The NATO summit is chance to wean Europe off US military might

This week President Joe Biden will meet with other NATO leaders in Madrid for what Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg promises will be a “transformative” summit, coming four months into the war in Ukraine. NATO, for the first time since 2010, will adopt and release a new Strategic Concept — a document that will set the alliance’s strategic objectives and security tasks for the next decade. The cornerstone of NATO’s approach will be a massive military buildup, increasing its high-readiness forces from 40,000 to over 300,000 troops, to protect its eastern flank.

NATO member countries ought to resist the temptation turn back the clock and pull the United States back in, settling on a larger US military presence on the continent as the easy answer. Instead, they should come to terms with the new reality: the United States cannot continue to underwrite European security if it is to meet the challenge posed by a rising China.

The only way to incentivize European allies to acquire the forces and military capabilities needed to guarantee their own defense is for the United States to step back from being Europe’s primary defender. As part of a rebalanced alliance, European members should shoulder the main responsibility for boosting the size of NATO’s high-readiness force, with the United States positioned as the security guarantor of last resort. To initiate this change, President Biden ought to set limits on America’s defense contributions to Europe.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine sparked an impressive display of unity from NATO allies, and the Biden administration deserves a great deal of credit for sustaining allied cohesion and coordination, even as cracks have begun to emerge over the last four months. But the crisis has also laid bare that NATO still functions as an American-led alliance, one in which the United States continues to subsidize European defense spending. While the United States and NATO’s Eastern European members have played an oversized role in supporting Ukraine, NATO Europe’s wealthiest members—France, Germany, and Italy—have lagged behind in financial, humanitarian, and military assistance. “It is remarkable that the U.S. alone has committed considerably more than all EU countries combined, in whose immediate neighborhood the war is raging,” a working paper from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy notes. How is this fair burden sharing?

Since the start of the war, Europe’s military dependency on the United States has actually increased. Before February, the United States had about 6,500 troops in Eastern Europe, accounting for about 60% of NATO’s forward force deployments on its eastern flank. Following Putin’s invasion, the United States dispatched additional reinforcement to Europe, tripling the number of American forces forward deployed in the east. Even though European allies also sent some additional reinforcements to the east, the United States now contributes about 80% of NATO’s forward force deployments. This is unsustainable. America’s European allies should assume the main burden, so Washington can get its strategic house in order, bringing defense commitments in line with U.S. capabilities, and so it can prioritize China.

In Madrid, Biden ought to drive a hard bargain with America’s European allies. First, he should insist that U.S. troop contributions on NATO’s eastern flank be reversed. European allies, not the United State, should make up 80 percent of all forward deployed forces, including primary responsibility for building up a 300,000-strong rapid reaction force. This is a tall order, but Europe can be well on its way to meeting it over the next decade if European countries raise their defense budgets and spend more efficiently, prioritizing common equipment procurement and streamlining their defense industries.

Second, Biden should make a coordinated and consistent push to strengthen NATO’s security ties with the EU. In Madrid, he should propound loud and unambiguous support for EU defense initiatives, including the European Defense Fund and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), signaling Washington views them as not only complimentary to NATO but also vital to building a stronger European pillar within the alliance. To lend credibility to his words, Biden should make a congressional push to finally conclude an administrative arrangement with the European Defense Agency, so the United States could take part in the agency’s projects aimed at developing European capabilities and thereby foster a transatlantic industrial base.

Finally, Biden should use his well-earned reputation as a staunch atlanticist to allay fears that strengthening European capabilities and force readiness would come at the expense of American security guarantees. The Russia-Ukraine crisis has heightened old anxieties and fears among NATO countries in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the crisis has refocused the alliance on its core purpose — territorial defense. This new (old) mission gives Biden an opening to recast European defense cooperation and reforms to the alliance as imperative to enhance NATO’s deterrence and defense posture on its eastern flank. Put simply, the task of the Biden administration is to convince NATO’s Eastern European members that these reforms are in their core national security interests, given the competing demands on U.S. military resources elsewhere.

Above all, Biden should remember that allied unity is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Some forty years ago, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger called for NATO reform, noting then, “Everyone has been afraid to take the initiative in changing the present arrangement, lest doing so unravel the whole enterprise,” and warning, “But since drift will surely lead to unraveling—if more imperceptibly—statesmanship impels a new approach.”

The Biden administration would do well to heed these words this week in Madrid.

Kelly A. Grieco is a resident senior fellow with the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

本周，美国总统乔·拜登将与北约其他领导人在马德里会晤。北约秘书长延斯·斯托尔滕贝格称此次峰会将是一次“变革性”峰会，而此时距离乌克兰战争爆发已过去四个月。北约将自2010年以来首次通过并发布新的战略构想——这份文件将为联盟未来十年设定战略目标和安全任务。北约战略的核心是大规模扩充军力，将其高战备部队从4万人增加到30多万人，以保护其东翼。

北约成员国应该抵制住让美国重回正轨的诱惑，不要把扩大美国在欧洲大陆的军事存在当作简单的解决办法。相反，它们应该接受新的现实：如果欧洲要应对崛起中的中国带来的挑战，美国就不能继续为欧洲安全提供保障。

要激励欧洲盟国获取保障自身防御所需的兵力和军事能力，唯一的办法就是美国不再扮演欧洲的主要防御者角色。作为重新平衡联盟的一部分，欧洲成员国应承担提升北约高战备部队规模的主要责任，而美国则应作为最后的安全保障者。为了启动这一变革，拜登总统应该限制美国对欧洲的国防投入。

俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰引发了北约盟国令人瞩目的团结，拜登政府在维持盟国凝聚力和协调性方面功不可没，尽管过去四个月来联盟内部已出现裂痕。但这场危机也暴露出北约仍然是一个由美国主导的联盟，美国仍在继续补贴欧洲的国防开支。虽然美国和北约东欧成员国在支持乌克兰方面发挥了过大的作用，但北约欧洲最富裕的成员国——法国、德国和意大利——在财政、人道主义和军事援助方面却远远落后。“令人惊讶的是，仅美国一国的投入就远远超过了所有欧盟国家的总和，而战争就发生在欧盟的近邻，”基尔世界经济研究所的一份工作报告指出。这样的负担分担公平吗？

自战争爆发以来，欧洲对美国的军事依赖实际上有所增加。2月之前，美国在东欧驻扎了约6500名士兵，约占北约东翼前沿部署兵力的60%。普京入侵后，美国向欧洲增派了更多兵力，使部署在东部的美国前沿部队数量增加了两倍。尽管欧洲盟国也向东部增派了一些兵力，但美国目前贡献了北约前沿部署兵力的约80%。这种情况难以持续。美国的欧洲盟国应该承担主要责任，这样华盛顿才能理顺其战略，使国防承诺与美国的能力相匹配，并优先应对中国问题。

在马德里，拜登应该与美国的欧洲盟友进行强硬谈判。首先，他应该坚持要求美国改变在北约东翼的驻军规模。欧洲盟友而非美国应该占所有前沿部署部队的80%，并承担组建一支30万人快速反应部队的主要责任。这并非易事，但如果欧洲各国提高国防预算、提高支出效率、优先采购通用装备并精简国防工业，那么未来十年欧洲完全可以朝着实现这一目标迈进。

其次，拜登应协调一致地推动加强北约与欧盟的安全联系。在马德里，他应高调明确地支持欧盟的各项防务举措，包括欧洲防务基金和永久结构性合作（PESCO），以此表明华盛顿不仅认为这些举措是对北约的补充，而且对于在北约内部构建更强大的欧洲支柱至关重要。为了增强其承诺的可信度，拜登应推动国会最终与欧洲防务局达成行政协议，以便美国能够参与该机构旨在发展欧洲能力并由此促进跨大西洋工业基础的项目。

最后，拜登应该利用他作为坚定大西洋主义者的声誉，消除人们对加强欧洲能力和部队战备会以牺牲美国安全保障为代价的担忧。俄乌危机加剧了北约东欧国家由来已久的焦虑和恐惧。与此同时，这场危机也让北约重新聚焦于其核心目标——领土防御。这一新的（旧的）使命为拜登提供了一个契机，让他可以重新定义欧洲防务合作和联盟改革，将其视为增强北约东翼威慑和防御态势的必要之举。简而言之，鉴于美国在其他地区也面临着军事资源的竞争性需求，拜登政府的任务是说服北约东欧成员国，这些改革符合它们的核心国家安全利益。

首先，拜登应该记住，盟国团结是实现目标的手段，而非目标本身。大约四十年前，国务卿亨利·基辛格呼吁改革北约，他当时指出：“每个人都害怕主动改变目前的安排，唯恐这样做会瓦解整个联盟。”他还警告说：“但既然偏离既定路线必然会导致解体——即便这种解体可能更隐蔽——那么政治家的智慧就应该促使我们采取新的方法。”

拜登政府本周在马德里最好认真听取这些意见。

Kelly A. Grieco 是大西洋理事会斯考克罗夫特战略与安全中心新美国参与倡议的常驻高级研究员。