Designing a soft landing for NATO by starting the clock on Europe

The June 24-25 NATO summit in the The Hague could be the most consequential summit in the Alliance’s 76-year history. Its outcome could also be the most important determinant of President Donald Trump’s national security legacy.

With the requisite leadership on both sides of the Atlantic, The Hague could be the catalyst for a fundamental transformation of today’s U.S.-dominated Atlantic alliance into a balanced partnership in which Europe takes primary responsibility for its own defense.

Such an outcome could provide a soft landing for the Alliance, defying pundits’ predictions of a transatlantic crisis at The Hague.

The path to a transformed Alliance would begin with the adoption at the summit of a five- to seven-year transition plan leading to establishment of a new NATO defense model in which Europe supplies the principal conventional capabilities required for its own defense, ending today’s excessive dependence on the United States.

This would mean Europe providing not only a larger number of ready troops, ships, and fighter aircraft, but also the enablers needed to deter a Russia that will certainly reconstitute its forces as soon as the Ukraine war is over.

The transition end state would still have some American troops forward deployed in Europe to keep NATO’s nuclear deterrence credible and to give the United States forward operating bases for rapid reinforcement and other global contingencies. But it would allow Washington to shift the bulk of its military attention from Europe to the Indo-Pacific to deter an increasingly aggressive China.

This transition plan will take time, which will be needed for European defense industries to produce the high-end enablers – such as air and missile defenses, air-to-air refueling, strategic lift and long-distance targeting information – that are currently contributed primarily by America. NATO planners should sequence the priorities for European production of these enablers.

The transition plan will also take money, which is now coming from European coffers, albeit not yet fast enough. Europe as whole now spends more than 2% of its GDP on defense, with more pledged for the future.

The new EU ReArm Europe Plan contains multiple elements that could raise European defense spending by over €800 billion including: 1) a national fiscal escape clause allowing nations to spend an additional 1.5% of their GDP on defense that could raise €650 billion; 2) a new loan instrument (Security Action for Europe or SAFE) that could raise another €150 billion; and 3) new mechanisms to widen the scope of public and private investment in Europe’s defense industry.

In addition, German defense spending has already nearly doubled in the past decade, and further growth is expected under the new German government.

NATO’s leadership has called for setting a new European defense spending goal of 3.5% of GDP (roughly America’s current level of defense spending), while four vulnerable front-line states will soon be spending 5%, the goal suggested by Trump. Europe is also contributing to burden-sharing by considering a $90 billion aid pledge for Ukraine should President Trump’s peace plan fail, and a plan to deploy European reassurance forces to Ukraine should the plan succeed.

This long-term commitment to rebalance the Alliance could be presented as a victory for Trump diplomacy. By taking Europe’s “yes” for an answer, Trump would have achieved NATO burden-sharing goals that previous statesmen like Mike Mansfield, Sam Nunn, and Robert Gates attempted but failed to deliver. And he could execute his strategic pivot to Asia without endangering European or American security.

Without a bold, forward-looking initiative along these lines, The Hague summit could have a far less happy ending , one fraught with danger for both global security and Trump’s legacy.

Call it the ‘Zelensky Oval Office visit on steroids’ outcome.

Trump could decide that Europe had failed to deliver enough and threaten to withdraw America’s commitment to NATO and Article 5. Tariff wars and political tensions over values could also disrupt the discussion. If the summit collapsed in confusion and recriminations, it could become an existential crisis for the Alliance.

A failed Alliance would present the greatest threat to world peace since 1949 and a strategic debacle for Trump diplomacy. NATO without its American commitment would open Europe to nuclear blackmail and risk a grave Russian miscalculation that could lead to war with NATO.

It would give Russia every reason to continue the Ukraine War. It would encourage China to believe that the United States will not stand behind its defense commitments. It would dissuade Europe from pursuing what is now a significant effort to help the United States to deter China from pursuing aggressive policies in Asia. It would create deep divisions within Europe that the United States in the past has managed to broker. It would cause costly disruption not just in transatlantic defense trade but in all transatlantic trade relationships with America’s most important trading partners. It would encourage global nuclear proliferation as nations seek to compensate for lack of an American nuclear umbrella. And it would rob the United States of forward bases that allow Washington to help protect Israel and secure freedom of navigation.

Alliance leaders have little time to ensure that the summit follows the first path and not the second. It will require Europe to step up to fully manage its defense obligations and to manage Trump. It will also require that American leaders like Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, both of whom have traditionally supported the Alliance, steer Trump in the direction of NATO transformation, not collapse.

The stakes could not be higher.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former senior director for defense policy at the U.S. National Security Council, vice president of the National Defense University, and legislative director for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Alexander Vershbow is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, senior advisor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House, and former U.S. ambassador to NATO and Russia, assistant defense secretary, and NATO deputy secretary-general.

6月24日至25日在海牙举行的北约峰会可能是北约76年历史上最重要的一次峰会。其结果也可能成为决定唐纳德·特朗普总统国家安全遗产的最重要因素。

如果大西洋两岸都具备必要的领导力，海牙会议可能会成为推动当今美国主导的大西洋联盟发生根本性转变的催化剂，使其成为一个平衡的伙伴关系，在这个伙伴关系中，欧洲将承担起自身防务的主要责任。

这样的结果可能会让北约软着陆，打破专家们关于海牙跨大西洋危机的预测。

北约转型之路将从峰会通过一项为期五至七年的过渡计划开始，该计划旨在建立一种新的北约防御模式，使欧洲能够提供自身防御所需的主要常规能力，从而结束目前对美国的过度依赖。

这意味着欧洲不仅要提供更多数量的现役部队、舰艇和战斗机，还要提供必要的支持，以威慑俄罗斯——俄罗斯肯定会在乌克兰战争结束后立即重组其军队。

过渡方案的最终状态仍将保留部分美军在欧洲前沿部署，以维持北约核威慑的可信度，并为美国提供快速增援和应对其他全球突发事件的前沿作战基地。但该方案将使华盛顿能够将其大部分军事重心从欧洲转移到印太地区，以遏制日益咄咄逼人的中国。

这项过渡计划需要时间，欧洲国防工业需要时间来生产目前主要由美国提供的高端保障装备，例如防空和导弹防御系统、空中加油系统、战略运输系统和远程目标信息系统。北约规划人员应确定欧洲生产这些保障装备的优先顺序。

过渡计划也需要资金，目前资金正来自欧洲国库，但速度还不够快。欧洲整体的国防开支目前超过其GDP的2%，未来还将增加国防开支。

新的欧盟“重整欧洲计划”包含多项要素，可使欧洲国防开支增加超过 8000 亿欧元，其中包括：1）一项国家财政豁免条款，允许各国将国内生产总值的 1.5% 额外用于国防，可筹集 6500 亿欧元；2）一项新的贷款工具（欧洲安全行动或 SAFE），可再筹集 1500 亿欧元；以及 3）扩大欧洲国防工业公共和私人投资范围的新机制。

此外，德国国防开支在过去十年中已经几乎翻了一番，预计在新一届德国政府的领导下还将继续增长。

北约领导层呼吁将欧洲国防开支目标设定为GDP的3.5%（大致相当于美国目前的国防开支水平），而四个易受攻击的前线国家很快将把国防开支提高到5%，这正是特朗普提出的目标。此外，欧洲也在考虑向乌克兰提供900亿美元的援助，以应对特朗普总统的和平计划失败的情况；同时，如果该计划成功，欧洲也计划向乌克兰部署欧洲安全部队，以分担责任。

特朗普对重塑北约格局的长期承诺，可以被视为其外交策略的胜利。如果欧洲同意，特朗普就能实现此前几位政治家（如迈克·曼斯菲尔德、萨姆·纳恩和罗伯特·盖茨）都未能实现的北约责任分担目标。而且，他还能推行其战略转向亚洲的计划，同时又不危及欧洲或美国的安全。

如果没有在这方面采取大胆的、具有前瞻性的举措，海牙峰会的结局可能会远没有现在这么好，而且对全球安全和特朗普的政治遗产都充满危险。

不妨称之为“泽连斯基椭圆形办公室之行的超级版”结果。

特朗普可能会认为欧洲未能做出足够的贡献，并威胁撤回美国对北约和第五条款的承诺。关税战和围绕价值观的政治紧张局势也可能扰乱讨论。如果峰会在混乱和相互指责中破裂，则可能演变成北约的生存危机。

一个失败的联盟将对世界和平构成自1949年以来最大的威胁，并对特朗普的外交政策造成战略性失败。失去美国承诺的北约将使欧洲面临核讹诈的风险，并可能导致俄罗斯严重误判，进而引发与北约的战争。

这将使俄罗斯有充分的理由继续乌克兰战争。这将使中国更加相信美国不会履行其防务承诺。这将使欧洲放弃目前为帮助美国遏制中国在亚洲采取侵略性政策而做出的重大努力。这将在欧洲内部造成深刻的分裂，而美国过去曾成功地从中斡旋。这将不仅对跨大西洋防务贸易造成代价高昂的破坏，而且会对美国与最重要的贸易伙伴之间的所有跨大西洋贸易关系造成破坏。这将鼓励全球核扩散，因为各国会寻求弥补美国核保护伞的缺失。这将使美国失去前沿基地，而这些基地使华盛顿能够帮助保护以色列并维护航行自由。

联盟领导人时间紧迫，必须确保峰会走上第一条道路，而不是第二条。这需要欧洲切实履行其防务义务，并妥善应对特朗普。同时，这也需要美国领导人，例如国务卿马可·卢比奥和国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯（他们两人历来都支持北约），引导特朗普走向北约转型，而不是走向崩溃。

事关重大。

汉斯·宾内迪克是大西洋理事会的杰出研究员，曾任美国国家安全委员会国防政策高级主任、美国国防大学副校长和美国参议院外交关系委员会立法主任。

亚历山大·弗什博是大西洋理事会的杰出研究员、宾夕法尼亚大学佩里世界之家的资深顾问，曾任美国驻北约和俄罗斯大使、国防部助理部长和北约副秘书长。