F FEICELL News全球新闻 · 本地动态 · 实时更新
← 返回新闻首页
军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 28, 2026

Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps publicized details on the third phase of Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction.

ISWNate Ha查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年9月28日

Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps publicized details on the third phase of Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction, which included successfully feinting and deceiving Russian forces and the liberation of Nove, Ridkodub, Katerynivka, Karpivka, and Novomykhailivka (all north of Lyman). Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi reported on September 28 that Ukrainian forces liberated 51 square kilometers of land in the third phase, for a total of 176 square kilometers over Operation Vivaldi’s three announced phases.[1] Biletskyi stated that Ukrainian forces feinted from Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman) toward Zelena Dolyna (northeast of Shandryholove), distracting from Ukraine’s main tactical objective of Nove on the northern flank of the Russian forces in the area. Biletsky noted that Ukrainian forces used BTR-80 armored personnel carriers (APCs) converted into vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) to break through Russian defenses and destroy Russian heavy fortifications. It is notable that Ukrainian forces were able to field and drive APCs up to heavy Russian fortifications without coming under Russian drone strikes, indicating that Ukrainian forces neutralized or otherwise negated Russian drone defenses. Ukrainian forces conducted extensive shaping operations and an intermediate-range strike campaign to mitigate the threat from Russian drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems and achieve tactical drone overmatch, aiding Ukrainian mechanized advances in the Lyman direction.[2]

Operation Vivaldi is fueling Russian ultranationalist milblogger discourse about how the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military is harming Russian forces and facilitating Ukrainian successes in the Lyman direction. Prominent ultranationalist milblogger Dva Mayora claimed on September 28, following Ukrainian reporting about Operation Vivaldi, that Russian information policy about frontline operations obscures difficult battlefield conditions and underrepresents Ukrainian capabilities, which creates problems when Ukrainian successes become publicly visible, such as with Operation Vivaldi.[3] The milblogger claimed that Russian officials will struggle to explain the situation to the public as the Russian media constantly fills the information space with triumphant rhetoric that portrays Ukrainian defensive lines on the verge of collapse. Another ultranationalist milblogger, Starshe Edy, claimed that inaccurate reporting about Ukrainian gains in the Lyman direction has impeded the Russian military command’s operational planning and reinforcement decisions.[4] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces capitalized on the fact that Russian personnel would not report Ukrainian gains to their higher chain of command. Russian milbloggers have been increasingly critical of the culture of “beautiful reports,” in which exaggerated claims of Russian advances from battlefield commanders to the higher command impede operational planning, thus enabling Ukrainian advances.[5] Inaccurate reporting within the Russian chain of command about the current state of the frontline consistently degrades Russian battlefield awareness and Russian commanders’ ability to disrupt advancing Ukrainian infantry and equipment.

The Kremlin is restricting publicly available information regarding Russia’s oil and gas industry, likely in an effort to conceal and protect Russian oil supplies for a variety of reasons, including from Ukrainian strikes, Western sanctions, or domestic Russian discontent and panic stemming from fuel shortages. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on September 28 restricting access to information regarding the Russian oil and gas industry, including market datasets; oil refining and production volumes; buyers, sellers, and intermediaries; transportation and transshipment information; dates and times of transactions; and the geographic coordinates of oil terminals and storage facilities.[6] This information restriction could aim to achieve one or more objectives. The Kremlin is likely attempting to improve the operational security of its oil and gas industry amid Ukraine’s effective long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refining infrastructure.[7] A more restrictive information environment may also help mitigate the effects of existing Western sanctions against the Russian oil industry and defend against new ones by obfuscating the extent to which Russia is relying on energy imports that could be targeted via secondary sanctions. The Kremlin may also seek to obfuscate the scale and prevalence of Russia’s continued domestic fuel crisis from ordinary Russians, as this crisis has caused widespread societal discontent in Russia and fueled panic-buying, further exacerbating fuel supply shortages.[8] An industry source told Kremlin newswire TASS, which reported on September 28 that Russian authorities are preparing to extend the ban on diesel fuel exports for another month, until the end of October 2026, after initially imposing the ban in July 2026.[9]

Russian forces conducted a drone strike mere kilometers from the Ukrainian-Polish border near the Yahodyn border crossing for the second time in September 2026. Poland announced its intent to change its air defense rules of engagement following the strike. A Russian Geran-5 jet-powered strike drone struck a truck parking lot near the Yahodyn international border checkpoint in Volyn Oblast, less than one-and-a-half kilometers from the Ukrainian-Polish border, during the day on September 28.[10] Geolocated footage shows the drone diving and an explosion after hitting an unknown object.[11] Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz confirmed that Polish air defense systems had been put on alert and aircraft scrambled in response to the strike but that no aerial targets violated Polish airspace.[12] Russian strikes against Ukrainian border infrastructure along the Ukrainian-Polish border, including the Yahodyn-Dorohusk border crossing, have repeatedly forced Polish authorities to scramble air defense assets and reconsider the Polish and NATO air defense posture.[13] Polish Deputy Defense Minister Cezary Tomczyk stated on September 28 that Poland will change its rules of engagement ”in the coming days” so that Polish fighter jets and helicopters only need a “positive identification” using radar and not a “visual identification” via both radar and pilot eyes on a target before engaging an object violating Polish airspace.[14] The change will enable Polish pilots to decide to shoot down an unidentified flying object using radar information about flight trajectory, speed, the location of the airspace violation, and communication response, enabling a more rapid response. Tomczyk stated that this change will enable Polish pilots to respond more quickly to drones and missiles flying toward Poland from “the direction of Russia.”[15] It is notable that Polish authorities have taken this step as NATO states attempt to find an adequate response to Russian drones nearing or entering their airspace from Ukraine, often leaving NATO air defense insufficient time to identify and target such threats before they have entered allied airspace.[16]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on September 28 transferring the assets of German wholesale retailer Metro AG in Russia to “temporary” management under Russian company UK Torg Rus LLC.[17] The Kremlin continues to nationalize both Russian and foreign assets, including those of prominent foreign enterprises, as ISW continues to assess that Putin is likely setting conditions for a broader nationalization of Russian private assets to support state revenues amid rising war costs.[18] The Kremlin may also seek ways to pressure European countries into adopting policy stances more favorable to Russia through coercion measures against European companies operating in Russia.

Russian Colonel General Alexander Lapin, who previously commanded the Central and Northern groupings of forces in Ukraine, became the deputy prime minister of the Republic of Tatarstan on September 28.[19] Republic of Tatarstan Rustam Minnikhanov announced that the Republic of Tatarstan government is creating a new structure to support active-duty soldiers fighting in Ukraine and that Lapin will lead this structure as deputy prime minister. Lapin reportedly served as Minnikhanov’s advisor after his dismissal from military service in September 2025.[20] Russian state newspaper RBK reported that Lapin placed second in the primary election of the ruling United Russia Party in Tatarstan but that the 25 percent vote bump from his veteran status put him in first place and made him eligible for a Russian State Duma seat.[21]

Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps publicized details on the third phase of Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction, which included successfully feinting and deceiving Russian forces and the liberation of Nove, Ridkodub, Katerynivka, Karpivka, and Novomykhailivka (all north of Lyman).

Operation Vivaldi is fueling Russian ultranationalist milblogger discourse about how the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military is harming Russian forces and facilitating Ukrainian successes in the Lyman direction.

The Kremlin is restricting publicly available information regarding Russia’s oil and gas industry, likely in an effort to conceal and protect Russian oil supplies for a variety of reasons, including from Ukrainian strikes, Western sanctions, or domestic Russian discontent and panic stemming from fuel shortages.

Russian forces conducted a drone strike mere kilometers from the Ukrainian-Polish border near the Yahodyn border crossing for the second time in September 2026. Poland announced its intent to change its air defense rules of engagement following the strike.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on September 28 transferring the assets of German wholesale retailer Metro AG in Russia to “temporary” management under Russian company UK Torg Rus LLC.

Russian Colonel General Alexander Lapin, who previously commanded the Central and Northern groupings of forces in Ukraine, became the deputy prime minister of the Republic of Tatarstan on September 28.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russia launched 289 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on the night of September 27 to 28.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on the night of September 27 to 28. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on September 28 that Ukrainian forces struck and caused fires at the Edelweiss-95 and Ding-Yug-Oil oil depots in stanitsa Novotitarovskaya, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 350 kilometers from the frontline), the Lukoil-Yugnefteproduct oil depot in stanitsa Pavlovskaya, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 310 kilometers from the frontline), and the Angelinskaya oil depot in stanitsa Staronizhestebliyevskaya, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 305 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of September 27 to 28.[22] Geolocated footage published on September 27 and 28 shows explosions at the Edelweiss-95 oil depot and large smoke plumes rising from the Angelinska oil depot following Ukrainian strikes.[23] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 28 that Ukrainian forces also struck unspecified Russian defense plants in Tula and Voronezh oblasts and drone launchers in Kaluga and Oryol oblasts.[24]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northwest of Sumy City. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position west of Kharkivka (northwest of Sumy City), according to geolocated footage published on September 27, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[25] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 28 that Russian forces seized Ulanove (northwest of Sumy City).[26]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and railway infrastructure in Bryansk and Kaluga oblasts on the night of September 27 to 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Pantsir-S2 air defense system near Seltso, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 113 kilometers from the international border).[27] Bryansk Oblast Governor Yegor Kovalchuk claimed on September 28 that Ukrainian forces struck the Dyatkovo-Lyudinovo railway section (roughly 140 kilometers from the international border), destroying part of a bridge and derailing 10 railcars, and railway infrastructure in Unechskiy and Navlinskiy raions in Bryansk Oblast (both roughly 65 kilometers from the international border).[28] The Moscow Railway Press Service announced a temporary suspension of train service on Unecha-Zlynka and Dyatkovo-Lyudinovo railway sections following Ukrainian strikes against Bryansk and Kaluga oblasts.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 28 that Ukrainian forces are actively probing an air corridor in Bryansk Oblast, seeking out Russian air defense and mobile fire groups, to facilitate Ukrainian drone flights toward Moscow City and St. Petersburg.[30]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian-occupied building in central Tokarivka (north of Kharkiv City), according to geolocated footage published on September 28, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[31] Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian position along the E-105 Kharkiv City — Belgorod City highway east of Hoptivka (north of Kharkiv City), according to geolocated footage published on September 16, after what ISW assessed was a Russian infiltration mission.[32] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of forces claimed on September 28 that Ukrainian forces are actively operating in the Russian rear in Kozacha Lopan, Hoptivka (both north of Kharkiv City), and near Starytsia (northeast of Kharkiv City) in an effort to disrupt Russian logistics and reinforcement efforts in the area.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 27 and 28 but did not make confirmed advances.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 27 and 28 that Russian forces advanced east of Loshakove and Khyzhniakove (both north of Velykyi Burluk).[35]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 27 and 28 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Kupyansk.[36]

Ukrainian forces are effectively intercepting a wide range of Russian drones in the Kupyansk direction, but Russian jet-powered drones and adverse weather conditions continue to strain Ukraine’s drone interception rates. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian drone interceptor battery operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on September 28 that Russian forces have been actively conducting offensive operations in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) in recent weeks but stated that the situation remains stable.[37] The NCO stated that Ukrainian forces effectively intercept a wide range of Russian drones in the Kupyansk direction despite Russian efforts to change the flight paths of their drones. The commander stated that Russian forces’ use of jet-powered drones and adverse weather conditions, such as rain and fog, are complicating Ukraine’s drone interception rates but noted that Ukrainian manufacturers are actively working on introducing new technological solutions to address these issues.

Russian forces used Ukrainian civilians as human shields as they retreated into a gas pipeline north of Kupyansk in a direct violation of international humanitarian law. The Ukrainian 2nd Khartiya Corps reported on September 28 that Russian forces used civilians, including the elderly and children, to cover their retreat into a pipeline through Holubivka (north of Kupyansk) to occupied territory, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[38] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s use of civilians as human shields is indicative of a pervasive culture within the Russian military that seeks to both weaponize and maximize civilian harm as a purposeful tool of war.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 27 and 28 but did not advance.[40]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman tactical area on September 27 and 28 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to push Russian forces back across the Zherebets River.[42]

See topline text for reports on phase 3 of Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Slovyansk toward Mykolaivka on September 27 and 28 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have been actively advancing toward Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Mykolaivka) but have not yet cleared the forest north of the settlement, from which Russian forces are attacking toward Mykolaivka.[44]

Russian milbloggers are acknowledging Ukrainian presence in the Chasiv Yar area. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on September 27 that Ukrainian forces continue to infiltrate into Chasiv Yar through Mykolaivka (just west of Chasiv Yar) and that Mykolaivka itself is a contested “gray zone.”[45] Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southwestern Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces likely do not maintain consolidated positions in Mykolaivka or Podilske (west of Mykolaivka).[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Ukrainian forces likely cleared Russian infiltrators from positions southwest of Druzhkivka. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Raiske toward Petrivka and Toretske (both southeast of Raiske), indicating that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian infiltrators from Raiske on a prior date.[47] Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Raiske, Toretske, and Novomykolaivka (west of Raiske) to prevent Russian forces from encircling Druzhkivka from the southwest.[48] The milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also counterattacked from Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, near Kurtivka (north of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka), and west of Kostyantynivka.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 27 and 28 but did not make confirmed advances.[49] The Russian MoD claimed on September 28 that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces seized Novovodiane (roughly eight kilometers northwest of Dobropillya and roughly 10 kilometers from the closest assessed Russian advance in the area).[50] The Russian MoD’s claim is likely part of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort to exaggerate Russian battlefield successes and portray Ukrainian defenses as collapsing.[51] The Russian MoD recently falsely claimed that Russian forces had encircled Ukrainian forces in Dobropillya, contrary to all available evidence.[52]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone storage, preparation, and launch site in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline); a Russian repair unit in occupied Mariupol (roughly 102 kilometers from the frontline); Russian ammunition depots in occupied Makiivka (roughly 47 kilometers from the frontline) and Ustynivka (likely referring to a settlement in Siverodonetsk Raion, Luhansk Oblast); and a Russian material and technical warehouse in occupied Nikolske (roughly 94 kilometers from the frontline) on September 27 or overnight September 27 to 28.[53]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on September 28.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on September 27 and 28 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[54]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on September 28 and 29 but did not advance.[55]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Orikhiv. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position south of Mala Tokmachka, according to geolocated footage published on September 27, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[56]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian temporary deployment point and a ground control station in Vynohradivka (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline).[57]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 28.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[58]

Russian forces conducted devastating drone strikes against Ukraine, heavily targeting Kyiv City, overnight on September 27 to 28 and during the day on September 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 165 Shahed-type strike drones (including 79 jet-powered ones), Gerbera-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo; Smolensk Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea, overnight.[59] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 112 drones, that air strike vehicles hit 14 locations, and that debris fell on seven locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an additional 124 strike drones (of which 86 were jet-powered), including Gerbera-type drones and Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions, from 0630 to 1830 local time on September 28, primarily targeting Kyiv Oblast.[60] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 86 of these drones (including 49 jet-powered ones) and that strike vehicles hit 29 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that many Russian drones remain airborne as of 1830 local time. Russian forces will likely attempt to further prolong their strike waves against Ukrainian cities to degrade Ukrainian air defenses for subsequent strikes, as Russian forces have been doing in recent weeks.[61]

Russian strikes in the past 24 hours have reportedly injured at least 110 Ukrainian civilians. Russian forces struck the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences building, the Dobrobut Medical Center, warehouses, gas stations, and civilian and communications infrastructure in Kyiv City, killing at least one and injuring at least 24, including former Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Volodymyr Horbulin.[62] Russian forces also struck a residential building in Kharkiv City, injuring at least 38 and killing an unspecified number of civilians; struck a business center in Dnipro City, injuring at least 18; and struck residential and other infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City, injuring at least 30.[63] Russian forces also hit a Palau-flagged ship in Odesa Oblast; residential buildings in Sumy, Rivne, and Odesa oblasts; and critical infrastructure in Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Khmelnytskyi, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[64]

Russian forces are beginning to use jet-powered Shahed drone variants capable of transmitting live video feeds and evading Ukrainian jamming in strikes against Kyiv City. Russian sources released footage of a Russian drone strike against a business center in Kyiv City on September 25, demonstrating that at least some Russian Shahed-type drones can relay live video feeds back to their operators to support targeting and battle damage assessment.[65] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported that a Russian Geran-5 jet-powered strike drone struck the Kyiv City business center while another Shahed-type drone flew about three kilometers overhead, serving as a mesh radio signal repeater for the striking Geran-5 drone.[66] Beskrestnov reported that the second Shahed then struck a food warehouse outside of Kyiv City and assessed that the Russian drone pilots were closely coordinating the strikes. Beskrestnov previously assessed that Russian forces used a Shahed drone on a mesh network repeater to strike the headquarters of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) on September 4.[67] A Ukrainian Telegram channel claimed on September 27 that Russian forces are also fielding modified Geran-5 K5 variants equipped with a navigation module that allows the drone to navigate using reference images of the ground even when it loses connection with its operator and satellites.[68] The channel claimed that the Geran-5 K5’s high speed — reportedly faster than typical Geran-4 or Geran-5 drones — means that it is often misreported as a Dan-T loitering munition.

Russian forces likely intend to test a new ballistic missile in Ukraine before the end of 2026 . Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian news agency UNIAN in an article published on September 28 that Russian forces intend to test a ballistic missile with an 800-kilometer range by the end of 2026 as part of broader efforts to modernize its missile arsenal.[69] The GUR reported that Russia is also further modernizing its “Iskander-1000” ballistic missile (variant 9M723), which Russian forces have already launched at Ukraine, to support a lighter warhead and increase the missile’s range from about 550 kilometers to about 700 kilometers. The GUR stated that Russia is struggling to produce 9M723 ballistic missiles, however. Russia has been increasing production and use of ballistic missiles in its strike packages amid global Patriot interceptor shortages that have impeded Ukraine’s ability to down Russian ballistic missiles, particularly ahead of winter.[70]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://x.com/ab3army/status/2104469975184396423 [2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/ [3] https://t.me/dva_majors/99670 [4] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/23881 [5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/ [6] https://t.me/tass_agency/397732 ; http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202609280007; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2026/09/29/1232579-putin-podpisal-ukaz [7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-strike-campaigns-will-likely-continue-to-hurt-russias-economy-and-military-operations-in-ukraine/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/gasoline-shortages-in-occupied-ukraine-show-the-synergy-of-ukraines-long-range-and-mid-range-strike-campaigns/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/ [8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-4-2026/ [9] https://t.me/tass_agency/397735; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-extends-ban-diesel-exports-until-september-30-2026-08-29/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/28159283 [10] https://unn dot ua/en/news/a-drone-crashed-near-the-border-with-poland-the-state-border-guard-service-said-whether-the-yahodyn-checkpoint-was-damaged; https://x.com/KosiniakKamysz/status/2104601113978708108; https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/2104596654053867938?s=20 ; https://x.com/acceladealer/status/2104599769838497971?s=20 ; https://x.com/acceladealer/status/2104599773974036791?s=20 ; https://tvn24 dot pl/polska/wojsko-rosyjski-dron-uderzyl-niedaleko-przejscia-granicznego-w-dorohusku-st9259452 [11] https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/2104596654053867938?s=20 ; https://x.com/acceladealer/status/2104599769838497971?s=20 ; https://x.com/acceladealer/status/2104599773974036791?s=20 [12] https://x.com/KosiniakKamysz/status/2104601113978708108 [13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/; [14] https://www.lrt dot lt/naujienos/pasaulyje/6/3066265/lenkija-keicia-taisykles-numusines-oro-erdves-pazeidejus-be-vizualinio-identifikavimo [15] https://www.politico.com/news/2026/09/28/poland-will-ease-rules-of-shooting-down-aerial-threats-amid-russian-attacks [16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ [17] https://t.me/tass_agency/397734; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202609280008 [18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2026/ [19] https://t.me/bbcrussian/99789; https://t.me/bbcrussian/99789; [20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2025/ [21] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/28/09/2026/6aba167e780b2ab49cc5dfb7 [22] https://t.me/SBUkr/18690 [23] https://t.me/supernova_plus/60688 ; https://x.com/Magyargeo56/status/2104477324364157312?s=20 ; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2104549934913462390?s=20 ; https://x.com/Magyargeo56/status/2104515104259924410?s=20 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/60677 ; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2104522036479401990?s=20 ; https://t.me/astrapress/126549 ; [24] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21109 [25] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13059 ; https://t.me/shadow_strike_27/1741 [26] https://t.me/mod_russia/67705 [27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42394 [28] https://t.me/E_V_Kovalchuk/2922 [29] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1118867 [30] https://t.me/arx_spn/31290 [31] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2104566489311260885; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2104566494650847427; https://t.me/craftoriz/762 [32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13065 ; https://t.me/contraomnes4/300 [33] https://t.me/severnnyi/9450 [34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42392 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42390 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/99658 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37241 [35] https://t.me/divgen/84254 ; https://t.me/divgen/84263 [36]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42392; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42390; https://t.me/dva_majors/99658; https://t.me/wargonzo/37241; https://t.me/grvZapad/19913 [37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/28/usi-yihni-taktyky-vzhe-vyvcheni-u-115-j-brygadi-rozpovily-pro-polyuvannya-na-vorozhi-bpla/ ; https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w [38] https://t.me/khartiia/4687; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/28/na-kupyanshhyni-rosiyany-vykradayut-lyudej-cherez-gazovu-trubu-prykryvayuchy-svij-vidhid/ [39] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/; [40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42392; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42390; https://t.me/grvZapad/19913 [41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42392 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42390 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/99658 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56346 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37241 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48138 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19913 [42] https://t.me/dva_majors/99658 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19913 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56346 [43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42392 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42390 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37241 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56343 ; https://t.me/t3mny/2423 [44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56343 ; https://t.me/t3mny/2423 [45] https://t.me/rybar/83533 [46] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/ [47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56355 [48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56343 ; https://t.me/t3mny/2423 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48128 [49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42392 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42390 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37241 [50] https://t.me/mod_russia/67707 [51] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://t.me/mod_russia/67602; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2026/ [52] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ [53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42394 [54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42392 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42390 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/21321 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56341 [55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42392; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42390; https://t.me/dva_majors/99658; https://t.me/voin_dv/21321 [56] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2104295911438299415; https://t.me/UVO58/2058 [57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42394 [58] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [59] https://t.me/kpszsu/80852 [60] https://t.me/kpszsu/81127 [61] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/ [62] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7684; https://kyivindependent dot com/ukraine-war-latest-russia-strikes-downtown-kyiv-kills-one-injures-21-damages-national-academy-of-sciences/; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1414402-vnaslidok-ataki-rf-u-kievi-poskodzena-klinika-dobrobut/ ; https://www.facebook.com/MCDobrobut/posts/pfbid09HphdMLiGY6JnCgDiSBbr5as61sCA8JmPUToBd17tQVUPsymYW6eNJ6KTiPc1aoil?locale=uk_UA; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1414402-vnaslidok-ataki-rf-u-kievi-poskodzena-klinika-dobrobut/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1414120-u-kievi-vnaslidok-ataki-rfbudivla-nanu-gorit-budivla-nanu/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7664; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7665; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7666; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7667; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7668; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7669; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7671; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7678; https://t.me/kyivoda/59007; https://t.me/kyivoda/59038; https://t.me/press_kobl/4478 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/28/vorozha-ataka-na-kyyivshhynu-u-sofiyivskij-borshhagivczi-zagynuly-dvoye-lyudej-blyzko-10-poraneni/; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2973; https://t.me/astrapress/126537; ttps://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21099; V [63] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21100; https://t.me/istories_media/13693 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/09/28/v-harkove-bolee-20-chelovek-postradali-pri-rossiyskom-udare-po-mnogokvartirnomu-domu; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32231; https://t.me/synegubov/26004 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26042 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26046; https://t.me/synegubov/25997 ; https://t.me/synegubov/25999 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26003 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26013 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26016 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4675 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4676; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67981; [64] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21110; https://t.me/synegubov/26004 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26042 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26046; https://t.me/bbcrussian/99790; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32218; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28876; https://t.me/vilkul/18073; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32219; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28879; https://t.me/vilkul/18075; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32225; https://t.me/bbcrussian/99795; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32229; https://t.me/odeskaODA/21013; https://t.me/odeskaODA/21039; https://t.me/odeskaODA/21039; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/75970 [65] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7775; https://euromaidanpress dot com/2026/09/28/russia-is-launching-a-faster-geran-5-at-ukraine-that-satellite-jamming-may-no-longer-knock-off-course-a-monitoring-channel-says/; https://x.com/clashreport/status/2104475245369274619 [66] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7775 [67] https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02K17ajxtrVy1LA8Ap5qgCidYSE29ViuA6mPs3w1pEGujHK2g8R5UKZRFLThGwkm5zl; https://kyivindependent dot com/breaking-russian-drone-hits-kyivs-center/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2026/ [68] https://t.me/war_home/7689 [69] https://www.unian dot ua/weapons/nova-balistichna-raketa-rf-dalnistyu-800-km-u-gur-rozkrili-plani-viprobuvan-13512471.html [70] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/

手机左右滑动，电脑按 ← → 键，也能切换新闻