜像酶和蛋白质的化学合成效率更高，与此同时，合成生物学的同步发展也展现出日益精密的细胞蛋白质合成机制组分的生产和组装能力。

2026 年初，明尼苏达大学的研究人员报告称，他们利用非生物化学成分组装了一种合成细胞——昵称 SpudCell——该细胞可以复制自己的基因组，生长并分裂几代。

明尼苏达大学的科学家们创造出了SpudCell，这是首个由无生命化学物质制成的、能够完成完整生命周期（从诞生到分裂成下一代细胞）的合成细胞。图片：ADAMALA实验室

明尼苏达大学的科学家们创造了 SpudCell，这是第一个由无生命化学物质制成的合成细胞，它完成了从诞生到分裂成下一代细胞的完整生命周期。

SpudCell 既不是镜像生命，甚至也不是我们所理解的“生命”，但这些进展共同表明，科学家们正在迅速学习如何将单个分子成分整合到越来越像生命的系统中。

人工智能可能会带来新的变数。

人工智能公司 Anthropic 的首席执行官 Dario Amodei 在 1 月份发表的关于人工智能风险的文章中指出，一个足够强大的 AI 模型——比当今任何模型都更强大——可以大大缩短创建镜像细菌所需的时间。

以上种种并不意味着镜像生活即将到来，但采取行动的窗口期可能没有最初认为的那么长。

创造镜像人生是否应该设置一些限制？

《科学》杂志文章中提出的许多风险都是科学推断，而非确凿的科学结论。有些风险——例如镜像细菌是否会胜过其他细菌并在环境中不受控制地扩散，造成大范围的生态破坏，或者是否会对包括人类在内的多种生物体造成致命感染——只有在实际制造出来之后才能得到证实。

但潜在的后果极其严重，而创造镜像生命本身除了这项独特的科学成就之外，几乎没有任何真正的好处。

国际、国家和私营机构都已开始做出反应。

今年 3 月，联合国秘书长科学顾问委员会发布简报警告称，“与自我复制的镜像生命相关的风险极高”，并建议建立一个全球论坛，积极制定治理框架。

联合国教科文组织国际生物伦理委员会更进一步，与众多科学家一道呼吁在全球范围内暂停镜像生物的研究，以防万一。今年7月，美国将镜像生物的构建列为危险的功能增益研究，禁止联邦政府资助此类研究。

世界各地举办了多场科学论坛和对话，最近一次是在 9 月 28 日和 29 日在新加坡举行，由新加坡国立大学联合主办，旨在传播知识并制定治理建议。

然而，目前尚无全球约束性的禁令，私人资助的工作也不受许多基于资金的限制。

重要的是，任何关于创造镜像生命的禁令都不应直接针对整个镜像生物学研究。其目标应该是防止创造出能够自我复制的镜像生物，同时允许对镜像分子的有益研究继续进行。

由于我们的酶不容易降解它们，而且我们的免疫系统也很大程度上忽略它们，因此镜像分子具有相当大的生物医学潜力。

依替卡西肽是首个几乎完全由“右旋”氨基酸构成的药物，目前用于治疗甲状旁腺功能亢进的透析患者。目前已有超过20种获批药物含有至少一种“右旋”氨基酸。镜像DNA和RNA已被开发为抗降解的诊断探针。

几十年前，就连“左旋”葡萄糖也被申请了专利，用作零卡路里甜味剂，但由于生产成本高昂，从未上市。

然而，这就造成了一个科学家之间没有共识的问题——考虑到实现镜像分子和合成生物学总体上带来的好处的技术也是实现镜像细菌的技术，那么在通往镜像细菌的道路上应该划清界限到什么程度呢？

或许更难的问题不在于在哪里划定一条红线，而在于我们应该如何密切关注通往这条红线的不同阶段。

对有用的镜像生物分子的研究应该继续。但随着研究开始整合可能使我们更接近自我复制镜像生物体的各种能力，审查力度也应相应提高。随着科学的发展，具体的界限也需要不断完善。

新加坡应该怎么做？

尽管新加坡尚未对镜像生命创造进行研究，但合成生物学和生物技术是国家研究重点和优势领域，有助于我们新兴的生物经济。

新加坡可以通过召集全球科学家、资助者和政策制定者进行更多对话，为构建国际共识做出贡献。但我们也可以在国内采取独立行动：我们的研究资助者可以宣布，他们将不再支持旨在创造镜像世界的研究——这一承诺的负面影响有限，却能树立明确的规范。

鉴于共和国已建立的生物医学研究体系和强大的治理声誉，这样的信号可能会对我国境外产生影响，并鼓励其他国家效仿。

新加坡还可以建立一套流程，强制对合成核酸订单（人工制造的用于研究或其他商业用途的短DNA和RNA序列）进行筛查。

这样的措施可以防范更广泛的生物风险，而不仅仅是反映生命本身，它会使个人或组织更难获得可用于制造或改造危险病原体的遗传物质。

这也能说明科学进步与负责任的治理应该齐头并进。

最后，人工智能或许最终能为创造镜像人生铺平技术道路。

因此，在生命科学领域，人工智能的开发和使用应伴随适当的生物风险评估和保障措施，尤其是在人工智能可能降低危险生物能力的技术门槛的情况下。

新加坡已朝着这个方向迈出了一步，提议制定一项关于人工智能保障措施的联合国框架公约，其中我们指出，人工智能可能被滥用以开发生物武器是一个主要的新兴风险。

趁现在还能行动的时候赶紧行动吧

在日益分裂的世界中，镜像生活可以被视为一种难得的共同治理和决策契机。我们目前尚不具备开发镜像生活的技术能力，而且其实际应用价值也微乎其微。

在科学进步关闭机会之窗之前，我们还有几年时间来建立护栏，甚至是红线。

只要保持适当的警惕，建立值得信赖的国际伙伴关系，并采取随着科学发展而不断完善的保障措施，我们就能在追求镜像生物学带来的巨大益处的同时，确保进展不会无意中将我们带过一个可能无法轻易回头的门槛。

许立阳是新加坡国立大学苏瑞福公共卫生学院亚洲健康安全中心主任。

陈汉彬是新加坡国立大学杜克-新加坡国立大学医学院监管卓越中心的联合负责人。

9月28日，他们与其他专家齐聚新加坡国立大学，参加新加坡镜像生命研讨会。此次研讨会是全球持续努力的一部分，旨在制定国际保障措施，并禁止那些构成严重生物安全风险的镜像合成生物。

杜克-新加坡国立大学医学院