Malaysia’s soft power will take a major hit in Asean — Phar Kim Beng

The article discusses Malaysia's strategic reliance on diplomatic credibility over military or economic might within ASEAN.

The recent decision to allow former Prime Minister Najib Razak to serve the remainder of his SRC International sentence under house arrest raises concerns about maintaining institutional credibility and judicial accountability.

The distinction between clemency and exoneration is emphasized, particularly in light of Najib's ongoing appeal in the 1MDB case.

As Malaysia navigates these challenges, it is crucial to uphold the perception of independent and consistent operations of its legal and governmental institutions to preserve its soft power and regional influence.

SEPTEMBER 19 — Malaysia has spent decades cultivating an image in Asean that rests on something more important than military strength or economic size.

It has relied on diplomatic credibility, institutional maturity and the capacity to present itself as a country governed by laws and functioning institutions.

The decision allowing former prime minister Najib Razak to serve the remainder of his SRC International sentence under house arrest therefore carries consequences extending beyond domestic politics.

On September 18, the King granted Najib a conditional pardon permitting him to serve the remainder of his sentence at home until August 23, 2028, provided that he pays the RM50 million fine and observes the conditions attached to the pardon. The decision concerns the SRC International case alone.

That distinction is crucial. Najib was originally sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment and fined RM210 million after his conviction involving RM42 million belonging to SRC International.

The Federal Court dismissed his final appeal in August 2022, after which he began serving his sentence at Kajang Prison.

A previous pardon subsequently reduced the imprisonment to six years and the fine to RM50 million.

Yet the SRC case is not the end of Najib’s legal difficulties.

On December 26, 2025, the High Court convicted him on 25 charges involving abuse of power and money laundering concerning approximately RM2.3 billion connected with 1MDB.

He received a maximum concurrent sentence of 15 years and a RM11.38 billion fine. Najib has appealed both the conviction and sentence.

This means Malaysia must be exceptionally careful about the distinction between clemency and exoneration.

A pardon or conditional pardon is an exercise of a constitutional power.

It does not by itself rewrite the factual and judicial history of the conviction to which it applies.

Nor does the latest decision determine Najib’s separate 1MDB appeal.

That distinction matters enormously to Malaysia’s international standing.

Soft power is accumulated slowly but can be damaged quickly. Malaysia cannot compete with the United States or China in hard power.

It does not possess their military reach, financial resources or technological scale. What Malaysia can possess, however, is credibility.

That credibility has been particularly valuable inside Asean.

Malaysia has repeatedly presented itself as a country capable of speaking about governance, moderation, institutional stability and the rule of law.

Kuala Lumpur has also sought to exercise diplomatic influence disproportionate to its material capabilities.

But diplomatic credibility begins at home. The danger is therefore not simply what Malaysians think about Najib.

Malaysians are entitled to disagree passionately over him. His supporters retain the right to defend him and to pursue every legal avenue available.

Those who remain indignant about corruption are equally entitled to insist that accountability must have meaning.

The larger question is how Malaysia’s institutions are perceived abroad.

The 1MDB scandal was never an exclusively Malaysian affair. Investigations and asset-recovery efforts extended across several jurisdictions.

The United States Department of Justice famously described the affair as an enormous kleptocracy-related asset recovery case.

Consequently, developments involving Najib are inevitably observed beyond Malaysia.

Malaysia must therefore avoid creating the international impression that political stature produces a different standard of accountability.

This is especially important in Asean. South-east Asia is competing for capital, technology, semiconductor investment, artificial-intelligence infrastructure and highly skilled talent.

Investors increasingly examine not merely tax incentives and labour costs but also regulatory predictability, institutional reliability and political stability.

Governance itself has become an economic asset. Malaysia consequently has something valuable to protect.

The conditional pardon should also not be confused with the separate judicial process surrounding 1MDB.

Najib’s 15-year sentence in that case was ordered to begin after completion of his SRC sentence, although the conviction and sentence remain under appeal.

That appeal must be allowed to proceed according to law. If the appellate courts overturn the conviction, that judgment must be respected.

If they uphold it, that judgment must likewise carry its full legal consequences, subject to whatever lawful constitutional processes may subsequently apply.

This is where Malaysia’s institutional credibility will ultimately be tested.

The strongest response to public anger is therefore neither triumphalism nor despair. Malaysians who oppose corruption have legitimate reasons to scrutinise how exceptional forms of clemency interact with public expectations of equal accountability.

But it would be equally inaccurate to conclude that the entire Malaysian legal system has somehow ceased functioning.

It has not. Courts convicted Najib in the SRC case. The Federal Court dismissed his final appeal. Another High Court subsequently convicted him in the separate 1MDB proceedings.

That latter judgment is now moving through the appellate process. The institutions are still operating.

Malaysia’s task is to demonstrate that they continue to operate independently and consistently regardless of the identity, political influence or historical importance of the individual appearing before them.

This is ultimately larger than Najib Razak. Asean is entering an era in which soft power will become increasingly important.

Malaysia wants to speak on regional peace, economic integration, artificial intelligence, institutional reform and the future direction of South-east Asia. Such diplomatic ambition requires credibility.

A country cannot easily advocate rules abroad while appearing uncertain about their application at home.

Malaysia has built substantial diplomatic capital across Asean and beyond. It should be careful not to squander it.

Najib has received conditional clemency in the SRC case. He also retains the right to appeal his separate 1MDB conviction.

Both facts can coexist. So can compassion and accountability.

The challenge for Malaysia is to demonstrate that constitutional clemency does not become synonymous with institutional weakness, and that political prominence does not erase judicial accountability.

Malaysia’s soft power ultimately depends not on whether everyone agrees with every decision made by its institutions.

It depends on whether those institutions remain credible enough that Malaysia’s neighbours — and Malaysians themselves — continue to believe in them.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies at International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) and a director at the Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS).

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail .

Najib’s house arrest: Not a get-out-of-jail free card — Hafiz Hassan

Malaysia must pursue legal action against Indonesia over transboundary haze — Shahrul Mizan Ismail

One warning is all it takes — Nur Syazwani Ahmad

Police probe Rompin religious school hostel assault, five senior students freed on bail

Sarawak, Penang to get greater focus in Malaysia fertility push, says women’s minister

Najib’s conditional pardon has not strained unity government, says DPM Zahid

文章探讨了马来西亚在东盟内部战略上依赖外交信誉而非军事或经济实力的做法。

最近允许前总理纳吉布·拉扎克在家软禁服完其在 SRC 国际公司案中剩余刑期的决定，引发了人们对维护机构信誉和司法问责制的担忧。

鉴于纳吉布正在就 1MDB 案提起上诉，特别强调了赦免和免罪之间的区别。

在马来西亚应对这些挑战的过程中，维护其法律和政府机构独立、一致运作的形象至关重要，这有助于维护其软实力和区域影响力。

9 月 19 日 — 马来西亚几十年来一直在东盟内部塑造一种形象，这种形象建立在比军事实力或经济规模更重要的东西之上。

它依靠外交信誉、制度成熟度和展现自身作为法治国家和运转良好的机构的能力。

因此，允许前总理纳吉布·拉扎克在家软禁服完其在 SRC 国际公司案中剩余刑期的决定，其影响远不止于国内政治。

9月18日，国王有条件地赦免了纳吉布，允许他居家服刑至2028年8月23日，前提是他必须缴纳5000万令吉的罚款并遵守赦免所附带的条件。该决定仅涉及SRC国际公司一案。

这一区别至关重要。纳吉布最初因涉嫌挪用SRC国际公司4200万令吉的资金而被判处12年监禁并罚款2.1亿令吉。

2022 年 8 月，联邦法院驳回了他的最终上诉，之后他开始在加影监狱服刑。

此前的赦免令将刑期减至六年，罚款减至 5000 万令吉。

然而，SRC案并非纳吉布法律困境的终结。

2025年12月26日，高等法院判处他25项罪名成立，包括滥用职权和洗钱，涉及与1MDB有关的约23亿令吉。

他被判处最高刑期15年监禁，并处罚金113.8亿令吉。纳吉已就定罪和量刑提出上诉。

这意味着马来西亚必须格外谨慎地区分赦免和无罪释放。

赦免或有条件赦免是行使宪法赋予的权力。

它本身并不能改写它所适用的定罪的事实和司法历史。

最新裁决也并未对纳吉布就1MDB案提出的单独上诉作出裁决。

这一殊荣对马来西亚的国际地位至关重要。

软实力积累缓慢，但损耗却很快。马来西亚在硬实力上无法与美国或中国匹敌。

它不具备他们的军事实力、财政资源或技术规模。然而，马来西亚所拥有的是信誉。

这种信誉在东盟内部尤其宝贵。

马来西亚一再标榜自己是一个能够谈论治理、温和、制度稳定和法治的国家。

吉隆坡还试图行使与其物质能力不成比例的外交影响力。

但外交信誉始于国内。因此，危险不仅仅在于马来西亚人对纳吉布的看法。

马来西亚人有权对他持有强烈不同意见。他的支持者也有权为他辩护，并采取一切可行的法律途径。

那些对腐败问题仍然感到愤慨的人同样有权坚持认为问责制必须具有实际意义。

更重要的问题是，马来西亚的制度在国外是如何被看待的。

1MDB丑闻从来都不是马来西亚独有的事件。调查和资产追回工作涉及多个司法管辖区。

美国司法部曾将此案描述为一起与盗窃统治有关的巨额资产追回案。

因此，涉及纳吉布的事件发展必然会在马来西亚以外引起关注。

因此，马来西亚必须避免给国际社会造成这样一种印象：政治地位决定了问责标准的高低。

这一点在东盟尤其重要。东南亚各国正在竞相争夺资本、技术、半导体投资、人工智能基础设施和高技能人才。

投资者越来越关注的不仅是税收优惠和劳动力成本，还有监管的可预测性、制度可靠性和政治稳定性。

治理本身已成为一种经济资产。因此，马来西亚拥有值得保护的宝贵资源。

有条件赦免也不应与围绕 1MDB 的单独司法程序混淆。

纳吉布在该案中的 15 年刑期被命令在其 SRC 刑期结束后开始执行，尽管定罪和量刑仍在上诉中。

必须允许上诉程序依法进行。如果上诉法院推翻原判，则必须尊重该判决。

如果他们维持原判，那么该判决也必须承担全部法律后果，但须遵守随后可能适用的任何合法宪法程序。

马来西亚的制度信誉最终将在这里受到考验。

因此，应对公众愤怒最强有力的方式既非沾沾自喜，也非绝望。反对腐败的马来西亚人有充分的理由仔细审视特殊形式的赦免如何与公众对平等问责的期望相协调。

但就此断定马来西亚整个法律体系已经停止运作，同样也是不准确的。

事实并非如此。法院在SRC案中判纳吉布有罪。联邦法院驳回了他的最终上诉。随后，另一家高等法院在另一起1MDB案中也判他有罪。

后一项判决目前正在上诉程序中。相关机构仍在正常运作。

马来西亚的任务是证明，无论出现在他们面前的个人的身份、政治影响力或历史重要性如何，他们都会继续独立、始终如一地运作。

这最终比纳吉布·拉扎克本人更为重要。东盟正在进入一个软实力日益重要的时代。

马来西亚希望就区域和平、经济一体化、人工智能、体制改革以及东南亚未来发展方向等议题发表意见。这样的外交抱负需要信誉保障。

一个国家如果对在国内实施这些规则显得不确定，就很难在国外积极倡导这些规则。

马来西亚在东盟及其他地区积累了大量外交资本，应该谨慎行事，不要挥霍掉这些资本。

纳吉布在SRC案中获得有条件赦免。他同时保留对另一起1MDB案定罪提出上诉的权利。

这两种事实可以并存。同情心和责任感也可以并存。

马来西亚面临的挑战是证明宪法赦免不会等同于制度软弱，政治地位也不会抹杀司法问责制。

马来西亚的软实力最终并不取决于每个人是否都同意其机构做出的每一项决定。

这取决于这些机构是否仍然足够可信，以至于马来西亚的邻国以及马来西亚人自己继续相信它们。

* Phar Kim Beng 是马来西亚国际伊斯兰大学 (IIUM) 东盟研究教授，也是国际与东盟研究所 (IINTAS) 的主任。

**本文仅代表作者或刊物个人观点，并不一定代表《马来邮报》的立场。

纳吉布的软禁：并非免罪金牌——哈菲兹·哈桑

马来西亚必须就跨境雾霾对印度尼西亚采取法律行动——Shahrul Mizan Ismail

只需一次警告就足够了——努尔·沙兹瓦尼·艾哈迈德

警方调查罗宾宗教学校宿舍袭击事件，五名高年级学生获准保释

妇女部长表示，马来西亚将更加关注砂拉越和槟城，以推动生育率提升。

副总理扎希德表示，纳吉布的有条件赦免并未使团结政府陷入紧张状态。