China’s neighbors seek expanded partnerships with US to deter, defend

WASHINGTON ― The Chinese Coast Guard ship made its presence known.

First, the ship sped near the Philippine patrol vessel Malapascua close to the Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef in the hotly contested South China Sea. Then, it allegedly came within 150 yards, blocking the Philippine ship’s path in what government officials later described as “ dangerous maneuvers ,” before the Chinese crew pointed what Manila called a green “military grade” laser at some of the Philippine crew, temporarily blinding them.

China denied it was operating unsafely, but Philippine officials were unassuaged. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. summoned Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian to express “ serious concern .”

In the days before the alleged Feb. 6 incident, the United States and the Philippines had announced an expansion of their 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Instead of periodic access for U.S. forces to five Philippine installations, they will have access to nine. The U.S. Navy’s top admiral has since offered Manila a chance for joint patrols: Philippine vessels cruising side by side with their American allies in the face of Chinese coercion.

The Philippines has accused China of using a green, military-grade laser at sea that allegedly blinding some Philippine Coast Guard crew members. (Philippine Coast Guard)

The agreement marked a striking reversal from Manila’s flirtation with ending most military cooperation with the U.S. , as it sought to balance relations with Washington and Beijing. It capped a wave of personal diplomacy, in which Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited the Philippines in 2021, President Joe Biden called Marcos to congratulate him on his election and Vice President Kamala Harris visited Manila in November.

And now the newly strengthened defense relationship was on full display. Austin called his counterpart days after the reported incident to reiterate that “an armed attack on Philippine armed forces, aircraft, and public vessels, including those of its Coast Guard, anywhere in the South China Sea, would invoke U.S. mutual defense commitments,” according to an official readout.

The Pentagon’s efforts to improve U.S. force posture in the Pacific have yielded a flurry of major agreements in recent months, with allies motivated by China’s aggressive behavior to embrace the U.S. With new arrangements, the Pentagon aims to spread what it calls “combat credible” forces closer to Taiwan as a way to deter China from invading the island and ― if deterrence fails ― win any resulting fight.

The U.S. military’s problem is that heavy concentrations of its forces in Northeast Asia ― 50,000 in Japan and 28,000 in South Korea ― offer fat targets for China’s long-range missiles, which can reach areas as far away as Guam. Shifting to smaller, more distributed groupings not only complicates Chinese targeting, but increases the presence of U.S. troops in the arc of islands east of Taiwan. China considers Taiwan a rogue province, and has threatened to take it back by force if necessary.

In early December, Ely Ratner , the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, publicly pledged that 2023 would be a “transformative” year for U.S. force posture in the Pacific, and in the eight weeks that followed, the Pentagon made good with moves Ratner has said “will make our forward posture more distributed, resilient and lethal.”

Beyond increasing access to sites in the Philippines, the U.S. military is transforming a Marine regiment in Japan into a quick-reaction force. At the same time, Australia rotations for U.S. Air Force bomber task forces and fighters are due to increase this year, in addition to newer Army and Navy rotations there. Australia is also expected to agree to host U.S. submarines when it announces March 13 the type of nuclear-propelled submarine it will obtain.

With tension over Taiwan escalating in recent years, amid Chinese military flights near the territory and controversial visits by U.S. politicians, the Biden administration has pushed for deeper ties in the region. Three months after Ratner forecast the new arrangements, he said on March 2 that “it’s already been really a breakthrough year for U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.”

Chinese fighter jets conduct drills around Taiwan on Aug. 7, 2022. (Gong Yulong/Xinhua via AP)

“The story of the U.S. position in the region, the degree to which we are deepening our partnerships with our allies and partners, the degree to which they’re investing in their own capabilities, their ability to contribute to regional security and the degree which they’re working with with each other is really cause for optimism,” Ratner said in at event sponsored by the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank. “It is creating a more stable and enduring security environment, even as these challenges from [China] become more intense.”

Avoiding a conflict with China over Taiwan before the end of the decade is “doable,” Ratner added. “It’s going to be really hard, but I think we’re getting after it with urgency, but also with confidence that we can do it.”

A change of pace in Manila

The Philippines is a case that might give a defense watcher whiplash.

In 2020, then-Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte announced plans to cancel Manila’s 1999 agreement to allow U.S. forces to visit, but he reversed course when Austin visited in June 2021 following a series of incidents that included a standoff with China over the contested Whitsun Reef. Fast forward to Austin’s visit with Marcos in February, where the two nations agreed to expand U.S. military presence there with access to four more bases.

The Philippines has long been a target of China’s maritime coercion in the resource-rich, busy South China Sea. There, China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Taiwan are among the countries involved in a tense, decades-long territorial impasse.

It’s unclear how a greater American presence will impact that dynamic. But the U.S. and the Philippines are planning high-level talks this spring to clarify the locations of the newly accessible sites — potentially in the northern Philippines, near Taiwan and the South China Sea. (The 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, or EDCA, authorizes U.S. military use of Philippine sites, but rules out permanent basing.)

The Philippine government said it earmarked $66.5 million to construct facilities for training, storage and more. Further infrastructure improvements, including airfield repairs and pre-positioned fuel supplies, are on the table.

“U.S. access to Philippine bases will offer a new level of training, exercises and interoperability between forces to modernize and develop the Philippines military ― to enable us to respond to events more quickly,” Ratner told Defense News. “Meetings in the spring will afford an opportunity to clarify which airfields may need repairs or be suitable for pre-positioned equipment so that we can respond to contingencies in the South China Sea or conduct joint disaster relief missions.”

Stacie Pettyjohn , director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security think tank, said that because the existing sites have languished, it’s unlikely that, without more investments, the runways or aprons are strong enough to support fully loaded U.S. fighters or bombers. The two countries also may be considering modest locations from where U.S. Marine or Army forces could operate surveillance drones or launch less expensive, mobile missiles.

There are several questions involved in the site selection process, according to Pettyjohn: “Is it a mountainous area? What can it range from that place, and can they actually reach the targets the U.S. wants to be able to hold at risk or that they want to be surveilling if they have unmanned or manned aircraft conducting surveillance in that area?”

U.S. Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said she’s hopeful the Philippines, alongside Australia, Guam and Japan, will host logistics hubs for pre-positioned fuel and other supplies the Army wants to bring to the region. The service’s role in a Pacific fight would be to furnish the joint force with long-range fires, as well as secure staging sites and communications.

“The folks in the Philippines have expanded the EDCA sites because of their concerns about what they see [China] doing,” Wormuth said at a Feb. 28 event in Washington. “I would like to see us continue to have wins like those four new sites. Our job in the Army certainly is to just be as ready as we can to take advantage of those agreements when they get signed.”

U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday said in a Feb. 22 visit to Manila the U.S. is “committed” to joint maritime patrols with the country in the South China Sea, and that details will likely emerge from broader bilateral talks.

In the meantime, the U.S., the Philippines and Australia plan to show off their strengthened ties with a bigger version of the joint Balikatan exercise, set for April. Last year’s exercise with the U.S. and the Philippines was billed as the largest since 2015, with a combined 8,900 troops.

“You’re going to see an increase with respect to the numbers. I think you’re going to see an increase with respect to the joint mix of capabilities that we bring together this time in Balikatan,” Gilday told reporters, adding that the drill “would provide a very powerful optic of assurance.”

Watching Taiwan from Japan

When the Chinese military’s large-scale drills near Taiwan last August managed to send some missiles into the waters of Japan’s exclusive economic zone, Japan saw it as a warning. And it reacted.

In January, Washington and Tokyo announced a new U.S. Marine quick-reaction force on Okinawa and unveiled plans to deepen military cooperation on Japan’s other southwest islands near Taiwan. The Okinawa-based 12th Marine Regiment, an artillery unit, will become the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment ― with advanced intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, anti-ship and transportation capabilities.

Japan has also announced it will acquire new counterstrike capabilities and raise defense spending to 2% of its gross domestic product, which would total about 43 trillion yen (U.S. $315 billion) through 2027. This marks a dramatic change for a nation that forged a pacifist approach to its defense after World War II and historically kept defense spending below 1% of its GDP.

Japan wants to buy American-made Tomahawk cruise missiles and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles that can reach potential targets in China ― and extend the range of its Type 12 land-based anti-ship missile. Tokyo also announced plans to buy all 400 of the Raytheon Technologies-made Tomahawks it is seeking from the U.S. at once this year, rather than over several years as initially planned.

The U.S. Navy submarine Annapolis and aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan participate in an antisubmarine exercise with South Korea and Japan in waters between the two countries on Sept. 30, 2022. (South Korean Defense Ministry via Getty Images)

The U.S. and Japan also agreed to the shared use of U.S. facilities on Okinawa. Marine officials say the littoral regiment will bolster the U.S. presence beyond Okinawa, into the first island chain, which stretches from Japan’s East China Sea islands through the Philippines.

Japan may use Okinawa as it adds bases, radars and air defense units on its chain of southwestern islands, which extend from Japan’s largest island to Yonaguni, which is 70 miles east of Taiwan. The deal also opened up these islands for joint training ― offering U.S. forces a greater familiarity with the terrain on which they’d operate in a confrontation over Taiwan.

“These islands are proximate to where the [Taiwan] conflict would be playing out, and in concept at least they would allow these small [American] units to place Chinese naval assets at risk,” said Christopher Johnstone, a former White House director for East Asia who is now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank. “The idea of this distributed presence with self-reliant comms, ISR capabilities and weapons has a pretty strong logic if it plays out according to concept.”

Marine littoral regiments are designed with stealth, speed and military prowess in mind. From beaches and straits throughout the region, they’d have naval strike missiles with 100-mile ranges capable of conducting anti-ship strikes or gaining sea control with just the threat of being able to target enemy ships.

“Having the [Marine littoral regiment] outfitted with anti-ship cruise missiles would allow them to really go after a potential Chinese invasion fleet, if China were to launch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan,” said Becca Wasser , who leads the Center for a New American Security’s gaming lab. “In line with the Marine Corps concept of stand-in forces, the Marines are supposed to be able to conduct sea-denial [missions] and be able to bottle up Chinese forces to ensure they don’t go outside the first island chain.”

Marine littoral regiments are also designed to use MQ-9A Reaper drones for extended-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ― sensing what’s happening in the region and passing those findings to joint force commanders in the theater or directly to Marines with the anti-ship missiles to take immediate action.

According to a Marine Corps spokesman, Marine Corps Air Station at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, will be home to two General Atomics-made Reapers later this year, and six by fiscal 2025 ― replacing the smaller Boeing Insitu RQ-21 Blackjack.

A new squadron on base and activated in January, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 153 will this year absorb the first of six KC-130J tankers. The aerial refueling aircraft are meant to allow more Hawaii-based Marines to move throughout the vast region in the event of a crisis.

Speaking at the West naval conference in February, the assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Eric Smith , teased that the Reapers and refueling aircraft were just two on a “laundry list” of U.S. military moves in the Pacific that “gets a lot longer and a lot sexier” at the classified level.

A Canadian service member rappels down the side of a ship during an exercise with the naval forces of Canada, Japan, Australia and the United States. (LSIS Bradley Darvill/Royal Australian Navy)

Australian modernization

Australia is expected to announce this month how it will acquire a fleet of submarines powered with U.S. nuclear technology as part of the trilateral AUKUS pact. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese recently called the program “the single biggest leap in our defense capability in our history.”

Options to replace the Australian-built Collins-class diesel-electric submarines that went into service more than 20 years ago include a next-generation U.S. Virginia-class sub, a British Astute-class boat or a new hybrid design.

But whatever the decision, Australia is also expected to host new rotations of U.S. nuclear-powered submarines as it begins a long ramp-up to 2040, when the plans call for the boats to arrive. That would give Australia’s naval personnel a chance to acclimate themselves to operating and maintaining the complex submarines.

“The rotation issue, I would be shocked if that’s not openly discussed in the next couple of weeks,” Connecticut Rep. Joe Courtney , the top Democrat on the House Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, said during a March 3 interview.

Eric Sayers , a former staffer for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command during the Trump administration, said he also expects U.S. and U.K. naval nuclear power schools to welcome Australians, who will “have to get on our nuclear submarines, deploy and learn.”

“It’s already going to be a long pathway to deliver this capability; it’s better to start that training now,” Sayers said.

Also likely, according to Pettyjohn, is that the Pentagon acquires rotational basing for its ships and submarines in locations like Perth, the Western Australian city that houses Australia’s Collins fleet. By her thinking, the U.S. could seek to build Australia-based stockpiles of missiles for its ships and submarines with vertical launching systems, especially if the Pacific ally operates the same kinds of munitions.

Amid criticism that Australia’s lack of nuclear expertise will leave it heavily reliant on nuclear-armed partners, Austin has vowed Australia will not face a capability gap as it waits for nuclear-powered subs. Without disclosing details, the defense secretary also pledged to increase U.S. rotations of bomber task forces and fighters in Australia in addition to bolstering Army and Navy rotations there.

The moves in 2023 dovetail with rotations in 2021 of F-22, B-2 and B-1 aircraft, and with fuel, runway and ordnance storage infrastructure projects underway at the Darwin and Tindal airfields in Australia’s Northwest Territory. The U.S. spent millions of dollars in recent years to build ramps and storage for munitions and fuel so that, in a crisis, American refueling aircraft could use Darwin and bombers could use Tindal.

Last year, the U.S. announced plans to accommodate up to six nuclear-capable B-52 bombers by upgrading facilities at Tindal by 2027. The project, expected to cost as much as $100 million, would build a new concrete apron and squadron operations facilities as a means to better host bombers, tankers and fighters.

“We’re building physical bases in places like Japan and Guam, but we’re also building infrastructure that we could quickly fall in on, that has what we need to scale up quickly ― in the Philippines and northern Australia,” Sayers said. “Some of these things are permanent for a heavier presence, while others are lighter so that we can go there if we need to.”

Military construction

Defense experts and at least one key lawmaker believe the recent moves are positive steps, but that the U.S. must make more investments in military construction. Budget watchers will be looking at the Pentagon’s military construction budget, known as MILCON, and the separate Pacific Deterrence Initiative for new proposals.

“If we’re going to be serious about pre-positioning Marine Corps, Navy and air assets, it goes hand and glove that you’ve got to build support for it, which obviously is airfields,” Courtney said.

A recent Center for Strategic and International Studies war game for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan highlighted the vulnerability of allied aircraft. It found that most would be destroyed on the ground as China launches missile attacks on U.S. bases in Japan and Guam.

U.S. Army Secretary Christine Wormuth tours Hawaii’s Red Hill fuel storage facility. (Spc. Matthew Mackintosh/U.S. Army)

Cognizant of the threat, the Air Force wants to establish a system of resilient basing that relies less on established forward bases that are well known to enemies and more on the “agile combat employment” concept of flexible satellite bases dispersed in a “hub-and-spoke” system.

Wasser is among the experts calling for the military to invest more in passive defenses by building hardened aircraft shelters, particularly on Tinian in the Mariana Islands and on Guam, which has none.

“Looking at some basic resiliency efforts, there are things that you need to do to create passive and active defenses on U.S. air bases,” Wasser said. “We announced these EDCA sites, but the state of the sites is unclear at the moment. All this suggests you’re going to want to see a request in MILCON or line items in [the Pacific Deterrence Initiative] for base resilience or infrastructure enhancement.”

Another expense is coming as the U.S. military shuts down a major fuel storage facility — Red Hill in Hawaii — after it leaked petroleum into Pearl Harbor’s tap water last year. Because Red Hill supplied fuel for Navy jets and surface combatants, the public health disaster may also hamstring U.S. operations in the Pacific, Sayers said.

“We basically didn’t address the issue of critical aviation and surface combatant fuel storage at this location for years. We just didn’t resource it properly,” Sayers said.

The Red Hill underground fuel storage facility consists of 20 steel-lined underground storage tanks encased in concrete, which together could store up to 250 million gallons of fuel.

“This fuel was not just protected, relatively safe, but huge portions of it are necessary to be able to sustain a maritime fight, not just for days, but weeks and months,” Sayers said. “We basically shut all that down without a clear plan or a budget for how we would disperse it.”

While stateside military construction funding is popular on Capitol Hill because it provides local economic boosts, military construction overseas can be a tough sell. It remains to be seen whether the tab for these moves would be picked up by or shared with host countries ― or be small enough, given the modest footprint for the forces involved, to fall under the budgets for training and military exercises.

Courtney predicted that a request for more military construction funding to support the plans would be “well received” by centrist Democrats and Republicans.

“Despite the fact that maybe some people think members of Congress view MILCON as earmarks for their district, I think the drumbeat of briefings on new dispersed presence is really sinking in, and people get it,” he said.

Megan Eckstein, Geoff Ziezulewicz and Jen Judson contributed to this report.

Joe Gould was the senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry. He had previously served as Congress reporter.

华盛顿——中国海警船现身了。

首先，这艘船高速驶近菲律宾巡逻舰“马拉帕斯卡”号，靠近位于南海争议海域的第二仁爱礁。随后，据称它逼近至距离菲律宾舰艇150码以内，阻挡其航道。菲律宾政府官员后来将此举描述为“危险举动”。之后，中国船员用马尼拉方面所称的绿色“军用级”激光照射部分菲律宾船员，导致他们暂时失明。

中国否认其运营存在不安全因素，但菲律宾官员对此并不满意。总统费迪南德·马科斯召见中国驻菲律宾大使黄溪连，表达了“严重关切”。

在据称2月6日事件发生前几天，美国和菲律宾宣布扩大2014年签署的《加强防务合作协议》。根据该协议，美军将不再只能定期使用菲律宾的五个军事设施，而是可以使用九个。此后，美国海军最高将领向马尼拉提出联合巡逻的提议：面对中国的胁迫，菲律宾舰艇将与美国盟友并肩巡逻。

菲律宾指责中国在海上使用绿色军用激光，据称导致部分菲律宾海岸警卫队队员失明。（菲律宾海岸警卫队）

该协议标志着马尼拉此前一度考虑终止与美国的大部分军事合作，以寻求平衡与华盛顿和北京的关系，这一立场发生了显著转变。它也为一系​​列人事外交活动画上了句号，其中包括美国国防部长劳埃德·奥斯汀于2021年访问菲律宾，美国总统乔·拜登致电马科斯祝贺其当选，以及副总统卡马拉·哈里斯于11月访问马尼拉。

如今，新近加强的防务关系得到了充分展现。据官方声明，奥斯汀在事件发生几天后致电菲律宾对口官员，重申“任何在南海对菲律宾武装部队、飞机和公共船只（包括其海岸警卫队船只）发动武装袭击的行为，都将触发美国的共同防御承诺”。

五角大楼为改善美国在太平洋的军事态势所做的努力，在近几个月来促成了一系列重大协议，盟友们也因中国的咄咄逼人行为而更加支持美国。五角大楼希望通过新的安排，将所谓的“具有作战能力的”部队部署到更靠近台湾的地方，以此来阻止中国入侵台湾，并在威慑失败的情况下，赢得任何可能发生的冲突。

美军面临的问题是，其在东北亚的兵力过于集中——在日本有5万人，在韩国有2.8万人——这使得中国远程导弹能够轻易击中目标，这些导弹的射程远至关岛。转向规模更小、分布更分散的部署，不仅能增加中国导弹的打击难度，还能提高美军在台湾以东岛屿弧形区域的驻扎强度。中国视台湾为叛离省份，并威胁称必要时将以武力收复台湾。

12 月初，负责印太安全事务的国防部助理部长伊莱·拉特纳公开承诺，2023 年将是美国在太平洋地区军事态势的“变革性”之年。在接下来的八周里，五角大楼兑现了拉特纳的承诺，采取了一系列举措，正如拉特纳所说，“这将使我们的前沿部署更加分散、更具韧性和杀伤力”。

除了增加对菲律宾军事设施的使用权限外，美军还在将驻日海军陆战队的一个团转型为快速反应部队。与此同时，今年美国空军轰炸机特遣队和战斗机在澳大利亚的轮换部署也将增加，此外，陆军和海军在澳大利亚的轮换部署也在进行中。澳大利亚预计将于3月13日宣布其将采购的核动力潜艇类型，届时预计澳大利亚也将同意为美国潜艇提供驻扎地。

近年来，随着中国军机频繁飞近台湾地区以及美国政要访问台湾引发争议，台湾问题紧张局势不断升级，拜登政府一直致力于深化与该地区的关系。在拉特纳预测新安排三个月后，他于3月2日表示，“对于美国在印太地区的联盟和伙伴关系而言，今年已经是真正具有突破性的一年。”

2022年8月7日，中国战机在台湾附近海域进行演习。（龚玉龙/新华社 via AP）

拉特纳在保守派智库哈德逊研究所主办的活动上表示：“美国在该地区的立场，我们与盟友和伙伴深化合作的程度，他们投资自身能力的程度，他们为地区安全做出贡献的能力，以及他们彼此合作的程度，都确实令人乐观。即便来自中国的挑战日益加剧，这些因素也正在创造一个更加稳定和持久的安全环境。”

拉特纳补充说，在十年结束前避免与中国就台湾问题发生冲突是“可以做到的”。“这确实非常困难，但我认为我们正在以紧迫感和信心去努力实现这一目标。”

马尼拉的节奏变化

菲律宾的案例可能会让关注国防事务的人士感到措手不及。

2020年，时任菲律宾总统罗德里戈·杜特尔特宣布计划取消马尼拉1999年与美国签署的允许美军驻扎的协议。但在2021年6月奥斯汀访问菲律宾后，杜特尔特改变了主意。此前，菲律宾与中国就五旬礁争议地区发生对峙。随后，奥斯汀于2021年2月访问菲律宾，两国同意扩大美国在菲律宾的军事存在，并允许美军使用另外四个军事基地。

菲律宾长期以来一直是中国在资源丰富、活动频繁的南海进行海上胁迫的目标。在南海，中国、菲律宾、越南、马来西亚和台湾等国家和地区陷入了长达数十年的紧张领土争端。

目前尚不清楚美国在菲律宾的军事存在增强将如何影响这一局面。但美国和菲律宾计划于今年春季举行高级别会谈，以明确新近开放的军事设施的具体位置——这些设施可能位于菲律宾北部，靠近台湾和南海。（2014年签署的《加强防务合作协议》（EDCA）授权美军使用菲律宾境内的军事设施，但禁止美军在此建立永久基地。）

菲律宾政府表示，已拨款6650万美元用于建设训练、仓储等设施。此外，包括机场维修和预先部署燃料供应在内的其他基础设施改善计划也在考虑之中。

“美国使用菲律宾军事基地将为美菲两国军队提供更高水平的训练、演习和互操作性，从而实现菲律宾军队的现代化和发展，使我们能够更快地应对各种事件，”拉特纳告诉《防务新闻》。“春季的会议将提供一个机会，明确哪些机场可能需要维修，或者适合预先部署装备，以便我们能够应对南海的突发事件或开展联合救灾任务。”

新美国安全中心（Center for a New American Security）国防项目主任斯泰西·佩蒂约翰（Stacie Pettyjohn）表示，由于现有基地年久失修，如果没有更多投资，跑道或停机坪不太可能足够坚固，能够支撑满载的美国战斗机或轰炸机起降。两国也可能正在考虑一些规模较小的地点，供美国海军陆战队或陆军部队操作侦察无人机或发射成本较低的机动导弹。

佩蒂约翰表示，选址过程中涉及几个问题：“这是一个山区吗？从那里可以覆盖多大的范围？如果美国在该地区部署无人机或有人驾驶飞机进行监视，他们真的能够到达美国想要威胁或监视的目标吗？”

美国陆军部长克里斯汀·沃姆斯表示，她希望菲律宾能够与澳大利亚、关岛和日本一道，成为陆军向该地区预先部署的燃料和其他物资的后勤枢纽。陆军在太平洋战区的作用是为联合部队提供远程火力支援，以及确保集结地和通信设施的安全。

“菲律宾方面之所以扩大《加强防务合作协议》（EDCA）的合作地点，是因为他们对中国的一些举动感到担忧，”沃姆斯在2月28日于华盛顿举行的一次活动上说道。“我希望我们能继续取得像新增这四个合作地点这样的成果。我们陆军的职责当然就是​​做好充分准备，一旦这些协议签署，就立即加以利用。”

美国海军作战部长迈克尔·吉尔迪海军上将在2月22日访问马尼拉时表示，美国“致力于”与中国在南海进行联合海上巡逻，具体细节可能会在更广泛的双边会谈中公布。

与此同时，美国、菲律宾和澳大利亚计划通过规模更大的“肩并肩”联合军演来展示三国日益紧密的联系，该军演定于4月举行。去年与美国和菲律宾举行的联合军演号称是自2015年以来规模最大的一次，共有8900名士兵参加。

吉尔迪告诉记者：“你们将会看到参演人数的增加。我认为你们将会看到我们在这次‘肩并肩’联合军演中汇集的各种能力的增强。”他还补充说，这次演习“将提供一个非常有力的安全保障”。

从日本观看台湾

去年8月，中国军队在台湾附近海域举行大规模军事演习，期间有部分导弹射入日本专属经济区水域，日本将其视为警告，并采取了应对措施。

今年1月，华盛顿和东京宣布在冲绳组建一支新的美国海军陆战队快速反应部队，并公布了深化在日本其他靠近台湾的西南岛屿上军事合作的计划。驻扎在冲绳的第12海军陆战队团（一支炮兵部队）将改编为第12海军陆战队近海团，具备先进的情报、监视、侦察、反舰和运输能力。

日本还宣布将购置新的反击能力，并将国防开支提高到国内生产总值的2%，到2027年总额将达到约43万亿日元（3150亿美元）。这对于二战后奉行和平主义国防方针、历史上国防开支一直保持在国内生产总值1%以下的日本来说，标志着一个巨大的转变。

日本希望购买美国制造的“战斧”巡航导弹和联合空对地防区外导弹（JASMS），这些导弹能够打击中国境内的潜在目标，并能提升其12型陆基反舰导弹的射程。东京方面还宣布，计划今年一次性从美国购买全部400枚由雷神技术公司制造的“战斧”导弹，而不是像最初计划的那样分几年交付。

2022年9月30日，美国海军潜艇“安纳波利斯”号和航空母舰“罗纳德·里根”号与韩国和日本在两国之间的海域举行反潜演习。（韩国国防部/Getty Images）

美国和日本还同意共享在冲绳的美国设施。海军陆战队官员表示，这支近海部队将加强美国在冲绳以外地区，即从日本东海诸岛延伸至菲律宾的第一岛链上的存在。

日本可能会利用冲绳岛，在其西南群岛上增设基地、雷达和防空部队。这些岛屿从日本最大的岛屿冲绳延伸至与那国岛，与那国岛位于台湾以东70英里处。该协议还允许在这些岛屿上进行联合训练，使美军更加熟悉在台湾冲突中可能作战的地形。

“这些岛屿靠近（台湾）冲突可能发生的地区，至少在理论上，它们可以让这些小型（美军）部队对中国海军资产构成威胁，”前白宫东亚事务主任、现任战略与国际研究中心智库成员克里斯托弗·约翰斯通表示。“如果按照设想实施，这种拥有自主通信、情报、监视和侦察能力以及武器的分布式存在理念具有很强的逻辑性。”

海军陆战队近岸部队的设计以隐蔽性、速度和军事实力为核心。他们可以从该地区的各个海滩和海峡出发，利用射程达100英里的舰载打击导弹进行反舰打击，或者仅凭威胁就能控制海域。

“如果中国对台湾发动两栖入侵，为海军陆战队近海团配备反舰巡航导弹将使他们能够真正打击潜在的中国入侵舰队，”新美国安全中心博弈实验室负责人贝卡·瓦瑟表示。“根据海军陆战队的替代部队概念，海军陆战队应该能够执行海上封锁任务，并能够包围中国军队，确保他们无法越过第一岛链。”

海军陆战队近岸部队还被设计使用 MQ-9A“死神”无人机进行远程情报、监视和侦察——感知该地区正在发生的事情，并将这些发现传递给战区的联合部队指挥官或直接传递给配备反舰导弹的海军陆战队员，以便他们立即采取行动。

据美国海军陆战队发言人称，今年晚些时候，位于夏威夷卡内奥赫湾的海军陆战队航空站将迎来两架通用原子公司制造的“死神”无人机，到 2025 财年将迎来六架——取代较小的波音 Insitu RQ-21“海盗旗”无人机。

今年一月在基地成立并正式启用的海军陆战队第153空中加油运输中队，将接收六架KC-130J加油机中的第一架。这些空中加油机的目的是为了让更多驻扎在夏威夷的海军陆战队员在危机情况下能够迅速调动到广袤的夏威夷地区。

今年二月，海军陆战队助理司令埃里克·史密斯将军在西部海军会议上发表讲话时暗示，“死神”无人机和加油机只是美国在太平洋地区一系列军事行动中的“一长串清单”中的两项，而这份清单在机密层面上“会变得更长、更刺激”。

一名加拿大军人在与加拿大、日本、澳大利亚和美国海军联合演习中，沿舰艇侧面速降。（LSIS Bradley Darvill/澳大利亚皇家海军）

澳大利亚现代化

预计澳大利亚将于本月宣布如何根据三方奥库斯协议，采购一支采用美国核动力技术的潜艇舰队。澳大利亚总理安东尼·阿尔巴尼斯最近称该计划是“我国历史上国防能力的最大飞跃”。

替换澳大利亚建造的柯林斯级柴电潜艇（该潜艇已服役 20 多年）的方案包括下一代美国弗吉尼亚级潜艇、英国机敏级潜艇或新的混合动力设计。

但无论最终决定如何，澳大利亚预计也将接收新一批美国核动力潜艇，因为澳大利亚正处于漫长的扩充阶段，计划在2040年之前接收这些潜艇。这将使澳大利亚海军人员有机会适应操作和维护这些复杂的潜艇。

“如果接下来几周内轮换问题没有公开讨论，我会感到震惊，”众议院海权和投射力量小组委员会首席民主党议员、康涅狄格州众议员乔·考特尼在 3 月 3 日接受采访时表示。

曾在特朗普政府时期担任美国印太司令部工作人员的埃里克·塞耶斯表示，他也希望美国和英国的海军核动力学校能够欢迎澳大利亚人，他们“必须登上我们的核潜艇，进行部署和学习”。

“要实现这种能力，注定是一条漫长的道路；最好现在就开始培训，”赛耶斯说。

佩蒂约翰认为，五角大楼很可能在珀斯等地为其舰艇和潜艇建立轮换基地。珀斯是西澳大利亚州的一座城市，也是澳大利亚柯林斯舰队的驻地。按照她的想法，美国可能会寻求在澳大利亚建立导弹储备库，为其舰艇和潜艇配备垂直发射系统，尤其是在其太平洋盟友也使用同类弹药的情况下。

针对澳大利亚因缺乏核技术而将严重依赖拥有核武器的伙伴国的批评，奥斯汀承诺，在等待核动力潜艇交付期间，澳大利亚不会面临能力缺口。这位国防部长在未透露具体细节的情况下还承诺，除了加强陆军和海军在澳大利亚的轮换部署外，还将增加美国在澳大利亚的轰炸机特遣部队和战斗机轮换部署。

2023年的这些举措与2021年F-22、B-2和B-1飞机的轮换部署相吻合，同时也与澳大利亚西北地区达尔文和廷德尔机场正在进行的燃料、跑道和弹药储存基础设施项目相呼应。近年来，美国投入数百万美元建设停机坪和弹药燃料储存设施，以便在危机情况下，美国加油机可以使用达尔文机场，轰炸机可以使用廷德尔机场。

去年，美国宣布计划到 2027 年升级廷德尔空军基地的设施，以容纳多达 6 架可携带核弹头的 B-52 轰炸机。该项目预计耗资 1 亿美元，将建造新的混凝土停机坪和中队作战设施，以便更好地容纳轰炸机、加油机和战斗机。

“我们正在日本和关岛等地建设实体基地，同时也在菲律宾和澳大利亚北部建设基础设施，以便我们能够迅速部署，并具备快速扩大规模所需的条件，”赛耶斯说。“其中一些是永久性的，用于加强军事存在；而另一些则是轻型的，以便我们在需要时可以随时部署。”

军事建设

国防专家和至少一位关键议员认为，近期的举措是积极的，但美国必须加大对军事建设的投资。预算观察人士将密切关注五角大楼的军事建设预算（简称“军事建设预算”）以及独立的“太平洋威慑倡议”，以期从中发现新的提案。

“如果我们真的要认真地预先部署海军陆战队、海军和空军资产，那么就必须建立相应的支持体系，这显然是指机场，”考特尼说。

美国战略与国际研究中心近期进行的一项模拟中国两栖入侵台湾的战争推演凸显了盟军飞机的脆弱性。推演结果显示，当中国向驻日美军基地和关岛基地发动导弹袭击时，大部分盟军飞机将在地面被摧毁。

美国陆军部长克里斯汀·沃姆斯视察了夏威夷红山燃料储存设施。（美国陆军下士马修·麦金托什摄）

空军意识到威胁，希望建立一个具有韧性的基地系统，减少对敌人熟知的现有前沿基地的依赖，更多地依靠“敏捷作战部署”概念，即在“中心辐射式”系统中分散部署灵活的卫星基地。

瓦瑟是呼吁军方加大被动防御投入的专家之一，这些专家希望军方能够建造加固的飞机掩体，尤其是在马里亚纳群岛的提尼安岛和关岛，因为关岛目前还没有飞机掩体。

“从一些基本的韧性建设措施来看，我们需要在美国空军基地建立被动和主动防御体系，”瓦瑟说。“我们公布了这些EDCA基地，但目前这些基地的状况尚不明确。所有这些都表明，我们需要在军事建设预算（MILCON）中看到关于基地韧性或基础设施升级的申请，或者在[太平洋威慑倡议]中看到相关项目。”

另一项开支即将到来：美国军方关闭了位于夏威夷的红山大型燃料储存设施，此前该设施去年发生石油泄漏，污染了珍珠港的自来水。萨耶斯表示，由于红山设施为海军喷气式飞机和水面作战舰艇提供燃料，这场公共卫生灾难也可能阻碍美国在太平洋地区的军事行动。

“多年来，我们基本上没有解决该地点关键航空和水面作战舰艇燃料储存的问题。我们没有投入足够的资源，”赛耶斯说。

红山地下燃料储存设施由 20 个钢衬地下储罐组成，这些储罐被混凝土包裹，总共可以储存多达 2.5 亿加仑的燃料。

“这些燃料不仅受到保护，相对安全，而且其中很大一部分对于维持海上作战至关重要，不仅能维持几天，还能维持数周甚至数月，”赛耶斯说。“我们基本上在没有明确计划或预算如何分配这些燃料的情况下，就关闭了所有这些设施。”

尽管美国本土的军事建设资金在国会山很受欢迎，因为它能促进当地经济发展，但海外军事建设资金却难以获得支持。这些海外军事建设的费用究竟是由东道国承担还是与东道国分担，或者考虑到相关部队规模较小，是否足以纳入训练和军事演习的预算，目前尚不得而知。

Courtney预测，要求增加军事建设资金以支持这些计划的请求将受到中间派民主党人和共和党人的“欢迎”。

“尽管有些人可能认为国会议员将军事建设视为其选区的专项拨款，但我认为关于新的分散部署情况的简报已经深入人心，人们也理解了这一点，”他说。

Megan Eckstein、Geoff Ziezulewicz 和 Jen Judson 对本报道亦有贡献。

乔·古尔德是《防务新闻》的资深五角大楼记者，负责报道国家安全政策、政治和国防工业的交汇点。他此前曾担任国会记者。