Maritime patrol aircraft, support ship among Korea's options for Strait of Hormuz mission

Seoul is weighing possible Korean contributions to a Strait of Hormuz mission, with military experts saying surveillance, logistics support and mine-clearing are the most practical roles. Cheong Wa Dae said Friday that no decision has been made and that it is considering combat, noncombat and search options. The Navy’s P-8A Poseidon and the 11,000-ton support ship ROKS Soyang are among the assets being considered.

The Navy operates six P-8A Poseidon aircraft, which entered service in July 2025.

The ROKS Soyang is an 11,000-ton fast combat support ship designed to resupply naval vessels with fuel, ammunition and other supplies.

Cheong Wa Dae said Friday that discussions had not yet reached the stage of consultations with the National Assembly.

Kang Eun-ho said an escort vessel would be needed to protect a Korean support ship operating in a high-threat environment.

Shin Jong-woo said Korean naval assets could support the evacuation of Korean nationals from the Middle East if the conflict worsens.

Published Sep 4, 2026 4:50 pm KST

Updated Sep 4, 2026 5:26 pm KST

Experts favor surveillance, logistics, mine clearance over direct combat

A Navy P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft takes off for pilot training at the Naval Aviation Command's airfield in Pohang, North Gyeongsang Province, July 2, 2025. Courtesy of Republic of Korea Navy

As Seoul weighs how to contribute to efforts to restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, attention is turning to what military assets Korea could realistically send — and what missions they could perform without drawing the country directly into combat with Iran.

Military experts say maritime surveillance, logistics support and mine-clearing operations could be the most practical roles for Korean forces in the Strait of Hormuz, allowing Seoul to contribute to securing the strategic waterway while limiting the risks of direct involvement in the conflict.

Cheong Wa Dae said Friday that no decision has been made on whether to deploy forces or what assets could be sent, adding that it is considering a range of options, including combat, noncombat and search missions.

Military readiness on the Korean Peninsula is also a key consideration. A Cheong Wa Dae official said Seoul could consider options that would not significantly undermine its readiness posture at home.

Kang Eun-ho, former head of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration and a professor at Korea Aerospace University’s Graduate School of Aerospace Policy, said Korea should steer clear of direct combat operations and focus on indirect support, such as logistics and mine clearance.

“Direct military support or combat involvement would be going a bit too far. Logistics support or mine-clearing operations would be appropriate,” Kang said, adding that such missions would allow Korea to contribute while taking into account its future relations with Iran and the broader international context.

Shin Jong-woo, secretary general of the Korea Defense & Security Forum, also saw little likelihood of Korean forces entering the narrow strait for direct combat.

“Even if we send maritime patrol aircraft or a support ship, they are not assets that would turn the situation around in the war,” Shin said. “I think the symbolic meaning is greater – that Korea is also taking part.”

Among the assets reportedly being considered are the Navy’s P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and the 11,000-ton fast combat support ship ROKS Soyang.

Commercial vessels lie anchored in the Strait of Hormuz off Bandar Abbas, Iran, Friday. AP-Yonhap

The Ministry of National Defense, however, said Friday that nothing has been decided.

The P-8A could provide surveillance over a wide area without placing a Korean warship directly in the strait.

Although its primary role is anti-submarine warfare, the aircraft is equipped with radar and electro-optical and infrared sensors for detecting and tracking targets at sea. The Navy operates six P-8As, which entered service in July 2025.

Shin said a P-8A could monitor activity that poses a threat to commercial vessels and pass information gathered from the air to forces operating in the area.

Kang also said the aircraft could be used in a supporting role, although its primary mission is anti-submarine warfare.

Soyang offers another option. The ship is designed to resupply naval vessels with fuel, ammunition and other supplies, allowing them to remain at sea for extended operations.

Kang favored logistics support over sending combat forces, saying it would offer a clearer rationale for Korean participation without putting Korean forces directly into the fighting.

Deploying a support ship, however, could raise another question: how to protect it.

Kang said an escort vessel would be needed to protect a Korean support ship operating in a high-threat environment. That could turn what begins as the deployment of a noncombat support vessel into a larger naval commitment.

Mine clearance emerged as another option supported by both experts.

Kang said mine-clearing operations would have a broader justification because they could protect commercial and other vessels using the waterway, rather than directly supporting attacks against Iran.

Shin said mine clearance could become particularly relevant once fighting subsides. He noted that modern mine countermeasure operations increasingly use unmanned underwater vehicles to locate and remove mines.

“If we send a combat ship, it could be seen in the context of engaging Iran,” Shin said. Given Korea’s diplomatic relations with Iran, he said, mine clearance “would not be a bad option.”

Any overseas deployment would still come at some cost to Korea’s own military posture.

Kang said sending either aircraft or naval vessels abroad would inevitably reduce the assets available for operations around the Korean Peninsula, an issue the government would have to weigh when determining the size and duration of any mission.

Another possible role could arise if the conflict worsens. Shin said Korean naval assets could support the evacuation of Korean nationals from the Middle East, as the Cheonghae Unit has done in previous overseas evacuation operations.

Cheong Wa Dae said discussions have not yet reached the stage of consultations with the National Assembly, emphasizing that the government is still reviewing what form, if any, Korea’s contribution should take.

首尔方面正在权衡韩国可能参与霍尔木兹海峡行动的可能性，军事专家表示，监视、后勤支援和扫​​雷是最切实可行的角色。青瓦台周五表示，尚未做出任何决定，正在考虑作战、非作战和搜索等多种方案。海军的P-8A“海神”反潜巡逻机和11000吨级的支援舰“昭阳”号都在考虑之列。

海军拥有六架 P-8A 海神飞机，于 2025 年 7 月投入使用。

韩国昭阳号是一艘11000吨级的快速战斗支援舰，设计用于为海军舰艇补给燃料、弹药和其他物资。

青瓦台周五表示，相关讨论尚未达到与国会磋商的阶段。

康恩浩表示，需要一艘护航舰艇来保护在高度危险环境下作业的韩国支援舰艇。

申钟宇表示，如果冲突恶化，韩国海军力量可以支援从中东撤离韩国国民。

发布于2026年9月4日下午4:50（韩国标准时间）

更新于2026年9月4日下午5:26（韩国标准时间）

专家们更倾向于侦察、后勤保障和排雷，而不是直接作战。

2025年7月2日，一架海军P-8A“海神”海上巡逻机从韩国海军航空司令部位于庆尚北道浦项市的机场起飞，进行飞行员训练。图片由韩国海军提供。

首尔正在权衡如何为恢复霍尔木兹海峡的航行自由做出贡献，人们的注意力转向了韩国实际能够派遣哪些军事力量，以及这些力量可以执行哪些任务而不会将韩国直接拖入与伊朗的战争。

军事专家表示，海上监视、后勤支援和扫​​雷行动可能是韩国军队在霍尔木兹海峡最实际的作用，这既能让首尔为确保这条战略水道的安全做出贡献，又能限制其直接卷入冲突的风险。

青瓦台周五表示，尚未决定是否部署兵力或派遣哪些资源，并补充说，正在考虑一系列选项，包括作战、非作战和搜救任务。

朝鲜半岛的军事战备也是一个关键考量因素。青瓦台一位官员表示，首尔方面可以考虑一些不会显著削弱其国内战备状态的方案。

韩国国防采办计划管理局前局长、韩国航空大学航空航天政策研究生院教授姜恩浩表示，韩国应该避免直接作战行动，而应专注于后勤和扫雷等间接支援。

康表示：“直接军事支持或战斗参与有点过头了。后勤支持或扫雷行动比较合适。”他还补充说，此类任务可以让韩国在考虑到其与伊朗的未来关系和更广泛的国际形势的同时，做出贡献。

韩国国防安全论坛秘书长申钟宇也认为，韩国军队进入狭窄海峡进行直接战斗的可能性很小。

申东赫表示：“即使我们派出海上巡逻机或支援舰艇，这些也无法扭转战局。我认为其象征意义更为重要——表明韩国也参与了战争。”

据报道，正在考虑的资产包括海军的 P-8A 海神海上巡逻机和 11000 吨级的快速战斗支援舰 ROKS 昭阳号。

周五，商船停泊在伊朗阿巴斯港附近的霍尔木兹海峡。美联社-韩联社

然而，国防部周五表示，尚未做出任何决定。

P-8A 可以在不将韩国军舰直接部署到海峡的情况下，对大片区域进行监视。

虽然其主要任务是反潜作战，但该飞机也配备了雷达、光电传感器和红外传感器，用于探测和跟踪海上目标。海军目前拥有六架P-8A反潜巡逻机，于2025年7月正式服役。

申表示，P-8A 可以监控对商船构成威胁的活动，并将从空中收集到的信息传递给在该地区作战的部队。

康还表示，该飞机可以用于支援角色，尽管其主要任务是反潜作战。

“昭阳”号提供了另一种选择。该舰的设计目的是为海军舰艇补给燃料、弹药和其他物资，使其能够长时间在海上执行任务。

康恩倾向于提供后勤支援而不是派遣作战部队，他说这样可以为韩国参战提供更清晰的理由，而无需让韩国军队直接投入战斗。

然而，部署支援舰可能会引发另一个问题：如何保护它。

康表示，在高度危险的环境中执行任务的韩国支援舰需要护航舰艇进行保护。这可能会使原本部署的非战斗支援舰艇演变成更大规模的海军行动。

两位专家都支持另一种排雷方案。

康表示，扫雷行动的理由更为广泛，因为它可以保护使用该水道的商船和其他船只，而不是直接支持对伊朗的袭击。

申先生表示，一旦战事平息，排雷工作可能变得尤为重要。他指出，现代水雷反制行动越来越多地使用无人水下航行器来定位和清除水雷。

申东赫表示：“如果我们派出作战舰艇，可能会被视为与伊朗发生冲突。” 他还说，考虑到韩国与伊朗的外交关系，扫雷“也不失为一个好选择”。

任何海外部署都会对韩国自身的军事态势造成一定影响。

康表示，向海外派遣飞机或海军舰艇必然会减少可用于朝鲜半岛周边作战的资源，政府在决定任何任务的规模和持续时间时都必须权衡这个问题。

如果冲突升级，韩国海军可能还会扮演另一种角色。申表示，韩国海军力量可以像清海部队以往在海外撤侨行动中那样，支援从中东撤离韩国公民。

青瓦台表示，讨论尚未达到与国会磋商的阶段，并强调政府仍在审查韩国应以何种形式（如果有的话）做出贡献。