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军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 16, 2026

Putin is framing the State Duma elections as a referendum on his war in Ukraine after setting conditions to ensure his desired outcome.

ISWNadia Sleiman查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年9月16日

Russian President Vladimir Putin is framing the State Duma elections as a referendum on his war in Ukraine after setting conditions to ensure his desired outcome. Putin stated on September 16 that participating in the State Duma elections scheduled for September 18-20 is a “responsibility” for all Russian citizens and contributes to strengthening Russia against external actors who seek to weaken Russia and undermine Russian sovereignty.[1] Putin stated that voting is a “common contribution” to Russia’s victory in its war in Ukraine and highlighted that residents of “Donbas and Novorossiya” — referring to the four Ukrainian oblasts that Russia illegally annexed in 2022 — will vote in the Duma elections for the first time. Putin is presenting the State Duma elections, whose results are predetermined, as a referendum on support for his war in Ukraine. The Kremlin regularly manipulates Russia’s domestic elections to suit Putin’s goals, and Putin will present his party’s inevitable victory as evidence of widespread domestic support for the war.[2] The Russian Supreme Court disqualified the Russian opposition party Yabloko from the State Duma elections on August 11, denying Russians the option of supporting a party with a pro-ceasefire platform as Putin continues to further consolidate the Russian political system around the war.[3] Russian occupation authorities have taken coercive measures to ensure the election results Putin desires in occupied Ukraine, including by staffing voting locations with armed soldiers.[4] United Russia party officials, including United Russia Chairperson Dmitry Mevedev, have confirmed their commitment to rallying public support for the war in Ukraine by positioning United Russia as the party of victory in Ukraine.[5] The Kremlin is setting conditions to demand long-term societal sacrifices such as mobilization by framing the State Duma election results as confirmation of popular support for the war effort in Ukraine despite the constant repetition of its claim that mobilization is not on the horizon.

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda confirmed that a Russian Gerbera drone entered Lithuanian airspace on the night of September 14 to 15.[6] Nauseda told reporters on September 15 that Lithuanian authorities identified the drone that had entered Lithuanian airspace on the night of September 14 to 15 as a Russian Gerbera-type strike drone. Lithuania’s National Crisis Management Center Head Vilmantas Vitkaukas stated on September 15 that the drone flew from Belarusian airspace into Lithuania.[7] Nauseda added that the drone was likely not targeting Lithuania and that Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) had inadvertently diverted the Russian drone into Lithuanian airspace.[8] Nauseda stated that further incidents could occur in the future and that Lithuania needs to be able to detect these air vehicles “while they’re still over neighboring countries” in order to give Lithuanian or NATO assets enough time to prepare to down the drones. Nauseda’s statement is in line with ISW’s assessment that NATO may need to reconsider its approach to air defense as a matter of self-defense against Russian drone strikes against NATO countries, regardless of whether the Russian drone incursions are accidental or intentional.[9]

Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov awarded the commander of a Russian frigate that fired two flares at a Danish Air Force helicopter on September 14 with the Military Distinction Medal for his “skillful and decisive actions.”[10] The Danish helicopter was conducting routine surveillance of the frigate in international waters in the Baltic Sea when the Russian frigate fired flares.[11]

Ukrainian forces struck and killed the commander of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) Major General Anton Grunis in a targeted drone strike in occupied Donetsk City on September 12. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi posted geolocated footage on September 16 and reported that Ukrainian forces struck and killed Grunis, call sign “Grozny,” in a targeted strike in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline) on September 12.[12] Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Major General Apti Alaudinov confirmed that Grunis died, but did not specify the cause.[13] The 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade is the primary fighting force in Kostyantynivka itself.[14] Putin notably met Grunis in a staged meeting with several Russian commanders on July 3 to make greatly exaggerated claims of Russian advances, and Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov later gave Grunis the Hero of Russia award for his brigade’s participation in the claimed seizure of Kostyantynivka.[15] Brovdi noted that Grunis is the seventh Russian military commander at the brigade, division, or army echelon that Ukraine’s USF has successfully targeted and killed.[16]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that Russian drones targeted his plane in Moldova twice in the past two weeks. Zelensky stated on September 15 that Russian drones entered Moldovan airspace on September 9 as Zelensky was preparing to depart from the Chisinau Airport and then again as he returned from Moldova to Ukraine on September 11.[17] Zelensky noted that Ukrainian officials did not previously disclose the September 11 incident and that Ukraine cannot confirm whether either incursion was intentional. Zelensky emphasized that both incidents demonstrate Russia’s effort to intimidate him and other foreign leaders through repeated drone incursions into NATO and European airspace. Russian forces have been escalating incursions into states neighboring Ukraine in recent weeks and recently conducted a precision drone strike intended to hit a passenger train carrying current and former European officials near the Ukrainian-Polish border.[18]

Russian President Vladimir Putin is framing the State Duma elections as a referendum on his war in Ukraine after setting conditions to ensure his desired outcome.

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda confirmed that a Russian Gerbera drone entered Lithuanian airspace on the night of September 14 to 15.

Ukrainian forces struck and killed the commander of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) Major General Anton Grunis in a targeted drone strike in occupied Donetsk City on September 12.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that Russian drones targeted his plane in Moldova twice in the past two weeks.

Russia launched 80 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman tactical area, on the eastern flank of the Fortress Belt, and in the Oleksandrivka direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman tactical area and western Zaporizhia Oblast.

ISW has reorganized its axes in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts to better reflect the Russian campaign to seize Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast Fortress Belt. ISW will analyze the Russian campaign in Donetsk Oblast in more detail in a forthcoming special edition.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 15 and 16 but did not advance.[19]

A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces warned that North Korean forces may replace Russian forces along portions of the frontline, presumably in northern Ukraine, so these Russian forces can redeploy to the Lyman tactical area.[20] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 16 that some Russian forces may withdraw from their positions to support the Russian defense of the Lyman area and that North Korean forces may replace them. The source claimed that some North Korean officers have already operated “beyond the wire,” likely referring to the international border, to gain experience and conduct reconnaissance. North Korean forces have been operating in the Russian rear in Kursk Oblast since March 2025, when Russian and North Korean forces pushed Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast, so this source is suggesting that North Korean forces would replace Russian forces operating in the Sumy or Kharkiv directions.[21] The source implied that North Korean forces may enter Ukrainian territory in such a reallocation of forces. ISW is unable to confirm this source’s claim and has observed no indications of North Korean forces operating in Ukraine. Any potential deployment of North Korean forces to Ukraine itself would be a dramatic escalation of North Korean involvement in the war in Ukraine that should require the international community, particularly South Korea, to reassess policy positions.

The Russian military command may redeploy two battalions southeast of Sumy City. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 16 that the Russian military command may redeploy two battalions of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) to Ryasne (southeast of Sumy City).[22] ISW has observed elements of the VKS’ 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment split across multiple parts of the frontline in northern Ukraine.[23]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 15 and 16 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kharkiv City.[24]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk on September 16 but did not advance.[25]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 15 and 16 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north and south of Kupyansk.[26] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on September 16 that Ukrainian forces control all of east (left) bank Kupyansk but that Russian forces have infiltrated along the railway line.[27]

Ukrainian forces likely advanced southeast of Borova. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 16 that Ukrainian forces liberated Hrekivka (southeast of Borova) and advanced 1.5 kilometers in depth in an area southeast of Hrekivka.[28]

A Russian milblogger claimed on September 16 that Russian forces advanced east of Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[29]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in Dovzhansk (roughly 155 kilometers from the frontline) and a fuel and lubricants storage site in Rovenky (roughly 130 kilometers from the frontline) on September 15 or on the night of September 15 to 16.[30]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Ukrainian forces cleared Russian infiltrators from Lyman as Russian forces advanced southeast of the city. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 16 that Ukrainian forces have pushed elements of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) from southeastern Lyman and Dibrova (southeast of Lyman) back to the Lyman-Zakitne road.[31] Mashovets reported that Ozerne (southeast of Lyman) is contested and that Russian forces likely maintain control over northeastern Ozerne and the parts of the village east of the Yampil-Kryva Luka road.

Ukrainian and Russian reporting continues to demonstrate the lack of clarity regarding the extent of Ukrainian advances north of Lyman. Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces have eliminated the Russian 20th CAA’s (MMD) tactical bridgehead on the Nitrius River and pushed Russian forces out of Serednie (northwest of Lyman) and the areas north and south of the settlement, but that Russian forces still control Shandryholove (south of Serednie).[32] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian infiltrators from Novoselivka and Drobysheve (both northwest of Lyman) but that Russian forces seemingly still hold Derylove (just east of Novoselivka and north of Drobysheve). Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces reached the outskirts of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman), Bilohorivka (just east of Kolodyazi), and Nove. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov may have dismissed 20th CAA Commander Lieutenant General Roman Yurchenko due to the failure to repel Ukrainian counterattacks north of Lyman.[33] Russian milbloggers have increasingly been acknowledging Ukrainian counterattacks in recent weeks, claiming that fighting is ongoing along the Zherebets River near Ivanivka (on the western bank of the river) and Terny (on the eastern bank).[34] There has been mixed reporting that Russian forces may maintain limited positions in some areas of the salient north of Lyman, including near Shandryholove, Stavky, Derylove, and Ridkodub.[35] The full extent of Ukrainian advances in the Lyman direction and the shape of the frontline in the area remains unclear, due to limited open-source evidence about the salient. ISW will continue to update its assessment as more open-source evidence becomes available.

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 99th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment and 217th Tank Regiment (both 3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA) are operating in the Lyman direction.[36] This is the first evidence ISW has observed of either regiment operating in Ukraine. The 217th Tank Regiment may be a re-formed Soviet-era unit.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Slovyansk. Ukrainian forces hold positions in central Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk), according to geolocated footage published on September 14.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces continued offensive operations in and southwest of Kostyantynivka and south and southwest of Druzhkivka on September 15 and 16 but did not advance.[38]

Russian forces are increasing drone operations to strike Ukrainian logistics and mine movement routes and identify Ukrainian drone operators in the Kostyantynivka tactical area. An intelligence officer of a Ukrainian special forces unit operating in the Kostyantynivka tactical area reported on September 16 that Russian forces are increasing Molniya fixed-wing and fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone strikes and remote mining operations against Ukrainian logistics and ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[39] The officer added that Russian drone operators are identifying and designating Ukrainian drone operators as targets for Russian glide bomb strikes. The officer reported that Russian forces dress in civilian clothes to attempt to infiltrate through Ukrainian defenses undetected — an act of perfidy and a war crime under the Geneva Convention.

Ukrainian forces conducted a frontline strike against Russian air defense assets south of Druzhkivka. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian mobile fire team in occupied Nova Poltavka (south of Druzhkivka and roughly 11 kilometers from the frontline) according to geolocated footage published on September 15.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Dobropillya and continued infiltration missions south of the city. Russian forces advanced in southwestern Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya), according to geolocated footage published on September 14.[41] Ukrainian forces struck multiple Russian positions in Dobropillya (the smaller of two settlements named ”Dobropillya” southwest of the larger settlement) after a likely Russian infiltration mission, according to geolocated footage published on September 16.[42]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 16 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone storage, preparation, and launch site near occupied Donetsk City (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline) and Russian drone control posts in occupied Staromlynivka (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline) and occupied Pokrovsk (south of Dobropillya) on September 15 or overnight on September 15 to 16.[43] Ukrainian forces also struck fuel tanks in occupied Kyrylivka (about 55 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 15.[44]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on September 16.

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of frontline strikes against Russian military assets in the Novopavlivka direction. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian GAZ-66 truck and a D-30 cannon west of occupied Novoyelyzavetivka (roughly 10 kilometers from the frontline east of Novopavlivka) according to geolocated footage published on September 14.[45]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced and Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission in the Oleksandrivka direction. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position north of Komyshuvakha (southeast of Oleksandrivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced in the area, according to geolocated footage published on September 15.[46] Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions west of Rybne (south of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission based on geolocated footage published on September 15.[47]

Russian forces continue to conduct small-group infiltration missions in the Oleksandrivka direction as poor weather conditions enable infiltration tactics. A Ukrainian unmanned systems company commander reported on September 16 that Russian forces continue to conduct small-group and individual infiltration missions in the Oleksandrivka direction but noted that Russian forces are currently not accumulating forces for a further offensive in the area.[48] The commander stated that poor weather conditions, such as rain, snow, and heavy fog, and the Russian use of thermal imaging cloaks generally complicate the use of drones, which play a significant role in Ukrainian forces’ ability to detect Russian infiltration missions. Poor weather conditions in part enabled Russian advances in the neighboring Hulyaipole direction in Fall 2025.[49]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on September 15 and 16 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 16 that Russian forces advanced north of Novoselivka (northeast of Orikhiv).[51]

Russian forces continue to prioritize the Hulyaipole direction despite Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics and the expanded “kill zone” that are inhibiting Russian efforts. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade reported on September 16 that Russian forces are suffering significant losses in the Hulyaipole direction as it remains one of the key Russian priorities in southern Ukraine.[52] The NCO noted that Ukrainian forces inflict over 750 casualties per day (likely including killed in action (KIA) and wounded in action (WIA) in the NCO’s brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR). The NCO stated that the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) is constantly receiving reinforcements and occasionally receives additional drone operators, including from the elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems. The NCO noted that Russian forces have begun primarily conducting infiltration missions with individual servicemembers in the Hulyaipole direction. The NCO also reported that Ukrainian forces have significantly intensified drone strikes against Russian military assets in the area, expanding the “kill zone” to up to 60 kilometers from the frontline in some areas, forcing Russian forces to travel on foot for weeks to reach the frontline. The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) company confirmed on September 15 that Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics and the expanded “kill zone” are forcing Russian personnel to use light motorized vehicles, particularly motorcycles, and added that decreased visibility due to deteriorating fall and winter weather may enable Russian forces to use more armored vehicles in the future.[53]

Russian forces continue to conduct glide bomb strikes against civilian infrastructure. The commander of a Ukrainian UGV company reported on September 15 that Russian forces continue to conduct regular guided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian settlements and civilian infrastructure along the frontline. The commander added that Russian forces regularly target civilian infrastructure, including bridges, to prevent Ukrainian forces from maintaining supply lines to forward units.

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Orikhiv. Russian forces advanced in southeastern Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv), according to geolocated footage published on September 16.[54]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on September 15 and overnight on September 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a fuel and lubricants depot in Berdyansk (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline) and a Russian drone command post in Pokrovske (roughly 22 kilometers from the frontline).[55]

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is struggling to maintain operations, and Russian forces continue to use the ZNPP as a military base. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate reported on September 16 that the situation at the ZNPP continues to deteriorate as the ZNPP suffers increasing power outages from disruptions to its external power cables, as the diesel backup generators begin to fail, as Russia integrates the ZNPP into its legal and energy structures, and as occupied Enerhodar (in which the ZNPP is located) struggles with communications, food, and water shortages.[56] The GUR stated that the water level in the cooling pool dropped to 12.55 meters at the end of August 2026, almost 3.5 meters below the normal minimum water level, and continues to fall. The GUR noted that Russia continues efforts to normalize and justify its occupation of the ZNPP, including to international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Conditions at the ZNPP have been deteriorating under Russian occupation, however, and Russian forces have militarized the ZNPP throughout the war despite the risk to the ZNPP and surrounding area.[57]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 16.

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 16 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Su-24 aircraft at Saky Airbase (roughly 175 kilometers from the frontline) and Grenadier automated technical reconnaissance posts in Suvorove (either roughly 224 or 98 kilometers from the frontline) and Rysove (roughly 88 kilometers from the frontline) on September 15 or overnight September 15 to 16.[58]

Ukrainian strikes against Russian ships in the Black and Azov seas are disrupting Russian forces’ ability to launch Kalibr cruise missiles. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Second Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on September 15 that Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels are not conducting operations in the Black Sea due to the threat of Ukrainian drones.[59] Pletenchuk reported that Russian forces have reduced the use of Kalibr cruise missiles by half, as Ukrainian forces have struck several BSF vessels capable of carrying Kalibr missiles. Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces currently have only two surface ships and two submarines capable of launching Kalibr cruise missiles, but that not all these vessels are ready for immediate use. Pletenchuk reported that Ukrainian drone strikes limited Russian forces to one to three Kalibr strikes per month and that Russian forces often launch them from land bases rather than at sea.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11. [60]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 15 to 16. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on September 16 that Russian forces launched 80 Shahed-type (including jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[61] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 63 drones, that an unspecified number of drones struck seven locations, and that debris fell at two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck commercial, transportation, residential, energy, rail, and industrial infrastructure in Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, and Volyn oblasts.[62] Russian forces struck Ukrainian passenger rail infrastructure in Volyn Oblast for the fourth time since September 12.[63]

Russian adaptations of jet-powered drones and drone-cruise missile hybrids will very likely cause a technological resurgence of cost-effective surface-to-air missiles, man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), and air-to-air missiles to down these drones and drone-missile hybrids. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 15 that Ukraine is testing an unspecified interceptor for jet-powered drones and that this interceptor has successfully downed an incoming Russian Shahed drone.[64] Zelensky stated that these interceptors need further technical refinement requiring additional time and that Ukraine is currently maximizing the use of fighter jets and helicopters to combat Russian drones. Russian forces increased their use of jet-powered drones, which fly between 240 and 500 kilometers per hour, from around 450 in June 2026 to around 2,850 in August 2026, according to Ukrainian military data seen by Reuters.[65] Ukrainian Air Force Deputy Commander and Unmanned Air Defense Systems Forces Commander Colonel Yuriy Cherevashenko acknowledged Ukraine’s difficulties in developing faster interceptor drones, but noted that Ukraine is testing cost-effective rockets to intercept jet-powered drones. A Ukrainian drone industry source stated to Reuters that Ukraine could adopt slower interceptor drones to strike incoming Russian drones head-on rather than chasing them from behind, which would require AI-driven targeting systems capable of precisely calculating an incoming drone’s flight path.

The Russian jet-powered drone-missile hybrid Geran-5 has a cruising speed of up to 600 kilometers per hour, according to Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) data, and a Ukrainian drone interceptor battalion commander previously reported that interceptor drones need to be 25 percent faster than their target.[66] The increasing speed of Russian strike drones and drone-missile hybrids will potentially require Ukrainian drone interceptors to reach speeds comparable to subsonic cruise missiles when chasing their target from behind. The high speed and maneuverability of Russian jet-powered drones increasingly necessitate that Ukraine rely on surface-to-air missiles, MANPADS, and air-to-air missiles to down them, and the mass use of such strike vehicles is further straining Ukrainian air-defense and air-to-air missile stocks. A Ukrainian F-16 wing commander stated in an interview published on September 16 that Ukrainian forces are facing a shortage of AIM-9 and AIM-120 air-to-air missiles for F-16 fighter jets that Ukrainian pilots use to intercept Russian cruise missiles and strike drones.[67] The commander stated that Ukrainian pilots are rationing air-to-air missiles and sometimes must rely on internal cannons to down Russian air targets.[68]

Significant Activity in Belarus

US Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale stated on September 16 that Belarus will release 25 political prisoners in return for the United States lifting sanctions on two Belarusian state-owned companies. [69] Coale stated that the United States and Belarus reached an interim agreement that could lead to the release of additional prisoners but did not specify any terms.

Belarus continues to operate signal repeaters along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border that enable Russian strike drones to penetrate deeper into Ukrainian territory. Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Spokesperson Colonel Andriy Demchenko stated on September 16 that Belarus has begun activating relay stations that allow Russian Shahed and Gerbera drones to strike deeper in Rivne, Volyn, and Lviv oblasts. Demchenko stated that such repeaters enabled Russian forces to strike the Yahodyn border crossing near the Polish border on September 13.[70] Demenchenko emphasized that while Belarus had activated repeaters, there were no signs indicating any forthcoming direct involvement from Belarusian forces in the war in Ukraine.[71]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80773 [2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-west-shouldnt-play-russias-game-with-ukrainian-elections/ ; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/24-210-0120ISW20Occupation20playbook.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/ [3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ ; https://www.vsrf dot ru/press_center/news/36246/; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/10/verhovnyy-sud-snyal-yabloko-s-vyborov-v-gosdumu; https://t.me/tass_agency/389622 [4] https://www.reuters.com/pictures/pictures-day-september-15-2026-2026-09-15/7FTJUH6EABKIDJ4NYEBBLW26LM ; https://crimea dot ria.ru/20260914/vybory-v-krymu–kak-obespechat-bezopasnost-na-uchastkakh-1159375227.html ; https://gazetacrimea dot ru/news/krym-gotovitsya-k-edinomu-dnyu-golosovaniya-chto-predusmotreno-dlya-bezopasnosti/ [5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2026/ ; 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