Vietnam nears completion of militarized South China Sea outposts

HO CHI MINH CITY, Vietnam — Vietnam has revved up its land reclamation efforts in the South China Sea this year, beginning construction on eight previously untouched features in the Spratly Islands.

The hotly contested archipelago has been turned from a scattering of low-lying reefs and partially submerged rocks into weaponized artificial islands mainly by China and Vietnam.

Analysts say Hanoi’s island-building is a defensive response to Beijing’s militarization of its South China Sea outposts including those in the Spratly Islands , since 2013.

The South China Sea is a resource-rich waterway and busy shipping lane that trillions of dollars of trade passes through yearly. Six countries have overlapping claims in the sea that stretches about 1.4 million square miles but Beijing has the biggest presence and claims the majority of the territory.

Vietnam began its island building push in 2021. With just 11 islands that year, now all 21 Vietnamese-occupied rocks and low-tide elevations in the Spratlys have been expanded to include artificial land. Vietnam had created about 70% as much artificial land in the Spratlys as China had as of March, the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative said in an August report .

This “all but ensures that Vietnam will match – and likely surpass – the scale of Beijing’s island-building,” the report said.

Hanoi’s foreign press office did not respond to requests for comment.

Alexander Vuving, professor at Honolulu’s Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, told Defense News the South China Sea is an “existential issue” for Vietnam – crucial to the country’s economy, security, and national identity.

“Vietnam right now is one of the major exporting nations in the world and 90% of Vietnam’s foreign trade exports to the world go through the South China Sea,” Vuving said.

“The South China Sea is also important to Vietnam securitywise,” he added. “The French came into Vietnam from the sea, and the Americans also came to Vietnam from the sea … now you have the Chinese threat.”

AMTI satellite imagery taken this year shows that Vietnam is turning five of its claimed features that previously housed only small concrete pillbox structures into military outposts.

These newly fortified reefs – Alison Reef, Collins Reef, East Reef, Landsdowne Reef, and Petleys Reef – now have munitions storage depots in the form of six containers surrounded and separated by thick walls. Militarization of Vietnam’s outposts also includes ports, harbors, and an 8,000-foot runway on Barque Canada Reef.

AMTI Director Gregory Poling said Hanoi nearing Beijing’s level of land reclamation matters symbolically but Vietnam will remain overpowered at sea.

“None of this means that Vietnam is actually capable of projecting power in the same way that China can. Nor does it mean that Vietnam is being as aggressive or as environmentally destructive as China is,” Poling said.

“Vietnam has never, as far as anybody knows, used forces deployed on these islands for aggression toward the other claimants, whereas China does so on a daily basis,” he said.

China’s South China Sea actions include using its maritime militia and coast guard to ram, swarm, and use powerful water cannons on foreign ships and to patrol inside other nations’ exclusive economic zones.

Beijing’s three largest artificial islands in the Spratly archipelago – Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef – have antiship and antiaircraft missile systems, laser and jamming equipment, underground storage tunnels, and fighter jets.

Poling said Hanoi will likely aim to match Beijing’s ability to forward deploy its coast guard and aircraft to the islands and to improve its intelligence collection.

Construction is continuing on Vietnam’s artificial islands. A Straits Times report described nonstop cranking of towering cranes on South Reef. According to local media reports, soldiers stationed on South Reef are being encouraged to raise chickens and grow vegetables.

Nguyen The Phuong, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of New South Wales focusing on Vietnam’s military, said Hanoi is taking a defensive stance.

“The ultimate goal is to be able to defend the islands under Vietnam’s jurisdiction better and to inflict some kind of maximum damage to China if the worst-case scenario happens,” Phuong said from Ho Chi Minh City.

“Vietnam doesn’t want to be embroiled in that kind of conflict but we have to be prepared,” he said.

Geopolitical implications

Hanoi has kept a tight lid on its island-building drive — wary of provoking its powerful neighbor or being seen as enacting the same kind of “bad” behavior as Beijing, according to Ray Powell, director of the maritime transparency initiative SeaLight at the Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation at Stanford University.

Powell, who was serving as U.S. air attaché to Vietnam when China kicked off its island-building in 2013, said the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi tried to discourage Vietnam from following China’s lead.

“We wanted to have this principled position that any changing of the [South China Sea] status quo was bad,” Powell said. He said he believes the U.S. stance has likely shifted.

“We, the United States, weren’t able to stop the madness when China did it and so now we’re going to go and tell Vietnam not to do it?” he asked.

Washington may even support the effort and see Vietnam’s land reclamation as making it “harder for China to take things by force at some point in the future,” he said.

The U.S. Embassy in Hanoi did not respond to requests for comment.

Although Vietnam’s navy wanted to start its island-building push as early as 2013, it took until 2021 to gather funds, internal consensus, and dredging technology, Phuong said.

Since then, Beijing’s response has been “low profile,” he added.

The Vietnamese sometimes “see Chinese vessels going around the construction site, or sometimes Chinese vessels blocked the movement of vessels transporting” goods for construction, Phuong said.

Van Pham, the Hanoi-based founder of the nonprofit South China Sea Chronicle Initiative, said Chinese vessels patrolling near Vietnamese outposts rarely appear in local media.

“Several years ago, Vietnam’s state media reported an incident in which a Vietnamese navy supply ship was obstructed by a Chinese vessel en route to a feature in the Spratly Islands. Such reports are rare given Vietnam’s quiet diplomacy; additional incidents may occur without public disclosure,” she wrote.

Philippine focus, Hanoi’s timing

Analysts see Beijing’s focus on the Philippines as an opportunity for Vietnam to expand its land.

Hanoi “also sort of had to wait for the right moment,” Powell said, adding that the current Chinese focus on the Philippines and its alliance with the United States “has given them that moment.”

“Everything the Philippines does is treated like the Philippines is just a sock puppet and that the Americans are pulling the strings,” Poling said.

However, he said it is likely that Chinese authorities have realized that as Vietnamese island building nears completion “they can’t just pretend it’s not happening.”

Vuving said he expects Vietnam’s island building is seen by most countries as a welcome counterweight to Beijing.

“China now has four big runways complete with deep-sea harbors and big artificial islands that can serve as dual-use military bases in the middle of the South China Sea. They can literally turn the South China Sea – a big sea – into a choke point,” he said.

“But Vietnam is now also building a lot of new ground in the middle of the sea and maybe also turning some of their artificial islands into runways and deep-sea harbors so it potentially can also correct the imbalance,” he said.

越南胡志明市——今年，越南加大了在南海的填海造陆力度，开始在南沙群岛的八个此前未开发的岛礁上进行建设。

这个备受争议的群岛，原本只是一些低洼的礁石和部分淹没的岩石，如今已被中国和越南等国改造成了武器化的人工岛屿。

分析人士称，自 2013 年以来，河内修建岛礁是对北京在南海（包括南沙群岛）军事化行动的一种防御性回应。

南海是一条资源丰富的航道，也是繁忙的航运通道，每年有数万亿美元的贸易经由此地进行。六个国家对这片面积约140万平方英里的海域提出主权声索，但北京在该海域的存在感最强，并声称拥有大部分领土的主权。

越南于2021年开始大规模岛礁建设。当年仅有11座岛屿，如今，越南在南沙群岛占据的21个礁石和低潮高地全部已扩建为人工岛。战略与国际研究中心亚洲海事透明倡议在8月份的一份报告中指出，截至今年3月，越南在南沙群岛的人工岛面积约为中国的70%。

报告称，这“几乎可以肯定越南的岛屿建设规模将与北京的规模相当，甚至可能超过北京”。

河内市对外新闻办公室未回应置评请求。

檀香山亚太安全研究中心教授亚历山大·武文告诉《防务新闻》，南海对越南来说是一个“生死攸关的问题”，对越南的经济、安全和国家认同至关重要。

“越南目前是世界主要出口国之一，越南90%的对外贸易出口都经过南海，”武文说。

他还补充说：“南海对越南的安全也至关重要。法国人从海上入侵越南，美国人也从海上入侵越南……现在又面临着中国的威胁。”

AMTI 今年拍摄的卫星图像显示，越南正在将其声称拥有主权的五个地块（以前只有小型混凝土碉堡）改建成军事哨所。

这些新近加固的礁石——艾莉森礁、柯林斯礁、东礁、兰斯当礁和佩特利礁——现在都设有弹药库，由六个集装箱组成，周围环绕着厚厚的墙壁。越南前哨的军事化还包括港口、码头以及位于加拿大湾礁上的一条8000英尺长的跑道。

AMTI 主任 Gregory Poling 表示，河内填海造陆的规模接近北京的水平，这具有象征意义，但越南在海上仍将处于劣势。

波林表示：“但这并不意味着越南真的有能力像中国那样投射力量。这也不意味着越南像中国那样具有侵略性或对环境造成破坏。”

他说：“据大家所知，越南从未利用部署在这些岛屿上的军队对其他声索国进行侵略，而中国却每天都在这样做。”

中国在南海的行动包括利用海上民兵和海警对外国船只进行撞击、围堵和使用强力水炮攻击，以及在其他国家的专属经济区内巡逻。

北京在南沙群岛建造的三大人工岛——美济礁、渚碧礁和永暑礁——拥有反舰和防空导弹系统、激光和干扰设备、地下储藏隧道以及战斗机。

波林表示，河内可能会力争达到北京向岛屿前沿部署海警和飞机的能力，并提高其情报收集能力。

越南人工岛的建设仍在继续。《海峡时报》报道称，南礁岛上高耸的起重机正在不停地运转。据当地媒体报道，驻扎在南礁岛的士兵被鼓励养鸡和种植蔬菜。

新南威尔士大学研究越南军事的博士候选人阮世芳表示，河内正在采取防御姿态。

“最终目标是更好地保卫越南管辖下的岛屿，并在最坏的情况下对中国造成最大程度的损害，”方在胡志明市表示。

他说：“越南不想卷入那种冲突，但我们必须做好准备。”

地缘政治影响

据斯坦福大学戈尔迪安结国家安全创新中心海洋透明度倡议“海光”（SeaLight）主任雷·鲍威尔称，河内一直对其岛屿建设行动严加控制，唯恐激怒其强大的邻国，或被视为采取与北京同样的“不良”行为。

鲍威尔在 2013 年中国开始在越南进行岛礁建设时担任美国驻越南空军武官，他说美国驻河内大使馆曾试图阻止越南效仿中国的做法。

鲍威尔说：“我们希望坚持这一原则立场，即任何改变南海现状的行为都是不好的。” 他还表示，他认为美国的立场可能已经发生了转变。

他问道：“当中国这样做的时候，我们美国都没能阻止这种疯狂行为，所以现在我们要去告诉越南不要这样做吗？”

他说，华盛顿甚至可能支持这一努力，并将越南的填海造地视为“让中国在未来某个时候更难用武力夺取土地”。

美国驻河内大使馆未回应置评请求。

方表示，虽然越南海军早在 2013 年就想开始造岛行动，但直到 2021 年才筹集到资金、达成内部共识并获得疏浚技术。

他补充说，自那以后，北京方面的反应一直“低调”。

Phuong说，越南人有时“会看到中国船只在建筑工地附近转悠，或者有时中国船只阻碍运送”建筑材料的船只通行。

总部位于河内的非营利组织“南海纪事倡议”创始人范文表示，在越南前哨附近巡逻的中国船只很少出现在当地媒体上。

“几年前，越南官方媒体曾报道过一艘越南海军补给舰在前往南沙群岛某岛礁途中遭到中国船只阻拦的事件。鉴于越南一贯低调的外交作风，此类报道实属罕见；未来可能还会发生一些未公开披露的类似事件，”她写道。

关注菲律宾，把握河内时机

分析人士认为，北京对菲律宾的关注为越南扩张领土提供了机会。

鲍威尔说，河内“也一直在等待合适的时机”，他还补充说，中国目前对菲律宾的关注以及与美国的联盟“给了他们这个时机”。

波林说：“菲律宾所做的一切都被视为菲律宾只是一个傀儡，而幕后黑手是美国人。”

不过，他表示，中国当局可能已经意识到，随着越南岛屿建设接近尾声，“他们不能再假装这件事没有发生”。

武文表示，他预计大多数国家会将越南的岛礁建设视为对北京的一种可喜的制衡力量。

他说：“中国现在在南海中心拥有四条大型跑道，配备深水港和大型人工岛，可以作为两用军事基地。他们完全可以将南海——一片广阔的海域——变成一个咽喉要道。”

“但越南现在也在海中央建造很多新土地，或许还会将一些人工岛屿改造成跑道和深水港，因此也有可能纠正这种不平衡，”他说。