Attacks on Saudi oil expose Iraqi PM’s struggle to control armed factions

A senior Iraqi source points to a resistance ‘splinter’ group for the September attack on the East-West pipeline.

Iraqi Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Ali Faleh Al-Zaidi chairs the Ministerial Council for National Security for an emergency meeting, to discuss the latest security developments and the attack carried out by the United States and Saudi Arabian air forces, Baghdad, Iraq, July 29, 2026. [Media Office of the Prime Minister/Handout via REUTERS] (Reuters)

As black smoke billowed over Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline, the repercussions of the drone attack were already reaching across the border into Iraq.

The strikes, launched from Iraqi territory, threatened about 4 percent of global oil supplies and helped push Brent crude above $108 a barrel. But they also presented Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi with perhaps the clearest test yet of his pledge to bring armed groups under state control as the US-led coalition is due to make its final withdrawal by September 30.

list 1 of 4 Iraq seizes drone-launching platform used for targeting Saudi oil pipeline

list 2 of 4 Iraq faces sovereignty test as US-led military coalition exit nears

list 3 of 4 Saudi Arabia says East-West pipeline hit by drones launched from Iraq

list 4 of 4 Former top US diplomat reveals mistakes made after 9/11 attacks

Who was behind the strikes?

No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks launched last Thursday. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella of pro-Iranian factions including Kataib Hezbollah, has denied involvement, calling the strike “an honour that we do not claim”.

Baghdad has confirmed the drones came from Iraqi soil. Security forces identified launch traces near the Duwayrij River in Maysan province’s al-Tayeb border area on Saturday. Lieutenant General Saad Maan, head of Iraq’s Security Media Cell, said an intelligence task force had seized a launch platform.

A senior source at the Ministry of Interior told Al Jazeera he believed a resistance splinter group was responsible, though this has not been confirmed. If true, it points to a deeper problem: factions operating outside the state’s chain of command, and subgroups that operate outside the factions’ control.

Michael Knights, a research lead at Washington-based consultancy Horizon Engage, was sceptical, noting that front groups are an old ploy to make reluctant governments think twice before retaliating.

He said it was probably a cell run directly by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or one of the established armed factions. “They just want to make it marginally harder for anyone to pin it on them,” he said.

Under international pressure, Zaidi has responded quickly. He sacked the Maysan operations commander, ordered the formation of an investigative committee to look into the incident and closed numerous border crossings with Iran to prevent perpetrators from fleeing. In a visual display, heavily armed troops in Humvees appeared on Maysan’s streets.

But to many observers, such moves are just a show to placate Saudi and US calls for action, as the September attack was not the first originating from Iraqi soil.

In July, drones launched from Iraq struck Saudi oil facilities, reportedly with help from Houthi fighters based in Iraq. The US and Saudi Arabia retaliated with strikes that killed more than 20 members of Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), including Iranian military advisers. The resulting diplomatic fallout forced al-Zaidi to postpone a planned trip to Riyadh.

The violence is threatening to undermine Iraq and Saudi Arabia’s warming relations. Riyadh froze ties after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, re-engaging in the mid-2010s as ISIL rose. Border crossings reopened in 2020, and talk has since turned to investment, electricity links and transport. Saudi intelligence chief Khalid al-Humaidan visited Baghdad this month, and Riyadh has held off retaliating against the September 10 attack at Zaidi’s request.

Lahib Higel, deputy director for the Middle East and North Africa at the International Crisis Group, said the strike may also have been a message to al-Zaidi, who has pursued greater engagement with Saudi Arabia as part of a wider strategy to diversify Iraq’s economy.

“What he’s doing with the Saudis now, I think they would be seriously concerned about,” she said of the factions, some of which have said avenging fighters killed in Saudi strikes matters more than business deals. More broadly, for fear of losing leverage, Iran and its associated factions do not want to see Iraq become less economically reliant on Tehran, or establish alternative oil export routes other than Hormuz.

Zaidi has attempted to balance relations with his neighbours, receiving Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in August just shy of a month after the Iraqi Prime Minister made an official visit to Tehran, where he met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.

The balancing act has put the prime minister, a multimillionaire business figure who was considered a compromise candidate of the governing Shia bloc, under pressure despite reportedly being a preferred option for the US.

A long list of attempts

Zaidi’s stated intent is clear. He has ordered Iraqi banks to enforce US sanctions on Lebanon’s Hezbollah, asked parliament to draft a law to put weapons under the control of the state, and said those who refuse to disarm will be tried for treason.

But enforcement has repeatedly been thwarted. In July, troops sent to search Harakat al-Nujaba’s compound south of Baghdad were turned away with warning shots. In August, counterterrorism forces arrested Abbas al-Yaqoubi, a senior Nujaba intelligence official, only for a judge to free him 48 hours later.

However, a Baghdad court did jail a Kataib Hezbollah member for 15 years over the March kidnapping of US journalist Shelly Kittleson.

Higel said Zaidi had been bolder than former prime ministers, and that such verdicts make low-level fighters ask whether an operation is “worth 15 years”.

“But in the bigger picture, this has essentially no meaningful impact,” she said. “It’s not a system that is changing.”

Three factions – Kataib Hezbollah, Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada – still refuse to disarm. Very few observers of Iraqi politics believe any meaningful concessions will be made, and the state has shown no sign it is willing to face off with the pro-Iranian factions.

A crisis of confidence

For Knights, whether the state can act is less about firepower than nerve.

He points out that attacking Saudi Arabia was the move most likely to draw US attention back onto faction leaders – but they did it anyway. “That says to me [the armed factions] are completely fearless right now.”

Knights believes that Iraq’s Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) had the operational capability to take out the leaders of most of Iraq’s armed factions if it had the support of Iraq’s leadership, Washington and its Gulf neighbours.

But few officials have faith in the US coming to Iraq’s support, if needed. As Saudi Arabia’s call for US assistance fighting the Houthis in Yemen has reportedly gone unheeded, Baghdad may be doubtful Washington would come to its aid if the Green Zone, Iraq’s fortified government district, was besieged by resistance factions.

“This is all about confidence and feeling like your partners have your back and nobody feels like that right now,” he said.

Higel said the factions believe time is on their side and can wait out Trump. The objective for al-Zaidi may be to appear bold enough to keep Washington and Riyadh happy without provoking a backlash that could topple his government, or worse.

“I wouldn’t put it past these groups to assassinate a prime minister if it came to it,” she said.

一位伊拉克高级消息人士指出，9 月份对东西输油管道的袭击是由一个抵抗组织的“分裂”团体所为。

2026年7月29日，伊拉克总理兼武装部队总司令阿里·法利赫·扎伊迪在伊拉克巴格达主持召开国家安全部长级委员会紧急会议，讨论最新的安全局势以及美国和沙特阿拉伯空军发动的袭击。[总理办公室/路透社供图]（路透社）

当沙特阿拉伯东西输油管道上空升起滚滚黑烟时，无人机袭击的影响已经蔓延到伊拉克境内。

这些从伊拉克境内发起的空袭威胁到全球约4%的石油供应，并推动布伦特原油价格突破每桶108美元。但与此同时，这也对伊拉克总理阿里·扎伊迪而言，或许是对其将武装团体置于国家控制之下的承诺最严峻的考验。以美国为首的联军将于9月30日完成最终撤军。

伊拉克缴获用于袭击沙特石油管道的无人机发射平台（共4条，第1条）

伊拉克面临主权考验（共4项），以美国为首的军事联盟即将撤军

沙特阿拉伯称，东西输油管道遭伊拉克无人机袭击（共4条记录，此为第3条）

前美国高级外交官揭露9/11事件后犯下的错误（共4条，此为第4条）

谁是罢工的幕后黑手？

目前尚无任何组织声称对上周四发生的袭击事件负责。伊拉克伊斯兰抵抗组织（一个由包括真主党旅在内的亲伊朗派别组成的联盟）否认参与其中，称此次袭击是“我们不愿声称拥有的荣誉”。

巴格达方面已证实，这些无人机来自伊拉克境内。安全部队周六在迈桑省塔伊布边境地区的杜瓦伊里杰河附近发现了发射痕迹。伊拉克安全媒体中心负责人萨阿德·马安中将表示，一个情报特遣队缴获了一个发射平台。

内政部一位高级消息人士告诉半岛电视台，他认为此次事件是由一个抵抗运动的分裂组织所为，但这一说法尚未得到证实。如果属实，则表明存在一个更深层次的问题：一些派系游离于国家指挥系统之外，而另一些派系又不受这些派系的控制。

华盛顿咨询公司 Horizo​​n Engage 的研究主管迈克尔·奈茨对此表示怀疑，他指出，幌子组织是一种老套的伎俩，目的是让不情愿的政府在采取报复行动之前三思而行。

他说，这很可能是一个由伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）或某个既有武装派别直接运作的小组。“他们只是想让别人更难把罪名强加在他们身上，”他说。

在国际压力下，扎伊迪迅速做出反应。他解除了迈桑行动指挥官的职务，下令成立调查委员会彻查事件，并关闭了与伊朗接壤的多个边境口岸，以防止肇事者逃逸。在视觉上，全副武装的士兵乘坐悍马车出现在迈桑的街道上。

但在许多观察人士看来，这些举措只是为了安抚沙特和美国要求采取行动的呼吁而作秀，因为9月份的袭击并不是第一次发生在伊拉克境内的袭击。

7月，据报道，伊拉克境内的胡塞武装人员协助了从伊拉克起飞的无人机袭击沙特阿拉伯的石油设施。美国和沙特阿拉伯随即发动报复性空袭，造成伊拉克人民动员部队（PMF）20多名成员死亡，其中包括伊朗军事顾问。由此引发的外交风波迫使扎伊迪推迟了原定的利雅得之行。

暴力事件正威胁着伊拉克和沙特阿拉伯之间日益升温的关系。1990年伊拉克入侵科威特后，利雅得冻结了与伊拉克的关系，直到2010年代中期随着“伊斯兰国”的崛起才重新开始接触两国关系。2020年，两国边境重新开放，此后双方的对话重点转向了投资、电力连接和交通运输等领域。沙特情报局长哈立德·胡迈丹本月访问了巴格达，应扎伊迪的要求，利雅得暂缓对9月10日的袭击事件进行报复。

国际危机组织中东和北非副主任拉希卜·希格尔表示，此次袭击也可能是在向扎伊迪发出信号，扎伊迪一直致力于加强与沙特阿拉伯的合作，以此作为伊拉克经济多元化更广泛战略的一部分。

“我认为，他现在和沙特人搞的那些事，他们肯定会非常担忧，”她谈到这些派别时说道。其中一些派别曾表示，为在沙特空袭中丧生的战士复仇比商业交易更重要。更广泛地说，出于担心失去影响力，伊朗及其相关派别不希望看到伊拉克在经济上减少对德黑兰的依赖，也不希望看到伊拉克建立除霍尔木兹海峡以外的其他石油出口路线。

扎伊迪一直试图平衡与邻国的关系，在伊拉克总理对德黑兰进行正式访问并与伊朗总统马苏德·佩泽什基安会面后不到一个月，他于 8 月接待了伊朗议会议长穆罕默德·巴格尔·加利巴夫。

这种平衡策略给这位总理带来了压力。这位身家数百万的商业巨头被认为是执政的什叶派联盟的妥协候选人，尽管据报道他是美国更倾向的选择。

一系列尝试

扎伊迪的意图很明确。他已下令伊拉克各银行执行美国对黎巴嫩真主党的制裁，要求议会起草一项法律将武器置于国家控制之下，并表示拒绝解除武装者将以叛国罪受审。

但执法行动屡屡受挫。7月，奉命搜查位于巴格达南部“努贾巴运动”营地的部队遭到鸣枪警告后被驱离。8月，反恐部队逮捕了“努贾巴运动”高级情报官员阿巴斯·雅库比，但48小时后，法官便将其释放。

然而，巴格达一家法院确实判处一名真主党旅成员 15 年监禁，罪名是参与了 3 月份美国记者雪莉·基特尔森的绑架事件。

希格尔表示，扎伊迪比前总理们更加大胆，这样的判决会让低级战士质疑一次行动是否“值得花费 15 年时间”。

“但从更宏观的角度来看，这基本上没有任何实质性的影响，”她说。“这不是一个正在改变的体系。”

三个派别——真主党旅、努贾巴旅和烈士旅——仍然拒绝解除武装。几乎所有伊拉克政治观察家都认为不会有任何实质性的让步，而伊拉克政府也丝毫没有表现出愿意与亲伊朗派别对抗的迹象。

信心危机

对于奈特斯来说，国家能否采取行动，与其说是火力问题，不如说是胆量问题。

他指出，袭击沙特阿拉伯是最有可能将美国注意力重新吸引到各派系领导人身上的举动——但他们还是这么做了。“这在我看来表明（武装派系）现在完全无所畏惧。”

奈茨认为，如果伊拉克反恐部队（CTS）得到伊拉克领导层、华盛顿及其海湾邻国的支持，它有能力消灭伊拉克大多数武装派别的领导人。

但很少有官员相信美国会在必要时向伊拉克提供支持。据报道，沙特阿拉伯呼吁美国援助打击也门胡塞武装的行动未得到回应，因此，如果伊拉克戒备森严的政府区——绿区——被抵抗组织围困，巴格达方面可能怀疑华盛顿是否会伸出援手。

“这完全关乎自信，关乎感觉你的伙伴会支持你，但现在没有人有这种感觉，”他说。

希格尔表示，各派系认为时间站在他们这边，可以熬过特朗普的任期。扎伊迪的目标可能是展现出足够的魄力，既能让华盛顿和利雅得满意，又不至于引发可能导致其政府垮台甚至更糟后果的强烈反弹。

“如果真到了那一步，我不会排除这些组织刺杀首相的可能性，”她说。