Beware of NATO’s enlargement trap

According to the new U.S. National Security Strategy, one of America’s policy priorities for Europe should be “ending the perception, and preventing the reality, of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance.”

By opposing NATO membership for Ukraine, the Trump administration has already expressed its doubts about the wisdom of NATO’s enlargement policy. However, other allies continue to adhere to NATO’s agreed-upon stance that the door remains open and Ukraine is on an “irreversible path” to membership.

This could turn into another transatlantic train wreck, but it doesn’t have to.

European allies should also recognize that NATO’s enlargement process has become counterproductive. Doubling NATO’s membership from 16 to 32 countries since the end of the Cold War is a resounding testimony for the undiminished attractiveness of a transatlantic defense framework. However, maintaining the enlargement process on autopilot risks squandering many of its past achievements.

NATO’s expansion, based primarily on the right of all European states to freely choose their alliances, was successful as long as the interests of key actors, including Russia, could be reasonably balanced. Consequently, in 1997, NATO agreed with Russia on key principles of their cooperation, even before officially inviting Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to join the alliance. These three states were admitted to NATO in 1999, followed by seven more Central and Eastern European states, including the three Baltic republics, in 2004. Many observers saw the fact that Moscow remained calm as confirmation that Russia was beginning to accept NATO enlargement.

But Russia never really did. Even if the military dimensions of enlargement were rather “soft” — no major combat units or nuclear weapons were stationed in the new member states — the accession of numerous former Warsaw Pact countries and even former Soviet republics signified an enormous geopolitical power shift. Furthermore, since the West viewed NATO enlargement as an open-ended process with no clearly defined endpoint, Russia had to contemplate that its shrinking sphere of influence could be lost altogether.

NATO’s geopolitical sin occurred in 2008, when the allies declared that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members.” Although these invitations were extended without a specific timeframe for accession, the West had crossed “the brightest of all red lines” for Moscow, as William Burns, then U.S. ambassador to Russia, had warned. A year after Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, in which he had complained that the West was ignoring Russian security concerns, NATO invited two states that Moscow regarded as part of its “zone of privileged interests.”

As Russia slipped further into authoritarianism and relations with the West continued to deteriorate, some observers argued that the alliance should only accept countries it could realistically defend. However, such a change in direction would have left several aspiring members stuck in a geopolitical no man’s land between NATO and Russia. It would also have given Russia a veto over decisions that were the alliance’s sole prerogative. Consequently, the West stuck to its narrative that NATO enlargement was a kind of post-Cold War family reunion – a moral duty that could not be questioned.

By continuing to insist that NATO’s door must remain open, the West is cornering itself. A deal with Russia to end its war against Ukraine would become impossible. Furthermore, given Russia’s recent belligerence, inviting countries that one is unable or unwilling to defend seems increasingly hazardous. It is true that denying Ukraine and other candidate countries the right to freely choose their alliances could be perceived as a betrayal. However, the West should not feel obliged to adhere to a policy that is now causing more problems than it solves. While NATO enlargement started out as a morally sound policy, new geopolitical realities now risk producing immoral results.

The tragedy of NATO expansion lies not in beginning it, but in never considering when and where it might end.

Michael Rühle worked for over 30 years in NATO’s International Staff, including as a speechwriter for six secretaries-general, as well as in policy planning, climate and energy security, and hybrid threats.

根据美国新的国家安全战略，美国对欧洲的政策重点之一应该是“消除北约作为不断扩张的联盟的观念，并阻止其成为现实”。

特朗普政府反对乌克兰加入北约，这已经表明其对北约扩张政策的合理性存有疑虑。然而，其他盟国仍然坚持北约此前达成的共识，即北约的大门依然敞开，乌克兰加入北约的进程“不可逆转”。

这可能会演变成另一场跨大西洋的灾难，但并非一定会如此。

欧洲盟国也应认识到，北约的扩张进程已适得其反。自冷战结束以来，北约成员国数量从16个增加到32个，这有力地证明了跨大西洋防务框架依然具有强大的吸引力。然而，如果继续让扩张进程保持现状，则有可能白白浪费其过去取得的诸多成就。

北约的扩张主要基于所有欧洲国家自由选择联盟的权利，只要包括俄罗斯在内的主要参与者的利益能够得到合理的平衡，扩张就能取得成功。因此，早在1997年，北约就与俄罗斯就合作的关键原则达成一致，甚至早于正式邀请波兰、捷克和匈牙利加入北约。这三个国家于1999年加入北约，随后，包括波罗的海三国在内的七个中东欧国家于2004年加入。许多观察家认为，莫斯科保持冷静表明俄罗斯开始接受北约的扩张。

但俄罗斯从未真正意识到这一点。即便北约扩张的军事层面相对“温和”——新成员国并未部署大型作战部队或核武器——众多前华沙条约组织成员国乃至前苏联加盟共和国的加入，也标志着地缘政治格局的巨大转变。此外，由于西方将北约扩张视为一个没有明确终点的开放式进程，俄罗斯不得不考虑其不断缩小的势力范围可能彻底丧失的风险。

北约的地缘政治罪过发生在2008年，当时盟国宣布乌克兰和格鲁吉亚“将成为成员国”。尽管发出邀请时并未设定具体的入盟时间表，但正如时任美国驻俄罗斯大使威廉·伯恩斯所警告的那样，西方此举已触及莫斯科“最明显的红线”。在普京于慕尼黑安全会议上发表讲话，抱怨西方无视俄罗斯安全关切一年后，北约邀请了莫斯科视为其“特权利益区”内的两个国家加入。

随着俄罗斯进一步滑向威权主义，与西方的关系持续恶化，一些观察人士认为，北约应该只接纳那些它能够切实保卫的国家。然而，这样的方向转变会让一些渴望加入北约的国家陷入北约与俄罗斯之间的地缘政治僵局。同时，这也将赋予俄罗斯对北约专属决策的否决权。因此，西方坚持认为，北约扩张是冷战后的一种“家庭团聚”，是一种不容置疑的道德义务。

西方坚持北约大门必须敞开，这无异于自掘坟墓。与俄罗斯达成结束其对乌克兰战争的协议将变得不可能。此外，鉴于俄罗斯近期的好战姿态，邀请那些自己无力或不愿保卫的国家加入北约，风险似乎越来越大。诚然，剥夺乌克兰和其他候选国自由选择盟友的权利，可能会被视为一种背叛。然而，西方不应被迫坚持一项如今弊大于利的政策。北约扩张最初是一项合乎道德的政策，但如今新的地缘政治现实却有可能带来不道德的后果。

北约扩张的悲剧不在于它的开始，而在于它从未考虑过它何时何地会结束。

Michael Rühle 在北约国际事务部工作了 30 多年，曾担任六位秘书长的演讲稿撰写人，并在政策规划、气候和能源安全以及混合威胁等领域工作。