Adopt a treaty for semiconductor export control

On Oct. 7, 2022, a seemingly obscure corner of the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Bureau of Industry and Security, delivered a seismic shockwave to the global semiconductor industry . It did so by announcing stringent, unprecedented and unilateral American export controls on advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing equipment destined for China. Just a little over a year later, on Oct. 17, 2023, the same bureau further strengthened its unilateral restrictions on such exports to China.

Now that we have had time to evaluate the results of this watershed moment, it is imperative that America charts a new course toward a robust semiconductor strategy to safeguard our national security and our economy.

Today, China and Taiwan combined have nearly three quarters of the global market share of semiconductors, which poses a threat to the U.S. economy and its critical military products and systems. Recent international developments have cast a stark spotlight on the decided deficiencies of the current global, voluntary export control framework known as the Wassenaar Arrangement . Russia’s brazen invasion of Ukraine and China’s multifaceted gray zone war against Taiwan have laid bare the shortcomings of this voluntary association.

In this era of relentless global geopolitics and intense technological competition, we find ourselves at a pivotal juncture where the bedrock of our future security lies in a semiconductor treaty firmly rooted in the Wassenaar Arrangement but fortified with substantial revisions, all with a keen focus on the indispensable semiconductor industry.

The Wassenaar Arrangement, conceived as a voluntary global export control alliance, was designed to facilitate information exchange among member nations regarding technologies, including semiconductors, that have military or military-civilian applications. The goal, as articulated by the Arms Control Association, is to promote “greater responsibility” in military exports and prevent “destabilizing accumulations” of weapons. This arrangement was never intended to target specific regions or groups of states, and members lacked veto authority over each other’s exports, rendering it a voluntary association.

The United States, alongside 41 other nations , stands as a member, while Russia, also a member, has repeatedly exposed the inadequacies of this voluntary accord. The absence of a robust global semiconductor export control regime leaves the United States vulnerable in the technological race , especially as China, conspicuously absent from the Wassenaar Arrangement, seeks to surge ahead.

The time has come for the United States to lead the charge in crafting an international treaty governing the export of advanced semiconductors, involving key allies that constitute the backbone of the semiconductor supply chain : Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea and Taiwan. This coalition can fittingly be christened the “Semi Allies Group.”

We must elevate the Wassenaar Arrangement to the status of a binding Wassenaar Treaty, targeting nations such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, which pose military and economic threats to the founding members. Our primary focus should be on semiconductor technology, a linchpin of both our economic prosperity and national defense. This treaty framework would grant each member veto authority over another member’s proposed exports.

Converting parts of the Wassenaar Arrangement into a specialized treaty would address its glaring inadequacies by concentrating on the key semiconductor supply chain leaders, honing in on a single critical technology, targeting a specific group of destabilizing nations and providing all participating members with the much-needed veto authority.

The existing U.S. tactics of unilaterally imposing ever-stricter unilateral export controls on domestic companies selling to China, combined with efforts to persuade other key nations to follow suit, is far from ideal for American military defense and its semiconductor businesses. They cannot rely on the United States indefinitely convincing foreign competitors — particularly in export-driven economies like Germany, the Netherlands, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan — to refrain from selling advanced semiconductor technology to China. The U.S. military should support this multilateral treaty approach because it keeps the most advanced technology out of the hands of our fiercest foes.

Likewise, U.S. semiconductor businesses should also rally behind this approach, recognizing that if they are barred from exporting a specific semiconductor technology to China, their primary commercial rivals will face similar restrictions.

The geopolitical landscape has undergone profound changes, with NATO uniting against Russia’s Ukraine invasion and the Quad — comprising the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia — aligning to counter China’s expansionist ambitions. These developments present golden opportunities for multinational cooperation in matters of defense.

The establishment of a Wassenaar Treaty will not be without challenges, such as securing a two-thirds vote in the U.S. Senate. Nevertheless, it is a challenge worth pursuing. Bipartisan support for the CHIPS and Science Act as well as shared concerns about China’s threat to Taiwan suggest the political will may exist at this critical juncture in time.

Effective export controls on semiconductors within the Semi Allies Group, under the proposed Wassenaar Treaty, could pave the way for the inclusion of other critical aspects of the global semiconductor trade. The Biden administration’s efforts to coordinate subsidies supporting specific members of the Semi Allies Group’s industrial policies align with the goal of promoting domestic semiconductor manufacturing, thus averting production surpluses or redundant government investments. This subsidy coordination could also become an additional focus under the treaty.

Furthermore, the Biden administration’s recent executive order issued on Aug. 9, 2023 — instructing the Treasury Department to develop regulations prohibiting American investment in certain advanced technologies, including semiconductors, in China for military purposes — underscores the necessity of multilateral, coordinated restrictions on outbound investments in China among the Semi Allies Group. This ensures that U.S. private equity and venture capital are not unfairly disadvantaged while their counterparts in other member countries remain free to invest. This, too, could become another facet for the Semi Allies Group to coordinate under the treaty.

The time has come for the United States to take resolute action in safeguarding its national security interests. The vulnerabilities of the Wassenaar Arrangement have been laid bare by recent events. We have witnessed the consequences of timid responses to Russia’s invasions of Moldova in 1992, Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. We cannot afford to be complacent. By establishing a Wassenaar Treaty with a laser focus on semiconductors, we can address the glaring gap in our export control framework for this critical technology. The moment has arrived to secure our technological edge and protect our nation’s future. The time for action is now.

André Brunel is an international technology attorney with Reiter, Brunel and Dunn. This commentary was adapted from his article published in the Journal of Business & Technology Law. The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are his and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the law firm or any clients it represents.

2022年10月7日，美国商务部一个看似不起眼的部门——工业与安全局——给全球半导体行业带来了巨大的冲击。该局宣布对销往中国的先进计算和半导体制造设备实施严格、史无前例的单方面出口管制。仅仅一年多之后，2023年10月17日，该局进一步加强了对这类对华出口的单方面限制。

现在我们已经有时间评估这一具有里程碑意义的时刻所带来的结果，美国必须制定新的路线，建立强有力的半导体战略，以保障我们的国家安全和经济。

如今，中国大陆和台湾合计占据了全球半导体市场近四分之三的份额，这对美国经济及其关键军事产品和系统构成了威胁。近期国际形势凸显了现行全球自愿出口管制框架——瓦塞纳尔安排——的明显缺陷。俄罗斯肆无忌惮地入侵乌克兰以及中国对台湾发起的多方位灰色地带战争，都暴露了这一自愿性安排的不足之处。

在全球地缘政治纷争不断、技术竞争激烈的时代，我们正处于一个关键时刻，我们未来安全的基石在于一项半导体条约，该条约以《瓦塞纳尔安排》为基础，并经过大幅修订，所有这些都高度关注不可或缺的半导体产业。

《瓦塞纳尔安排》旨在建立一个自愿性的全球出口管制联盟，促进成员国之间就包括半导体在内的具有军事或军民两用用途的技术进行信息交流。正如军备控制协会所阐述的那样，其目标是促进军事出口的“更大责任”，并防止武器“破坏稳定的积累”。该安排从未打算针对特定地区或国家集团，成员国之间也无权否决彼此的出口，因此它是一个自愿性组织。

美国与另外41个国家同为瓦塞纳尔安排的成员国，而俄罗斯作为该安排的成员国，却屡次揭露这项自愿协议的不足之处。由于缺乏强有力的全球半导体出口管制机制，美国在科技竞赛中处于弱势地位，尤其是在中国——一个明显缺席瓦塞纳尔安排的国家——正寻求迅速崛起的情况下。

现在是时候由美国牵头制定一项规范先进半导体出口的国际条约了，该条约应涵盖构成半导体供应链支柱的关键盟友：德国、日本、荷兰、韩国和台湾。这个联盟可以恰当地命名为“半导体盟友集团”。

我们必须将《瓦塞纳尔安排》提升为具有约束力的《瓦塞纳尔条约》，重点关注对创始成员国构成军事和经济威胁的中国、俄罗斯、伊朗和朝鲜等国家。我们的首要关注点应放在半导体技术上，这既是我们经济繁荣的基石，也是国防的保障。该条约框架将赋予每个成员国对其他成员国拟议出口的否决权。

将《瓦塞纳尔安排》的部分内容转化为一项专门条约，可以解决其明显的不足之处，具体做法是集中精力于关键的半导体供应链领导者，聚焦于一项关键技术，针对特定群体的不稳定国家，并赋予所有参与成员急需的否决权。

美国目前单方面对向中国销售产品的国内企业实施日益严格的出口管制，并试图说服其他主要国家效仿，这种做法远非美国军事防御及其半导体业务的理想选择。它们不能指望美国无限期地说服外国竞争对手——尤其是像德国、荷兰、韩国、日本和台湾这样以出口为导向的经济体——停止向中国出售先进的半导体技术。美国军方应该支持这种多边条约模式，因为它能防止最先进的技术落入我们最强大的敌人手中。

同样，美国半导体企业也应该支持这种做法，因为他们认识到，如果禁止他们向中国出口特定的半导体技术，他们的主要商业竞争对手也将面临类似的限制。

地缘政治格局已发生深刻变化，北约联合起来对抗俄罗斯入侵乌克兰，而由美国、日本、印度和澳大利亚组成的“四方安全对话”（Quad）则结盟以遏制中国的扩张野心。这些事态发展为多国在防务领域开展合作提供了绝佳机遇。

建立《瓦塞纳尔条约》并非一帆风顺，例如需要在美国参议院获得三分之二的多数票。然而，这是一项值得努力的挑战。两党对《儿童健康信息安全法案》（CHIPS）和《科学法案》的支持，以及对中国威胁台湾的共同担忧，表明在这一关键时刻，或许存在着促成该条约的政治意愿。

根据拟议的《瓦塞纳尔条约》，对半导体联盟内部的半导体产品实施有效的出口管制，可能为将全球半导体贸易的其他关键方面纳入其中铺平道路。拜登政府致力于协调补贴，以支持半导体联盟特定成员的产业政策，这与促进国内半导体制造业发展的目标相一致，从而避免产能过剩或政府投资重复。这种补贴协调也可能成为该条约的另一个重点。

此外，拜登政府于2023年8月9日发布的行政命令——指示财政部制定法规，禁止美国企业出于军事目的在中国投资某些先进技术，包括半导体——凸显了半官方盟友集团在对华投资方面采取多边协调限制措施的必要性。这可以确保美国私募股权和风险投资不会受到不公平的不利影响，同时其他成员国的投资者仍然可以自由投资。这也可以成为半官方盟友集团根据该条约进行协调的另一个方面。

美国现在必须采取果断行动，维护其国家安全利益。近期的事件已将《瓦塞纳尔安排》的脆弱性暴露无遗。我们已经目睹了对俄罗斯1992年入侵摩尔多瓦、2008年入侵格鲁吉亚以及2014年入侵乌克兰反应迟缓所造成的后果。我们绝不能掉以轻心。通过制定一项重点关注半导体领域的《瓦塞纳尔条约》，我们可以弥补这一关键技术出口管制框架中存在的明显漏洞。现在正是巩固我们技术优势、捍卫国家未来的关键时刻。行动刻不容缓。

安德烈·布鲁内尔是Reiter, Brunel & Dunn律师事务所的国际技术律师。本文改编自他发表在《商业与技术法杂志》上的文章。文中表达的观点和意见仅代表布鲁内尔本人，并不一定反映律师事务所或其任何客户的观点或立场。