Taiwan’s big stake in Washington’s budget battles

Passing twelve appropriations bills is essential for avoiding a government shutdown and a dangerous return of sequestration , which did so much damage to America’s military over the last decade. And as recent legislative action reveals, these bills are also critical for bolstering deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.

After two years of debate , both House and Senate appropriators have for the first time approved legislation that would fund Foreign Military Financing grants, specifically for Taiwan. This funding would provide the U.S. government another important tool for quickly delivering asymmetric capabilities Taiwan needs to add complexity and risk to Beijing’s military calculus.

The fate of appropriations legislation remains uncertain amid ongoing budget battles on Capitol Hill, which may culminate in another government shutdown this weekend. As negotiations continue, lawmakers should build on recent progress by providing additional resources for Taiwan to preserve peace in the Indo-Pacific.

At minimum, Congress should provide $500 million in FMF for Taiwan in fiscal year 2024, which starts Oct. 1, as House appropriators recommended . The Senate version’s $113 million represents a paltry sum that does not reflect American or Taiwanese security needs.

For perspective, that’s less than ten percent than what Egypt has received in FMF each year for the last three decades—aid that is due for additional scrutiny given alleged connections to bribery charges against Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ). Of the $1.3 billion set aside for Egypt for next year, Senate appropriators withheld $225 million yet again due to persistent concerns related to democracy, rule of law, and human rights.

In other words, under the Senate bill, Egypt could lose twice as much money as Taiwan would receive and still end up with nearly ten times the FMF funding. That is patently absurd given the stakes of defense cooperation with Taiwan and the U.S. commitment to prioritizing the Indo-Pacific.

The Biden administration has also asked for $1 billion in “global FMF” in its supplemental funding request , indicating—albeit somewhat apprehensively—these funds could be used to support Taiwan. Lawmakers should explicitly fence off $300 million of this funding for Taiwan.

Presidential Drawdown Authority is another tool whose value has been clearly demonstrated on the battlefield in Ukraine and can also assist Taiwan. Last year, Congress authorized the President to transfer up to $1 billion worth of equipment from the U.S. military’s inventory to Taiwan but provided no appropriations to replace that equipment.

In July, President Joe Biden used that authority to send the first $345 million tranche of fiscal year 2023 drawdown assistance to Taiwan. Now, Senate appropriators have included $1.1 billion in a draft defense funding bill for fiscal year 2024 to replace U.S. military stocks sent to Taiwan.

This is encouraging progress. But the U.S. military services, which are responsible for manning, training and equipping U.S. servicemembers, are unlikely to use the remaining $655 million in drawdown authority for fiscal year 2023 if they believe there is a risk that equipment transferred to Taiwan will not be replaced.

Echoing prior testimony by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, administration officials testified in the House this month that security assistance authorities for Taiwan, including drawdown, “should be met by full appropriations.”

Congress should include $1.5 billion in supplemental appropriations bill to cover the fiscal year 2023 Taiwan drawdowns and another $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2024 appropriations bill to ensure all drawdowns to Taiwan are backfilled. Replenishment funds should exceed drawdown authority because the cost of new equipment is often higher than the assessed value of the equipment it is meant to replace.

Congress should also direct the State and Defense Departments to prioritize security assistance tools and resources on building Taiwan’s munitions stockpiles as quickly as possible. In a potential conflict, Taiwan’s island geography and proximity to China will likely preclude weapons deliveries of the kind Ukraine received after the conflict commenced.

Credible deterrence requires that Taiwan has the munitions it needs to fight before—not after—a conflict ensues. Focusing Taiwan assistance on weapons and munitions will also enhance the Pentagon’s market demand signal for expanded munitions production to the U.S. defense industrial base.

To be clear, Taiwan must spend more and spend better on its own defense. To its credit, seven consecutive years of increases will make Taiwan’s 2024 defense budget its largest ever . And its latest “ National Defense Report ” contains encouraging emphasis on defense-in-depth, survivable command control, and AI-enabled weapons and UAVs.

As Xi Jinping’s 2027 timeline to be ready to invade Taiwan rapidly approaches, it’s in the U.S. national security interest to accelerate Taiwan’s procurement of the capabilities it needs to deter such an invasion.

That means not just selling weapons to Taiwan as in the past, but using the full suite of security cooperation tools, including FMF and drawdown authority, in a targeted fashion to deliver the most critical capabilities for credible deterrence.

This is a legislative breakthrough with strategic impact Congress can and must deliver this year.

Dustin Walker is a nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he focuses on US defense policy and strategic affairs in the Indo-Pacific.

Eric Sayers is a nonresident fellow at AEI, where he focuses on Asia-Pacific defense policy and strategy and U.S.-China relations .

通过十二项拨款法案对于避免政府停摆和避免危险的自动减支机制卷土重来至关重要，后者在过去十年中对美国军力造成了巨大损害。正如近期立法行动所表明的那样，这些法案对于加强台湾海峡的威慑力也至关重要。

经过两年的辩论，众议院和参议院拨款委员会首次批准了一项法案，该法案将为专门针对台湾的对外军事融资拨款提供资金。这项资金将为美国政府提供又一项重要工具，使其能够迅速向台湾提供其所需的非对称军事能力，从而增加北京军事战略的复杂性和风险。

由于国会山持续不断的预算之争，拨款法案的命运仍然不明朗，这场争斗可能导致本周末政府再次停摆。随着谈判的继续，立法者应巩固近期取得的进展，为台湾提供更多资源，以维护印太地区的和平。

至少，国会应按照众议院拨款委员会的建议，在2024财年（始于10月1日）向台湾提供5亿美元的外国军事基金（FMF）。参议院提出的1.13亿美元数额微不足道，既不符合美国的安全需求，也不符合台湾的安全需求。

作为对比，这笔援助金额不到埃及过去三十年每年从外国军事基金（FMF）获得的援助金额的百分之十——鉴于参议员鲍勃·梅嫩德斯（新泽西州民主党）涉嫌受贿，这笔援助理应受到更严格的审查。在为埃及明年预留的13亿美元援助中，参议院拨款委员会再次扣留了2.25亿美元，原因是他们持续担忧埃及的民主、法治和人权状况。

换句话说，根据参议院的法案，埃及可能损失的资金是台湾所得资金的两倍，但最终获得的外国军事基金（FMF）拨款却几乎是台湾的十倍。考虑到与台湾防务合作的重要性以及美国对印太地区的优先战略，这显然是荒谬的。

拜登政府在其补充拨款申请中也要求提供10亿美元的“全球外国资金”，这表明——尽管语气略显谨慎——这些资金可能用于支持台湾。立法者应明确划拨3亿美元用于台湾。

总统撤军授权是另一项在乌克兰战场上已充分展现其价值的工具，它也可以帮助台湾。去年，国会授权总统将价值高达10亿美元的美军装备从美军库存转移到台湾，但并未拨款用于替换这些装备。

今年7月，拜登总统动用授权，向台湾拨付了2023财年撤军援助的首笔3.45亿美元款项。如今，参议院拨款委员会已在2024财年国防拨款法案草案中纳入11亿美元，用于替换此前运往台湾的美国军事物资。

这是一个令人鼓舞的进展。但是，负责美军人员配备、训练和装备的美国军方，如果认为移交给台湾的装备可能无法得到替换，则不太可能动用2023财年剩余的6.55亿美元撤军授权。

与国防部长劳埃德·奥斯汀之前的证词相呼应，本月，政府官员在众议院作证称，对台安全援助授权，包括撤军，“应该得到全额拨款”。

国会应在补充拨款法案中列入15亿美元，用于支付2023财年对台资金的拨付，并在2024财年拨款法案中再列入15亿美元，以确保所有拨付给台湾的资金都能得到补充。补充资金应超过拨付权限，因为新设备的成本通常高于其拟替换设备的评估价值。

国会还应指示国务院和国防部优先考虑安全援助工具和资源，尽快帮助台湾建立军火储备。在潜在的冲突中，台湾的岛屿地理位置及其与中国的邻近关系很可能阻碍其获得类似乌克兰在冲突爆发后获得的那种武器。

可信的威慑要求台湾在冲突爆发前而非爆发后就拥有所需的弹药。将援助重点放在武器弹药上，也有助于增强五角大楼向美国国防工业基地发出的市场需求信号，从而促进美国国防工业基地扩大弹药生产。

需要明确的是，台湾必须在国防上投入更多资金，并提高投入效率。值得肯定的是，台湾已连续七年增加国防预算，这将使台湾2024年的国防预算达到历史最高水平。其最新发布的《国防报告》也重点强调了纵深防御、生存能力强的指挥控制系统以及人工智能武器和无人机，令人鼓舞。

随着习近平提出的2027年做好入侵台湾准备的时间表迅速临近，加快台湾获取其所需的能力以阻止此类入侵，符合美国的国家安全利益。

这意味着不仅要像过去那样向台湾出售武器，还要有针对性地使用包括外国军事力量和撤军授权在内的全套安全合作工具，以提供可信威慑的最关键能力。

这是国会今年可以而且必须实现的具有战略意义的立法突破。

达斯汀·沃克是美国企业研究所的非常驻研究员，他主要研究美国在印太地区的国防政策和战略事务。

埃里克·塞耶斯是美国企业研究所的非常驻研究员，他主要研究亚太地区的国防政策和战略以及美中关系。