Russian Occupation Update, September 17, 2026

Russian inaction and mismanagement have blockaded thousands of people in occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast and surrounding areas.

Russia continues its illegal deportation of female Ukrainian political prisoners to penal colonies thousands of kilometers away from Ukraine. Russia’s harsh sentencing and frequent deportation of Crimean political prisoners, particularly women, have significant ramifications for the families and communities left behind.

Russian state-owned television channel Rossiya-1 recently interviewed a teenager from occupied Kherson Oblast who is now fighting in the Russian army.

Russia continues efforts to engrain military-patriotic programming in preschools in occupied Ukraine.

The first stages of voting in the Russian State Duma elections have concluded in occupied Ukraine as occupation administrators continue to set conditions for a controlled and coerced United Russia victory.

A prominent Crimean occupation official publicly advocated for using forced military service to punish residents for the perceived expression of pro-Ukrainian views.

The Sevastopol occupation administration is expanding the institutionalization of punitive nationalization.

Russia continues to expand the reach of state-controlled public broadcast media into occupied Ukraine.

Occupation Administration Mismanagement and Internal Dynamics

Russian inaction and mismanagement have blockaded thousands of people in occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast and surrounding areas. Ukrainian Oleshky Military Administration Head in exile Tetyana Hasanenko told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on September 11 that there have been no food deliveries to Oleshky since May 26 and that the threat of constant drone attacks and unexploded mines is making movement within and out of the settlement effectively impossible.[22] Hasanenko reported that residents who managed to flee Oleshky are reporting that there are between three and four thousand people remaining in Oleshky, including children. The United Nations recently assessed that there were up to 6,000 civilians remaining in the wider area around Oleshky as of June 2026.[23] Hasanenko also emphasized a deteriorating sanitary situation, as people are unable to safely bury the bodies of the dead. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on September 14 that Russian forces and occupation authorities are preventing humanitarian missions and evacuations while blaming the situation on Ukraine.[24] Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on September 16 that Ukrainian and Russian officials previously agreed on the joint facilitation of an evacuation from Oleshky, but that the Russian side has since begun ignoring the agreement and is not assisting in any humanitarian actions.[25] The worsening situation in Oleshky is a direct consequence of Russian occupation policies — a combination of deliberately weaponized deprivation and bureaucratic mismanagement that has culminated in a blockade that has placed thousands at risk of disease, starvation, and abuse at the hands of Russian forces.[26]

Deportation and Forcible Transfer of Ukrainian Citizens, Including Children

Russia continues its illegal deportation of female Ukrainian political prisoners to penal colonies thousands of kilometers away from Ukraine. The Crimean Human Rights Group reported on September 10 that Russian authorities deported occupied Sevastopol resident Nadiya Hrekovka to Correctional Colony No. 7 in Ulan Ude, Republic of Buryatia (over 5,000 kilometers from Sevastopol).[1] The Russian Southern District Military Court sentenced Hrekovka to 22 years in prison on terrorism and treason charges on the allegation that she organized an explosive attack against servicemembers of the Black Sea Fleet.[2] Ukrainian sources stated that Hrekovka is being kept in conditions of deprivation and is given very limited access to communications with the outside world. Russia’s harsh sentencing and frequent deportation of Crimean political prisoners, particularly women, have significant ramifications for the families and communities left behind. Russian independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta reported on September 11 that the 18-month-old daughter of Crimean political prisoner Oleksandra Strilets died the day after she was released from the hospital.[3] The Sevastopol City occupation court sentenced Strilets and her mother to 12 years in prison on treason charges in 2025 on the allegation that the women shared intelligence about the Russian military with Ukraine. Strilets appealed to the court for a deferment of her sentence given that her infant daughter, who had been born prematurely, was suffering from severe health issues. The court denied her appeal, and a Russian court later upheld her sentence in early 2026.[4] Russian authorities later deported Strilets to Correctional Colony No. 5 in Kozlovka, Chuvash Republic (1,600 kilometers from Sevastopol). Strilets’ imprisonment and deportation deprived her of her ability to care for her daughter. Russia has been deporting political prisoners, including women, from occupied Crimea to Russia since 2014 but has significantly intensified this practice since the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[5] This practice is a central component of Russia’s use of coercive and punitive levers as a tool of occupation control, and is likely a violation of international human rights and humanitarian law.[6]

Sociocultural Control

Nothing significant to report.

Militarization of Occupied Areas

Russian state-owned television channel Rossiya-1 recently interviewed a teenager from occupied Kherson Oblast who is now fighting in the Russian army, highlighting the ways in which Russia’s occupation of Ukraine has succeeded in turning some Ukrainian youth into weapons against their home country. Rossiya-1 aired an exclusive interview on September 12 with Oleksandr Mustiatse, a 19-year-old originally from Krynky, Kherson Oblast, who is now serving in the Russian military.[7] The Ukrainian “Children of War” database listed Mustiatse as “missing” following the occupation of Kherson Oblast in 2022, meaning that the Ukrainian government had registered him as unaccounted for either due to the occupation or because he was removed or deported from his home.[8] Back to Ukraine, a Ukrainian initiative dedicated to tracking Russia’s militarization and Russification of Ukrainian children, reported in July 2026 that it found social media evidence that Mustiatse had joined the Russian military and posted an image of the teenager in bandages, apparently after being wounded in combat.[9] The Rossiya-1 interview shows Mustiatse in combat fatigues loading ammunition into a machine gun. Mustiatse stated that his family moved to Russia’s Krasnodar Krai after the invasion, and that he signed a volunteer contract with the Russian army in March 2026, a month after turning 18. Mustiatse also claimed that he has friends from occupied Kherson Oblast who are currently fighting for Russia in the Kherson area. Mustiatse’s story is complex, in part because he claims that his family made the decision to move to Russia following the full-scale invasion. If verified, that would mean that his circumstances are different than those of the tens of thousands of children whom Russia has deported without parental consent and in violation of international law. Regardless of the circumstances of his relocation to Russia, however, Mustiatse’s experience is indicative of the way in which Russia indoctrinates and militarizes children and youth — both in Russia and in occupied Ukraine. Mustiatse and other teenagers like him have likely been exposed to intense pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian propaganda, as well as overt military training programs, for nearly five years.[10] Mustiatse’s story fits within a broader trend of Russia’s targeted indoctrination and militarization of Ukrainian teenagers, however. Other Ukrainian teenagers who have grown up in occupied Ukraine or have been deported to Russia have featured heavily in Russian pro-war and pro-occupation propaganda. The Back to Ukraine initiative identified three other such teenagers — the Chymbur brothers — who were similarly listed on the Children of War registry, and one of whom is now serving in Russian military intelligence.[11] Kremlin-appointed Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova often talks about the teenager she adopted from Mariupol, including open discussions about how pro-Russian propaganda worked to completely change his personality and worldview.[12] The Wall Street Journal published a story in 2024 detailing how a Ukrainian teenager who Russia deported from occupied Kherson Oblast transformed from a pro-Ukrainian activist to a pro-Russian blogger.[13] Russia’s occupation of Ukraine is intended, in part, to turn young Ukrainians into the next generation of Russians, who can be mobilized in service of the Russian state or military. Russia continues efforts to engrain military-patriotic programming in preschools in occupied Ukraine. The Crimea occupation Ministry of Education, Science, and Youth reported on September 4 that it launched the “Cadetiki and Cossacks” program for preschoolers in 13 schools across occupied Crimea.[14] Crimea occupation Minister of Education Valentina Lavrik emphasized that “the cultivation of patriotism and spiritual and moral values should begin in early childhood,” and that the Cadetiki and Cossacks program seeks to instill in preschoolers a “respect” for Russian history, culture, and traditions. The program also notably allows preschoolers to interact with older cadets from various military-patriotic training programs as well as representatives of Cossack organizations. The Russian government, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, has recently justified the increased institutionalization of Russification and militarization programs in schools for younger and younger students, to the point that the pro-Russian indoctrination pipeline now begins for children as young as three.[15]

Administrative and Bureaucratic Control

The first stages of voting in the Russian State Duma elections have concluded in occupied Ukraine as occupation administrators continue to set conditions for a controlled and coerced United Russia victory. Occupation officials and the heads of regional election commissions claimed that the first two stages of early voting (voting for Russian frontline servicemembers and for frontline communities) have concluded throughout occupied areas in advance of the September 18 to 20 unified voting days.[16] Early voting occurred under highly securitized and militarized conditions, to the further detriment to the freedom of the elections.[17] Reuters, for example, posted an image on September 15 showing an armed Russian soldier holding a ballot box as a woman nearby fills out voter documents in occupied Verbivka, Donetsk Oblast.[18] Occupation election officials also highlighted their efforts to maximize voter registration and turnout during both early voting and the upcoming unified voting days. Kherson Oblast occupation Election Commission head Marina Zakharova claimed that voter turnout was 47.2 percent as of September 14, and that election officials visited over 80,000 households to ensure people with lower mobility could vote at home.[19] Donetsk and Zaporizhia occupation election officials highlighted their use of the “Mobile Voter” mechanism, which allows voters to vote wherever they are on election day — not just at their legally registered residence.[20] Russia’s attempts to control election results via coercive measures, including at-home voting and the presence of armed personnel at voting places, are likely to all but assure that Putin’s ruling United Russia party wins both in occupied Ukraine and in Russia.[21]

Physical and Legal Repressions

A prominent Crimean occupation official publicly advocated for using forced military service to punish residents for the perceived expression of pro-Ukrainian views. Chairman of the Crimean occupation Public Chamber and a veteran of the Russian war in Ukraine Ilya Kazakov told Radio Krym on September 10 that the occupation administration should consider forming penal battalions comprised of “those who collaborate with the enemy.”[27] Kazanov suggested that the penal battalions could conduct logistics and engineering functions both on the frontline and in the rear and also proposed that the penal battalions could help “re-educate” such individuals. Russian and occupation courts have significantly intensified prosecutions against residents of occupied Ukraine for perceived collaboration with Ukraine, which is often a stand-in for pro-Ukrainian statements made on social media or small donations made to the Ukrainian armed forces via Ukrainian banking applications.[28] The prevalence of such cases likely would mean that Russian occupation authorities would have a broad manpower pool from which to fill these proposed battalions. These battalions, if created, would likely be a violation of international law, which prohibits Russia, as the occupying power, from forcing the population it occupies to serve in its armed forces.[29]

Economic and Financial Control

The Sevastopol occupation administration is expanding the institutionalization of punitive nationalization. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev reported on September 15 that his administration adopted a resolution that effectively allows the occupation administration to seize properties from individuals and entities affiliated with Ukraine.[30] Razvozhaev listed four properties and five individuals who he claimed are “providing assistance” to the Ukrainian military or Ukrainian intelligence, and stated that their property and assets will be transferred to the Sevastopol occupation government’s budget. The Crimean occupation administration in particular has engaged in widespread punitive nationalization to strip Ukrainians of their property, likely generating billions of rubles in profit for local and regional budgets.[31]

Information Space Control

Russia continues to expand the reach of state-controlled public broadcast media into occupied Ukraine. Radio Sputnik, a Russian state-owned news agency and radio broadcast service, announced on September 15 that it will begin a 24-hour news broadcast in occupied Mariupol.[32] The Radio Sputnik broadcast will provide residents with “news and analysis programs,” and will broadcast on the same frequency as the “Novorossiya Today” program. Novorossiya Today is a joint initiative between Radio Sputnik and Ukraine.ru, which is part of the Rossiya Segodnya media group. Radio Sputnik also broadcasts elsewhere in occupied Donetsk Oblast, in occupied Luhansk Oblast, and in occupied Crimea.[33] The proliferation of Russian-controlled news, media, and broadcast networks is a critical component of Russia’s strategy to take control of the information space in occupied Ukraine.[34] Radio Sputnik, as well as Ukraine.ru, engage in explicitly pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian messaging, furthering the narrative that occupied territories inherently belong to Russia.[35]

Infrastructure and Development Projects

[1] https://crimeahrg dot org/uk/zasudzhena-na-22-roki-nadiya-grekova-perebuva%d1%94-v-koloni%d1%97-suvorih-umov-u-buryati%d1%97/?fbclid=IwY2xjawUXdTpwZG9mBWV4dG4DYWVtAjEwAGJyaWQRMUVDR0NUSmtMTTliRFJFVnRzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEe00vlwUd_NZQgfLcNs4nZ9bPAdMFciyrTbZ04F8wu1HPaonb817gFUQtIHIY_aem_1uV1DBS-dR_-x3gp_bixuw [2] https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1079587-nastav-cas-poborotisa-za-nei-istoria-nadii-grekovoi-aku-okupanti-zvinuvacuut-u-zamahu-na-rosijskogo-oficera/ [3] https://novayagazeta\ dot ru/articles/2026/09/11/diuimovochku-ubili [4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-template-january-30-2026/ [5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-may-29-2026/ [6] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949 [7] https://ok dot ru/video/15836945517267 [8] https://childrenofwar.gov dot ua/ [9] https://www.threads.com/@backtoukraine/post/DbV0ShIl8vX; https://meduza dot io/feature/2026/08/10/proekt-back-to-ukraine-rasskazal-istoriyu-aleksandra-mustyatse-ukrainskogo-podrostka-stavshego-rossiyskim-soldatom ; https://x.com/MykolaKuleba/status/2082855193461334488 [10] https://www.google.com/goto?url=CAESngEB6zswFceGHTZNZPbolh-YkZ6BrNG0godfrBI11LUYInv5qrkoUD8iT4dmbMWnKNfJT_G27LVuHgLkS0_64DeuFB-QSsDZGfjPDypkf5BT_3Hj3F93ng_5wW8GIiJExDvij7GUb_KpAKF2tVMSUlYlrXC7eFt08DltzUDDUHBrFM2NP__97ID5rh8myw1vyMg5vEMEILNtYI_WF8Heyg; https://jamestown.org/russia-expands-youth-militarization-part-one/ [11] https://www.threads.com/@backtoukraine/post/Dba0o_gl7KH [12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-october-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_5-19/; https://t.me/stormdaily/59684; https://novayagazeta dot eu/en/articles/2026/08/10/russian-childrens-rights-commissioner-announces-teen-she-adopted-from-occupied-ukraine-will-study-to-become-prosecutor-en-news; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2025/10/21/8003736/ [13] https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-russia-propaganda-children-49ad9e09 [14] https://crimea-news dot com/society/2026/09/04/2059751.html [15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-10-2026/; https://almenda dot org/vpliv-na-najmenshix-yak-okupanti-na-tot-formuyut-rosijsku-identichnist-u-doshkilnyat/ [16] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/28100031; https://xonews dot ru/news/v-hersonskoj-oblasti-472-izbiratelej-prinjali-uchastie-v-dosrochnom-golosovanii/; https://donetskmedia dot ru/20260914-golos-donbassa-kak-dnr-i-lnr-gotovjatsja-k-pervym-vyboram-v-gosdumu.media; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/17400; https://t.me/razvozhaev/23849 [17] https://crimea.ria dot ru/20260914/vybory-v-krymu–kak-obespechat-bezopasnost-na-uchastkakh-1159375227.html; https://gazetacrimea dot ru/news/krym-gotovitsya-k-edinomu-dnyu-golosovaniya-chto-predusmotreno-dlya-bezopasnosti/ [18] https://www.reuters.com/pictures/pictures-day-september-15-2026-2026-09-15/7FTJUH6EABKIDJ4NYEBBLW26LM [19] https://xonews dot ru/news/v-hersonskoj-oblasti-472-izbiratelej-prinjali-uchastie-v-dosrochnom-golosovanii/ [20] https://ria dot ru/vybory/mobilnyj-izbiratel/; https://tass dot ru/info/12039493 [21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/ [22] https://suspilne dot media/kherson/1401472-ludi-vidcuvaut-sebe-prirecenimi-nacalnica-mva-pro-situaciu-v-oleskah-na-tot-hersonsini/ [23] https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/Desperate-situation-for-civilians-trapped-in-frontline-areas-says-UN-Human-Rights-Ukraine [24] https://sprotyv dot org.ua/oleshky-peretvoryly-na-pastku-a-trahediiu-vykorystovuiut-dlia-propahandy/ [25] https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/12544 [26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-february-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-may-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/map/russian-occupied-oleshky-kherson-oblast-faces-a-worsening-humanitarian-crisis-may-14-2026-at-130-pm-et/ [27] https://crimea-radio dot ru/kazakov-predlozhil-sozdavat-dlya-poso/; https://crimea24tv dot ru/content/kazakov-predlozhil-sozdavat-shtrafni/ [28] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-october-2-2025/; https://rm.coe.int/sg-inf-2026-23-en/48802da27d [29] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-51 [30] https://t.me/razvozhaev/23850 [31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_9-5/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_20-21/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-december-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-21-2026/ [32] https://radiosputnik dot ru/20260915/radio-1988813833.html; https://ria dot ru/20260915/mariupol-2117711530.html [33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-may-12-2025/ [34] https://understandingwar.org/research/cognitive-warfare/the-kremlins-expanding-media-conglomerate/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-may-12-2025/ [35] https://ukraina dot ru/; https://ukraina dot ru/category_radio-novorossiya-segodnya/

俄罗斯的不作为和管理不善导致被占领的赫尔松州奥列什基市及周边地区的数千人被封锁。

俄罗斯继续非法将乌克兰女性政治犯驱逐到距离乌克兰数千公里之外的流放地。俄罗斯对克里米亚政治犯，特别是女性政治犯的严厉判决和频繁驱逐，对留守的家庭和社区造成了重大影响。

俄罗斯国家电视台Rossiya-1频道最近采访了一位来自被占领的赫尔松州的青少年，他现在正在俄罗斯军队中作战。

俄罗斯继续努力在被占领的乌克兰的幼儿园里灌输军事爱国主义教育。

俄罗斯国家杜马选举的第一阶段投票在被占领的乌克兰结束，占领当局继续为控制和胁迫统一俄罗斯党取得胜利创造条件。

一位克里米亚占领当局的高级官员公开主张使用强制兵役来惩罚被认为表达亲乌克兰观点的居民。

塞瓦斯托波尔占领当局正在扩大惩罚性国有化的制度化进程。

俄罗斯继续扩大其国家控制的公共广播媒体在被占领的乌克兰的影响力。

职业管理不善及内部动态

俄罗斯的不作为和管理不善导致被占领的赫尔松州奥列什基及其周边地区数千人被困。流亡的乌克兰奥列什基军事管理局局长塔季扬娜·哈萨年科9月11日告诉乌克兰广播公司Suspilne，自5月26日以来，奥列什基一直没有收到任何食品供应，持续不断的无人机袭击和未爆炸地雷的威胁使得居民在定居点内外的行动实际上变得不可能。[22] 哈萨年科报告说，设法逃离奥列什基的居民表示，奥列什基仍然有三四千人，其中包括儿童。联合国最近评估称，截至2026年6月，奥列什基周边地区仍有多达6000名平民。[23] 哈萨年科还强调，卫生状况正在恶化，人们无法安全地埋葬死者遗体。乌克兰抵抗中心于9月14日发表声明称，俄罗斯军队和占领当局阻止人道主义救援行动和撤离，并将局势归咎于乌克兰。[24] 乌克兰监察员德米特罗·卢比涅茨于9月16日报告称，乌克兰和俄罗斯官员此前已就共同协助从奥列什基撤离达成一致，但俄方此后开始无视该协议，并且没有协助任何人道主义行动。[25] 奥列什基局势的恶化是俄罗斯占领政策的直接后果——蓄意剥夺和官僚主义管理不善相结合，最终导致封锁，使成千上万人面临疾病、饥饿和遭受俄罗斯军队虐待的风险。[26]

驱逐和强制转移乌克兰公民，包括儿童

俄罗斯继续非法将乌克兰女性政治犯驱逐至距离乌克兰数千公里之外的劳改营。克里米亚人权组织9月10日报告称，俄罗斯当局将居住在被占领的塞瓦斯托波尔的纳迪亚·赫雷科夫卡驱逐至布里亚特共和国乌兰乌德的第七号劳改营（距离塞瓦斯托波尔超过5000公里）。[1] 俄罗斯南部地区军事法院以恐怖主义和叛国罪判处赫雷科夫卡22年监禁，指控她组织了一起针对黑海舰队官兵的爆炸袭击。[2] 乌克兰方面称，赫雷科夫卡被关押在条件恶劣的监狱，与外界的联系也受到极大限制。俄罗斯对克里米亚政治犯，特别是女性政治犯的严厉判决和频繁驱逐，对留守的家庭和社区造成了严重影响。俄罗斯独立报纸《新报》9月11日报道，克里米亚政治犯奥列克桑德拉·斯特里列茨18个月大的女儿在她出院后的第二天夭折。[3] 塞瓦斯托波尔市占领法院于2025年以叛国罪判处斯特里列茨及其母亲12年监禁，罪名是她们向乌克兰泄露了有关俄罗斯军方的情报。斯特里列茨以其早产的幼女患有严重健康问题为由，向法院提出缓刑申请。法院驳回了她的上诉，俄罗斯法院随后于2026年初维持了原判。[4] 俄罗斯当局随后将斯特里列茨驱逐至楚瓦什共和国科兹洛夫卡市第五惩教所（距塞瓦斯托波尔1600公里）。斯特里列茨的监禁和驱逐使她失去了照顾女儿的能力。自 2014 年以来，俄罗斯一直将包括妇女在内的政治犯从被占领的克里米亚驱逐回俄罗斯，但自 2022 年全面入侵乌克兰以来，这种做法显著加强。[5] 这种做法是俄罗斯利用强制和惩罚手段作为占领控制工具的核心组成部分，很可能违反了国际人权法和人道主义法。[6]

社会文化控制

没有什么重大事项需要报告。

占领区的军事化

俄罗斯国家电视台Rossiya-1近日采访了一位来自被占领的赫尔松州的青少年，他目前正在俄罗斯军队服役。此次采访凸显了俄罗斯占领乌克兰如何成功地将一些乌克兰青年变成对抗祖国的武器。Rossiya-1于9月12日播出了对奥列克桑德·穆斯蒂亚采的独家专访。穆斯蒂亚采现年19岁，来自赫尔松州克林基市，目前正在俄罗斯军队服役。[7] 乌克兰“战争儿童”数据库在2022年赫尔松州被占领后将穆斯蒂亚采列为“失踪人员”，这意味着乌克兰政府已将其登记为下落不明，原因可能是占领，也可能是他被带离或驱逐出境。[8]乌克兰“重返乌克兰”组织（Back to Ukraine）致力于追踪俄罗斯对乌克兰儿童的军事化和俄罗斯化进程。该组织于2026年7月发布报告称，他们发现社交媒体证据表明穆斯蒂亚采已加入俄罗斯军队，并发布了一张这位少年缠着绷带的照片，显然是在战斗中受伤。[9] 俄罗斯电视台第一频道（Rossiya-1）的采访画面显示，穆斯蒂亚采身穿作战服，正在给机枪装填弹药。穆斯蒂亚采声称，他的家人在入侵后搬到了俄罗斯克拉斯诺达尔边疆区，他在2026年3月，也就是他年满18岁一个月后，与俄罗斯军队签署了一份志愿兵役合同。穆斯蒂亚采还声称，他有一些来自被占领的赫尔松州的朋友，目前正在赫尔松地区为俄罗斯作战。穆斯蒂亚采的说法颇为复杂，部分原因是他声称，他的家人是在全面入侵后才决定搬到俄罗斯的。如果属实，这意味着他的处境与俄罗斯未经父母同意、违反国际法驱逐的数万名儿童有所不同。然而，无论他被移居俄罗斯的具体情况如何，穆斯蒂亚采的经历都表明了俄罗斯对儿童和青少年进行灌输和军事化的方式——无论是在俄罗斯境内还是在被占领的乌克兰境内。穆斯蒂亚采和其他像他一样的青少年很可能在近五年的时间里，都接触到了密集的亲俄反乌克兰宣传以及公开的军事训练项目。[10] 然而，穆斯蒂亚采的遭遇符合俄罗斯针对乌克兰青少年进行灌输和军事化的更广泛趋势。其他在被占领的乌克兰长大或被驱逐到俄罗斯的乌克兰青少年，也经常出现在俄罗斯的亲战和亲占领宣传中。 “重返乌克兰”倡议还发现了另外三名类似的青少年——奇姆布尔兄弟——他们同样被列入“战争儿童”名单，其中一人目前在俄罗斯军事情报部门服役。[11] 克里姆林宫任命的儿童权利专员玛丽亚·利沃娃-别洛娃经常谈及她从马里乌波尔收养的青少年，包括公开讨论亲俄宣传如何彻底改变了他的性格和世界观。[12] 《华尔街日报》2024年发表了一篇报道，详细描述了一名被俄罗斯从占领的赫尔松州驱逐的乌克兰青少年如何从一名亲乌克兰活动家转变为一名亲俄博主。[13] 俄罗斯占领乌克兰的部分目的在于将年轻的乌克兰人变成下一代俄罗斯人，以便他们能够被动员起来为俄罗斯国家或军队效力。俄罗斯仍在继续努力，在被占领的乌克兰的幼儿园中灌输军事爱国主义教育。克里米亚占领当局教育、科学和青年部于9月4日报告称，已在被占领的克里米亚13所学校启动了面向学龄前儿童的“少年军校生与哥萨克”项目。[14] 克里米亚占领当局教育部长瓦伦蒂娜·拉夫里克强调，“爱国主义以及精神和道德价值观的培养应从幼儿时期开始”，而“少年军校生与哥萨克”项目旨在向学龄前儿童灌输对俄罗斯历史、文化和传统的“尊重”。值得注意的是，该项目还允许学龄前儿童与来自不同军事爱国主义训练项目的高年级学员以及哥萨克组织的代表互动。俄罗斯政府，包括俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京，近期为在学校中针对越来越小的学生开展的俄罗斯化和军事化项目日益制度化辩护，以至于亲俄思想的灌输管道现在从三岁的孩子就开始了。[15]

行政和官僚控制

在被占领的乌克兰，俄罗斯国家杜马选举的第一阶段投票已经结束，占领当局继续为控制和胁迫统一俄罗斯党赢得选举创造条件。占领官员和地区选举委员会负责人声称，在9月18日至20日统一投票日之前，所有被占领地区的提前投票（俄罗斯前线军人和前线社区居民的投票）已经结束。[16] 提前投票在高度安全和军事化的环境下进行，进一步损害了选举的自由。[17] 例如，路透社9月15日发布了一张照片，显示一名武装的俄罗斯士兵手持投票箱，旁边一名妇女正在顿涅茨克州被占领的韦尔比夫卡填写选民登记表。[18] 占领选举官员还强调，他们已尽力提高提前投票和即将到来的统一投票日的选民登记率和投票率。赫尔松州占领区选举委员会主席玛丽娜·扎哈罗娃声称，截至9月14日，投票率为47.2%，选举官员走访了超过8万户家庭，以确保行动不便的人能够在家投票。[19] 顿涅茨克和扎波罗热占领区的选举官员强调了他们使用“流动选民”机制，该机制允许选民在选举日当天无论身在何处都可以投票，而不仅仅是在他们合法登记的居住地。[20] 俄罗斯试图通过强制措施控制选举结果，包括允许选民在家投票以及在投票站部署武装人员，这几乎可以肯定普京领导的统一俄罗斯党将在被占领的乌克兰和俄罗斯本土都赢得选举。[21]

身体和法律上的压迫

一位克里米亚占领当局的高级官员公开倡导使用强制兵役来惩罚被认为表达亲乌克兰观点的居民。克里米亚占领当局公共议院主席、曾参加过俄乌战争的老兵伊利亚·卡扎科夫9月10日告诉克里米亚电台，占领当局应该考虑组建由“与敌人合作者”组成的惩戒营。[27] 卡扎科夫建议，这些惩戒营可以在前线和后方执行后勤和工程任务，并提议惩戒营可以帮助“再教育”这些人。俄罗斯和占领当局的法院已大幅加强对被占领乌克兰居民的起诉，理由是他们被认为与乌克兰合作，这通常指的是在社交媒体上发表亲乌克兰言论或通过乌克兰银行应用程序向乌克兰武装部队捐赠小额款项。[28] 此类案件的普遍存在可能意味着俄罗斯占领当局将拥有庞大的人力资源来组建这些拟议的惩戒营。如果这些营成立，很可能违反国际法，因为国际法禁止俄罗斯作为占领国强迫其占领的人民在其武装部队服役。[29]

经济和金融控制

塞瓦斯托波尔占领当局正在扩大惩罚性国有化的制度化。塞瓦斯托波尔占领当局总督米哈伊尔·拉兹沃扎耶夫于9月15日报告称，其政府通过了一项决议，实际上允许占领当局没收与乌克兰有关联的个人和实体的财产。[30] 拉兹沃扎耶夫列出了四处房产和五名个人，他声称这些人“向乌克兰军方或乌克兰情报部门提供协助”，并表示他们的财产和资产将被转移到塞瓦斯托波尔占领当局的预算中。克里米亚占领当局尤其进行了广泛的惩罚性国有化，以剥夺乌克兰人的财产，这很可能为地方和区域预算带来了数十亿卢布的利润。[31]

信息空间控制

俄罗斯持续扩大其国家控制的公共广播媒体在被占领乌克兰的影响力。俄罗斯国有新闻通讯社和广播电台“卫星广播电台”（Radio Sputnik）于9月15日宣布，将在被占领的马里乌波尔市开播24小时新闻节目。[32] “卫星广播电台”将为当地居民提供“新闻和分析节目”，并与“今日新俄罗斯”（Novorossiya Today）节目使用相同的频率播出。“今日新俄罗斯”是“卫星广播电台”与乌克兰网站Ukraine.ru的联合项目，后者隶属于“今日俄罗斯”（Rossiya Segodnya）媒体集团。“卫星广播电台”还在被占领的顿涅茨克州、卢甘斯克州和克里米亚半岛等地播出节目。[33] 俄罗斯控制的新闻、媒体和广播网络的扩散是俄罗斯控制被占领乌克兰信息空间战略的关键组成部分。[34]俄罗斯卫星广播电台和 Ukraine.ru 网站都公开宣扬亲俄反乌克兰的言论，进一步强化了被占领土理应属于俄罗斯的说法。[35]

基础设施和发展项目

[1] https://crimeahrg.t org/uk/zasudzhena-na-22-roki-nadiya-grekova-perebuva%d1%94-v-koloni%d1%97-suvorih-umov-u-buryati%d1%97/?fbclid=IwY2xjawUXdTpwZG9mBWV4dG4DYWVtAjEwAGJyaW QRMUVDR0NUSmtMTTliRFJFVnRzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEe00vlwUd_NZ QgfLcNs4nZ9bPAdMFciyrTbZ04F8wu1HPaonb817gFUQtIHIY_aem_1uV1DBS-dR_-x3gp_bixuw [2] https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1079587-nastav-cas-poborotisa-za-nei-istoria-nadii-grekovoi-aku-okupanti-zvinuvacuut-u-zamahu-na-rosijskogo-oficera/ [3] https://novayagazeta\ dot ru/articles/2026/09/11/diuimovochku-ubili [4] https://understandingwar.org/research/ Russia-ukraine/Russian-Occupation-update-template-january-30-2026/ [5] https://understandingwar.org/research/Russia-ukraine/Russian-Occupation-update-august-6-2026/； https://understandingwar.org/research/ Russia-ukraine/Russian-occupation-update-may-29-2026/ [6] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949 [7] https://ok dot ru/video/15836945517267 [8] https://childrenofwar.gov dot ua/ [9] https://www.threads.com/@backtoukraine/post/DbV0ShIl8vX； https://meduza dot io/feature/2026/08/10/proekt-back-to-ukraine-rasskazal-istoriyu-aleksandra-mustyatse-ukrainskogo-podrostka-stavshego-rossiyskim-soldatom ； https://x.com/MykolaKuleba/status/2082855193461334488 [10] https://www.google.com/goto?url=CAESngEB6zswFceGHTZNZPbolh-YkZ6BrNG0godfrBI11LUYInv5qrkoUD8iT4dmbMWnKNfJT_G27LVuHgLkS0_64DeuFB-QSsDZGfjPDypkf5BT_3Hj3F93ng_5wW8GIiJExDvij7GUb_KpAKF2tVMSUlYlrXC7eFt08DltzUDDUHBrFM2NP__97ID5rh8myw1vyMg5vEMEINLtYI_WF8Heyg; 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https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/ Russia-ukraine/ Russian-offective-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/ [22] https://suspilne dot media/kherson/1401472-ludi-vidcuvaut-sebe-prirecenimi-nacalnica-mva-pro-situaciu-v-oleskah-na-tot-hersonsini/ [23] https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/Desperate-situation-for-civilians-trapped-in-frontline-areas-says-UN-Human-Rights-Ukraine [24] https://sprotyv dot org.ua/oleshky-peretvoryly-na-pastku-a-traheediiu-vykorystovuiut-dlia-propahandy/ [25] https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/12544 [26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-february-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-6-2026/; 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