Ukraine’s air defense woes can’t be fixed by American aid

Ukraine’s air defenses are succumbing to myriad air threats that cannot be held off, despite the passage of a recent aid bill that provided an additional $61 billion in military aid. Ukraine’s dire military situation cannot be remedied by a blank check, or as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently requested, more Patriot batteries .

The problem is not a resourcing issue, at least not in the short term. The air threats Ukraine faces pose a quantitative overmatch that simply make countering this unachievable.

Ukraine’s air defenses are already facing an untenable situation, one which additional Patriot batteries simply cannot remedy. Ukraine currently possesses just three Patriot batteries, one of which recently lost two launchers to a Russian air attack while convoying.

By President Zelenskyy’s own reckoning, Ukraine’s patchwork of Soviet, European and American air defense systems is only about 25% of what Ukraine would need to adequately defend itself. Zelenskyy went on to state that providing full coverage would entail a full 25 Patriot systems — nearly eight times Ukraine’s current arsenal and more than twice what Raytheon can produce in a full year.

Ukraine’s vulnerability is going to worsen with time, and new Patriot systems are likely to become expensive liabilities if introduced. Russia is exploiting Ukraine’s lack of air defense to both gather timely intelligence and to take out strategic targets behind the front line, such as air defenses and power plants . This in turn makes each Patriot system vulnerable, as the system is designed to operate within a larger ecosystem of air defenses operating at higher and lower altitudes. On its lonesome, it would be vulnerable to Russia’s increasingly sophisticated and low-altitude capable drones.

Ukraine would also face operational limitations both in its theater coverage and in magazine depth. The Patriot can either support Ukraine’s front-line defense or protect its rear infrastructure, but not both. And even overlooking these trade-offs, the fight itself is unsustainable. As Zelenskyy bluntly admitted last month in response to a successful Russian strike on a power plant, “We ran out of all missiles.”

Ukraine recently received additional American Patriot interceptors to replenish its inventory. But this will only delay, not stop, the painful battlefield realities. The U.S. industrial base simply cannot churn out these expensive interceptors in large quantities; by contrast, Russia can continuously procure Shahed drones , churn out Iskander or Kinzhal missiles, and refit its planes with abundant Soviet-era glide bombs .

While Patriot systems are inherently defensive and cannot be employed in a kinetically offensive manner, this only describes their tactical effect. These systems can still be employed in such a way that they create an escalatory effect at the strategic level, namely striking Russian warplanes within Russian airspace.

Up to this point, Washington has been conditioning the use of American weapon systems on their use within Ukraine itself. But given that previous restrictions on cluster munitions , Abrams tanks , F-16 fighter jets and more have been lifted when expedient, there is reason to suspect these Patriots will end up employed in precisely this manner. While it does seem fair to allow Ukraine every advantage, the Russians have signaled that NATO weapons attacking Russia will invite direct retaliation.

Ukrainian civilians are likely to be unaffected by the presence of additional Patriot batteries. Ukrainian civilians have primarily been targeted by means of the power plants and infrastructure they rely on. The limiting factor to protecting these are not the number of Patriot platforms but the interceptors on hand, as seen last month, and this is not fixable in the short term.

Furthermore, the harsh reality is that Ukrainian Patriot operators will likely have an asset list that prioritizes Patriot protection for strategic targets, but the civilian population centers likely won’t meet this threshold. This means the best measures for civilian protection are going to be a mix of lower-altitude defense platforms, electronic warfare systems, and passive measures like air raid shelters and sirens, all of which Ukraine has already employed to positive effect.

European allies are not going to plug the gap, either. Germany is sending additional TRML-4D radar systems to detect low-altitude threats as well as a Skynex system to intercept drones. This is on top of the IRIS-T , Patriot and Stinger systems Germany had provided previously . But this aid, though helpful, is not at the scale needed to actually alleviate the overmatch Ukraine faces in the air.

The United States simply does not have the physical capabilities to fix the magazine depth issue in the near term. This is being remedied with nearly $30 billion being spent on air defense across the joint force in fiscal 2024, with a similar amount in the budget proposal for fiscal 2025 .

But turning on the assembly lines to increase interceptor production is not a function of flipping a switch once funding is secured; the lackluster air defense-industrial base is a result of putting this on the backburner during the war on terrorism. To fill a gap decades in the making will take years.

What is to be done? Washington needs to recognize the gaps in its approach to intervening thus far.

Just as Ukraine requested Abrams tanks and then recognized that they were not survivable on this battlefield, Patriot systems are not a panacea for solving the extreme vulnerability Ukraine faces. Washington cannot change the outcome of this conflict with military aid, nor can it enter the conflict directly without risking nuclear war — an unacceptable prospect.

Washington should instead leverage its diplomatic power to push for a ceasefire or at least initiate the groundwork for bringing Kyiv and Moscow to the negotiating table. The alternative to this is wishful thinking.

In addition to the dire air defense situation, Ukraine faces between a 1-to-5 and 1-to-10 artillery disadvantage ; is facing manpower shortages so severe that it is retaining amputees ; and is facing localized Russian superiority near Kharkiv that is thinning out the rest of its front line.

Ukraine today is likely in the best position it will ever be in for negotiations; every day erodes its relative strength and bargaining power. If Washington wants what’s best for Ukraine, it shouldn’t encourage its destruction.

Geoff LaMear is a fellow at the Defense Priorities think tank.

尽管最近通过了一项援助法案，提供了额外的610亿美元军事援助，但乌克兰的防空系统仍然不堪重负，难以抵御各种空中威胁。乌克兰严峻的军事形势无法通过一张空白支票来解决，也无法像泽连斯基总统最近要求的那样，通过增加“爱国者”导弹系统来解决。

问题不在于资源，至少短期内不是。乌克兰面临的空中威胁在数量上完全压倒性，使得应对根本无从谈起。

乌克兰的防空系统已经面临难以承受的困境，增购“爱国者”导弹系统根本无法解决这一问题。乌克兰目前仅有三套“爱国者”导弹系统，其中一套在最近一次护送途中遭到俄罗斯空袭，损失了两套发射装置。

据泽连斯基总统本人估计，乌克兰目前拼凑的苏联、欧洲和美国防空系统仅占乌克兰有效防御所需系统的约25%。泽连斯基还指出，要实现全面防御，需要25套完整的“爱国者”导弹系统——几乎是乌克兰现有防空武器库的八倍，也是雷神公司一年产量的两倍多。

随着时间的推移，乌克兰的脆弱性将会加剧，而新的“爱国者”导弹系统一旦投入使用，很可能成为代价高昂的负担。俄罗斯正利用乌克兰防空能力的不足，既能及时收集情报，又能摧毁前线后方的战略目标，例如防空设施和发电厂。反过来，这也使得每个“爱国者”系统都变得脆弱，因为该系统的设计初衷是与更高低空作战的防空系统协同运作。单凭自身力量，它很容易受到俄罗斯日益先进且具备低空作战能力的无人机的攻击。

乌克兰在战区覆盖范围和弹药储备方面也将面临作战限制。“爱国者”导弹系统要么支援乌克兰前线防御，要么保护其后方基础设施，但二者不可兼得。即便不考虑这些权衡取舍，这场战争本身也难以持续。正如泽连斯基上个月在回应俄罗斯成功袭击一座发电厂时直言不讳地承认的那样，“我们的导弹已经全部用完了。”

乌克兰最近接收了更多美国“爱国者”拦截导弹以补充其库存。但这只能延缓而非阻止残酷的战场现实。美国的工业基础根本无法大规模生产这些昂贵的拦截导弹；相比之下，俄罗斯可以持续采购“沙赫德”无人机，大量生产“伊斯坎德尔”或“匕首”导弹，并为其飞机改装大量苏联时代的滑翔炸弹。

虽然“爱国者”导弹系统本质上是防御性的，不能用于动能进攻，但这仅仅描述了它们的战术效果。这些系统仍然可以以某种方式使用，从而在战略层面造成局势升级，例如打击俄罗斯领空内的俄罗斯战机。

迄今为止，华盛顿一直将美国武器系统的使用与乌克兰境内的使用挂钩。但鉴于此前对集束弹药、艾布拉姆斯坦克、F-16战斗机等武器的限制在必要时已被解除，因此有理由怀疑这些“爱国者”导弹系统最终也会以这种方式使用。虽然给予乌克兰一切优势似乎合情合理，但俄罗斯已发出信号，北约武器攻击俄罗斯将招致直接报复。

乌克兰平民可能不会受到新增“爱国者”导弹系统的影响。乌克兰平民主要遭受的攻击是其赖以生存的发电厂和基础设施。正如上个月所见，保护这些设施的限制因素并非“爱国者”导弹系统的数量，而是现有拦截导弹的数量，而这个问题短期内无法解决。

此外，残酷的现实是，乌克兰“爱国者”导弹系统的使用者很可能有一份资产清单，优先保障战略目标的安全，但平民居住区很可能达不到这一标准。这意味着，保护平民的最佳措施将是结合低空防御平台、电子战系统以及防空洞、警报器等被动防御措施，而乌克兰此前已成功运用了所有这些措施。

欧洲盟友也无法弥补这一缺口。德国正在向乌克兰增派TRML-4D雷达系统，用于探测低空威胁，以及一套Skynex系统用于拦截无人机。这还不包括德国此前提供的IRIS-T、爱国者和毒刺导弹系统。但这些援助虽然有所帮助，规模却不足以真正缓解乌克兰在空中面临的绝对劣势。

美国目前尚不具备在短期内解决弹药库深度问题的物理能力。为了弥补这一不足，美国将在2024财年投入近300亿美元用于联合部队的防空建设，2025财年的预算提案中也将拨出类似数额的资金。

但启动生产线以提高拦截机产量并非资金到位后就能一蹴而就；防空工业基础薄弱，正是由于在反恐战争期间将这项工作搁置所致。填补数十年来积累的缺口，需要数年时间。

该怎么办？华盛顿需要认识到其迄今为止的干预方式存在哪些不足。

正如乌克兰请求提供艾布拉姆斯坦克后才意识到它们无法在这种战场上生存一样，爱国者导弹系统也并非解决乌克兰面临的极端脆弱性的灵丹妙药。华盛顿既无法通过军事援助改变这场冲突的结局，也无法在不冒着核战争风险的情况下直接介入——而核战争是不可接受的。

华盛顿应该利用其外交影响力推动停火，或者至少为基辅和莫斯科重返谈判桌奠定基础。否则，就只是一厢情愿的想法。

除了严峻的防空形势外，乌克兰还面临着 1 比 5 到 1 比 10 的炮兵劣势；面临严重的人力短缺，甚至不得不保留截肢者；并且在哈尔科夫附近面临俄罗斯的局部优势，这削弱了其前线的其他力量。

乌克兰如今的处境或许是其有史以来最有利于谈判的时期；每一天都在削弱其相对实力和谈判筹码。如果华盛顿真心希望乌克兰好，就不应该助长其自我毁灭。

杰夫·拉米尔是国防优先事项智库的研究员。