Now is the wrong time for the Pentagon to pull back from Europe

TOPSHOT - In this pool photograph distributed by the Russian state agency Sputnik, Russia's President Vladimir Putin meets with Yevgeny Balitsky (not pictured), the Moscow-installed head of the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine, at the Kremlin in Moscow on November 18, 2024. (Photo by Vyacheslav PROKOFYEV / POOL / AFP) (Photo by VYACHESLAV PROKOFYEV/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)

Since the start of 2026, two key pillars buttressing NATO deterrence have taken a hit. The first is the ongoing rapid and deep deterioration of US munitions stockpiles resulting from the war with Iran, and the second is the May announcement of immediate and substantial limitations on US contributions to NATO’s Force Model in the event of a future conflict.

Now, the Pentagon has launched a European force posture review. The Secretary of War will be briefed on a few sets of options for the size and distribution of US forces in Europe in early November, with the process ending in early December. President Donald Trump will then make the ultimate decision on accepting, amending or rejecting the department’s recommendation, no doubt with input from the National Security Council and State Department.

Periodically undertaking a clear-eyed review of America’s commitments in Europe is a prudent exercise. But considering the Kremlin’s increasingly active kinetic campaign against Europe, and a European rearmament that has not gained full steam, an honest review should conclude that the US must retain a robust force posture in Europe.

The reality is that there is little excess left to cut from the US presence in Europe without affecting capabilities. The 80,000 combined rotational and permanent troops currently deployed there are well below the average permanent American presence in Europe of approximately 94,000 since the Cold War ended.

The US has only three fighter wings permanently deployed to Europe and zero strategic bombers permanently deployed there. Most of the Navy already patrols the Pacific. A command-and-control ship in Italy and five destroyers in Spain are the only permanently based US surface vessels or submarines in Europe, and those destroyers have been consistently deployed to the eastern Mediterranean to take part in operations in the Middle East, limiting their ability to participate in exercises with NATO allies. (A sixth destroyer will arrive in October to augment US naval forces in the theater.)

Meanwhile, the war in Iran has only emphasized the crucial value of American basing and overflight rights in Europe. The Pentagon could not have sustained the length and lethality of strikes against the regime without this access from allies.

An often-overlooked fact: America’s basing in Europe is quietly heavily subsidized by European taxpayers and supports not only NATO deterrence and US extended power projection, but also political influence in Europe. This stationing also enjoys strong public support across the political spectrum in the US.

Do Not Encourage Russia

There is also this reality: The European posture review, which is likely to recommend some reductions in American presence, is being conducted at a sensitive time when Moscow appears to be willing to test just how far it can push NATO before the alliance fractures or admits a war with Russia is already underway.

A recent spate of attacks and plots against European infrastructure — including an airport attack in Germany directly attributed by Berlin to Moscow or an arson at a Polish drone factory, which Prime Minister Tusk stated is very likely a Russian act — show a clear pattern of escalation. America’s CIA chief recently visited Russia reportedly to carry a message dissuading Moscow from further adventurism into NATO. And Russia is no doubt closely tracking reports that US stockpiles in Europe of PAC-3 missile interceptor and ATACMS missile are “beyond critical.”

Replacing these high-end capabilities will take years . Those same time lags also hold true for replacing the reductions in American contributions to NATO’s Force Model, the troops and capabilities that could surge forward swiftly should a future conflict break out.

The structural changes from Europe’s rapid and considerable investments in defense, ushered in in no small part by President Trump, are significant and necessary. They are also not yet fully realized. While allies are working to fill the gaps, there are simply not enough capabilities, particularly high-end enablers, to replace those withdrawn on paper by the US earlier this year one-for-one. Weapons production, as the Pentagon is finding out in real time, takes years, not months.

Signaling significant limits on the cavalry that would come running over the hill in the event of a crisis in Europe — which is, effectively, what happened in May — places greater emphasis on the size and type of US capabilities already based there. Russia must remain convinced that America’s presence, combined with what firepower European NATO members would bring to a conflict, is enough not to risk a direct confrontation.

An alliance of 32 member states, NATO’s deterrence is sustained by a myriad of decisions and signals across many nations. Still, for Putin, the US is the nation that matters most; were he to come to the conclusion that America were so constrained as to not be able or willing to meaningfully intervene in defense of our allies, it could prompt him to roll the dice on a conventional attack against the alliance before European military rebuilding has gained critical mass.

Last month , Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Roger Wicker, R-Miss., reiterated the danger of a hollowing out of US presence in Europe before Europe has adequately rebuilt its military strength, saying, “It will take time to translate this spending into military capability. The ongoing force posture review in Europe must account for this reality and for the risk that a wounded and failing Putin might seek to change his circumstances through opportunistic aggression in Europe.”

Congress, of course, will have a say in whatever America’s force posture looks like in Europe. The fiscal 2027 NDAA is likely to build upon the initial roadblocks introduced last year on the withdrawal of US forces in Europe beyond the 76,000-troop floor, with clearer restrictions and more onerous requirements further complicating any decision to substantially reduce the US footprint in Europe.

For now, the credibility of Europe’s rearmament still depends in no small measure on the US forces already there, and the determinations Washington makes about whether they stay.

Everyone with a vested interest in NATO security — including Moscow — will be watching this review closely. Let us hope those working on it remember what is at stake and get it right.

Daniel Kochis is a Senior Fellow in the Center on Europe and Eurasia at the Hudson Institute.

头条新闻——这张由俄罗斯国家通讯社卫星通讯社发布的合影显示，2024年11月18日，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京在莫斯科克里姆林宫会见了由莫斯科任命的乌克兰扎波罗热共和国领导人叶夫根尼·巴利茨基（图中未显示）。（图片来源：Vyacheslav PROKOFYEV / POOL / AFP）（图片来源：VYACHESLAV PROKOFYEV/POOL/AFP via Getty Images）

自2026年初以来，支撑北约威慑的两大支柱遭受​​重创。首先是受伊朗战争影响，美国军火储备持续快速且严重损耗；其次是5月份宣布，一旦未来发生冲突，美国对北约部队模式的贡献将立即受到大幅限制。

目前，五角大楼已启动欧洲兵力部署评估。11月初，陆军部长将听取关于美军在欧洲的规模和部署方案的几项简报，评估过程将于12月初结束。届时，唐纳德·特朗普总统将最终决定是否接受、修改或拒绝国防部的建议，毫无疑问，国家安全委员会和国务院也会参与其中。

定期对美国在欧洲的承诺进行冷​​静客观的评估是明智之举。但考虑到克里姆林宫日益活跃的针对欧洲的军事行动，以及欧洲尚未全面展开的重整军备，客观的评估应当得出结论：美国必须在欧洲保持强大的军事存在。

现实情况是，如果不影响作战能力，美国在欧洲的驻军已几乎没有多余的资源可以削减。目前部署在欧洲的轮换和常驻美军共计8万人，远低于冷战结束以来美国在欧洲的平均常驻兵力约9.4万人。

美国在欧洲仅常驻三个战斗机联队，没有战略轰炸机常驻。海军的大部分舰艇已部署在太平洋。一艘驻扎在意大利的指挥控制舰和五艘驻扎在西班牙的驱逐舰是美国在欧洲仅有的常驻水面舰艇或潜艇，而这些驱逐舰一直被部署到东地中海参与中东地区的军事行动，这限制了它们与北约盟国进行联合演习的能力。（第六艘驱逐舰将于10月抵达，以增强美国在该战区的海军力量。）

与此同时，伊朗战争更加凸显了美国在欧洲的军事基地和飞越权至关重要。如果没有盟友的这些准入，五角大楼不可能持续对伊朗政权发动如此持久且致命的打击。

一个常被忽视的事实是：美国在欧洲的军事基地实际上得到了欧洲纳税人的大量补贴，这不仅支持北约的威慑和美国的远距离力量投射，也支持其在欧洲的政治影响力。此外，这种驻军在美国国内也获得了各政治派别的广泛支持。

不要鼓励俄罗斯

还有这样一个现实：欧洲态势评估可能会建议减少美国在北约的驻军，而此次评估正值敏感时期，莫斯科似乎愿意试探北约在分裂或承认与俄罗斯的战争已经开始之前，究竟能将北约逼到什么程度。

近期针对欧洲基础设施的一系列袭击和阴谋——包括柏林方面直接指责莫斯科所为的德国机场袭击事件，以及波兰无人机工厂纵火案（图斯克总理称极有可能是俄罗斯所为）——都显示出局势明显升级的趋势。据报道，美国中央情报局局长近期访问俄罗斯，旨在劝阻莫斯科不要在北约内部采取进一步的冒险行动。毫无疑问，俄罗斯正在密切关注有关美国在欧洲的PAC-3导弹拦截器和ATACMS导弹库存“已远超临界”的报道。

替换这些高端能力需要数年时间。同样，替换美国对北约部队模式贡献的减少也需要时间，这些部队和能力原本可以在未来冲突爆发时迅速部署到位。

欧洲在国防领域迅速而大规模的投资，在很大程度上得益于特朗普总统的推动，这些投资带来的结构性变革意义重大且势在必行。然而，这些变革尚未完全实现。尽管盟友们正努力填补空白，但现有的能力，尤其是高端武器装备，仍然不足以完全替代美国今年早些时候名义上撤回的那些武器。正如五角大楼正在实时体会到的那样，武器生产需要数年时间，而非数月。

这表明，一旦欧洲发生危机（实际上，五月份的情况正是如此），美国对能够迅速赶来支援的部队规模和类型进行了严格限制，从而更加凸显了美国已部署在欧洲的军事力量的规模和类型。俄罗斯必须继续坚信，美国的存在，加上欧洲北约成员国在冲突中能够提供的火力，足以避免直接对抗的风险。

北约由32个成员国组成，其威慑力依赖于众多国家做出的各种决定和发出的各种信号。然而，对普京而言，美国才是最重要的国家；如果他认定美国受到诸多限制，以至于无法或不愿对盟国进行有效的防御，那么他可能会在欧洲军事重建尚未达到临界规模之前，孤注一掷地对北约发动常规攻击。

上个月，参议院军事委员会主席、密西西比州共和党参议员罗杰·威克重申了美国在欧洲军事力量尚未充分重建之前就撤出欧洲的危险性。他表示：“将这些开支转化为军事能力需要时间。目前正在进行的驻欧兵力部署评估必须考虑到这一现实，以及普京可能因在欧洲发动机会主义侵略而改变自身处境的风险。”

当然，国会对美国在欧洲的兵力部署拥有发言权。2027财年国防授权法案可能会在去年对美军撤离欧洲设定的7.6万人最低人数限制基础上，进一步加强限制，提出更明确的限制和更苛刻的要求，从而进一步复杂化任何大幅削减美军在欧洲驻军的决定。

目前来看，欧洲重新武装的可信度在很大程度上仍然取决于美国已经驻扎在那里的军队，以及华盛顿决定是否继续驻扎这些军队。

所有与北约安全息息相关的各方——包括莫斯科——都将密切关注此次评估。我们希望参与评估的人员能够牢记利害关系，确保评估结果准确无误。

Daniel Kochis 是哈德逊研究所欧洲和欧亚研究中心的高级研究员。