NATO’s spending pledge is no invitation for creative accounting

Nearly five months have passed since the June 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, where allied leaders unveiled what seemed like a bold new commitment – a collective defense-spending benchmark of 5% of GDP by 2035. The headline figure grabbed attention. But the devil is in the details.

The new framework divides the pledge into two parts: 3.5% of GDP for traditional, “hard” defense accounts, such as personnel, equipment, operations, research and development.

An additional 1.5% is for the broader category of defense- and security-related spending, meant to cover investments that make societies more resilient, like critical infrastructure protection, cyber defense, military mobility, civil preparedness, and support for the defense-industrial base.

Yet, as often in diplomacy, this political compromise has created conceptual ambiguity with practical consequences.

A framework without a playbook

The problem is simple: No one knows exactly what counts toward that 1.5%, and the first progress check slated in the summit declaration is set for 2029. The declaration text provided no definitions, no annex of eligible categories, no oversight mechanism, and no reporting standards.

This ambiguity allows governments to adapt spending to national needs. But without a common framework, the 1.5% risks morphing into a bookkeeping loophole, a space where countries pad their defense numbers by re-labeling existing civilian programs as “ security-related .”

In an era of tight budgets, creative accounting is a temptation few finance ministries can resist.

The stakes are not merely bureaucratic. NATO’s cohesion has always depended on comparable effort and transparent burden-sharing. If resilience spending becomes a gray zone of unverifiable claims, the 5% target may dilute, rather than reinforce, allied solidarity.

NATO must apply the right lessons

Some allies questioned the need to raise defense spending to these levels and saw the deal in The Hague mainly as a way to appease U.S. President Donald Trump. They may choose to list existing infrastructure projects under the 1.5% and would rather not be told by NATO HQ what to do.

By contrast, allies along NATO’s eastern frontier interpret the 5% pledge in far more concrete terms. For them, the 3.5% benchmark for “hard defense“ represents the minimum necessary for deterrence, and the 1.5% resilience component is just as important.

But doubling down exclusively on tanks and ammunition would miss the point of modern deterrence and defense. Resilience is not an alternative to hard power, but its enabler. Frontline states themselves have experienced repeated sabotage, cyberattacks and energy infrastructure disruptions. And in an age of hybrid campaigns, protection of energy and digital infrastructure that sustains societal stability under pressure is precisely what the 1.5% window should fund.

Downplaying investment in resilience would also weaken deterrence and defense. The challenge is not whether to spend on resilience, but how to do it credibly and coherently.

Resilience is defense by other means

NATO has discussed resilience since the 2016 Warsaw Summit, which established seven “baseline requirements”: continuity of government, secure energy and communications, civil transportation, food and water security, and the ability to manage mass casualties and population movements.

These are not soft issues. Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression demonstrates that military power relies on the integrity of civilian systems and its industrial base. A brigade cannot deploy if bridges are not strong enough or ports jammed; command networks fail if cyberattacks cripple civilian grids. Investing in resilient energy systems, hardened digital infrastructure, and military logistics is not charity – it is crucial combat support.

To get there, NATO must turn political aspiration into measurable practice by implementing the following steps:

A shared taxonomy defining what qualifies as resilience spending and establishing tiers or priorities by categories or localities linked to NATO regional defense plans.

Transparent reporting standards to compare and verify national contributions.

Outcome-based metrics to assess whether projects tangibly enhance military readiness rather than just adding new budget lines.

Strict no-relabeling rules allowing only genuine dual-use enhancements to qualify. For example, reinforcing civilian infrastructure to carry heavy armored equipment is legitimate; claiming the entire cost of a new high-speed rail line is not.

Major new multinational projects through the existing NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) to ensure unity and scrutiny on the planning and financing side.

Integration of 1.5% spending into the NATO Defense Planning Process, where appropriate, to align projects with existing defense plans for Europe.

Building a Joint NATO-EU coordination cell to prevent duplication and close operational gaps.

Without these guardrails, the 1.5% pillar will invite creative accounting and undercut the credibility of the entire spending pledge.

From compromise to capability

The clock is ticking, and the alliance should prepare next steps in time for discussions at the 2026 NATO Summit in Turkey. The political compromise struck in The Hague bought NATO time and consensus. The alliance must now turn the resilience component into a force multiplier that hardens collective defense.

The debate already unfolding on NATO’s eastern flank illustrates the stakes. It is less about budgets than about strategic balance: Strength means purely military mass to fight the next war, but also a resilient society that is well equipped to function through a crisis below the level of armed conflict.

Handled with urgency, commitment, discipline, and transparency – and enabled by innovation and collaboration – the new benchmark could become one of NATO’s most significant steps in decades.

Justina Budginaite-Froehly, LeAnne Noelani Howard, and Timo Koster are nonresident senior fellows with the Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

自2025年6月在海牙举行的北约峰会以来，已经过去了近五个月。在峰会上，盟国领导人公布了一项看似大胆的新承诺——到2035年，集体国防开支将达到GDP的5%。这一数字引人注目。但魔鬼藏在细节里。

新框架将承诺分为两部分：国内生产总值的 3.5% 用于传统的“硬性”国防账户，如人员、装备、行动、研发。

另外 1.5% 用于更广泛的国防和安全相关支出类别，旨在涵盖使社会更具韧性的投资，例如关键基础设施保护、网络防御、军事机动性、民防准备以及对国防工业基础的支持。

然而，正如外交中经常发生的那样，这种政治妥协造成了概念上的模糊不清，并产生了实际后果。

一个没有操作手册的框架

问题很简单：没有人确切知道这1.5%的指标包含哪些内容，而峰会宣言中规定的第一次进度检查定于2029年进行。宣言文本没有提供定义，没有合格类别的附件，没有监督机制，也没有报告标准。

这种模糊性使得各国政府能够根据国家需求调整支出。但如果没有统一的框架，这1.5%的国防开支就有可能沦为账目漏洞，各国可以通过将现有的民用项目重新贴上“安全相关”的标签来虚增国防开支。

在预算紧张的时代，很少有财政部门能够抵挡住创造性会计手段的诱惑。

这不仅仅关乎官僚作风。北约的凝聚力历来依赖于各方付出相当的努力和透明的责任分担。如果韧性建设支出沦为无法核实的灰色地带，那么5%的目标非但不能加强盟国团结，反而会削弱盟国团结。

北约必须吸取正确的教训。

一些盟国质疑将国防开支提高到如此高水平的必要性，并认为海牙协议主要是为了安抚美国总统唐纳德·特朗普。他们可能会选择将现有的基础设施项目列入1.5%的预算范围，并且不愿听从北约总部的指示。

相比之下，北约东部边境的盟国对5%的承诺则有着更为具体的解读。对他们而言，3.5%的“硬防御”基准代表着威慑的最低要求，而1.5%的韧性要素同样重要。

但仅仅加倍投入坦克和弹药，就忽略了现代威慑和防御的本质。韧性并非硬实力的替代品，而是其赋能手段。前线国家自身也曾多次遭受破坏、网络攻击和能源基础设施中断。在混合战时代，保护那些在压力下维持社会稳定的能源和数字基础设施，正是这1.5%的资金窗口应该资助的内容。

轻视对韧性建设的投资也会削弱威慑和防御能力。挑战不在于是否应该在韧性建设上投入资金，而在于如何以可信且协调的方式进行投入。

韧性是另一种形式的防御。

自 2016 年华沙峰会以来，北约一直在讨论韧性问题，该峰会确立了七项“基本要求”：政府的连续性、安全的能源和通信、民用交通、食品和水安全，以及应对大规模伤亡和人口流动的能力。

这些并非无关紧要的问题。乌克兰抵御俄罗斯侵略的行动表明，军事力量依赖于民用系统的完整性和工业基础。如果桥梁不够坚固或港口被堵塞，旅级部队就无法部署；如果网络攻击瘫痪了民用电网，指挥网络也会失效。投资建设具有韧性的能源系统、强化数字基础设施和加强军事后勤保障并非慈善之举，而是至关重要的作战支持。

为了实现这一目标，北约必须通过实施以下步骤，将政治愿景转化为可衡量的实践：

制定一套共享的分类标准，明确哪些支出属于韧性支出，并根据类别或地区与北约区域防御计划建立分级或优先事项。

透明的报告标准，用于比较和核实各国的贡献。

采用基于结果的指标来评估项目是否切实提高了军事战备能力，而不仅仅是增加了新的预算项目。

严格的禁止重新贴标规则，只允许真正意义上的两用增强工程符合报销条件。例如，加固民用基础设施以承载重型装甲装备是合法的；但申报新建高速铁路的全部费用则不合法。

通过现有的北约安全投资计划（NSIP）开展重大的新多国项目，以确保在规划和融资方面保持统一和严格审查。

将 1.5% 的支出纳入北约国防规划流程（如适用），以使项目与欧洲现有的国防计划保持一致。

建立北约-欧盟联合协调机构，以防止重复工作并弥合行动差距。

如果没有这些保障措施，1.5% 的支出支柱将会招致会计造假，并削弱整个支出承诺的可信度。

从妥协到能力

时间紧迫，北约应及时做好准备，以便在2026年土耳其北约峰会上进行讨论。海牙达成的政治妥协为北约赢得了时间和共识。现在，北约必须将韧性建设转化为增强集体防御能力的倍增器。

北约东翼正在上演的辩论表明了其中的利害关系。这与其说是预算问题，不如说是战略平衡问题：实力不仅意味着拥有足以打赢下一场战争的军事力量，也意味着拥有一个能够有效应对低于武装冲突级别的危机的、具有韧性的社会。

如果以紧迫感、决心、纪律和透明度来处理，并借助创新和协作，新的基准可能会成为北约几十年来最重要的一步。

Justina Budginaite-Froehly、LeAnne Noelani Howard 和 Timo Koster 是大西洋理事会斯考克罗夫特战略与安全中心跨大西洋安全倡议的非常驻高级研究员。