Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 29, 2026

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues attempts to falsely assert control over settlements in the Lyman direction that Ukrainian forces liberated during Operation Vivaldi. The Russian MoD published a series of videos on September 29 purporting to show Russian servicemembers in Ridkodub, Novomykhailivka, and Nove (all north of Lyman) in an attempt to assert Russian control over the settlements.[1] The Russian MoD released the footage one day after the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps publicized details of the third phase of Operation Vivaldi, which included the liberation of Nove, Ridkodub, and Novomykhailivka.[2] The Russian MoD’s footage, while genuine, is old and was likely taken when Russian forces first seized the settlements in 2025 prior to Ukrainian counterattacks in 2026. A Russian milblogger highlighted how the Russian MoD’s footage shows a standing telephone pole, while the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps footage shows the pole destroyed — demonstrating that the Russian footage is older.[3] The Russian information space has grown increasingly critical of the Russian MoD’s failure to acknowledge Operation Vivaldi and where the true frontline is.[4]

The Russian MoD’s continuous denial of Ukrainian successes in Operation Vivaldi despite overwhelming evidence continues to fuel Russian ultranationalist and milblogger criticism of the Russian military’s pervasive culture of lying. Several Russian milbloggers continued to acknowledge the effects of Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi and protest the Russian MoD’s refusal to recognize the severity of the situation for Russian forces operating in this direction.[5] Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps published footage of a large group of Russian prisoners of war (POWs) on September 28 and reported that Ukrainian forces captured over 250 POWs during the first three phases of Operation Vivaldi.[6] Prominent Russian-backed former Ukrainian separatist politician Oleg Tsaryov responded to this footage and stated that the Russian MoD’s refusal to acknowledge the footage is outrageous, as Russian ”mothers and wives” of Russian personnel must search the Ukrainian video releases with POWs for their ”loved ones.“.[7] Tsaryov stated that continued Russian denial of Operation Vivaldi has allowed Ukraine to detonate an ”information bomb” and left Russians to speculate about events on the frontline. Tsaryov stated that Russians can accept Russian military failure and still support the Russian military, but they cannot support ”being taken for fools.” Russian sources have been increasingly critical of the Russian military’s pervasive culture of lying and calling out the serious consequences for Russian commanders’ ability to understand battlefield realities and operational planning and for Russians’ own understanding of the war and its consequences.

The Kremlin reportedly plans to significantly increase defense spending in 2027 as Russian attempts to raise public revenues have failed to offset rising debt and deficit estimates. Reuters reported on September 28, citing leaked Russian government documents, that the Kremlin plans to increase defense spending by 27 percent in 2027 to 17.1 trillion rubles (roughly $204.2 billion), from 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly $161.2 billion) in 2026.[8] The documents reportedly plan to increase total defense spending to 50 trillion rubles (roughly $597 billion) between 2027 and 2030. The Russian government has raised defense spending annually since 2022, as the Kremlin continues to prioritize the war in Ukraine despite the economic costs.[9] Russian authorities have implemented a series of suboptimal economic policies to increase available capital to the defense industry, leading to increased budget deficits.[10] The documents reportedly show that the Russian government doubled its 2026 budget deficit estimate from 1.6 percent of GDP to 3.2 percent of GDP and increased spending by 13.2 percent to 48.6 trillion rubles (roughly $580.3 billion or 20.9 percent of Russian GDP). The documents reportedly indicate that Russia plans to increase net public borrowing by 26 percent and raise total borrowing by 43 percent to 7.7 trillion rubles (roughly $91.9 billion) in 2027, while state debt will rise from 19.9 percent of GDP in 2026 to 21.7 percent of GDP in 2027, which is above the 20 percent of GDP threshold that Russian authorities consider “safe.” Rising defense spending without adequate revenue increases or non-defense expenditure reductions inevitably contributes to rising public debt, which burdens Russian citizens through rising inflation and future debt servicing costs. Russian President Vladimir Putin has grossly mismanaged the Russian economy, which is suffering due to unsustainably high spending on the Russian military and Russian defense industrial base (DIB).[11]

Rising Russian defense spending is forcing the Kremlin to sacrifice non-defense-related spending and raise revenues through new and increased taxes — policies that have failed to offset expenditures. The Kremlin has directly placed the burden of its protracted war in Ukraine onto the Russian domestic populace, leading to stagnant investment in the civilian industries and contributing to inflation, while Russian banks also pass on lending pressures from the Russian DIB onto consumers.[12] The documents indicate that Russian officials expect that the new windfall tax on Russian metals and mining companies will raise additional funds in 2027, but not nearly enough to offset the anticipated 1.3 trillion-ruble (roughly 15.5 billion USD) reduction in oil and gas revenues in 2026.[13] The documents also reportedly plan for a seven percent reduction in spending on social policy in 2027, including payments for war veterans, state pensions, and maternity benefits; a six percent reduction in education spending; a 6.8 percent reduction in healthcare funding; and a 7.4 percent reduction in “national economy” spending, including road construction, infrastructure projects, and agricultural and other sectoral subsidies.[14] Russian defense spending is increasingly crowding out both the Russian federal budget and the civilian economy as the Kremlin struggles to raise revenues, forcing reductions in social and commercial spending and contributing to inflation and stagnating growth and investment.[15] Putin’s unwavering commitment to his war in Ukraine will continue to burden ordinary Russians, and the Kremlin’s fiscal policy demonstrates that Putin is willing to sacrifice the health, education, and prosperity of Russian citizens to ensure the continued financing of the war effort, despite Russian forces achieving only marginal battlefield gains while losing more soldiers than they can recruit.[16]

Russian President Vladimir Putin held several meetings with senior Russian officials on September 28 to present the State Duma election results as an endorsement of Putin’s policies and continued war effort in Ukraine . Putin met with Russian Central Election Commissioner Ella Pamfilova and with high-ranking officials from parties that won seats in the State Duma on September 28 to discuss the Duma election results, presenting the predetermined results as evidence of sweeping domestic support for Putin and his war.[17] Putin claimed during a meeting with high-ranking Duma representatives that Russia will “undoubtedly” secure victory over its enemies and that all parties in the Duma support efforts to unify security and economic policy.[18] Pamfilova told Putin that no State Duma parties expressed dissent with the official election results and claimed that this demonstrates the election results’ legitimacy.[19] United Russia Chairperson and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed that the election results prove Russian society’s “unprecedented consolidation” around Putin, and State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin claimed that all parties in the Duma understand the need to contribute to victory in Ukraine.[20] Pamfilova stated that 46 Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine were elected to the State Duma (which has a total of 450 seats) and 655 veterans won elections across all electoral levels, of which 573 are members of the United Russia Party.[21] Veterans’ participation in the elections is a central part of Putin’s efforts to militarize the State Duma, expand the influence of pro-war voices in the Russian information space, and politically empower and enfranchise veterans as an emerging key demographic in Russian society. Putin, Pamfilova, and the party representatives are framing the election results as a confirmation of Russian society’s support for Putin’s policies and potential measures to support the war effort in Ukraine. The Kremlin will likely use the predetermined results to demand long-term societal sacrifices from the Russian public, including for potential mobilization.

Estonian officials attributed the August 15 arson attack against the Milrem Robotics defense company in Tallinn, Estonia, to the Russian Federation. Estonian officials announced on September 29 that they determined that Russian security services were responsible for the attack and that Russia is increasingly employing repeated acts of sabotage to intimidate Europe from supporting Ukraine.[22] Russia has been escalating behavior toward NATO states, including through air incursions, sabotage, false flag provocations, EW interference, and overflights.[23] The attack is consistent with the Kremlin’s recent and concerted campaign of malign operations against NATO aimed at degrading Europe’s will and ability to provide aid to Ukraine.[24]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to marginally increase the authorized end strength of the Russian Armed Forces as part of ongoing Russian military reforms. Putin signed a decree on September 28 expanding the strength of the Russian Armed Forces to 2,441,630 total personnel, including 1,550,500 military personnel.[25] The decree represents an increase of 15,500 military personnel compared to Putin’s July 27 decree, which increased the authorized end-strength to 2,426,130 total personnel, including 1,535,000 military personnel.[26] Putin has signed four such decrees in 2026, increasing the end-strength of the Russian Armed Forces by a total of 49,860 personnel. Putin signed decrees increasing the size of the Russian military by 137,000 in 2022, 170,000 in 2023, and 180,000 in 2024, and the 2026 increases are the lowest so far. The end-strength increases are marginal and likely not directly connected to a possible mobilization, which Russian authorities have been setting conditions for and preparing to conduct.[27] Any decision to increase authorized end-strength will simultaneously support the development of additional administrative capacity necessary to support larger and more complex force generation tasks, including those associated with Russia’s biannual conscription cycle and any potential future mobilization. Increases in Russian military administrative capacity can better enable Russia to activate, integrate, train, and deploy new recruits. Russia’s semi-annual fall conscription process normally begins in October, and the biannual conscription cycle places a significant burden on Russia’s military administration.[28] Russia has been increasing its military administrative capacity since 2022 in various ways to alleviate administrative bottlenecks and expand the rate at which Russia can call up larger volumes of conscripts and reservists.[29]

A Russian Tu-95MS strategic bomber crashed near Krasnoyarovo, Amur Oblast, on September 29, likely after experiencing serious technical problems, possibly an onboard fuel explosion. [30] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 29 that the bomber crashed during a routine training flight and killed six crew members.[31] Russia primarily relies on Tu-95MS strategic bombers for long-range cruise missile strikes against Ukraine and to support broader reconnaissance missions.[32] Russian aviation still relies on certain Western-produced aviation components, and Western sanctions have likely complicated Russia’s ability to procure the aircraft’s complex and expensive components. Western sanctions have likely prevented Russia from conducting routine maintenance on an aging fleet of such aircraft, which very likely contributed to the crash.[33]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues attempts to falsely assert control over settlements in the Lyman direction that Ukrainian forces liberated during Operation Vivaldi.

The Russian MoD’s continuous denial of Ukrainian successes in Operation Vivaldi, despite overwhelming evidence, continues to fuel Russian ultranationalist and milblogger criticism of the Russian military’s pervasive culture of lying.

The Kremlin reportedly plans to significantly increase defense spending in 2027 as Russian attempts to raise public revenues have failed to offset rising debt and deficit estimates.

Russian President Vladimir Putin held several meetings with senior Russian officials on September 28 to present the State Duma election results as an endorsement of Putin’s policies and continued war effort in Ukraine.

Estonian officials attributed the August 15 arson attack against the Milrem Robotics defense company in Tallinn, Estonia, to the Russian Federation.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to marginally increase the authorized end-strength of the Russian Armed Forces as part of ongoing Russian military reforms.

A Russian Tu-95MS strategic bomber crashed near Krasnoyarovo, Amur Oblast, on September 29, likely after experiencing serious technical problems, possibly an onboard fuel explosion.

Ukrainian forces likely conducted a strike against Russian logistics infrastructure along the Russian-Belarusian international border on September 28 to 29. Russia launched one Zircon/Onyx anti-ship missile, two Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, and 152 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction and in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced in the Fortress Belt Outer Encirclement Effort.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces likely conducted a strike against Russian logistics infrastructure along the Russian-Belarusian international border on September 28 to 29. Ukrainian forces struck the Krasny Kamen international border checkpoint along the Russian-Belarusian border in Bryansk Oblast (roughly 36 kilometers from the international border with Ukraine) likely overnight on September 28 to 29, according to geolocated footage published on September 29.[34]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian aircraft in Russia. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian L-39 aircraft at Yeysk Airfield, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 178 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 28.[35]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 28 and 29 but did not make confirmed advances, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Sumy City. [36] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 29 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Ulanove (northwest of Sumy City).[37]

Russian offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast appear to have slowed in September, as Russian forces continue to launch drones and glide bombs towards Sumy City. Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Viktor Trehubov reported on September 29 that Russian offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast have slowed in September compared to August 2026.[38] Trehubov stated that the lower intensity of Russian offensive operations may be due to Russian manpower exhaustion in a sector that Russian military command does not consider a priority. Trehubov reported that Russian units operating in northern Sumy Oblast suffer from a shortage of supplies and low-quality personnel. A Ukrainian serviceman operating in northern Sumy Oblast also noted on September 29 that Russian forces decreased their offensive operational tempo in northern Sumy Oblast, but emphasized that Russian forces continue to conduct regular infiltration missions.[39] The Ukrainian serviceman stated that Russian forces continue to launch a variety of drones and glide bombs towards Sumy City.

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian-occupied building in Hrafske (northeast of Kharkiv City), according to geolocated footage published on September 27, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely cleared Hrafske of Russian infiltrators.[40] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on September 29 that elements of the Russian 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 344th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Kreidyanka, but ISW has not observed evidence of any Russian positions in the settlement.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 28 and 29 but did not advance. [42]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kupyansk. Ukrainian forces recently cleared Russian positions north of Kalynove (northwest of Kupyansk), according to geolocated footage published on September 28, indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced in the area.[43] The footage was accompanied by a Ukrainian regiment’s statements asserting that Ukrainian forces had cleared the entire forested area northwest of Kalynove.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Novoyehorivka (roughly 17 kilometers from the frontline) on September 28 or overnight on September 28 to 29.[44]

Russian forces have decreased their tempo of offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction in September 2026. Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Viktor Trehubov reported on September 29 that Russian forces noticeably decreased their offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction from August to September, despite Russian forces remaining active on the east bank of the Oskil River.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported only one combat engagement in the Kupyansk direction from September 28 to 29.[46]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 29, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced. [47]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 29 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points in occupied Kyrnosove and Novoaydar (roughly 145 and 75 kilometers from the frontline) and an ammunition warehouse in occupied Druzhne (roughly 145 kilometers from the frontline).[48]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

See topline text for more information on the Lyman tactical effort.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman tactical effort on September 28 and 29, as Ukrainian forces continued to conduct significant counterattacks. [49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions east and northeast of Slovyansk, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area in order to slow Russian advances. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 28 and 29 that elements of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) conducted an infiltration mission between Starodubivka and Psykunivka (both northeast of Slovyansk) and into southeastern Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk).[50] Mashovets stated that the Russian 3rd CAA is attempting to accumulate as many assault infantry in the area as possible to advance towards Slovyansk from the east , though Ukrainian counterattacks have slowed the Russian 3rd CAA’s progress in this direction. Mashovets stated that the longer Russian forces conduct this direct effort towards Slovyansk and Kramatorsk (south of Slovyansk) from the east across this wide area, the less their chances of success are, as the effort requires significant and prolonged deployment of resources and personnel. Mashovets noted that Ukrainian forces’ successful elimination of the Russian 20th and 25th CAA’s (Western Grouping of Forces) bridgehead in the Lyman tactical area during Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi will likely hamper the 3rd CAA’s own offensive efforts towards Slovyansk directly from the east.[51]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission southeast of Kramatorsk, as Ukrainian forces either maintained positions or advanced east of Kramatorsk. Mashovets reported on September 29 that a Russian infiltration group was operating northeast of Fedorivka (southeast of Kramatorsk).[52] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Malynivka and Tykhonivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions west of the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas Canal, contrary to Russian claims.

Russian forces will likely need to deploy significantly more reserves to their effort to advance on the Fortress Belt from the east towards Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. Mashovets stated on September 29 that the Russian 3rd CAA would need to deploy at least one or even two full-fledged additional brigades to continue its persistent push toward the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.[53] Mashovets stated that the Russian 3rd CAA would need Russian military high command to deploy most or all of its operational reserves before breaking through to the immediate approaches of both cities.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces continued offensive operations in and southwest of Kostyantynivka and south and southeast of Druzhkivka on September 28 to 29, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[54]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian servicemember northwest of Dorozhnie, according to geolocated footage published on September 29, indicating that Russian forces advanced in the area.[55]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a 39N6 “Kasta” radar station in occupied Manhush (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline) and an ammunition warehouse in Kachkarske (roughly 123 kilometers from the frontline) on September 28 or on the night of September 28 to 29.[56]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 28 and 29 but did not advance. [57]

High drone density along the frontline in the Oleksandrivka direction is driving a shift towards remote mine emplacement. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on September 29 that high drone density in the area complicates manual anti-personnel and anti-tank mine operations.[58] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces instead use remote mining systems that can operate several kilometers behind the frontline and deliver mines deep into Russian-controlled territory.

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Ukrainian drone operations in the Hulyaipole direction are inhibiting Russian drone operations, evacuations, and logistics. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on September 28 that the Ukrainian strike campaign in the area is disrupting Russian drone operations, evacuation capabilities, and logistics, preventing Russian forces from conducting successful infiltration missions.[59]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 28 and 29 but did not advance. [60] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 29 that Russian forces are attacking Orikhiv from the east in an attempt to stretch Ukrainian forces across a wider area and prevent them from establishing strong defensive positions around Orikhiv.[61]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military logistics in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian logistics depot in Komysh-Zoria (roughly 53 kilometers from the frontline) on September 28 or on the night of September 28 to 29.[62]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 29.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military, logistical, and naval assets and infrastructure in occupied Crimea. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian radar system at the Belbek Air Base north of Sevastopol (roughly 225 kilometers from the frontline) and a BK-16 high-speed landing craft and a Mangust-class patrol boat in Sevastopol, according to geolocated footage published on September 28.[63]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11. [64]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 28 to 29 and during the day on September 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on September 29 that Russian forces launched one Zirkon or Onyx anti-ship missile and two Iskander-M or S-400 ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast; and 152 Shahed-type (82 of them jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[65] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed one Zirkon or Onyx anti-ship missile, two Iskander-M or S-400 missiles, and 106 drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strike vehicles struck 24 locations and that downed debris fell on 16 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces subsequently launched 112 Shahed-type (including 29 jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions, and other drones, during the day on September 29, and that Ukrainian forces downed 95 (18 of which were jet-powered) of these drones.[66] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck railway, commercial, energy, port, telecommunications, and residential infrastructure in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[67]

Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported that Russian strikes against Kyiv City on September 28 killed two people and injured 26.[68]

Russian forces are increasing their use of Geran-5 drone-missile hybrids in long-range strike packages against Ukraine to take advantage of limited Ukrainian jet-powered drone interception capabilities. A Ukrainian military journalist reported on September 28 that Russia used primarily jet-powered Geran-5 drone-missile hybrids as part of its long-range strike packages against Kyiv City and Oblast on September 28.[69] The journalist stated that Russian forces accumulated a stockpile of Geran-5 drone-missile hybrids and began deploying them against Ukraine amidst improving Ukrainian interception rate of jet-powered Geran-4 drones. The journalist stated that Ukrainian forces are currently intercepting 70 to 80 percent of Geran-4 drones but only 50 to 65 percent of Geran-5 drone-missile hybrids. The journalist noted that Ukrainian forces often intercept Geran-4 drones on the approaches to Kyiv City but do not intercept Geran-5 drone-missile hybrids until after they enter the metropolitan area. The journalist reported that Geran-4 and Geran-5 differ in their radar cross section, speed, and maneuverability, and their interception depends on weather, approach routes, and availability of Ukrainian interception ammunition. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces intercepted 70 percent of all strike drones compared to 57 percent of jet-powered Geran-type drones.[70]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/67731 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/67733 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/67734 [2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2026/ [3] https://t.me/milinfolive/180452 [4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ [5]https://t.me/rybar/83558; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48156; https://t.me/dva_majors/99694; https://t.me/milinfolive/180452; https://t.me/rybar/83579 [6] https://x.com/ab3army/status/2104469975184396423 [7] https://t.me/olegtsarov/47866 [8] https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-raises-2027-military-spending-by-27-budget-documents-show-2026-09-28/ [9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_12-23/ ; 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[64] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [65] https://t.me/kpszsu/81294 [66] https://t.me/kpszsu/81455 [67] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21119 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2104852526931521848 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2104852520849805458 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32232 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32238; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7688 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7690 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7691; https://t.me/kyivoda/59278 ; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid02dSWhen6886N2XUoQuTh56wW2bDoreGL4YGvcSKNXwEmk6fH6e6Hi23EoVG7RWNQKl ; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1414558-bili-z-artilerii-ta-atakuvali-sahedami-ak-minula-doba-na-mikolaivsini/ ; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3382 ; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3384 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/21140 ; https://www.facebook.com/ZabolotNAtalia/posts/pfbid0MadwCAVhjc5upuUE2bWPsrJwZq5fGYWZX2kuodUfDf7uNHBkBByViNtLxpN21n9Bl; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1JmCv9547g/ [68] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7689 [69] https://x.com/v_stus/status/2104684381893706117?s=20 [70] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/uves-den-sogodni-ataki-shahediv-uzhe-bilsh-nizh-120-droniv-9-106613

俄罗斯国防部持续试图错误地宣称对莱曼方向的定居点拥有控制权，这些定居点是乌克兰军队在“维瓦尔第行动”中解放的。9月29日，俄罗斯国防部发布了一系列视频，声称视频中俄罗斯军人在里德科杜布、新米哈伊利夫卡和诺韦（均位于莱曼以北）出现，试图以此证明俄罗斯对这些定居点的控制权。[1] 就在俄罗斯国防部发布这些视频的前一天，乌克兰第三军公布了“维瓦尔第行动”第三阶段的细节，其中包括解放诺韦、里德科杜布和新米哈伊利夫卡。[2]俄罗斯国防部提供的视频虽然真实，但年代久远，很可能是俄军在2025年首次占领这些定居点时拍摄的，当时乌克兰军队尚未在2026年发动反击。一位俄罗斯军事博主指出，俄罗斯国防部的视频显示一根电线杆仍然屹立，而乌克兰第三军的视频则显示电线杆已被摧毁——这表明俄罗斯提供的视频年代更久远。[3] 俄罗斯信息界对俄罗斯国防部未能承认“维瓦尔第行动”以及真正的战线位置的批评日益高涨。[4]

尽管有大量证据，俄罗斯国防部仍持续否认乌克兰在“维瓦尔第行动”中取得的胜利，这进一步加剧了俄罗斯极端民族主义者和军事博客作者对俄罗斯军队普遍存在的撒谎文化的批评。一些俄罗斯军事博客作者继续承认乌克兰“维瓦尔第行动”的成效，并抗议俄罗斯国防部拒绝承认俄军在该方向作战所面临的严峻形势。[5] 9月28日，乌克兰第三军公布了一大群俄罗斯战俘的视频，并报告称乌克兰军队在“维瓦尔第行动”的前三个阶段俘虏了超过250名战俘。[6]受俄罗斯支持的乌克兰前分离主义政治家奥列格·察廖夫就这段视频作出回应，称俄罗斯国防部拒绝承认这段视频令人愤慨，因为俄罗斯军人的“母亲和妻子”不得不从乌克兰公布的战俘视频中寻找她们的“亲人”。[7] 察廖夫表示，俄罗斯持续否认“维瓦尔第行动”使得乌克兰得以引爆“信息炸弹”，并让俄罗斯人对前线局势进行猜测。察廖夫指出，俄罗斯人可以接受俄罗斯军队的失败并继续支持俄罗斯军队，但他们无法接受“被当成傻瓜”。俄罗斯方面对俄罗斯军队普遍存在的撒谎文化日益持批评态度，并指出这种文化严重影响了俄罗斯指挥官理解战场现实和作战计划的能力，也影响了俄罗斯人对战争及其后果的理解。

据报道，由于俄罗斯增加公共收入的努力未能抵消不断增长的债务和赤字预期，克里姆林宫计划在2027年大幅增加国防开支。路透社9月28日援引泄露的俄罗斯政府文件报道称，克里姆林宫计划在2027年将国防开支增加27%，达到17.1万亿卢布（约合2042亿美元），高于2026年的13.5万亿卢布（约合1612亿美元）。[8] 据报道，这些文件计划在2027年至2030年间将国防总开支增加到50万亿卢布（约合5970亿美元）。自2022年以来，俄罗斯政府每年都在增加国防开支，尽管经济代价高昂，克里姆林宫仍将乌克兰战争列为优先事项。[9] 俄罗斯当局实施了一系列次优的经济政策，以增加国防工业的可用资金，导致预算赤字增加。[10]据报道，文件显示，俄罗斯政府将2026年预算赤字预期从占GDP的1.6%上调至3.2%，并将支出增加13.2%，达到48.6万亿卢布（约合5803亿美元，占俄罗斯GDP的20.9%）。文件还显示，俄罗斯计划在2027年将公共净借款增加26%，并将总借款增加43%，达到7.7万亿卢布（约合919亿美元）。与此同时，国家债务占GDP的比重将从2026年的19.9%上升至2027年的21.7%，超过俄罗斯当局认为的20%的“安全”阈值。在财政收入没有相应增加或非国防支出没有相应削减的情况下，国防开支的增加必然导致公共债务上升，进而通过通货膨胀和未来的偿债成本加重俄罗斯民众的负担。俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京严重管理不善俄罗斯经济，导致俄罗斯经济遭受重创，原因是俄罗斯军方和俄罗斯国防工业基地（DIB）的支出过高，难以为继。[11]

俄罗斯不断增长的国防开支迫使克里姆林宫削减非国防相关支出，并通过新增和提高税收来增加财政收入——但这些政策未能抵消支出。克里姆林宫将旷日持久的乌克兰战争的负担直接转嫁给俄罗斯国内民众，导致民用工业投资停滞不前，加剧了通货膨胀，同时俄罗斯银行也将俄罗斯国防工业银行（DIB）的贷款压力转嫁给消费者。[12] 文件显示，俄罗斯官员预计，对俄罗斯金属和矿业公司征收的新暴利税将在2027年带来额外资金，但这远远不足以抵消预计2026年石油和天然气收入减少1.3万亿卢布（约合155亿美元）。[13] 据报道，文件还计划在2027年削减7%的社会政策支出，包括退伍军人抚恤金、国家养老金和生育津贴；削减6%的教育支出；削减6.8%的医疗保健资金；国民经济支出削减了7.4%，其中包括道路建设、基础设施项目以及农业和其他部门的补贴。[14] 随着克里姆林宫努力增加财政收入，俄罗斯国防开支日益挤占了俄罗斯联邦预算和民用经济的份额，迫使其削减社会和商业支出，并导致通货膨胀和经济增长及投资停滞。[15] 普京对乌克兰战争的坚定承诺将继续加重普通俄罗斯人的负担，克里姆林宫的财政政策表明，尽管俄军在战场上仅取得微弱进展，且伤亡人数超过新兵招募数量，普京仍愿意牺牲俄罗斯公民的健康、教育和福祉，以确保战争的持续资金支持。[16]

9月28日，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京与多位俄罗斯高级官员举行会晤，将国家杜马选举结果解读为对其政策和在乌克兰持续战争的认可。普京会见了俄罗斯中央选举委员会委员埃拉·帕姆菲洛娃以及9月28日赢得国家杜马席位的各党派高级官员，讨论杜马选举结果，并将预先确定的结果作为普京及其战争在国内获得广泛支持的证据。[17] 普京在与杜马高级代表的会晤中声称，俄罗斯“无疑”将战胜敌人，并且杜马所有政党都支持统一安全和经济政策的努力。[18] 帕姆菲洛娃告诉普京，没有国家杜马政党对官方选举结果表示异议，并声称这表明了选举结果的合法性。[19]统一俄罗斯党主席兼俄罗斯联邦安全会议副主席德米特里·梅德韦杰夫声称，选举结果证明了俄罗斯社会围绕普京实现了“前所未有的团结”，国家杜马议长维亚切斯拉夫·沃洛金则声称，杜马所有政党都明白有必要为乌克兰的胜利做出贡献。[20] 帕姆菲洛娃指出，46名参加过乌克兰战争的俄罗斯老兵当选为国家杜马议员（国家杜马共有450个席位），另有655名老兵在各级选举中获胜，其中573人是统一俄罗斯党成员。[21] 退伍军人参与选举是普京旨在使国家杜马军事化、扩大亲战声音在俄罗斯信息空间的影响力以及赋予退伍军人政治权力和选举权（退伍军人是俄罗斯社会中一个新兴的关键群体）的核心举措之一。普京、帕姆菲洛娃和党内代表将选举结果解读为俄罗斯社会支持普京政策以及可能支持乌克兰战争措施的证明。克里姆林宫很可能会利用既定结果，要求俄罗斯民众做出长期的社会牺牲，包括可能进行的动员。

爱沙尼亚官员将8月15日发生在爱沙尼亚首都塔林的米尔雷姆机器人公司（Milrem Robotics）纵火案归咎于俄罗斯联邦。爱沙尼亚官员于9月29日宣布，他们已确定俄罗斯安全部门应对此次袭击负责，并且俄罗斯正日益频繁地采取破坏行动，以恐吓欧洲，阻止其支持乌克兰。[22] 俄罗斯一直在升级其针对北约国家的行为，包括空中入侵、破坏、伪旗行动、电子战干扰和飞越。[23] 此次袭击与克里姆林宫近期针对北约发起的旨在削弱欧洲援助乌克兰的意愿和能力的恶意行动相一致。[24]

作为俄罗斯持续军事改革的一部分，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京继续小幅增加俄罗斯武装部队的核定编制。9月28日，普京签署法令，将俄罗斯武装部队总兵力扩大至2,441,630人，其中包括1,550,500名军事人员。[25] 与普京7月27日签署的法令相比，此次法令增加了15,500名军事人员。7月27日的法令将核定编制增加至2,426,130人，其中包括1,535,000名军事人员。[26] 普京在2026年签署了四项类似的法令，累计将俄罗斯武装部队的核定编制增加了49,860人。普京签署法令，分别于2022年、2023年和2024年将俄罗斯军队规模扩大13.7万人、17万人和18万人，而2026年的增幅是迄今为止最低的。这些最终兵力增长幅度有限，可能与俄罗斯当局一直在为动员做准备的潜在动员没有直接联系。[27] 任何增加核定最终兵力的决定都将同时支持发展额外的行政能力，以支持更大规模、更复杂的兵力生成任务，包括与俄罗斯每两年一次的征兵周期和任何潜在的未来动员相关的任务。俄罗斯军事行政能力的提升可以更好地帮助俄罗斯激活、整合、训练和部署新兵。俄罗斯每半年一次的秋季征兵通常在10月开始，这一两年一次的征兵周期给俄罗斯的军事行政部门带来了沉重的负担。[28]自 2022 年以来，俄罗斯一直在以各种方式提高其军事行政能力，以缓解行政瓶颈，并加快俄罗斯征召更多应征入伍者和预备役人员的速度。[29]

9月29日，一架俄罗斯图-95MS战略轰炸机在阿穆尔州克拉斯诺亚罗沃附近坠毁，很可能是由于遭遇严重技术故障，例如机载燃油爆炸。[30] 俄罗斯国防部于9月29日报告称，该轰炸机在例行训练飞行中坠毁，机上六名机组人员遇难。[31] 俄罗斯主要依靠图-95MS战略轰炸机对乌克兰进行远程巡航导弹打击，并支持更广泛的侦察任务。[32] 俄罗斯航空仍然依赖某些西方生产的航空零部件，而西方的制裁很可能使俄罗斯难以采购该飞机复杂且昂贵的零部件。西方的制裁可能阻碍了俄罗斯对老旧机队进行例行维护，这很可能是导致此次坠机的原因之一。[33]

俄罗斯国防部继续试图错误地宣称对乌克兰军队在维瓦尔第行动中解放的莱曼方向的定居点拥有控制权。

尽管有大量证据，俄罗斯国防部仍一再否认乌克兰在“维瓦尔第行动”中取得的胜利，这继续加剧了俄罗斯极端民族主义者和军事博客作者对俄罗斯军队普遍存在的撒谎文化的批评。

据报道，克里姆林宫计划在 2027 年大幅增加国防开支，因为俄罗斯增加公共收入的努力未能抵消不断上升的债务和赤字预期。

9月28日，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京与俄罗斯高级官员举行了多次会议，将国家杜马选举结果视为对普京政策和继续在乌克兰发动战争的认可。

爱沙尼亚官员将 8 月 15 日发生在爱沙尼亚首都塔林的 Milrem Robotics 防务公司的纵火袭击归咎于俄罗斯联邦。

作为俄罗斯持续军事改革的一部分，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京继续小幅增加俄罗斯武装部队的核定编制。

9月29日，一架俄罗斯图-95MS战略轰炸机在阿穆尔州克拉斯诺亚罗沃附近坠毁，很可能是由于遭遇严重技术故障，也可能是机载燃料爆炸。

9月28日至29日，乌克兰军队可能对俄白国际边界沿线的俄罗斯后勤基础设施发动了袭击。俄罗斯当晚向乌克兰发射了一枚锆石/缟玛瑙反舰导弹、两枚伊斯坎德尔-M/S-400弹道导弹和152架无人机。

乌克兰军队最近向库皮扬斯克方向和哈尔科夫州北部推进，而俄罗斯军队最近在要塞带外围包围战中推进。

我们不会详细报道俄罗斯的战争罪行，因为西方媒体已对此进行充分报道，而且这些罪行不会直接影响我们正在评估和预测的军事行动。我们将继续评估并报道这些犯罪活动对乌克兰军队和乌克兰民众的影响，特别是对乌克兰城市地区战斗的影响。我们强烈谴责俄罗斯违反武装冲突法和日内瓦公约的行为以及反人类罪行，尽管我们并未在这些报告中详细描述这些罪行。

乌克兰在俄罗斯联邦的行动

9 月 28 日至 29 日，乌克兰军队可能对俄罗斯与白俄罗斯国际边界沿线的俄罗斯后勤基础设施发动了袭击。根据 9 月 29 日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队可能在 9 月 28 日至 29 日夜间袭击了布良斯克州俄罗斯与白俄罗斯边界沿线的克拉斯尼卡缅国际边界检查站（距离乌克兰国际边界约 36 公里）。[34]

乌克兰军队继续在俄罗斯境内袭击俄罗斯飞机。根据9月28日公布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队在克拉斯诺达尔边疆区叶伊斯克机场（距离前线约178公里）袭击了一架俄罗斯L-39飞机。[35]

俄罗斯的支持行动：北方轴心

9月28日和29日，俄军继续在苏梅州北部发动进攻，但并未取得确切进展，乌克兰军队在苏梅市东南方向进行了反击。[36] 9月29日，一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，俄军已向乌拉诺夫东北方向（苏梅市西北部）推进。[37]

9月份，俄军在苏梅州北部的进攻行动似乎有所放缓，但俄军仍在向苏梅市发射无人机和滑翔炸弹。乌克兰联合部队发言人维克托·特列胡博夫9月29日报告称，与2026年8月相比，俄军在苏梅州北部的进攻行动在9月份有所放缓。[38] 特列胡博夫表示，俄军进攻行动强度降低可能是由于俄军在该地区兵力不足，而俄军指挥部并未将该地区视为优先事项。特列胡博夫报告称，在苏梅州北部作战的俄军部队面临物资短缺和人员素质低下的问题。一名在苏梅州北部作战的乌克兰军人也在9月29日指出，俄军降低了在苏梅州北部的进攻行动节奏，但强调俄军仍在继续进行常规渗透任务。[39] 这名乌克兰军人表示，俄军仍在向苏梅市发射各种无人机和滑翔炸弹。

俄罗斯的支持行动：哈尔科夫州

乌克兰军队近期向哈尔科夫市东北方向推进。根据9月27日公布的地理定位视频显示，俄军袭击了哈尔科夫市东北部赫拉夫斯克的一栋乌克兰占领的建筑物，这表明乌克兰军队可能已将赫拉夫斯克的俄罗斯渗透者清除。[40] 俄罗斯国防部和俄罗斯北方集团军于9月29日声称，俄罗斯第34独立摩托化步兵旅（隶属第49集团军，南部军区）和第344摩托化步兵团（隶属第69摩托化步兵师，第6集团军，列宁格勒军区）的部分兵力占领了克雷迪扬卡，但ISW尚未在该定居点发现任何俄军阵地。[41]

9月28日和29日，俄军继续在韦利基布尔鲁克方向发动进攻，但没有取得进展。[42]

俄罗斯的支持行动：奥斯基尔河

乌克兰军队最近在库皮扬斯克以北推进。根据9月28日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队最近清除了卡利诺韦（库皮扬斯克西北部）以北的俄军阵地，表明乌克兰军队在该地区推进。[43] 该视频还附有乌克兰某团的声明，声称乌克兰军队已清除卡利诺韦西北部的整个森林地区。

乌克兰总参谋部于 9 月 29 日报告称，乌克兰军队于 9 月 28 日或 9 月 28 日至 29 日夜间袭击了位于被占领的诺沃耶霍里夫卡（距前线约 17 公里）的俄罗斯弹药库。[44]

2026年9月，俄军在库皮扬斯克方向的进攻行动节奏有所放缓。乌克兰联合部队发言人维克托·特列胡博夫于9月29日报告称，尽管俄军在奥斯基尔河东岸仍保持活跃，但其在库皮扬斯克方向的进攻行动在8月至9月期间明显减少。[45] 乌克兰总参谋部报告称，9月28日至29日期间，库皮扬斯克方向仅发生一次战斗。[46]

有消息人士称，俄罗斯西部部队于 9 月 29 日继续向博罗瓦方向发动进攻，但 ISW 没有观察到俄罗斯部队推进的证据。[47]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的卢甘斯克州的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部9月29日报告称，乌克兰军队袭击了被占领的克尔诺索韦和新艾达尔（距前线分别约145公里和75公里）的俄罗斯无人机控制点，以及被占领的德鲁日内（距前线约145公里）的一个弹药库。[48]

俄罗斯主要行动：夺取乌克兰要塞带并完成对顿涅茨克州的占领

俄军下属主要行动一：从西北方向包围要塞带

有关莱曼战术行动的更多信息，请参阅正文。

9月28日和29日，俄军继续在莱曼战术行动中发动进攻，而乌克兰军队则继续进行大规模反击。[49]

俄军第二主力行动——从东面进攻要塞带

近期，俄军在斯拉维扬斯克东部和东北部地区实施了渗透行动，乌克兰军队则在该地区展开反击，以减缓俄军的推进。乌克兰军事观察员科斯蒂安廷·马绍韦茨于9月28日和29日报告称，俄军第3集团军的部分兵力在斯塔罗杜比夫卡和普西库尼夫卡（均位于斯拉维扬斯克东北部）之间以及尼古拉耶夫卡东南部（位于斯拉维扬斯克东部）实施了渗透行动。[50] 马绍韦茨指出，俄军第3集团军试图在该地区集结尽可能多的突击步兵，以便从东部向斯拉维扬斯克推进，但乌克兰军队的反击减缓了俄军第3集团军在该方向的推进速度。马绍韦茨指出，俄军从东部跨越这片广阔区域直接向斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克（斯拉维扬斯克以南）发起进攻的时间越长，其成功的可能性就越小，因为这项行动需要大量且长时间的资源和人员部署。马绍韦茨还指出，乌克兰军队在“维瓦尔第行动”中成功摧毁了俄军第20和第25联合武装集团军（西部部队群）在莱曼战术区的桥头堡，这很可能会阻碍俄军第3联合武装集团军从东部直接向斯拉维扬斯克发起进攻。[51]

俄罗斯军队近期在克拉马托尔斯克东南部进行了一次渗透行动，而乌克兰军队则在克拉马托尔斯克以东维持阵地或推进。马绍韦茨于9月29日报告称，一支俄罗斯渗透小组正在费多里夫卡东北部（克拉马托尔斯克东南部）活动。[52] 马绍韦茨指出，乌克兰军队在马利尼夫卡和季霍尼夫卡附近进行了反击，这表明乌克兰军队在西维尔斯基-顿涅茨-顿巴斯运河以西保持着阵地，这与俄罗斯的说法相悖。

俄军可能需要投入更多预备队，才能从东部向斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克方向推进，推进至要塞带。马绍韦茨9月29日表示，俄军第3装甲师至少需要增派一个甚至两个完整的旅，才能继续向斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克城市群推进。[53] 马绍韦茨指出，俄军第3装甲师需要俄军最高指挥部部署大部分或全部作战预备队，才能突破防线，抵达这两个城市的近邻。

俄军下属主要行动#3——从南部向要塞带推进

9月28日至29日，俄军继续在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡及其西南地区以及德鲁日基夫卡南部和东南部发动进攻行动，而乌克兰军队则在该地区进行反击。[54]

俄军下属主要行动#4——从西南方向包围要塞带

俄罗斯军队最近向多布罗皮利亚东南方向推进。根据9月29日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队在多罗日涅西北部袭击了一名俄罗斯军人，这表明俄罗斯军队在该地区推进。[55]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的顿涅茨克州的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部于9月29日报告称，乌克兰军队于9月28日或9月28日至29日夜间袭击了位于被占领的曼胡什（距前线约105公里）的39N6“卡斯塔”雷达站和位于卡奇卡尔斯克（距前线约123公里）的弹药库。[56]

俄罗斯支援行动：进军第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州

9月28日和29日，俄军继续向新巴甫洛夫卡方向发起进攻，但没有取得进展。[57]

奥列克桑德里夫卡方向前线无人机密度极高，促使乌克兰军队转向远程布雷。9月29日，在奥列克桑德里夫卡方向作战的乌克兰旅发言人报告称，该地区无人机密度过高，使得人工排雷和反坦克地雷作业变得复杂。[58] 该发言人表示，乌克兰军队转而使用远程布雷系统，该系统可在前线后方数公里处作业，并将地雷投放至俄军控制区深处。

俄罗斯的支持行动：南方轴心

乌克兰在胡利亚伊波列方向的无人机行动正在阻碍俄罗斯的无人机行动、撤离和后勤保障。乌克兰空降突击部队第7快速反应军于9月28日报告称，乌克兰在该地区的打击行动正在扰乱俄罗斯的无人机行动、撤离能力和后勤保障，阻止俄罗斯军队成功实施渗透任务。[59]

9月28日和29日，俄军在扎波罗热州西部继续进行有限的进攻行动，但没有取得进展。[60] 9月29日，一位俄罗斯军事博客作者声称，俄军正从东部进攻奥里希夫，试图将乌克兰军队分散到更广阔的区域，并阻止他们在奥里希夫周围建立强大的防御阵地。[61]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的扎波罗热州的俄罗斯军事后勤设施进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部报告称，乌克兰军队于9月28日或9月28日至29日夜间袭击了科米什佐里亚（距前线约53公里）的一个俄罗斯后勤仓库。[62]

9月29日，俄罗斯和乌克兰军队均未报告在赫尔松方向发生地面行动。

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的克里米亚的俄罗斯军事、后勤和海军资产及基础设施进行中程打击。根据9月28日公布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队袭击了位于塞瓦斯托波尔以北（距前线约225公里）的别尔贝克空军基地的俄罗斯雷达系统，以及塞瓦斯托波尔的一艘BK-16高速登陆艇和一艘“马古斯特”级巡逻艇。[63]

俄罗斯空袭、导弹和无人机行动

注：自 8 月 11 日起，乌克兰军方停止定期报告俄罗斯发射的导弹数量和拦截的导弹数量。[64]

9月28日至29日夜间以及9月29日白天，俄罗斯军队对乌克兰发动了一系列无人机和导弹袭击。乌克兰空军9月29日报告称，俄罗斯军队从库尔斯克州发射了一枚“锆石”或“缟玛瑙”反舰导弹和两枚“伊斯坎德尔-M”或“S-400”弹道导弹；并从奥廖尔和库尔斯克市、罗斯托夫州米列罗沃、克拉斯诺达尔边疆区滨海-阿赫塔尔斯克、被占领的顿涅茨克市以及被占领的克里米亚赫瓦尔迪斯克和乔达角方向发射了152架“沙赫德”型（其中82架为喷气式）和“非洲菊”型攻击无人机以及“帕罗迪亚”型诱饵无人机。[65]乌克兰空军报告称，乌克兰军队击落了一枚“锆石”（Zirkon）或“缟玛瑙”（Onyx）反舰导弹、两枚“伊斯坎德尔-M”（Iskander-M）或S-400导弹以及106架无人机。乌克兰空军报告称，俄罗斯攻击车辆袭击了24个地点，坠毁的残骸散落在16个地点。乌克兰空军报告称，9月29日当天，俄罗斯军队随后发射了112架“沙赫德”（Shahed）型（包括29架喷气式）和“非洲菊”（Gerbera）型攻击无人机、“班德罗尔”（Banderol）或“丹-T”（Dan-T）巡飞弹以及其他无人机，乌克兰军队击落了其中95架（其中18架为喷气式）。[66]乌克兰官员报告称，俄罗斯军队袭击了基辅、第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克、尼古拉耶夫、敖德萨、文尼察和日托米尔等州的铁路、商业、能源、港口、电信和居民基础设施。[67]

基辅市市长维塔利·克利奇科报告称，9月28日俄罗斯对基辅市的袭击造成两人死亡，26人受伤。[68]

俄罗斯军队正加大对乌克兰远程打击行动中使用“格朗-5”无人机导弹混合系统的力度，以利用乌克兰喷气式无人机拦截能力的不足。一位乌克兰军事记者于9月28日报道称，俄罗斯在9月28日对基辅市及周边地区发动的远程打击行动中，主要使用了喷气式“格朗-5”无人机导弹混合系统。[69] 该记者指出，俄罗斯军队已储备了大量“格朗-5”无人机导弹混合系统，并开始在乌克兰拦截喷气式“格朗-4”无人机的成功率不断提高的情况下，将其部署到对乌克兰的行动中。该记者还表示，乌克兰军队目前能够拦截70%至80%的“格朗-4”无人机，但只能拦截50%至65%的“格朗-5”无人机导弹混合系统。该记者指出，乌克兰军队经常在基辅市区附近拦截Geran-4无人机，但只有在Geran-5无人机导弹混合型进入市区后才会进行拦截。该记者报道称，Geran-4和Geran-5在雷达反射截面、速度和机动性方面存在差异，拦截成功与否取决于天气、进场路线以及乌克兰拦截弹药的可用性。乌克兰总统泽连斯基表示，乌克兰军队拦截了70%的攻击型无人机，而拦截喷气式Geran型无人机的概率为57%。[70]

白俄罗斯的重大活动

没有什么重大事项需要报告。

注：ISW 不接收任何来源的机密材料，仅使用公开信息，并广泛参考俄罗斯、乌克兰和西方媒体的报道和社交媒体，以及市售卫星图像和其他地理空间数据作为报告的基础。所有参考资料均列于每份更新报告的尾注中。

[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/67731；https://t.me/mod_russia/67733；https://t.me/mod_russia/67734 [2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2026/ [3] https://t.me/milinfolive/180452 [4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2026/；https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2026/； https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ [5]https://t.me/rybar/83558; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48156; https://t.me/dva_majors/99694; https://t.me/milinfolive/180452; https://t.me/rybar/83579 [6] https://x.com/ab3army/status/2104469975184396423 [7] https://t.me/olegtsarov/47866 [8] https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-raises-2027-military-spending-by-27-budget-documents-show-2026-09-28/ [9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_12-23/ ; 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