Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 19, 2026

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to greatly exaggerate the extent of Russian advances across the frontline to construct a false narrative of Russian battlefield progress for domestic and international audiences. The unusual MoD statement comes in the midst of Russian State Duma elections and shortly before the convening of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. The Russian MoD claimed on September 19 that Russian forces have seized over 5,300 square kilometers and more than 220 settlements in Ukraine since the start of 2026, including over 670 square kilometers and 27 settlements so far in September 2026.[1] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized only 147.7 square kilometers and 40 settlements, but have lost a net of 20 settlements in 2026. Including areas into which Russian forces have infiltrated but do not control brings the total Russian gains to 718.8 square kilometers this year, still far below the Russian MoD’s September 19 claims. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces, on the other hand, have liberated at least 972.56 square kilometers and 60 settlements in 2026. The Russian MoD’s September 19 claims are part of a longstanding Kremlin effort to use aggrandized claims of battlefield advances to convince Ukraine and its partners that Ukrainian defenses will collapse and that Ukraine should surrender in the face of an allegedly inevitable Russian victory.[2] Exaggerated Russian claims likely also result from the culture of pervasive lying within the Russian military. Ukrainian forces have, in fact, successfully contested both the strategic and the operational initiative since late 2025, having held Russian forces to near-zero gains since March 2026 and having conducted successful counterattacks that have liberated significant amounts of territory in the Kupyansk, Oleksandrivka, and Lyman directions.[3]

The Russian MoD also tried to deny Ukrainian successes in the Lyman direction by presenting an inaccurate picture of the battlefield that denies the ample evidence provided by Russian milbloggers, Ukrainian sources, and geolocated footage. The Russian MoD’s claims were a response to a growing number of Ukrainian officials’ and Russian milbloggers’ reports about Ukrainian successes north of Lyman over the past months during Operation Vivaldi.[4] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) is successfully conducting combat operations in the Lyman direction and that Ukraine is spreading lies about this part of the battlefield. The Russian MoD claimed that small Ukrainian assault groups are unsuccessfully trying to penetrate Russian lines in the area. The Russian MoD implied that Russian forces have advanced much further northwest of Lyman, claiming that Russian forces are attacking to seize Oskil, Krymky, and Studenok. Ukrainian forces have largely leveled the frontline along the Zherebets River north of Lyman, however, leaving Oskil, Krymky, and Studenok 22 to 37 kilometers from the current assessed Russian forward line of own troops (FLOT). The Russian MoD also claimed that Russian forces are clearing Lyman and Svyatohirsk, implying that Russian forces have already seized these towns. Ukrainian military officials have recently definitively disproven Russian President Vladimir Putin’s September 1 claim that Russian forces had seized Svyatohirsk, and the town is currently 25 kilometers from the assessed Russian FLOT.[5] Similarly, Russian forces have conducted limited infiltrations into Lyman but have failed to consolidate any of those positions.

The Russian MoD’s claims likely aim to shape Russian voters’ perceptions of the war during the ongoing State Duma elections as well as the perceptions of foreign governments that support Ukraine. The Russian MoD’s September 19 post was anomalous, as the MoD does not typically offer claimed statistics about Russian advances at apparently random moments or highlight the alleged successes of each GoF apropos of nothing. The post is part of the Kremlin’s wider effort to promote a narrative that Russian forces are maintaining the initiative across the battlefield and advancing at high rates in order to convince Russians to accept the ever-increasing costs associated with Putin’s war. The MoD statement is a defensive response to the growing chorus of Russian milbloggers, who have large numbers of followers in Russia, about Ukrainian successes in the Lyman direction. This Kremlin information campaign is particularly important in the context of the ongoing September 18-20 Russian State Duma elections, as the Kremlin is trying to position the United Russia party as the party of victory in Ukraine and is presenting the election as a referendum on the war.[6] This Russian information operation likely also aims to convince Western audiences that support for Ukraine is futile just ahead of the annual UN General Assembly sessions that will be held from September 21 through September 28.

Ukrainian forces extensively targeted Russian drone operators as part of their battlefield shaping effort that enabled Ukrainian drone overmatch prior to Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander Petro Horbatenko stated on September 19 that Ukrainian forces established dedicated coordination channels, conducted a series of strikes against Russian drone launch sites, established air defense and electronic warfare (EW) systems, and severed Russian supply lines in the sector to shape the battlefield ahead of their counteroffensive against the Russian salient north of Lyman.[7] An air defense commander of the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps stated on September 19 that Ukrainian forces prioritized identification and destruction of Russian drone launch sites to counter increasing numbers of Russian reconnaissance and strike drones.[8] The commander stated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian drone operators pushed Russian drone units further away from the frontline and forced Russia’s elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems units to relocate the entire force it had deployed in this area to a different sector. Ukraine’s systematic intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast disrupted Russian logistics up to 120 kilometers from the frontline and degraded fuel supplies to the frontline, straining Russia’s ability to use drones and EW to protect against Ukrainian drones.[9]

ISW assessed in 2024 that the restoration of operational-level maneuver would require neutralizing the Russian tactical reconnaissance strike complex (TRSC) to facilitate a penetration that Ukrainian forces can exploit, sustainment of these exploitations, and expansion of the campaign design to encompass planning and preparation for successive operations.[10] The TRSC is the expression ISW uses to describe the current system of persistent reconnaissance and strike drones coupled with legacy crewed weapons, artillery, and prepared defenses in depth. Ukrainian forces have successfully incorporated operational planning and battlefield shaping along with achieving surprise by concealing the intent of forces concentrated ostensibly for defensive operations into their offensive template. The Ukrainian mid-range strike campaign isolated Russian frontline forces from reinforcements and supplies. Ukrainian forces established an anti-drone bubble primarily using electronic warfare systems over Ukrainian forces that temporarily disrupted the Russian TRSC and moved with advancing Ukrainian forces. This campaign design is consistent with ISW’s 2024 assessment of how maneuver could be restored in contemporary war.

The US Department of State approved on September 18 the sale of air defense equipment worth $2.68 billion to Ukraine.[11] The sale will provide Ukraine with S-300 Clone missiles, GAM-67 missiles, Range-Extended Air Defense Laser Guided Rocket missile systems, several launch systems, RPS 202 counter-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) radars, and logistical and maintenance support. European contributions and US Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which provides grants and loans to foreign governments to fund the purchase of American defense equipment, will finance the sale if the states conclude the proposed purchases. S-300 Clone missiles are not the standard Soviet 5V55 missiles but are new designs with a modern guidance system and are compatible with Ukraine’s older S-300 air defense systems.[12]

US President Donald Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act on September 18.[13] The act will authorize the United States to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on the five largest importers of Russian oil and natural gas.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to greatly exaggerate the extent of Russian advances across the frontline to construct a false narrative of Russian battlefield progress for domestic and international audiences. The unusual MoD statement comes in the midst of Russian State Duma elections and shortly before the convening of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

The Russian MoD also tried to deny Ukrainian successes in the Lyman direction by presenting an inaccurate picture of the battlefield that denies the ample evidence provided by Russian milbloggers, Ukrainian sources, and geolocated footage.

The Russian MoD’s claims likely aim to shape Russian voters’ perceptions of the war during the ongoing State Duma elections as well as the perceptions of foreign governments that support Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces extensively targeted Russian drone operators as part of their battlefield-shaping effort that enabled Ukrainian drone overmatch prior to Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction.

The US Department of State approved on September 18 the sale of air defense equipment worth $2.68 billion to Ukraine.

US President Donald Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act on September 18.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the eastern Fortress Belt and Oleksandrivka directions, while Russian forces recently advanced in the southern Fortress Belt direction.

Russia launched two Zirkon anti-ship missiles and 174 drones and loitering munitions at Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian military officials confirmed that recent Ukrainian strikes damaged aircraft and radars in Russia. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 19 that Ukrainian forces struck three An-12 and An-25 transport aircraft and three helicopters at the Rostov Airfield, likely on the night of September 16 to 17.[14] Ukrainian open-source Telegram channels assessed that Ukrainian forces destroyed two Mi-8 helicopters, an An-12 aircraft, and an An-26 aircraft at the Rostov Airfield, citing satellite imagery collected on unspecified recent dates.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on September 19 damage to a Russian 80P6 radar station near Mityuli, Smolensk Oblast (roughly 220 kilometers from the international border) from a Ukrainian strike conducted on September 17.[16]

Ukrainian forces have been engaging in a suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign throughout 2026 that has facilitated subsequent intermediate- and long-range strikes against occupied Ukraine and Russia. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on September 19 that Ukrainian forces have destroyed or struck 300 Russian air defense systems since the start of 2026, including 162 air defense systems, 124 radar systems, and 14 electronic warfare (EW) systems.[17]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 18 and 19 but did not advance.[18] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces have been “stuck” at the Korova River near Ryasne (southeast of Sumy city) for a few months and have been suffering from shortages of provisions.[19] The source denied Russian claims that Russian forces have crossed the river from Dronovka, Belgorod Oblast (just southwest of Ryasne across the international border).

Russian forces continue to use glide bombs to strike frontline cities. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against a high-rise building in Sumy City on the evening of September 18, killing two people and damaging six residential buildings.[20]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk direction. Geolocated footage published on September 19 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions west of Vilkhuvatka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area contrary to Russian claims.[21]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 18 and 19 but did not advance.[22] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces are beginning infiltration missions toward Nova Kozacha and Tokarivka (both northwest of Kharkiv City).[23] The source claimed that Russian attempts to cross the international border north of Ternova (northeast of Kharkiv City) were “extremely unsuccessful” as Ukrainian drones reconnoitered and struck the Russian infantry from afar.

Russian officials and milbloggers continue to make unsubstantiated claims about an encirclement of Ukrainian forces in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed on September 19 that Russian forces continue to destroy encircled Ukrainian forces in the area and have reduced Ukrainian-controlled territory in the area by 152 square kilometers since September 5.[24] The Russian MoD further claimed on September 19 that Russian forces seized Komisarove and Loshakove (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk in the eastern part of the alleged encirclement).[25] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces are closing the encirclement, with one milblogger assessing that Russian forces aim to seize Khyzhnyakove (between Lukashove and Komisarove) in order to form a “mini-encirclement” to the east and destroy the wider encirclement “piecemeal.”[26] ISW continues to assess that Russian sources are misrepresenting the situation on the ground as there is no evidence of an encirclement in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast.[27]

Russian forces continue efforts to degrade Ukrainian air defense and logistics infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed on September 19 that Russian forces conducted Geran-type drone strikes against Ukrainian 35D6 and P-18 radar stations in unspecified areas of Kharkiv Oblast and a Geran-4 Seeker drone strike against a logistics center in Kurortne (just north of Kharkiv City).[28]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 18 and 19 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kupyansk.[29]

Russian forces may try to cross the shallow areas of the Oskil River near Kupyansk in order to expand their presence on the western side of the river. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on September 19 that the water level of the Oskil River has recently lowered notably near Kupyansk, allowing Russian forces to ford it in certain areas.[30] Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov recently stated that there are no active Russian crossings over the river but that Russian forces in some areas hold positions on both sides of the river.[31]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on September 18 or 19.

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

See topline text for more information about the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Lyman tactical area.

Russian forces continued offensive operations east, north, and southeast of Lyman on September 18 and 19 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Slovyansk. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander Petro Horbatenko stated on September 19 that Ukrainian forces cleared Rai-Oleksandrivka, which Russian forces had previously infiltrated.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces recently advanced in Kostyantynivka. Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Kostyantynivka based on geolocated footage published on September 18.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya directions on September 18 and 19 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[35] The Russian MoD claimed on September 19 that Russian forces seized Hulive (southwest of Dobropillya) and Marivka (northeast of Dobropillya), but ISW has not observed any visual evidence of Russian positions in either settlement.[36]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on September 18 or on the night of September 18 to 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point in Pokrovsk, a logistics depot in Rybynske (roughly 77 kilometers from the frontline), and an ammunition depot in Amvrosiivka (roughly 95 kilometers from the frontline).[37]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 18 and 19.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed on September 19 that Russian forces advanced to southeastern Novopavlivka.[39]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Oleksandrivka. Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Solodke (southeast of Oleksandrivka), based on geolocated footage published on September 18.[40]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces are attempting to bypass Ukraine’s heavily fortified positions around Orikhiv through the Hulyaipole direction. A spokesperson for the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces stated on September 19 that the Ukrainian military command assigned the Hulyaipole direction to the 7th Rapid Reaction Corps’ area of responsibility (AoR).[41] The spokesperson stated that the Hulyaipole direction is one of the most important and intense sectors along the southern frontline , noting that the area is less urban and features more open terrain, making it harder to mass forces. The spokesperson stated that the Russian 5th and 35th Combined Arms Armies (both Eastern Military District [EMD] and part of the Eastern Grouping of Forces) are conducting offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction with the objective of bypassing Ukrainian defensive positions around Orikhiv.[42] Polevyi stated that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Mala Tokmachka (southwest of Hulyaipole and southeast of Orikhiv) from the northeast to eventually reach the outskirts of Zaporizhzhia City. The spokesperson added that Russian forces have likely amassed a sufficient number of armored vehicles to reinforce Russian infantry and conduct tactical-level mechanized assaults where Russian forces “have at least some small tactical successes.”

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 18 and 19 but did not make confirmed advances.[43] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Militia representative Lieutenant Colonel Andrey Marochko claimed that Russian forces seized the southern outskirts of Orikhiv, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are operating in the central part of the town.[44]

Ukrainian forces conducted multiple frontline strikes in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to degrade Russian forces’ drone capabilities. Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone ground control stations near Volodymyrivka (likely the settlement roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline), Verbove (roughly nine kilometers from the frontline), Novoprokopivka (roughly eight kilometers from the frontline), Dobropillya (along the frontline northwest of Hulyaipole), and Rivnopillya (roughly five kilometers from the frontline) on September 18 or the night of September 18 to 19, according to the Ukrainian General Staff.[45] Ukrainian forces also struck the Vostochny Training Ground in Novopetrivka, Zaporizhia Oblast (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline).

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck an unidentified facility in occupied Melitopol (roughly 64 kilometers from the frontline), possibly a fuel facility or electrical substation, according to geolocated footage published on September 18.[46]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 19.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11. [47]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Zirkon anti-ship missiles from Kursk Oblast and 174 Shahed-type strike drones (about half of which were jet-powered), Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[48] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces mainly targeted Odesa and Kyiv oblasts; that Ukrainian forces downed 141 air targets, including three Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions and 138 drones; that an unspecified number of air targets hit 15 locations; and that debris fell at nine locations. The Ukrainian Air Force clarified that an unspecified number of missiles did not reach their targets. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck medical, industrial, business, and administrative infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, and Odesa oblasts and conducted a “double tap” strike against rescue workers in Odesa City.[49] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck logistics centers in Kyiv and Odesa oblasts; dry cargo ships and tanker-type vessels in the Chornomorsk and Odesa City ports; and a launch command post at Voznesensk Air Base in Mykolaiv Oblast.[50] Ukraine’s largest energy company, DTEK, reported on September 19 that over 178,000 families were without power in Odesa Oblast after large-scale Russian strikes on the region.[51]

Russian forces conducted a Banderol strike against civilian infrastructure in Balakliya, Kharkiv Oblast on the morning of September 19.[52] Russian forces also conducted a strike against a shopping center in Dnipro City on the afternoon of September 19, and various Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces used a ballistic missile, a Dan-T loitering munition, or Geran-type drones for the strike.[53]

Russian forces likely continue to target bridges in Odesa Oblast that Ukraine has been using as alternative export routes in the face of Russia’s strike campaign against Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck a pontoon crossing over the Dnister River connecting the Izmail Port in Odesa Oblast to Romania overnight on September 18 to 19.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck a bridge across the Dnister near Mayaki, Odesa Oblast (east of Izmail) with about 15 Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions and five glide bombs.[55] It is unclear if the milblogger is referring to the same reported strike as the Russian MoD.

The Ukrainian defense industrial base continues to make progress toward developing and deploying interceptors capable of downing faster jet-powered Russian drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky posted footage on September 19 showing a Ukrainian interceptor drone downing a Russian jet-powered Geran-5 drone.[56] Ukrainian drone manufacturer Wild Hornets reported that one of its Ukrainian Sting S interceptor drones also successfully intercepted a Russian jet drone.[57] Zelensky reported that this was the second successful deployment of a new Ukrainian interceptor drone against Russian jet-powered drones.[58]

Russian forces have been increasingly leveraging repurposed S-400 missiles to compensate for shortfalls in ballistic missile stockpiles, as ISW previously assessed.[59] Russian forces significantly increased their use of RM48U missiles – repurposed training missiles for S-400 air defense systems that fly on ballistic trajectories at high speeds – during the summer, according to official Ukrainian data that Reuters observed.[60] Russian forces launched two to 15 RM48U missiles between January and June 2026 before launching 87 in July — 55 percent of the total 158 ballistic and hypersonic missiles Russian forces launched in July. The number of Russian-launched Iskander missiles fell to 38 in July and August, down from more than 100 in June 2026, according to Ukraine’s General Prosecutor’s Office. The RM48U reportedly deviates about 300 meters on average from its intended target, which has likely caused higher civilian casualties in the last few months.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/67456 [2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/ [3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/ [4] https://t.me/mod_russia/67456 [5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2026/; https://t.me/ab3army/7443 [6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2026/; [7] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1407348-se-e-zvilneni-sela-sili-oboroni-prodovzuut-operaciu-vivaldi-na-pivnoci-doneccini-nacstabu-tretogo-korpusu/ [8] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/ppo-3-ak-zmusyla-rubikon-zminyty-dilyanku/ [9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/; 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https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1407184-armia-rf-vlucila-po-sumah-2/; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1407214-u-sumah-zaginuli-pracivniki-miskradi-roman-trepalin-ta-alla-kornienko/, https://t.me/serhii_kryvosheienko/2317 [21] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22049; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13003 [22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293 [23] https://t.me/severnnyi/9365 [24] https://t.me/mod_russia/67456 [25] https://t.me/mod_russia/67460; [26] https://t.me/sashakots/64535; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47773; https://t.me/arx_spn/31145; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56045; [27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/ [28] https://t.me/mod_russia/67468; https://t.me/mod_russia/67477 [29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293; https://t.me/rybar/83263; https://t.me/severnnyi/9365 [30] https://t.me/grvZapad/19816 [31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/ [32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/99196 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37042 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19816 [33] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1407348-se-e-zvilneni-sela-sili-oboroni-prodovzuut-operaciu-vivaldi-na-pivnoci-doneccini-nacstabu-tretogo-korpusu/ [34] https://t.me/soniah_hub/18269 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/38376 [35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293; https://t.me/wargonzo/37042; https://t.me/epoddubny/29130 [36] https://t.me/mod_russia/67462 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/67463 [37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42298 [38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293 [39] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56041; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47771 [40] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2101047205670854707; https://t.me/mod_russia/67446 [41] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/19/somyj-korpus-dshv-pryjnyav-novu-smugu-oborony-desantnyky-teper-voyuyut-na-gulyajpilskomu-napryamku/; https://youtu.be/E0-JZ3ixHKU [42] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/19/v-obhid-maloyi-tokmachky-rosiyany-kynuly-na-zaporizhzhya-odrazu-2-armiyi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0-JZ3ixHKU [43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293; https://t.me/rybar/83263; https://t.me/wargonzo/37042; https://t.me/dva_majors/99196; https://t.me/dva_majors/99207 [44] https://t.me/tass_agency/396125; https://t.me/dva_majors/99207 [45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42298 [46] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2101042356749230288; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/1170 [47] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [48] https://t.me/kpszsu/78956 [49] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32116; https://t.me/astrapress/125594; https://t.me/khmelnytskaODA/11480; https://www.facebook.com/suziria.ukraine/posts/pfbid0349zxZQhmfTeidCaBitsTYJYLHAkyZqT6QLgpthQEms4Q65MrEjKm5jhf886VqM2yl; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2921; https://t.me/kyivoda/57795; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2923; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/75117; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20360; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20372; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20425; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/63563; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3297; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3298; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3299; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3301 [50] https://t.me/mod_russia/67453; https://t.me/mod_russia/67468; https://t.me/mod_russia/67477; https://t.me/mod_russia/67475 [51] https://t.me/dtek_ua/4540 [52] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/30665 [53] https://t.me/borys_filatovv/3604; https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2101329381893312783?s=20; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/78701; https://t.me/dva_majors/99246; https://t.me/notes_veterans/29893; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/123601 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/179798 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/75283; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/75290 [54] https://t.me/mod_russia/67453 [55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47764 [56] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20960; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/reaktyvnyj-dron-perehoplyuvach-geran-5/ [57] https://x.com/wilendhornets/status/2101304449289363650?s=20 [58] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2101353001461993958 [59] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/ [60] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-russia-war/revamped-missile-leading-russias-ballistic-onslaught-ukraine-2026-09-18/

俄罗斯国防部持续夸大俄军在前线的推进程度，以构建一个虚假的俄军战场进展叙事，供国内外受众参考。这份不同寻常的国防部声明正值俄罗斯国家杜马选举期间，且联合国大会即将在纽约召开之际发布。俄罗斯国防部于9月19日声称，自2026年初以来，俄军已在乌克兰占领超过5300平方公里土地和220多个定居点，其中包括2026年9月至今占领的670平方公里土地和27个定居点。[1] 独立战争研究所（ISW）观察到的证据表明，俄军仅占领了147.7平方公里土地和40个定居点，但2026年净损失了20个定居点。若将俄军已渗透但尚未控制的区域也计算在内，俄军今年的总占领面积为718.8平方公里，远低于俄罗斯国防部9月19日的说法。 ISW观察到的证据表明，乌克兰军队在2026年至少解放了972.56平方公里土地和60个居民点。俄罗斯国防部9月19日的说法是克里姆林宫长期以来夸大战场进展的策略之一，旨在让乌克兰及其盟友相信乌克兰的防御体系即将崩溃，乌克兰应该在所谓俄罗斯不可避免的胜利面前投降。[2] 俄罗斯夸大战果很可能也源于俄罗斯军队内部普遍存在的撒谎文化。事实上，自2025年底以来，乌克兰军队已成功扭转了战略和作战主动权，自2026年3月以来几乎没有取得任何进展，并在库皮扬斯克、奥列克桑德里夫卡和莱曼方向发动了成功的反击，解放了大片领土。[3]

俄罗斯国防部试图否认乌克兰在莱曼方向取得的胜利，其歪曲的战场态势否认了俄罗斯军事博客、乌克兰方面以及地理定位视频提供的诸多证据。此前几个月，在“维瓦尔第行动”期间，越来越多的乌克兰官员和俄罗斯军事博客报道了乌克兰在莱曼以北取得的胜利，俄罗斯国防部的上述说法正是对此的回应。[4] 俄罗斯国防部声称，俄罗斯西部部队群正在莱曼方向成功开展作战行动，而乌克兰则在散布有关该地区战场情况的谎言。俄罗斯国防部还声称，乌克兰的小股突击队试图突破该地区的俄军防线，但未能成功。俄罗斯国防部暗示，俄军已向莱曼西北方向推进，并声称俄军正在进攻奥斯基尔、克里姆基和斯图杰诺克。乌克兰军队已基本清除莱曼以北热列别茨河沿线的战线，使得奥斯基尔、克里姆基和斯图杰诺克距离目前评估的俄军前沿阵地仍有22至37公里。俄罗斯国防部声称俄军正在肃清莱曼和斯维亚托希尔斯克，暗示俄军已占领这些城镇。乌克兰军方官员近日已明确驳斥了俄罗斯总统普京9月1日关于俄军已占领斯维亚托希尔斯克的说法，该镇目前距离评估的俄军前沿阵地仍有25公里。[5] 同样，俄军也曾小规模渗透莱曼，但未能巩固任何阵地。

俄罗斯国防部的声明很可能旨在影响俄罗斯选民在正在进行的国家杜马选举期间对战争的看法，以及支持乌克兰的外国政府的看法。俄罗斯国防部9月19日的帖子反常，因为国防部通常不会在看似随机的时刻提供关于俄军推进的统计数据，也不会毫无缘由地强调每个部队取得的所谓胜利。该帖子是克里姆林宫更广泛努力的一部分，旨在宣传俄军在战场上保持主动权并以高速度推进的叙事，以此说服俄罗斯民众接受普京发动的这场战争不断增加的代价。国防部的声明是对俄罗斯军事博客作者（他们在俄罗斯拥有大量粉丝）越来越多地报道乌克兰在莱曼方向取得胜利的回应。在9月18日至20日俄罗斯国家杜马选举的背景下，克里姆林宫的这场信息宣传活动尤为重要，因为克里姆林宫正试图将统一俄罗斯党塑造成乌克兰的胜利政党，并将此次选举视为对战争的一次全民公投。[6] 俄罗斯的这场信息行动可能也旨在让西方民众相信，在9月21日至28日举行的联合国大会年度会议召开之前，支持乌克兰是徒劳的。

在乌克兰向莱曼方向发起“维瓦尔第行动”之前，乌克兰军队广泛打击俄罗斯无人机操作员，以此作为战场控制行动的一部分，从而在战场上占据优势。乌克兰第三军参谋长兼副司令彼得罗·霍尔巴坚科于9月19日表示，乌克兰军队建立了专门的协调渠道，对俄罗斯无人机发射场进行了一系列打击，部署了防空和电子战系统，并切断了该地区的俄罗斯补给线，从而在对莱曼北部俄罗斯突出部发起反攻之前控制了战场。[7] 乌克兰第三军的一名防空指挥官于9月19日表示，乌克兰军队优先识别并摧毁俄罗斯无人机发射场，以应对俄罗斯侦察和攻击无人机数量的不断增加。[8]指挥官指出，乌克兰对俄罗斯无人机操作员的打击迫使俄罗斯无人机部队进一步远离前线，并迫使俄罗斯精锐的鲁比孔先进无人系统中心部队将其部署在该地区的全部兵力转移到其他区域。乌克兰对被占领的卢甘斯克州的俄罗斯后勤设施发动的系统性中程打击行动，破坏了距离前线120公里范围内的俄罗斯后勤，并削弱了前线的燃料供应，从而削弱了俄罗斯使用无人机和电子战防御乌克兰无人机的能力。[9]

ISW在2024年评估认为，恢复作战层面的机动能力需要削弱俄罗斯的战术侦察打击系统（TRSC），以便乌克兰军队能够利用渗透，并维持这些渗透，同时扩展作战设计，使其涵盖后续行动的规划和准备。[10] TRSC是ISW用来描述当前持续侦察和打击无人机系统以及传统有人驾驶武器、火炮和纵深防御体系的术语。乌克兰军队已成功地将作战规划和战场塑造，以及通过隐藏表面上集中用于防御作战的部队意图来实现突袭，从而将进攻模式融入其中。乌克兰的中程打击行动切断了俄罗斯前线部队的增援和补给。乌克兰军队主要利用电子战系统在自身上空建立了一个反无人机屏障，暂时干扰了俄罗斯的TRSC，并随着乌克兰军队的推进而移动。该战役设计与 ISW 2024 年对如何在当代战争中恢复机动性的评估相一致。

美国国务院于9月18日批准向乌克兰出售价值26.8亿美元的防空装备。[11] 此次军售将为乌克兰提供S-300仿制导弹、GAM-67导弹、增程型激光制导防空导弹系统、多种发射系统、RPS 202反无人机雷达以及后勤和维护支持。如果乌克兰最终完成此次军售，欧洲的捐款和美国对外军事融资（FMF）——该机构向外国政府提供赠款和贷款，用于购买美国国防装备——将为此次军售提供资金。S-300仿制导弹并非标准的苏联5V55导弹，而是采用新型设计，配备现代化制导系统，并且与乌克兰较老的S-300防空系统兼容。[12]

美国总统唐纳德·特朗普于9月18日签署了《林赛·O·格雷厄姆制裁俄罗斯和伊朗法案》。[13] 该法案将授权美国对俄罗斯石油和天然气的五大进口国征收高达100%的关税。

俄罗斯国防部继续大幅夸大俄军在前线取得的进展，以向国内外舆论构建俄军战场战果的虚假叙事。国防部的这份不同寻常的声明正值俄罗斯国家杜马选举期间，且临近纽约联合国大会召开之际。

俄罗斯国防部还试图否认乌克兰在莱曼方向取得的胜利，其歪曲的战场图景否认了俄罗斯军事博客作者、乌克兰消息人士和地理定位视频提供的充足证据。

俄罗斯国防部的说法很可能是为了在正在进行的国家杜马选举期间影响俄罗斯选民对战争的看法，以及影响支持乌克兰的外国政府的看法。

作为塑造战场态势行动的一部分，乌克兰军队广泛打击俄罗斯无人机操作员，从而在乌克兰向莱曼方向发起维瓦尔第行动之前，使乌克兰无人机占据了优势。

美国国务院于9月18日批准向乌克兰出售价值26.8亿美元的防空设备。

美国总统唐纳德·特朗普于9月18日签署了《林赛·O·格雷厄姆制裁俄罗斯和伊朗法案》。

乌克兰军队最近在东部要塞带和奥列克桑德里夫卡方向推进，而俄罗斯军队最近在南部要塞带方向推进。

俄罗斯连夜向乌克兰发射了两枚“锆石”反舰导弹和174架无人机及巡飞弹。

我们不会详细报道俄罗斯的战争罪行，因为西方媒体已对此进行充分报道，而且这些罪行不会直接影响我们正在评估和预测的军事行动。我们将继续评估并报道这些犯罪活动对乌克兰军队和乌克兰民众的影响，特别是对乌克兰城市地区战斗的影响。我们强烈谴责俄罗斯违反武装冲突法和日内瓦公约的行为以及反人类罪行，尽管我们并未在这些报告中详细描述这些罪行。

乌克兰在俄罗斯联邦的行动

乌克兰军方官员证实，乌克兰近期对俄罗斯的空袭造成飞机和雷达受损。乌克兰国防部9月19日报告称，乌克兰军队袭击了罗斯托夫机场的三架安-12和安-25运输机以及三架直升机，袭击可能发生在9月16日至17日夜间。[14] 乌克兰开源Telegram频道援引近期（具体日期不详）收集的卫星图像评估称，乌克兰军队摧毁了罗斯托夫机场的两架米-8直升机、一架安-12运输机和一架安-26运输机。[15] 乌克兰总参谋部9月19日证实，乌克兰9月17日的空袭损坏了位于斯摩棱斯克州米秋利附近（距国际边界约220公里）的一座俄罗斯80P6雷达站。[16]

2026年全年，乌克兰军队开展了压制和摧毁敌方防空系统（SEAD/DEAD）的行动，为随后对被占领的乌克兰和俄罗斯进行中远程打击提供了便利。乌克兰无人系统部队（USF）指挥官罗伯特·“马扎尔”·布罗夫迪少校于9月19日报告称，自2026年初以来，乌克兰军队已摧毁或打击了300套俄罗斯防空系统，其中包括162套防空系统、124套雷达系统和14套电子战（EW）系统。[17]

俄罗斯的支持行动：北方轴心

9月18日和19日，俄军在苏梅州北部继续进行有限的进攻行动，但没有取得进展。[18] 一位报道俄罗斯北方集团军的消息人士称，俄军在雷亚斯内（苏梅市东南部）附近的科罗瓦河被“困”了几个月，并且一直面临物资短缺的问题。[19] 该消息人士否认了俄方关于俄军已从别尔哥罗德州德罗诺夫卡（位于雷亚斯内西南，越过国际边界）渡过科罗瓦河的说法。

俄罗斯军队继续使用滑翔炸弹袭击前线城市。乌克兰官员报告称，9 月 18 日晚，俄罗斯军队对苏梅市的一栋高层建筑进行了制导滑翔炸弹袭击，造成两人死亡，六栋居民楼受损。[20]

俄罗斯的支持行动：哈尔科夫州

乌克兰军队在韦利基布尔卢克方向保持阵地或近期取得进展。9 月 19 日发布的地理定位视频显示，俄罗斯军队袭击了维尔胡瓦特卡以西（韦利基布尔卢克东北部）的乌克兰阵地，这表明乌克兰军队在该地区保持着阵地，这与俄罗斯的说法相悖。[21]

9月18日和19日，俄军继续在哈尔科夫州北部开展进攻行动，但并未取得进展。[22] 据俄罗斯北方部队群的消息来源称，俄军开始向新科扎恰和托卡里夫卡（均位于哈尔科夫市西北部）渗透。[23] 该消息来源称，俄军试图越过捷尔诺瓦（哈尔科夫市东北部）以北的国际边界，但“极其失败”，因为乌克兰无人机进行了侦察并从远处打击了俄军步兵。

俄罗斯官员和军事博客作者继续就乌克兰军队在哈尔科夫州东北部被包围一事发表未经证实的说法。俄罗斯国防部9月19日声称，俄军继续在该地区歼灭被包围的乌克兰军队，自9月5日以来，已将乌克兰控制的该地区领土减少了152平方公里。[24] 俄罗斯国防部还在9月19日声称，俄军占领了科米萨罗韦和洛沙科韦（均位于所谓包围圈东部，大布尔卢克东北部）。[25]俄罗斯军事博客作者继续声称俄军正在收紧包围圈，其中一位军事博客作者评估认为，俄军的目标是占领赫日尼亚科夫（位于卢卡绍夫和科米萨罗夫之间），以便在东部形成一个“小型包围圈”，然后“逐步”摧毁更大的包围圈。[26] ISW 继续评估认为，俄罗斯方面歪曲了实地情况，因为没有证据表明哈尔科夫州东北部存在包围圈。[27]

俄罗斯军队继续努力削弱哈尔科夫州的乌克兰防空和后勤基础设施。俄罗斯国防部于9月19日声称，俄军对哈尔科夫州未指明地区的乌克兰35D6和P-18雷达站进行了“格朗”型无人机袭击，并对库罗尔特内（哈尔科夫市以北）的一个后勤中心进行了“格朗-4”型无人机袭击。[28]

俄罗斯的支持行动：奥斯基尔河

9月18日和19日，俄军继续向库皮扬斯克方向发动进攻，但由于乌克兰军队在库皮扬斯克北部发动反击，俄军未能取得进展。[29]

俄军可能试图渡过库皮扬斯克附近奥斯基尔河的浅滩，以扩大其在河西岸的存在。9月19日，有消息人士援引俄罗斯西部部队的消息称，奥斯基尔河在库皮扬斯克附近的水位近期显著下降，使得俄军能够在某些区域涉水过河。[30] 乌克兰联合部队发言人维克托·特列胡博夫上校近日表示，目前没有俄军正在渡河，但俄军在某些地区占据了河两岸的阵地。[31]

9月18日或19日，乌克兰和俄罗斯方面均未报告博罗瓦方向有地面活动。

俄罗斯主要行动：夺取乌克兰要塞带并完成对顿涅茨克州的占领

俄军下属主要行动一：从西北方向包围要塞带

有关莱曼战术区正在进行的乌克兰反攻的更多信息，请参阅正文。

9 月 18 日和 19 日，俄军继续在莱曼以东、以北和以东南方向发动进攻，但由于乌克兰军队在该地区进行反击，俄军未能取得进展。[32]

俄军第二主力行动——从东面进攻要塞带

乌克兰军队最近向斯拉维扬斯克以东推进。乌克兰第三军参谋长兼副司令彼得罗·霍尔巴坚科于9月19日表示，乌克兰军队已清除此前被俄罗斯军队渗透的赖奥列克桑德里夫卡。[33]

俄军下属主要行动#3——从南部向要塞带推进

根据 9 月 18 日发布的地理定位视频显示，俄罗斯军队最近在科斯佳蒂尼夫卡取得了进展。[34]

俄军下属主要行动#4——从西南方向包围要塞带

9月18日和19日，俄军继续在波克罗夫斯克和多布罗皮利亚方向发动进攻，但由于乌克兰军队的反击，俄军并未取得确切进展。[35] 9月19日，俄罗斯国防部声称俄军占领了胡利韦（多布罗皮利亚西南）和马里夫卡（多布罗皮利亚东北），但ISW没有在这两个定居点发现任何俄军阵地的视觉证据。[36]

9月18日或9月18日至19日夜间，乌克兰军队继续对被占领的顿涅茨克州的俄罗斯军事目标进行前线和中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部报告称，乌克兰军队袭击了波克罗夫斯克的一个俄罗斯无人机控制点、雷宾斯克（距前线约77公里）的一个后勤仓库以及安夫罗西伊夫卡（距前线约95公里）的一个弹药库。[37]

俄罗斯支援行动：进军第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州

9 月 18 日和 19 日，俄军继续向新巴甫洛夫卡方向发起进攻。[38] 9 月 19 日，俄罗斯军事博客作者声称俄军已推进至新巴甫洛夫卡东南部。[39]

根据 9 月 18 日发布的地理定位视频，乌克兰军队最近向奥列克桑德里夫卡东南方向推进。[40]

俄罗斯的支持行动：南方轴心

俄军正试图从胡利亚伊波列方向绕过乌克兰在奥里希夫附近重兵把守的阵地。乌克兰空降突击部队第7快速反应军发言人于9月19日表示，乌克兰军方已将胡利亚伊波列方向划入第7快速反应军的责任区。[41] 该发言人指出，胡利亚伊波列方向是南部战线最重要、战斗最激烈的地区之一，并强调该地区城市化程度较低，地形较为开阔，因此难以集中兵力。发言人还表示，俄军第5集团军和第35集团军（均隶属于东部军区，是东部集团军群的一部分）正在胡利亚伊波列方向发起进攻，目标是绕过乌克兰在奥里希夫附近的防御阵地。[42]波列维表示，俄军正试图从东北方向绕过马拉托克马奇卡（位于胡利亚伊波列西南方，奥里希夫东南方），最终抵达扎波罗热市郊区。这位发言人补充说，俄军可能已经集结了足够数量的装甲车辆，以增援俄军步兵并进行战术级别的机械化突击，俄军在这些突击行动中“至少取得了一些小规模的战术胜利”。

9月18日和19日，俄罗斯军队在扎波罗热州西部进行了有限的进攻行动，但没有取得确切的进展。[43] 前卢甘斯克人民共和国（LNR）人民民兵代表安德烈·马罗奇科中校声称，俄罗斯军队占领了奥里希夫的南部郊区，一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，俄罗斯军队正在该镇中心作战。[44]

乌克兰军队在被占领的扎波罗热州前线发动了多次袭击，以削弱俄军的无人机能力。据乌克兰总参谋部称，9月18日或9月18日至19日夜间，乌克兰军队袭击了位于弗拉基米里夫卡（可能位于距前线约20公里处）、韦尔博韦（距前线约9公里）、新普罗科皮夫卡（距前线约8公里）、多布罗皮利亚（位于胡利亚伊波列西北方向的前线沿线）和里夫诺皮利亚（距前线约5公里）附近的俄军无人机地面控制站。[45] 乌克兰军队还袭击了位于扎波罗热州新普罗科皮夫卡的东方训练场（距前线约70公里）。

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的扎波罗热州的俄罗斯能源基础设施进行中程打击。根据9月18日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队袭击了被占领的梅利托波尔（距前线约64公里）的一处不明设施，可能是燃料设施或变电站。[46]

9月19日，乌克兰和俄罗斯方面均未报告赫尔松方向有地面活动。

俄罗斯空袭、导弹和无人机行动

注：自 8 月 11 日起，乌克兰军方停止定期报告俄罗斯发射的导弹数量和拦截的导弹数量。[47]

9月18日至19日夜间，俄罗斯军队对乌克兰发动了一系列导弹和无人机袭击。乌克兰空军报告称，俄罗斯军队从库尔斯克州发射了两枚“锆石”反舰导弹，并从奥廖尔市、罗斯托夫州米列罗沃、克拉斯诺达尔边疆区滨海-阿赫塔尔斯克、被占领的顿涅茨克市以及被占领的克里米亚赫瓦尔季斯克方向发射了174架“沙赫德”型攻击无人机（其中约一半为喷气式）、“非洲菊”型攻击无人机、“班德罗尔/丹-T”巡飞弹和“帕罗迪亚”型诱饵无人机。[48] 乌克兰空军报告称，俄罗斯军队主要以敖德萨州和基辅州为目标；乌克兰军队击落了141个空中目标，其中包括3枚“班德罗尔/丹-T”巡飞弹和138架无人机；乌克兰方面称，数量不详的空中目标击中了15个地点；另有9个地点落下碎片。乌克兰空军澄清说，数量不详的导弹未能击中目标。乌克兰官员报告称，俄军袭击了第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州、赫梅利尼茨基州、基辅州和敖德萨州的医疗、工业、商业和行政基础设施，并对敖德萨市的救援人员进行了“双重打击”。[49] 俄罗斯国防部声称，俄军袭击了基辅州和敖德萨州的后勤中心；切尔诺莫尔斯克港和敖德萨市港口的干货船和油轮；以及尼古拉耶夫州沃兹涅先斯克空军基地的发射指挥所。[50] 乌克兰最大的能源公司DTEK于9月19日报告称，在俄罗斯对敖德萨州进行大规模袭击后，该州超过17.8万户家庭断电。[51]

9 月 19 日上午，俄罗斯军队对哈尔科夫州巴拉克利亚的民用基础设施发动了 Banderol 导弹袭击。[52] 9 月 19 日下午，俄罗斯军队还袭击了第聂伯罗市的一个购物中心，一些俄罗斯军事博客作者声称，俄罗斯军队使用了弹道导弹、Dan-T 巡飞弹或 Geran 型无人机进行袭击。[53]

面对俄罗斯对乌克兰黑海港口的打击行动，乌克兰一直将敖德萨州的桥梁作为替代出口通道，俄罗斯军队很可能继续以此为目标。俄罗斯国防部声称，9月18日至19日夜间，俄军袭击了连接敖德萨州伊兹梅尔港和罗马尼亚的德涅斯特河上的一座浮桥。[54] 一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，俄军使用约15枚“班德罗尔/丹-T”巡飞弹和5枚滑翔炸弹袭击了敖德萨州马亚基附近（伊兹梅尔以东）的一座德涅斯特河桥梁。[55] 目前尚不清楚这位军事博主所指的是否与俄罗斯国防部所报道的袭击是同一事件。

乌克兰国防工业基地在研发和部署能够击落速度更快的俄罗斯喷气式无人机的拦截机方面持续取得进展。乌克兰总统泽连斯基于9月19日发布了一段视频，显示一架乌克兰拦截无人机击落了一架俄罗斯喷气式Geran-5无人机。[56] 乌克兰无人机制造商“野黄蜂”（Wild Hornets）公司报告称，其生产的乌克兰“毒刺S”（Sting S）拦截无人机也成功拦截了一架俄罗斯喷气式无人机。[57] 泽连斯基表示，这是乌克兰新型拦截无人机第二次成功拦截俄罗斯喷气式无人机。[58]

正如ISW此前评估的那样，俄罗斯军队越来越多地利用改装后的S-400导弹来弥补弹道导弹库存的不足。[59] 路透社观察到的乌克兰官方数据显示，俄罗斯军队在夏季显著增加了RM48U导弹的使用量。RM48U导弹是S-400防空系统的改装训练导弹，以高速沿弹道轨迹飞行。[60] 2026年1月至6月期间，俄罗斯军队发射了2至15枚RM48U导弹，7月份发射了87枚，占俄罗斯军队7月份发射的158枚弹道导弹和高超音速导弹总数的55%。根据乌克兰总检察长办公室的数据，俄罗斯发射的“伊斯坎德尔”导弹数量在7月和8月降至38枚，低于2026年6月的100多枚。据报道，RM48U 火箭弹平均偏离预定目标约 300 米，这可能导致近几个月来平民伤亡人数增加。

白俄罗斯的重大活动

没有什么重大事项需要报告。

注：ISW 不接收任何来源的机密材料，仅使用公开信息，并广泛参考俄罗斯、乌克兰和西方媒体的报道和社交媒体，以及市售卫星图像和其他地理空间数据作为报告的基础。所有参考资料均列于每份更新报告的尾注中。

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https://www.war.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3896714/opening-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-at-the-24th-ukraine/; https://euromaidanpress dot com/2026/09/19/what-are-s-300-clone-and-gam-67-in-americas-new-2-68-billion-package-for-ukraine-experts-think-they-have-answer/; https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/retired-army-colonel-explains-why-patriot-missiles-are-so-valuable-and-in-short-supply [13] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/09/congressional-bill-hr-5334-signed-into-law/; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/house-passes-russia-sanctions-bill-named-lindsey-graham-sending-trump-rcna598124; [14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/09/19/rosiya-vtrachaye-milyardy-dolariv-vnaslidok-ukrayinskyh-dip-i-midlstrajkiv-pidsumky-chergovyh-udariv-vid-minoborony/； https://www.facebook.com/reel/1568990747631441； https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/suputnykovi-znimky-znyshhennya-my-an-rostov/#google_vignette [15] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13512； https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8171 [16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42298 [17] https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2101296050187256271 [18] https://t.me/dva_majors/99196; https://t.me/severnnyi/9365; https://t.me/wargonzo/37042 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9369 [19] https://t.me/severnnyi/9369 [20] https://t.me/serhii_kryvosheienko/2314; https://t.me/serhii_kryvosheienko/2315; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20945; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/44876； https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1407184-armia-rf-vlucila-po-sumah-2/； https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1407214-u-sumah-zaginuli-pracivniki-miskradi-roman-trepalin-ta-alla-kornienko/，https://t.me/serhii_kryvosheienko/2317 [21] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22049； https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13003 [22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291； https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293 [23] https://t.me/severnnyi/9365 [24] https://t.me/mod_russia/67456 [25] https://t.me/mod_russia/67460; [26] https://t.me/sashakots/64535; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47773; https://t.me/arx_spn/31145; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56045; [27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/ [28] https://t.me/mod_russia/67468; https://t.me/mod_russia/67477 [29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293; https://t.me/rybar/83263; https://t.me/severnnyi/9365 [30] https://t.me/grvZapad/19816 [31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/ [32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293; https://t.me/dva_majors/99196; https://t.me/wargonzo/37042; https://t.me/grvZapad/19816 [33] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1407348-se-e-zvilneni-sela-sili-oboroni-prodovzuut-operaciu-vivaldi-na-pivnoci-doneccini-nacstabu-tretogo-korpusu/ [34] https://t.me/soniah_hub/18269； https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/38376 [35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291； https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293； https://t.me/wargonzo/37042； https://t.me/epoddubny/29130 [36] https://t.me/mod_ Russia/67462 ； https://t.me/mod_russia/67463 [37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42298 [38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293 [39] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56041; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47771 [40] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2101047205670854707; https://t.me/mod_russia/67446 [41] https://armyinform.com.ua/2026/09/19/somyj-korpus-dshv-pryjnyav-novu-smugu-oborony-desantnyky-teper-voyuyut-na-gulyajpilskomu-napryamku/; https://youtu.be/E0-JZ3ixHKU [42] https://armyinform.com.ua/2026/09/19/v-obhid-maloyi-tokmachky-rosiyany-kynuly-na-zaporizhzhya-odrazu-2-armiyi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0-JZ3ixHKU [43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293; https://t.me/rybar/83263; https://t.me/wargonzo/37042; https://t.me/dva_majors/99196; https://t.me/dva_majors/99207 [44] https://t.me/tass_agency/396125; https://t.me/dva_majors/99207 [45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42298 [46] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2101042356749230288; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/1170 [47] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [48] https://t.me/kpszsu/78956 [49] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32116; https://t.me/astrapress/125594; https://t.me/khmelnytskaODA/11480; https://www.facebook.com/suziria.ukraine/posts/pfbid0349zxZQhmfTeidCaBitsTYJYLHAkyZqT6QLgpthQEms4Q65MrEjKm5jhf886VqM2yl; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2921; https://t.me/kyivoda/57795; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2923; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/75117; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20360; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20372; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20425; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/63563; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3297; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3298; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3299; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3301 [50] https://t.me/mod_russia/67453; https://t.me/mod_russia/67468; https://t.me/mod_russia/67477; https://t.me/mod_russia/67475 [51] https://t.me/dtek_ua/4540 [52] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/30665 [53] https://t.me/borys_filatovv/3604; https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2101329381893312783?s=20; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/78701; https://t.me/dva_majors/99246; https://t.me/notes_veterans/29893; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/123601 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/179798 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/75283; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/75290 [54] https://t.me/mod_russia/67453 [55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47764 [56] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20960; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/reaktyvnyj-dron-perehoplyuvach-geran-5/ [57] https://x.com/wilendhornets/status/2101304449289363650?s=20 [58] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2101353001461993958 [59] https://understandingwar.org/research/ Russia-ukraine/ Russian-offective-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/ [60] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine- Russia-war/revamped-missile-leading-Russias-ballistic-onslaught-ukraine-2026-09-18/