How the Swedish Air Force is finding its flow as part of NATO

The commander of the Swedish Air Force, Maj. Gen. Jonas Wikman, has led the flying force since December 2022, overseeing the integration efforts of Sweden into NATO’s deterrence and defense posture since joining the alliance in March. He spearheads a force of 2,700 military personnel and fighter fleet numbering almost 100 aircraft. Sweden has proposed to increase its defense spending to 2.6% relative to the size of its economy by 2030.

In an interview ahead of the Farnborough Airshow in the United Kingdom, which runs July 22-26, the air chief touched on the dogged obstacles of information-sharing among allies, the lessons from the air war in Ukraine, and how air forces must be prepared to fight in more contested electronic warfare environments in the future.

This interview was edited for length and clarity.

Maj. Gen. Jonas Wikman is chief of the Swedish Air Force. (U.S. Air Force photo by Eric Dietrich)

What are some of your observations from the air war in Ukraine, and what lessons should the training of the Swedish air force personnel entail as a result?

First of all, speaking from a national perspective, there’s a lot of experiences that have confirmed our earlier beliefs. One of them is the control of the air, where the necessity of controlling the airspace is quite obvious if you want to control your territory. If Ukraine had been able to control the air over Kyiv in the first few days of the full-scale invasion, we would have potentially seen a whole different kind of outcome.

The war makes it evident and reminds us as commanders that we need to convey to a larger audience the necessity to be prepared from day one to control our airspace and of having Day Zero capability as well as air defense. An example of this is the Nordic cooperation, where one of the foundations is the need to operate together in peace time and have the capability in place.

Connected to that, the effect of having a strong and integrated air defense, as well as the potential we hold in combining our ground-based and air-based air defense – that has become a higher priority for all of us since looking at Ukraine.

With air defense being arguably more important than ever, what does that focus look like for you?

We already have our ground-based air defense, which belongs to the Swedish Army in peacetime and to the Air Force in wartime. We have bought Patriot systems and are looking forward to procuring more systems capable of defending at the brigade and wing level since we have medium-range air defense weapons but need more short-range ones.

Sometimes when we talk about air defense and integrated air and missile defense, we talk about defending assets, aircraft, and other ground-based systems. However, the overall concept is also important – for Sweden, which comes from a history of total defense, we normally look at defense capabilities on a wider scale.

In my perspective, integrated air and missile defense includes everything from export control to the “left-of-launch” all the way through the military part of it – which is ground- and air-based air defense but also our nation’s capability to withstand an attack. There also needs to be a whole-government approach to air defense that we need to adopt as well.

Based on what we are seeing unfold in Ukraine, where drones have taken on a huge role, what changes or modifications around unmanned systems is the Swedish Air Force making when it comes to training and new acquisitions?

We have made adjustments to our plans. We are procuring more counter-UAS systems to protect our bases and airspace, we are also trialing within all the branches of our armed forces how we can be more effective using drones ourselves.

We are also buying a brigade-level unmanned aerial vehicle, but have not yet decided to procure more strategic ones like the MQ-9 Reaper mostly because it does not fit our size or budget. However, we are looking into cooperation within Europe, NATO, and the Nordics to be able to have access to that kind of capability all the time.

Overall, we try to follow everything happening in Ukraine where the development speed is mind-blowing. Everybody is attempting to draw conclusions about where the war is heading, while also trying to be careful not to conclude where it’s going.

For us, one obvious area is the capability to counter different kinds of UAS, including one-way attack drones or whichever other system it might be with electronic warfare or early warning systems.

So far, our focus has been more on countering than attacking with drones. We are all trying to figure this out but for the moment, with our current plans that’s the focal point – but like everybody else we are also trialing unmanned and artificial intelligence assets.

Many countries are considering a loyal wingman drone or remote carriers to accompany their next-gen fighter. What is your view on the utility of those concepts and how could current technology residing in Swedish companies (autonomy, AI, etc.) support it?

I get this question a lot and I always have to say the same thing. We are still early in our process so I try to be careful not to decide or set my mind on which road to go down. Of course, I also see future systems being AI-supported and some combination of manned-unmanned, to me that’s quite clear.

When we look at future fighting systems or a next-generation fighter, we are focusing a lot on the platform of one or two, or the combination of two platforms. For Sweden, going back to our history, as a small air force under perceived big threats, we have had to combine different kinds of capabilities into one system.

Currently, we are using low-personnel usage, dispersed operations as a concept and are looking into what would be our future concept. To us, it is very much about the use of systems of systems, and in that, it is obvious that we will have an unmanned-manned system.

Whether that is a typical loyal wingman or another asset, I don’t know yet.

In the area of air combat and air defense, how can Europeans cooperate more effectively to strengthen their defensive posture?

Overall, what I see right now in all my contacts with the European and NATO air chiefs is a whole different mindset regarding cooperation than before. Historically, some of the problems we have had were related to never being on the right timeline or never having the right economy for more cooperation projects. It is also important to note that every nation has its own kind of goals and targets, which has made the setting up of a greater number of common initiatives challenging.

Now, it is the effect of the common view of the security situation in Europe and the sense of urgency that really affects how we view cooperation for the future. I see very clearly in my conversations that cooperation we didn’t have before or didn’t want previously because it was perceived as ineffective in building our own air forces, now all of a sudden, it is necessary since we share the same goal.

For us, to cooperate more effectively requires overcoming some of the existing obstacles – an obvious one being information sharing, but we are trying to address that when it comes to operational coordination between our capabilities and those of other nations. Everything from intellectual property to national security threats – the area of information sharing is one where we really have to make some changes.

Is there the same sense of urgency felt all across Europe or is it your view that some nations might still not feel an acute need to strengthen their own and collaborative defensive posture?

Certainly, there are differences amongst nations that stem from having a different sense of urgency, sometimes connected to the distance a country has between itself and the threat. However, everyone agrees on the overall problem of needing to cooperate more effectively and address information-sharing issues – it is very high on the agenda.

For instance, for NATO Allied Air Command, one of the main priorities is enhancing information sharing, both now with current capabilities and for future cooperation.

However, we are all struggling, all of us, as there are many built-in obstacles within the industry, nations, and different armed forces that exist to protect each of their functions but make this complex. I choose to stay positive since we are only a few years into this kind of newer situation where this is needed and have realized what we need to do

In your opinion, when looking at the barriers that make sharing data difficult, does one of them stem from a level of distrust, even amongst allies, or simply put there is always a general sense of uneasiness in disclosing sensitive information?

I see what you mean. One part is to, of course, build trust, but I don’t think that this is the main obstacle right now. We have built information systems as well as security protocols and regulations that were set up to protect all information, rather than being set up to share it as effectively as possible.

It has a lot to do with turning these processes around and setting the right goal – before it was to make sure no data was supposed to be somewhere else. Now, the aim for all of us is operational capabilities and that means we need to fundamentally change the way we process information.

A lot of it is bureaucracy in its best form, and I understand that we come from a different history and have established information laws with distinct setups for a reason. For us, as a new NATO member, it is very obvious that to figure out how to match our piece of the puzzle in the bigger context and have information about capabilities and systems, new ways of sharing data are necessary.

I am not a lawyer here, but it is quite obvious to us since joining NATO that we need to change a lot of the regulations and laws to be able to share information and operate together, train together, and that on different territories.

One part is to have the right rules in place, and the other is to delegate mandate and have the kind of processes in place to share or change information on the level where actual capabilities can be combined.

How is the Swedish air force personnel preparing for operating in GPS-denied or jammed environments, a problem that has become acute in Ukraine?

When it comes to GPS navigation systems, that is not a particular problem for us — we have our systems set up to be able to operate without them. It is of course a problem for the security of the nation, which we need to encounter. But when it comes to our operations within the Air Force, we are quite familiar and prepared for it.

I would rather focus on the electronic-warfare aspect on a wider scale. We are preparing for a future conflict where the electronic spectrum will be much more contested. That’s one of the main reasons we have these future capabilities on the Gripen-E fighter, which has a high electronic warfare capability as we believe that it will only have to work in a more contested and tougher environment in the future.

We need to refocus on this and have started to do so. Back in the day, we as a nation used to be good at fighting in an environment where radio traffic was jammed. Then, for a few years we lost a little bit of our culture when it came to our position and mindset on electronic warfare.

So now, we are reevaluating whether or not we need more education on every level when it comes to electronic warfare to be able to fight in future settings. That’s really important to us to account for this and there is room for progress in this respect for us and many others, I think.

What would progress look like for you to address this? For instance, would it entail dedicating a whole unit to electronic warfare specifically or would you rather see it implemented at every level into military training?

The tip of the spear is always constructed by the organization behind it. So if we want to be really good at this in the future, including in the procurement of equipment, we need to build a base for that and that starts with knowledge on all levels — this is the aspect I am talking about, including basic-know how of electronic warfare for every Swedish airmen.

Other than that, different units — maybe. I think the greatest potential, to go back to your question about enhancing European defense cooperation, would be to look at how we best combine assets.

For instance, how do we form the Gripen-E and our capabilities on other platforms to fit in a wider context? How do we combine the Gripen-E with the F-35 when it comes to electronic warfare and how does that look in the future?

Some bigger nations would possibly be able to procure special assets or have special electronic warfare units, which we could merge with our efforts. Electronic warfare today is a common challenge that should be addressed and rooted in cooperation.

What patterns have you observed lately when it comes to Russian military aircraft near Scandinavian airspace?

The overall situation and the fact that we have a war in Europe certainly affects our area of operations when it comes to the Baltic Sea and our territory — everything is connected. We see the same kind of atmosphere going on in different areas over the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea.

So there are a lot more assets in our vicinity — that is NATO assets, our national assets, but also Russian assets. The level of activity is definitely higher than it used to be, and of course, the overall atmosphere has also translated into our airspace.

Our readiness when it comes to defending our territory is on a higher level than it used to be, and we do more QRA [quick reaction alert] sorties than we used to do. The intensity is higher and that means we need to also be ready to observe, collect information, and defend our territory and NATO’s.

We have instances where Russian aircraft are very close to our territory, even violating it like it happened a few weeks ago but I don’t want to exaggerate the situation either.

The word I would use to describe the general mood is high-intensity, where activity is higher, there are a lot of aircraft, a lot of capabilities, everybody is increasing their capability and the overall atmosphere is thus affected. In terms of Russian activity, we do observe that there is jamming going on, but we don’t see any attacks towards us.

Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo was a Europe correspondent for Defense News. She covers a wide range of topics related to military procurement and international security, and specializes in reporting on the aviation sector. She is based in Milan, Italy.

自2022年12月起，瑞典空军司令约纳斯·维克曼少将一直领导着这支空军部队，负责监督瑞典自今年3月加入北约以来融入北约威慑和防御体系的工作。他统领着一支由2700名军事人员和近100架战斗机组成的部队。瑞典已提议到2030年将其国防开支提高到占其经济规模的2.6%。

在7月22日至26日于英国范堡罗举行的航展之前，空军司令在接受采访时谈到了盟友间信息共享面临的顽固障碍、乌克兰空战的教训，以及空军必须如何做好准备，在未来更具对抗性的电子战环境中作战。

为了篇幅和清晰度，本次采访内容经过编辑。

约纳斯·维克曼少将是瑞典空军司令。（美国空军照片，摄影：埃里克·迪特里希）

您对乌克兰空战有哪些观察？瑞典空军人员的训练应该从中吸取哪些教训？

首先，从国家层面来看，许多经验都印证了我们早先的信念。其中之一便是制空权，想要控制领土，控制领空的必要性显而易见。如果乌克兰在全面入侵的最初几天就能控制基辅上空的制空权，那么我们或许会看到截然不同的结果。

战争清楚地表明，作为指挥官，我们必须向更广泛的受众传达从一开始就做好控制领空准备、具备“零日”应对能力以及防空能力的重要性。北欧合作就是一个例证，其基础之一就是在和平时期开展联合行动并具备相应的能力。

与此相关的是，拥有强大而一体化的防空力量，以及我们在结合地面和空中防空方面所拥有的潜力——自从关注乌克兰局势以来，这已成为我们所有人的首要任务。

鉴于防空的重要性可能比以往任何时候都更加突出，您认为防空重点应该如何制定？

我们已经拥有陆基防空系统，和平时期归瑞典陆军所有，战时归空军所有。我们已经采购了“爱国者”导弹系统，并期待采购更多能够在旅级和联队级进行防御的系统，因为我们拥有中程防空武器，但还需要更多近程防空武器。

有时，当我们谈到防空和一体化防空反导时，我们指的是保护资产、飞机和其他地面系统。然而，整体概念也很重要——对于有着全面防御历史的瑞典来说，我们通常会从更广泛的层面来看待防御能力。

在我看来，一体化防空和导弹防御涵盖了从出口管制到“发射前”防御，再到军事层面的所有方面——包括陆基和空基防空，以及我国抵御攻击的能力。此外，我们还需要采取全政府参与的防空策略。

根据我们在乌克兰看到的情况，无人机在那里发挥了巨大的作用，瑞典空军在训练和新采购方面对无人系统做了哪些改变或修改？

我们已对计划进行调整。我们正在采购更多反无人机系统以保护我们的基地和领空，同时也在各军种内部试验如何更有效地利用无人机。

我们也在采购旅级无人机，但尚未决定采购更具战略意义的机型，例如MQ-9“死神”，主要是因为它的规模和预算都不符合我们的需求。不过，我们正在寻求与欧洲、北约和北欧国家合作，以便能够随时获得此类能力。

总的来说，我们密切关注乌克兰的一切动态，那里的发展速度令人震惊。每个人都在试图推断战争的走向，同时也小心翼翼地避免妄下结论。

对我们来说，一个显而易见的领域是利用电子战或预警系统对抗不同类型的无人机系统，包括单向攻击无人机或其他任何无人机系统。

目前为止，我们的重点更多地放在无人机反制而非攻击上。我们都在努力寻找解决方案，但就目前而言，这是我们计划的重点——不过，和其他人一样，我们也在试用无人系统和人工智能设备。

许多国家正在考虑为其下一代战斗机配备忠诚僚机无人机或远程载具。您如何看待这些概念的实用性？瑞典公司目前拥有的技术（自主系统、人工智能等）如何能够为其提供支持？

我经常被问到这个问题，而我的回答总是千篇一律。我们目前还处于早期阶段，所以我尽量谨慎，避免过早地决定或预设未来的发展方向。当然，我也预见到未来的系统会以人工智能为支撑，并结合有人驾驶和无人驾驶，这一点对我来说非常明确。

当我们展望未来作战系统或下一代战斗机时，我们往往更关注单一或两种平台，或是两种平台的组合。对于瑞典而言，回顾我们的历史，作为一个规模较小的空军，面对巨大的威胁，我们不得不将各种不同的能力整合到一个系统中。

目前，我们采用低人员投入、分散式作战的概念，并正在探索未来的作战理念。对我们而言，关键在于系统之系统的应用，而这其中显然包含无人-有人协同作战系统。

他是典型的忠诚僚机还是其他重要人物，我目前还不得而知。

在空战和防空领域，欧洲国家如何才能更有效地合作，加强其防御态势？

总的来说，我目前与欧洲和北约空军司令的接触让我感受到，他们对合作的理念与以往截然不同。过去，我们遇到的一些问题源于时间安排不合理，或者经济条件不足以支持更多合作项目。此外，值得注意的是，每个国家都有各自的目标和计划，这也使得制定更多共同倡议更具挑战性。

如今，真正影响我们对未来合作看法的，是欧洲安全形势的共识以及由此产生的紧迫感。我在与各方的交流中清楚地看到，过去我们要么没有合作，要么以前不愿合作，因为我们认为这种合作对于各自空军的建设收效甚微；而现在，由于我们拥有共同的目标，合作突然变得必不可少。

对我们而言，要更有效地开展合作，就需要克服一些现有的障碍——其中一个显而易见的障碍是信息共享，但我们正在努力解决这个问题，尤其是在我们自身能力与其他国家能力之间的行动协调方面。从知识产权到国家安全威胁，信息共享领域是我们真正需要做出一些改变的领域。

欧洲各地是否都感受到同样的紧迫感？或者您认为有些国家可能仍然没有感受到加强自身及合作防御态势的迫切需要？

当然，各国之间存在差异，这源于它们对紧迫性的感受不同，有时也与一国与威胁之间的距离有关。然而，各方都认同需要更有效地合作并解决信息共享问题这一总体难题——这已被列为议程上的重中之重。

例如，对于北约盟军空军司令部来说，主要优先事项之一是加强信息共享，既要利用现有能力，也要为未来的合作做好准备。

然而，我们都在努力，每个人都面临着挑战，因为行业内部、各国以及不同的武装力量都存在许多固有的障碍，这些障碍旨在保护各自的职能，但也使情况变得复杂。我选择保持乐观，因为我们进入这种需要应对的新局面才几年，而且我们已经意识到我们需要做什么。

您认为，在审视阻碍数据共享的障碍时，其中一个障碍是否源于盟友之间的不信任，或者简单地说，人们在披露敏感信息时总是普遍感到不安？

我明白你的意思。当然，建立信任是其中一部分，但我认为这并非目前的主要障碍。我们建立的信息系统、安全协议和规章制度，其目的是为了保护所有信息，而不是为了尽可能有效地共享信息。

这与转变流程、设定正确目标密切相关——以前的目标是确保数据不会出现在其他地方。现在，我们所有人的目标都是提升运营能力，这意味着我们需要从根本上改变信息处理方式。

很多方面都体现了官僚主义的本质，我理解我们有着不同的历史背景，也明白我们制定了不同的信息法律体系是有原因的。对我们这个北约新成员国来说，很显然，为了更好地融入大环境，了解自身的能力和系统，我们需要新的数据共享方式。

我不是律师，但自从加入北约以来，我们很清楚地意识到，我们需要改变很多规章制度和法律，才能在不同的领土上共享信息、共同行动、共同训练。

一方面要制定正确的规则，另一方面要授权并建立相应的流程，以便在能够整合实际能力的层面上共享或更改信息。

瑞典空军人员如何为在 GPS 信号被干扰或无法使用的环境中进行作战做准备？这个问题在乌克兰已经变得十分严重。

就GPS导航系统而言，这对我们来说并非什么大问题——我们的系统已经设置好，即使没有GPS也能正常运行。当然，这关乎国家安全，我们必须面对这个问题。但就空军内部行动而言，我们对此非常熟悉，也做好了充分的准备。

我更愿意从更广泛的层面来探讨电子战问题。我们正在为未来冲突做准备，届时电子频谱的争夺将更加激烈。这正是我们为“鹰狮-E”战斗机配备这些未来能力的主要原因之一，该战斗机拥有强大的电子战能力，因为我们相信它未来只会面临更加激烈、更加严峻的作战环境。

我们需要重新重视这个问题，而且已经开始着手做了。过去，我们国家很擅长在无线电通信受阻的环境下作战。但后来，有几年时间，我们在电子战的立场和思维方式上有所退步。

所以现在，我们正在重新评估是否需要在各个层面加强电子战教育，以便能够在未来的作战环境中作战。考虑到这一点对我们来说至关重要，我认为我们和其他许多国家在这方面还有很大的进步空间。

您认为解决这个问题应该取得哪些进展？例如，是否需要专门设立一个电子战单位，还是您希望看到电子战技术融入到各个层级的军事训练中？

矛尖永远是由其背后的组织打造的。因此，如果我们想在未来真正擅长此道，包括装备采购方面，我们就需要为此打下基础，而这始于各个层面的知识——这正是我要说的，包括每位瑞典空军人员都必须掌握的电子战基础知识。

除此之外，或许还有其他不同的单位。回到你关于加强欧洲防务合作的问题，我认为最大的潜力在于探讨如何更好地整合各方资源。

例如，我们如何将“鹰狮-E”战斗机和其他平台上的能力整合到更广泛的背景下？在电子战方面，我们如何将“鹰狮-E”与F-35战斗机结合起来？未来这种结合又将如何发展？

一些大国或许能够获得特殊资产或拥有专门的电子战部队，我们可以将它们纳入我们的行动之中。当今的电子战是一个共同的挑战，需要通过合作来应对。

最近，您观察到俄罗斯军用飞机在斯堪的纳维亚空域附近有哪些活动规律？

欧洲的整体局势以及战争的事实无疑会影响我们在波罗的海和我们领土上的行动区域——一切都息息相关。我们在黑海和波罗的海沿岸的不同地区都看到了类似的氛围。

因此，我们附近的军事设施数量大幅增加——包括北约设施、我们国家的设施，以及俄罗斯的设施。活动水平无疑比以往更高，当然，整体氛围也影响到了我们的空域。

我们在保卫领土方面的战备水平比以往更高，快速反应警戒（QRA）出动次数也比以往更多。紧张局势加剧，这意味着我们也需要随时准备观察、收集情报，并保卫我们和北约的领土。

我们遇到过俄罗斯飞机非常接近我们领土的情况，甚至像几周前发生的那样侵犯了我们的领土，但我也不想夸大这种情况。

我会用“高强度”来形容目前的整体氛围，活动更加频繁，飞机数量众多，作战能力也很强，各方都在提升自身实力，因此整体气氛受到影响。就俄罗斯方面而言，我们确实观察到存在干扰活动，但没有发现任何针对我们的攻击。

伊丽莎白·戈斯林-马洛曾任《防务新闻》欧洲通讯员。她的报道涵盖军事采购和国际安全等广泛领域，尤其擅长航空领域的报道。她常驻意大利米兰。