Europe weighs giving utilities, infrastructure companies more powers to bring down drones

At a former flight-test base south of Paris, drones swoop over fields and woodland as teams on the ground test systems designed to stop them — a response to a growing wave of drone incursions and “hybrid attacks” since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022.

The potential clients for technology such as electronic jammers and interceptor drones tested at the Brétigny-sur-Orge site are no longer just governments, police and armies.

Private firms and state entities across Europe that operate critical infrastructure want to strengthen their defenses, with some utilities asking for authorization to shoot drones down themselves. From Paris to Berlin, governments are taking note.

They are worried that hybrid warfare or a drone attack could knock out power to millions of people — as has happened frequently in Ukraine after Russian strikes.

“It is a theoretical, and increasingly a practical, possibility that there could be heating outages this winter due to hybrid attacks,” Kristian Ruby, secretary general of European energy body Eurelectric, told Reuters.

Some European governments are responding by starting to give firms powers traditionally confined to the military. Interviews by Reuters with over 30 company executives, officials and drone experts meanwhile show the technology to detect and bring down drones is maturing faster than the rules on who may use it.

Approaches vary widely across Europe and legal uncertainties remain, including over who has the right to order a response to a drone threat. Bringing down a drone could cause injury or death to people on the ground or damage property, raising questions for companies about liability and accountability.

France is among countries that have led the way. Its parliament passed a law in August allowing approved operators of critical infrastructure and contractors to detect, jam and shoot down drones near designated facilities.

The law passed by the French parliament in August responded to a wave of drone incursions over critical and military sites, including flights over the Ile Longue nuclear submarine base near Brest in northwestern France in December 2025.

France wants a newly expanded list of sensitive sites deemed of vital importance equipped by 2027, a senior French official involved in the plans told Reuters, asking not to be named because details of the plan are not yet public.

“We were defenseless in the face of the (drone) threat,” the official said, adding that concerns had been growing over the last decade as unmanned aerial vehicles became more accessible and more common.

The French government wants to give operators of critical infrastructure such as state-owned utility company EDF and state-owned railway company SNCF a catalogue of approved systems ranging from electronic jammers to interceptor drones, depending on different environments and situations.

Confirming important elements of the plan outlined by the French official, Systematic Paris-Region, which runs the government testing program at Brétigny-sur-Orge, said evaluations launched this summer had so far catalogued three systems integrators — which combine different computer systems into a unified whole — and 17 counter-drone systems.

It said assessments were continuing and work was underway to accelerate procurement from among those solutions.

France’s defense ministry said the law passed in August would help strengthen capabilities to counter the threat, though it said it could speak only for the critical infrastructure under its authority. EDF and SNCF declined comment.

Who can bring down a drone?

The discovery of an explosives-laden drone near a Ukrainian cargo plane at Germany’s Leipzig/Halle airport in August underlined how far the risks have spread.

Germany blamed Russia for the incident. Moscow denied it was behind it, and has repeatedly denied carrying out hybrid attacks in Europe, many of which have been in countries that support Kyiv in Russia’s war in Ukraine.

But concerns are growing that national authorities cannot respond fast enough to protect widely dispersed infrastructure against such attacks, and that the damage caused by relatively cheap drones could bring hefty repair costs.

In Germany, where counter-drone operations remain a policing function, the interior ministry told Reuters it was reviewing how critical infrastructure operators and third parties could be legally involved in active counter-drone measures.

In September, Austria announced plans to give similar powers to critical infrastructure operators, including large energy firms. Defense Minister Klaudia Tanner told a press conference that the state could not protect every site on its own.

Poland has gone further. Operators told Reuters they have deployed counter-drone systems and trained with military and police units. Drone-restricted zones have been established around critical energy infrastructure, and designated security units working for operators have been authorized to destroy, disable or take control of drones entering them.

But two sources at energy transmission companies on NATO’s eastern flank told Reuters that effective intervention still requires more assurances, and perhaps a judicial precedent, on who bears responsibility for collateral damage.

Without that certainty, they said, operators of critical infrastructure could remain reluctant to neutralize drones because bringing one down could itself cause injury or costly damage.

Having powers to bring down drones would be a change of approach for companies across Europe.

Executives, officials and energy analysts told Reuters that utilities have spent years hardening networks and preparing to restore disrupted services, rather than preventing attacks.

Leonhard Birnbaum, chief executive of German energy firm E.ON, said in September that operators must assume some attacks will succeed, rather than plan on stopping all of them. The company operates about 2,720 substations across Germany, he said.

Lithuania is building a fortified substation near its border with Russia as part of plans by the Baltic states and Poland to improve their defenses that include constructing bunkers , installing anti-drone nets and building up stocks of hard-to-replace equipment for critical parts of the energy grid.

Poland’s state-owned transmission operator PSE patrols parts of its about 16,500-km (10,250-mile) high-voltage network by helicopter and is preparing more powerful aircraft to help protect an undersea power link to Sweden.

Yet relatively inexpensive drones are challenging such defenses. Essential equipment such as large transformers can take years to replace, while even a successful repair can leave infrastructure out of service for months.

Not all utility operators are seeking a bigger role in defending themselves.

Asta Sihvonen-Punkka, chief executive of Finland’s national power grid operator Fingrid, told Reuters that responsibility for countering threats around critical infrastructure should remain with Finnish authorities and armed forces.

Any move to give such powers to utility operators would be “a very, very big change” requiring careful legal consideration, she said.

Jari Stenius, head of security of Finnish utility Fortum, said he was content for energy companies to focus on producing energy while police and military authorities handled security threats.

Technology ready, rules are not

Security officials and counter-drone technology firms say systems are becoming increasingly automated because operators cannot station specialist teams at every site.

Modern counter-drone systems combine sensors, command-and-control software and countermeasures into a single chain designed to identify, classify and respond to threats within seconds.

Several companies told Reuters that uncertainty over who can authorize a response has slowed investment in the latter stages of that process. France is therefore trying to automate the process as much as possible, said the senior French official involved in France’s plans.

The official said security workers at utilities should eventually be able to detect a threat and launch an automated response at the press of a button, because having operators trained to use military-grade solutions at every location was unrealistic.

German defense company Rheinmetall told Reuters the biggest hurdle for civilian operators was often the delay between detecting a drone and deciding whether to deploy a countermeasure, as legal responsibilities remain fragmented.

Rheinmetall said interest from private infrastructure operators in counter-drone systems was rising sharply.

The company said it was conducting workshops, site surveys and infrastructure assessments for operators and was preparing for what it described as a “very fast-growing” market segment.

(Reporting by Maria Rugamer and Leo Marchandon in Gdansk, Florence Loeve in Paris and Marek Strzelecki in Warsaw.)

在巴黎南部的一个前飞行测试基地，无人机在田野和林地上空盘旋，地面团队正在测试旨在阻止它们的系统——这是为了应对自 2022 年俄罗斯入侵乌克兰以来日益增多的无人机入侵和“混合攻击”。

在布雷蒂尼-奥尔日试验场测试的电子干扰器和拦截无人机等技术的潜在客户，不再仅仅是政府、警察和军队。

欧洲各地运营关键基础设施的私营企业和国有实体都希望加强防御，一些公用事业公司甚至要求获得自行击落无人机的授权。从巴黎到柏林，各国政府都对此高度关注。

他们担心混合战争或无人机袭击可能导致数百万人断电——就像俄罗斯空袭后乌克兰经常发生的那样。

“从理论上讲，由于混合攻击，今年冬天可能会出现供暖中断，而且这种可能性越来越大，”欧洲能源机构 Eurelectric 的秘书长 Kristian Ruby 告诉路透社。

一些欧洲政府的回应是，开始赋予企业以往仅限于军方的权力。与此同时，路透社采访了30多位公司高管、官员和无人机专家，结果显示，探测和击落无人机的技术发展速度远超相关使用规则的制定速度。

欧洲各地应对无人机威胁的方式差异很大，法律上仍存在诸多不确定性，例如谁有权下令应对无人机威胁。击落无人机可能会造成地面人员伤亡或财产损失，这引发了企业在责任和问责方面的担忧。

法国是率先采取行动的国家之一。法国议会于8月通过一项法律，允许经批准的关键基础设施运营商和承包商在指定设施附近探测、干扰并击落无人机。

法国议会于 8 月通过的这项法律，是为了应对无人机入侵关键军事设施的一系列事件，其中包括 2025 年 12 月飞越法国西北部布雷斯特附近的伊勒朗格核潜艇基地的事件。

一位参与该计划的法国高级官员告诉路透社，法国希望在2027年前扩大敏感场所清单，这些场所被认为至关重要。由于该计划的细节尚未公开，该官员要求匿名。

“面对（无人机）威胁，我们毫无防备，”这位官员说，并补充说，过去十年来，随着无人机变得越来越容易获得和越来越普遍，人们的担忧也日益加剧。

法国政府希望向国有公用事业公司 EDF 和国有铁路公司 SNCF 等关键基础设施运营商提供一份经批准的系统目录，涵盖从电子干扰器到拦截无人机等各种系统，具体取决于不同的环境和情况。

负责在布雷蒂尼-奥尔日开展政府测试项目的巴黎大区系统公司证实了法国官员概述的计划中的重要要素，该公司表示，今年夏天启动的评估迄今为止已记录了三家系统集成商（将不同的计算机系统组合成一个统一的整体）和 17 个反无人机系统。

声明称，评估工作仍在进行中，目前正在加快从这些解决方案中采购产品的工作。

法国国防部表示，8月份通过的这项法律将有助于加强应对威胁的能力，但同时指出，它只能代表其管辖范围内的关键基础设施发言。法国电力公司（EDF）和法国国家铁路公司（SNCF）均拒绝置评。

谁能击落无人机？

8 月份在德国莱比锡/哈勒机场一架乌克兰货机附近发现一架装载爆炸物的无人机，凸显了风险蔓延的范围之广。

德国指责俄罗斯发动了这起事件。莫斯科否认幕后指使，并一再否认在欧洲发动混合袭击，其中许多袭击发生在支持基辅参与俄罗斯乌克兰战争的国家。

但人们越来越担心，国家当局无法足够迅速地做出反应来保护分散的基础设施免受此类攻击，而且相对廉价的无人机造成的破坏可能会带来巨额的修复费用。

在德国，反无人机行动仍然是一项警务职能。德国内政部告诉路透社，他们正在审查关键基础设施运营商和第三方如何才能合法地参与积极的反无人机措施。

9月，奥地利宣布计划赋予包括大型能源公司在内的关键基础设施运营商类似的权力。国防部长克劳迪娅·坦纳在新闻发布会上表示，国家无法独自保护所有设施。

波兰采取的措施更为进一步。运营商告诉路透社，他们已部署反无人机系统，并与军警部队进行了联合训练。关键能源基础设施周围已设立无人机禁飞区，运营商指定的安保人员已被授权摧毁、瘫痪或控制进入禁飞区的无人机。

但北约东翼两家能源输送公司的消息人士告诉路透社，有效的干预措施仍然需要更多保证，或许还需要一个司法先例，来确定谁应该承担附带损害的责任。

他们表示，如果没有这种确定性，关键基础设施的运营者可能仍然不愿意击落无人机，因为击落无人机本身可能会造成人员伤亡或代价高昂的损失。

拥有击落无人机的权力将改变欧洲各地公司的经营方式。

高管、官员和能源分析师告诉路透社，公用事业公司多年来一直在加固网络并准备恢复中断的服务，而不是预防攻击。

德国能源公司E.ON首席执行官莱昂哈德·伯恩鲍姆(Leonhard Birnbaum)在9月份表示，运营商必须假设部分攻击会成功，而不是试图阻止所有攻击。他表示，该公司在德国运营着约2720座变电站。

立陶宛正在其与俄罗斯接壤的边境附近建造一座加固的变电站，这是波罗的海国家和波兰加强防御计划的一部分，该计划包括建造掩体、安装反无人机网以及为能源网的关键部分储备难以更换的设备。

波兰国有输电运营商 PSE 使用直升机巡逻其约 16,500 公里（10,250 英里）高压电网的部分路段，并正在准备更强大的飞机来帮助保护通往瑞典的海底电力线路。

然而，价格相对低廉的无人机正在挑战此类防御措施。大型变压器等关键设备的更换可能需要数年时间，即使成功维修，基础设施也可能需要数月才能恢复运行。

并非所有公用事业运营商都希望在自我保护方面发挥更大的作用。

芬兰国家电网运营商 Fingrid 的首席执行官 Asta Sihvonen-Punkka 告诉路透社，应对关键基础设施周围威胁的责任应该仍然由芬兰当局和武装部队承担。

她表示，任何赋予公用事业运营商此类权力的举措都将是“非常非常大的改变”，需要仔细的法律考量。

芬兰公用事业公司富腾的安全主管亚里·斯泰纽斯表示，他乐见能源公司专注于能源生产，而警察和军方则负责处理安全威胁。

技术已就绪，规则尚未制定。

安全官员和反无人机技术公司表示，由于操作人员无法在每个地点都部署专业团队，因此系统正变得越来越自动化。

现代反无人机系统将传感器、指挥控制软件和对抗措施结合成一个单一的链条，旨在几秒钟内识别、分类和应对威胁。

多家公司告诉路透社，由于缺乏授权审批的权限，导致后续阶段的投资放缓。一位参与法国相关计划的高级官员表示，因此，法国正努力尽可能地实现流程自动化。

该官员表示，公用事业公司的安保人员最终应该能够检测到威胁，并只需按下一个按钮即可启动自动响应，因为在每个地点都培训操作员使用军用级解决方案是不现实的。

德国国防公司莱茵金属公司告诉路透社，民用运营商面临的最大障碍通常是探测到无人机和决定是否部署反制措施之间的延迟，因为法律责任仍然分散。

莱茵金属公司表示，私人基础设施运营商对反无人机系统的兴趣正在急剧上升。

该公司表示，它正在为运营商举办研讨会、现场调查和基础设施评估，并为它所描述的“增长非常迅速”的市场领域做准备。

（格但斯克 Maria Rugamer 和 Leo Marchandon，巴黎 Florence Loeve，华沙 Marek Strzelecki 报道。）