Russia’s war could reshape the global arms market in favor of China俄罗斯的战争可能重塑全球军火市场格局,使之有利于中国。
Opinion: China has the opportunity, the incentive and the capacity to gain from Russia’s losses.

The war in Ukraine has taken a heavy toll on Russia’s capacity to supply arms to the international market due to both sanctions and attrition on the battlefield. If these changes lead to long-lasting effects on Russia’s defense-industrial base, opportunities could emerge for other suppliers to reshape the landscape of the international arms market, and China stands to benefit most.
The trend reversal in Russia’s arms sales predates its war in Ukraine and the pandemic. Until 2016, Russia had managed to expand and hold its share of the international arms market while reducing its dependence on sales to China. After 2016, publicly available data shows that Russia began to see major declines in the value of arms exported to almost all of its customers except India and China.
Russia could further lose its grasp on some countries’ arms markets due to production being diverted to the battlefield to cover massive equipment losses , which already is leading some countries to begin shopping elsewhere . Russia has already missed delivery deadlines for equipment and maintenance services to Cameroon and India — a key customer — and Russia may even be buying back its own exports to use in Ukraine.
When it comes to the race to fill the demand for Russian systems, China is in a uniquely advantageous position. Six of the 15 largest defense firms in the world are Chinese state-owned enterprises. China has the defense manufacturing capacity to meet domestic demand while delivering large orders of increasingly sophisticated systems and platforms to foreign buyers .
In recent years, China has delivered fourth-generation combat aircraft and a warship to Pakistan , and a large surface combat platform to Thailand . The Type 054 A/P frigate delivered to Pakistan is the largest and allegedly most advanced warship China has ever exported. As a result, in just two years China almost tripled the value of its arms sales from its 10-year low in 2020.
China is in a sweet spot to address capability gaps. Many sophisticated Chinese systems are derived from Russian counterparts, and mid- and long-range air defense systems are among the most sought-after capabilities by Russia’s customers. China has developed the HQ-9 series and HQ-17 series of surface-to-air missile systems based on reverse-engineered Russian S-300 systems and Tor-M1 surface-to-air missile systems — and with improvements . They offer better performance compared to their Russian counterparts to countries where Western suppliers are unwilling to export similar capabilities, such as Serbia .
In addition, China’s rapid progress in fielding and exporting drones is part of its transition from the niche exporter of “value arms” (cost-effective but lower-tech systems) to the exporter of cutting-edge capabilities. Drones have helped China gain a foothold in markets with an entrenched presence of not only Russia, but the U.S. as well.
For example, during the past 10 years, China’s arms sales to Saudi Arabia (which is the United States’ top military sales customer) as well as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (among Russia’s top customers) focused almost exclusively on unmanned air-to-ground strike capabilities with the Wing Loong series and CH (or Rainbow) series UAVs paired with guided munitions.
While the U.S. dominates the Saudi arms market, Washington has thus far been reluctant to sell UAVs to the country , providing a market opening for China. Saudi Arabia has even opted to jointly produce UAVs with China. As drones become the star of the show in Ukraine and the Nagorno-Karabakh war, the demand for UAVs is likely to keep growing, which holds great prospects for China as long as the drones continue to demonstrate effectiveness as they did in Africa .
China exerts flexibility in choosing where to sell arms, and its products have miraculously shown up in places where the country promised not to sell them , like the Shaanxi Baoji Tiger armored personnel carriers seen used by Russian forces in Ukraine. Beijing also offers attractive pricing to buyers, though sometimes with a caveat.
Some buyers have begun to complain about serious quality deficiencies in their Chinese purchases, such as four warships sold to Pakistan that are unable to fire missiles on a target, or the JF-17 fighter fleet grounded by Myanmar due to technical malfunctions. China may need to overcome bad publicity about its products’ quality if it is to fully realize the potential benefits presented by Russia’s losses.
The war in Ukraine is straining Russia’s defense production, which is having downstream effects on Moscow’s ability to export arms. These challenges might plague Russia for years or even decades to come if the nation needs to reconstitute its military’s inventory after the war. China has the opportunity, the incentive and the capacity to gain from Russia’s losses. As Russia relinquishes more of its share of the global arms market, there is not much standing in the way of China’s success.
Weilong Kong is an assistant policy researcher at the think tank Rand.
乌克兰战争对俄罗斯向国际市场供应武器的能力造成了沉重打击,制裁和战场损耗都加剧了这一影响。如果这些变化对俄罗斯的国防工业基础产生长期影响,其他供应商可能会抓住机会重塑国际武器市场格局,而中国有望从中获益最多。
俄罗斯武器销售趋势的逆转早于乌克兰战争和新冠疫情。2016年之前,俄罗斯在扩大和维持其国际武器市场份额的同时,还降低了对中国军售的依赖。但2016年之后,公开数据显示,除印度和中国外,俄罗斯对几乎所有客户的武器出口额均出现大幅下滑。
由于大量装备损失被转移到战场,俄罗斯的武器生产可能进一步削弱其在一些国家武器市场的影响力,这已导致一些国家开始转向其他供应商。俄罗斯已经未能按时向喀麦隆和印度(其重要客户)交付装备和提供维护服务,甚至可能正在回购自己出口的武器用于乌克兰战场。
在满足俄罗斯国防系统需求的竞争中,中国拥有得天独厚的优势。全球15家最大的国防企业中,有6家是中国国有企业。中国拥有强大的国防制造能力,既能满足国内需求,又能向海外买家交付日益复杂的系统和平台的大批量订单。
近年来,中国向巴基斯坦交付了第四代战斗机和一艘军舰,并向泰国交付了一艘大型水面作战平台。交付给巴基斯坦的054型A/P护卫舰是迄今为止中国出口的最大、据称也是最先进的军舰。因此,短短两年内,中国的军售额就几乎翻了三倍,从2020年十年来的最低点增长到如今的水平。
中国在弥补能力差距方面处于有利地位。许多先进的中国系统都源自俄罗斯的同类产品,而中远程防空系统正是俄罗斯客户最渴望获得的能力之一。中国基于对俄罗斯S-300系统和Tor-M1地空导弹系统的逆向工程,并在此基础上进行了改进,研制出了HQ-9系列和HQ-17系列地空导弹系统。与俄罗斯同类产品相比,这些中国产品在向塞尔维亚等西方供应商不愿出口类似能力的国家提供更优异的性能。
此外,中国在无人机部署和出口方面的快速进展,标志着其从“高性价比武器”(成本低但技术含量较低的系统)的小众出口国向尖端技术出口国转型。无人机帮助中国在俄罗斯和美国都占据主导地位的市场站稳了脚跟。
例如,在过去的 10 年里,中国对沙特阿拉伯(美国最大的军售客户)以及埃及和阿拉伯联合酋长国(俄罗斯的主要客户)的武器销售几乎完全集中在无人空对地打击能力上,主要采用翼龙系列和 CH(或彩虹)系列无人机以及制导武器。
尽管美国主导着沙特阿拉伯的武器市场,但华盛顿迄今为止一直不愿向该国出售无人机,这为中国打开了市场。沙特阿拉伯甚至选择与中国联合生产无人机。随着无人机在乌克兰和纳戈尔诺-卡拉巴赫战争中发挥重要作用,对无人机的需求可能会持续增长,只要无人机继续像在非洲那样展现出效能,这对中国来说就蕴藏着巨大的前景。
中国在武器销售地点的选择上展现出灵活性,其产品甚至奇迹般地出现在一些中国曾承诺不出售的地方,例如在乌克兰被俄罗斯军队使用的陕西宝鸡“虎”式装甲运兵车。北京也向买家提供极具吸引力的价格,尽管有时会附加一些条件。
一些买家开始抱怨从中国购买的商品存在严重的质量缺陷,例如出售给巴基斯坦的四艘军舰无法向目标发射导弹,以及缅甸因技术故障而停飞的JF-17战斗机机队。如果中国想要充分把握俄罗斯损失带来的潜在利益,就必须克服其产品质量方面的负面舆论。
乌克兰战争正使俄罗斯的国防生产捉襟见肘,进而影响莫斯科的武器出口能力。如果俄罗斯需要在战后重建其军事装备,这些挑战可能会在未来数年甚至数十年内持续困扰该国。中国有机会、有动机也有能力从俄罗斯的损失中获益。随着俄罗斯在全球军火市场份额的不断下降,中国的成功之路将畅通无阻。
孔伟龙是兰德智库的助理政策研究员。