French defense committee takes swipe at German industry tack

PARIS — France’s lower-house defense committee took a swipe at what it described as Germany’s self-interested approach in European defense matters, saying the Berlin government’s promotion of domestic firms comes at the expense of the greater industrial cooperation that is needed to increase strategic autonomy in the European Union.

European defense-industry cooperation should systemically apply a “best athlete” approach, said Jean-Louis Thiériot, one of two rapporteurs of an information report on Europe’s defense industry, in a parliamentary committee presentation on Wednesday. Participating countries should stop seeing joint programs as a tool to boost the skills of national manufacturers in a given segment, and the “principle of geographic return” should be scrapped, he said.

While France and Germany have moved ahead on joint programs to develop a sixth-generation fighter and a new battle tank , the rapporteurs said that Germany torpedoed several joint programs, didn’t involve France in the launch of its European Sky Shield Initiative, and is using the war in Ukraine to expand its defense-industry presence in Eastern Europe.

“Germany is now developing a genuine defense industrial strategy to extend its sphere of influence in Europe, which tends to increase the competitive logic even more, at the expense of the cooperative logic,” Thiériot said.

The new broadside at Berlin follows a storied history of bilateral defense-industrial squabbling, based on lingering mistrust, that senior government leaders from both countries have managed to wrangle at crucial moments to ensure joint programs can move forward.

Competition between European defense companies is “very strong” and even increasing, mainly because industrial cooperation is weak. Only 18% of capital expenditure on defense by European Union member states is collaborative, against a target of 35%, according to the rapporteurs.

While lack of political will may weigh on joint programs, the committee says the main hurdles are difficulties such as excessive time frames. Thiériot highlighted the Eurodrone program, with talks starting in 2013, for an arrival in the armed forces no earlier than 2030 at best, “in a radically different strategic context, with no certainty that what will arrive will correspond exactly to the needs of the time.”

Joint programs are also marred by participating governments seeking a return on investment for local firms rather than a best-in-class approach, while the value of capability harmonization is often diminished by demands for national specifications. The report cites the example of the NH90 medium-sized helicopter, which exists in nearly 50 different versions across European countries.

Strong intra-European competition is linked to “non-cooperative national strategies,” with the European space industry the biggest victim, according the committee.

The panel said Germany is the first to reaffirm competing national strategies in Europe, torpedoing Franco-German cooperation on the Maritime Airborne Warfare System patrol aircraft, the Tigre attack helicopter Standard 3 and the Common Indirect Fire System artillery project.

It says Berlin took “full advantage” of the NATO Framework Nations Concept to establish itself as the lead nation for the European Sky Shield missile defense project, which excludes MBDA, Europe’s leading missile manufacturer, while France was not involved in its launch. The project promotes Israel’s Arrow-3 and the U.S. Patriot system, “even though our Franco-Italian SAMP/T ground-air defense system could have met German requirements,” Thiérot said.

In the wake of the war in Ukraine, Germany is also pursuing a strategy of penetrating the defense markets of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, according to the committee report.

Rheinmetall is playing a “central role” through an aggressive expansion policy in those markets, with several partnerships to set up factories in Eastern Europe and co-finance a tank development project in Hungary, “even though we all know how divergent Hungary’s strategic choices can be from those of Europe in general,” Thiérot said.

The committee’s report is based on almost 50 hearings in Paris as well as roughly 30 interviews with executives, military and policy makers in various countries, including Sweden, Italy and Poland.

Rudy Ruitenberg is a Europe correspondent for Defense News. He started his career at Bloomberg News and has experience reporting on technology, commodity markets and politics.

巴黎——法国下议院国防委员会抨击德国在欧洲防务事务中奉行的自私自利的做法，称柏林政府扶持国内企业的做法是以牺牲欧盟提高战略自主性所需的更广泛的产业合作为代价的。

欧洲国防工业信息报告的两名报告员之一让-路易·蒂埃里奥周三在议会委员会作证时表示，欧洲国防工业合作应系统性地采用“优胜劣汰”模式。他指出，参与国不应再将联合项目视为提升本国制造商在特定领域技能的工具，并应废除“地域回报原则”。

尽管法国和德国在联合开发第六代战斗机和新型主战坦克方面取得了进展，但报告员表示，德国破坏了几个联合项目，没有让法国参与其“欧洲天空之盾”倡议的启动，并且正在利用乌克兰战争扩大其在东欧的国防工业影响力。

蒂埃里奥表示：“德国现在正在制定一项真正的国防工业战略，以扩大其在欧洲的影响范围，这往往会进一步增强竞争逻辑，而牺牲合作逻辑。”

柏林的这场新交锋延续了两国在国防工业领域长期存在的争端，这种争端源于根深蒂固的不信任。两国高级政府领导人在关键时刻设法化解了这些争端，以确保联合项目能够向前推进。

欧洲国防企业之间的竞争“非常激烈”，而且愈演愈烈，这主要是因为产业合作薄弱。报告指出，欧盟成员国国防资本支出中只有18%是合作支出，而目标是35%。

尽管缺乏政治意愿可能会对联合项目造成阻碍，但委员会表示，主要障碍在于诸如时间框架过长等难题。蒂埃里奥特重点提到了欧洲无人机项目，该项目于2013年启动谈判，但最早也要到2030年才能装备军队，“届时战略环境将截然不同，而且无法保证最终交付的产品能够完全满足时代的需求。”

联合项目也受到参与国政府的制约，这些政府往往寻求的是本地企业的投资回报，而非追求一流水平；同时，对国家规格的要求也常常削弱了能力协调的价值。报告以NH90中型直升机为例，该机型在欧洲各国存在近50种不同的版本。

委员会认为，激烈的欧洲内部竞争与“不合作的国家战略”有关，而欧洲航天工业是最大的受害者。

该小组表示，德国是第一个重申欧洲各国战略相互竞争的国家，破坏了法德两国在海上空中作战系统巡逻机、虎式攻击直升机标准3型和通用间接火力系统火炮项目上的合作。

报告称，柏林“充分利用”了北约框架国家概念，将自身确立为欧洲“天空之盾”导弹防御项目的主导国，该项目将欧洲领先的导弹制造商MBDA排除在外，而法国也未参与该项目的启动。蒂埃罗表示，该项目推广以色列的“箭-3”导弹和美国的“爱国者”导弹系统，“尽管我们法意联合研制的SAMP/T地空防御系统本可以满足德国的要求”。

委员会报告称，在乌克兰战争之后，德国也在推行打入东欧和波罗的海国家国防市场的战略。

蒂埃罗表示，莱茵金属公司通过积极的扩张政策在这些市场中扮演着“核心角色”，它与多家公司合作在东欧建厂，并共同资助匈牙利的一个坦克开发项目，“尽管我们都知道匈牙利的战略选择与整个欧洲的战略选择有多么不同”。

该委员会的报告基于在巴黎举行的近 50 场听证会，以及对包括瑞典、意大利和波兰在内的各个国家的企业高管、军方人士和政策制定者进行的约 30 次采访。

鲁迪·鲁伊滕贝格是《防务新闻》的欧洲记者。他的职业生涯始于彭博新闻社，拥有报道科技、大宗商品市场和政治方面的经验。