Germany must to raise its nuclear-deterrence IQ

Russia’s attack on Ukraine and Moscow’s blatant threats to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine’s supporters have confronted Western public opinion with the danger of nuclear escalation for the first time since the end of the Cold War. This means that the concept of nuclear deterrence, with all its advantages, dangers and dilemmas, is once again a core element of transatlantic security policy. At the 75th anniversary Summit in Washington , NATO leaders, for the first time in decades, even spoke about modernizing the alliance’s nuclear capabilities.

Exactly how this modernization should take place will be the subject of future discussions. But one thing is already clear: Such politico-military debates require above all subject-matter expertise – or, as it is known in NATO, a sufficient nuclear IQ. This applies not only to political decision makers but also to the need of creating an informed public.

Germany’s nuclear IQ is currently in a poor state. The brief public debate in early 2024 on how to respond to Donald Trump’s announcements that, as U.S. president, he would question the American promise to protect its allies, revealed a profound lack of knowledge in large parts of politics, in the press and even among supposed experts. Statements by members of parliament revealed considerable gaps in knowledge, and a well-known German historian seriously suggested in a press interview that the European Union should procure its own nuclear weapons and -- in the absence of EU statehood – rotate the “red button” between the European capitals.

So much ignorance is frightening, but it can be found in many non-nuclear NATO states. The widespread narrative since the 1990s, particularly in Western Europe, of being “surrounded by friends” has caused general interest in security and defence policy to wane. Nuclear issues were frowned upon and were only discussed, if at all, in small circles of experts. “Peace research” was often misunderstood as a substitute for strategic thinking and nuclear weapons were seen almost exclusively as objects of nuclear disarmament.

To reverse this trend and to provide Germany with the nuclear expertise necessary to pursue its interests in a new security environment, a nuclear “Zeitenwende” will be necessary. This will require adaptations in universities, in the armed forces, in think tanks and in the wide field of civil education.

Generating security policy expertise for politics, journalism or the public begins at universities. Currently, the number of professors who offer seminars on deterrence or nuclear issues in their political seminars in Germany is almost negligible. Changing this will not only require government funding for security policy and strategy professorships. It would also necessitate efforts to counter the stigmatisation of security policy within the German educational system, where the few professors who deal with nuclear strategy issues still face rejection and protest both within and outside their institutions.

Also, the German armed forces and the Ministry of Defence have long ignored the relevance of nuclear deterrence. In last two decades, the General Staff College of the Bundeswehr taught nuclear deterrence only as a side issue and in the German MoD only two (!) of the approximately 2,500 employees deal explicitly with nuclear issues. It is obvious that with these limited capacities, it is difficult to meet NATO’s requirements for independent nuclear positions, particularly as Germany is a country where American nuclear weapons are stationed.

The same holds true for the German think tank landscape. Of the roughly 30 foreign and security policy think tanks, only one or two deal with nuclear issues on a permanent and structured basis. Changing this overnight is difficult, as the number of academic experts in the field is still scarce. Moreover, since – unlike in the United States – there is little exchange of personnel between ministries and foreign and security policy research institutes, the relationship between the two worlds is not always free of tension. Ministries often complain that the think tanks do not provide the analyses required for day-to-day work, while think tank representatives often complain that political decision makers are resistant to advice. This could be remedied by offering more think tankers to spend a few months in a ministry to learn what form of policy advice is required in ministerial bureaucracies.

Finally, Germany has a vast number of political education institutions – often state-funded – that address both political decision makers and the public. Those which focus on security policy should be requested to include questions on nuclear deterrence more strongly in their educational programs.

However, when addressing nuclear strategy issues in politics and society, it is important that knowledge transfer is not misunderstood as nuclear indoctrination, but that the strengths and weaknesses of a security policy based on deterrence are openly identified. Nuclear deterrence is a partly contradictory concept that raises painful political or ethical questions. Addressing these openly and self-critically, even when conclusive and universally satisfactory answers cannot be found, is also part of the nuclear IQ.

Karl-Heinz Kamp was a Special Advisor in the German Ministry of Defence and is an Associate Fellow of the German Council on Foreign Relations

俄罗斯对乌克兰的攻击以及莫斯科公然威胁对乌克兰支持者使用核武器，使西方公众舆论自冷战结束以来首次面临核升级的危险。这意味着，核威慑的概念及其所有优势、风险和困境，再次成为跨大西洋安全政策的核心要素。在华盛顿举行的北约成立75周年峰会上，北约领导人数十年来首次讨论了联盟核能力的现代化问题。

具体如何进行现代化改造将是未来讨论的主题。但有一点已经很明确：此类政治军事辩论首先需要专业知识——或者用北约的话来说，需要足够的核智商。这不仅适用于政治决策者，也适用于培养知情公众。

德国目前的核智商状况堪忧。2024年初，就如何应对唐纳德·特朗普宣布若当选美国总统将质疑美国保护盟友的承诺而展开的短暂公开辩论，暴露出德国政界、媒体乃至所谓专家群体在核知识方面存在严重的匮乏。议员们的言论也暴露出知识上的显著缺陷，一位知名的德国历史学家甚至在一次媒体采访中认真地建议，欧盟应该自行研发核武器，并在欧盟尚未成为独立国家的情况下，轮流控制“红色按钮”。

如此之多的无知令人震惊，但这种现象在许多非核北约国家也存在。自20世纪90年代以来，尤其是在西欧，一种“被朋友环绕”的普遍论调导致公众对安全和国防政策的关注度下降。核问题不受欢迎，即使讨论，也仅限于少数专家圈子。“和平研究”常常被误解为战略思考的替代品，而核武器几乎完全被视为核裁军的对象。

为了扭转这一趋势，并使德国拥有在新安全环境下维护自身利益所需的核技术，一场核领域的“时代转型”势在必行。这将要求大学、军队、智库以及广泛的公民教育领域做出相应的调整。

为政界、新闻界或公众培养安全政策专业知识，应从大学开始。目前，德国政治学系开设威慑或核问题研讨课的教授寥寥无几。改变这种现状，不仅需要政府资助安全政策和战略教席，还需要努力消除德国教育体系中对安全政策的污名化现象。在德国，少数研究核战略问题的教授仍然面临着来自校内外的排斥和抗议。

此外，德国武装部队和国防部长期以来忽视了核威慑的重要性。过去二十年间，德国联邦国防军总参谋学院仅将核威慑作为一门辅助课程进行授课，而德国国防部约2500名员工中，仅有两人（！）专门负责核事务。显然，在如此有限的能力下，德国难以满足北约对独立核力量的要求，尤其是在美国核武器部署在德国的情况下。

德国智库格局亦是如此。在约30家外交与安全政策智库中，只有一两家长期系统地研究核问题。要一夜之间改变这种状况并非易事，因为该领域的学术专家仍然匮乏。此外，与美国不同，德国各部委与外交与安全政策研究机构之间的人员交流甚少，因此两者之间的关系并非总是顺畅无阻。各部委经常抱怨智库无法提供日常工作所需的分析，而智库代表则经常抱怨政治决策者不愿接受建议。或许可以通过安排更多智库成员到部委工作几个月，了解部委官僚机构需要何种形式的政策建议来改善这种情况。

最后，德国拥有大量政治教育机构——其中许多由国家资助——面向政治决策者和公众。应要求那些专注于安全政策的机构在其教育课程中更着重纳入有关核威慑的问题。

然而，在政治和社会层面探讨核战略问题时，重要的是避免将知识转移误解为核灌输，而是要公开明确地指出基于威慑的安全政策的优势和劣势。核威慑本身就是一个存在一定矛盾的概念，它会引发一些棘手的政治或伦理问题。即便无法找到最终的、普遍适用的答案，公开且自我批判地探讨这些问题也是核智商的重要组成部分。

卡尔-海因茨·坎普曾任德国国防部特别顾问，现为德国外交关系委员会副研究员。