Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 4, 2026

Russian sources falsely and baselessly claimed that Russian forces encircled 2,000 Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 3 that elements of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) seized Vasylivka, Blahodatne, and Dovzhanka (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[1] The Russian Northern GoF additionally claimed on September 3 that Russian forces seized Slyzneve (northeast of Kharkiv City) and baselessly claimed that Russian forces completed an encirclement of 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers.[2] Several Russian milbloggers amplified claims about a Russian encirclement of Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City along the international border on September 3 and 4.[3] Russian sources did not present any visual evidence to support their claims, and some Russian sources even cast doubt on the claims about a grand encirclement. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged on September 3 that claims about Russian forces’ complete encirclement of Ukrainian forces required further confirmation, for example.[4] The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps directly refuted the Russian claims about the seizures of the mentioned settlements on September 3, directly refuting claims that Russian forces had encircled any Ukrainian forces in the corps’ area of responsibility.[5] The 16th Corps emphasized that Russian false encirclement claims emerged against the backdrop of a growing gasoline crisis in Russia, Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries and warehouses, and the upcoming State Duma elections. Russian high-ranking officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the Russian MoD have continuously made exaggerated claims about Russian battlefield performance — including false claims about large encirclements of Ukrainian forces — as part of Russia’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian forces as making sweeping advances and Ukrainian defenses as collapsing. Putin recently and baselessly claimed that the Russian Western GoF encircled 13 Ukrainian battalions with a total of around 5,000 servicemembers on the eastern shore of the Oskil Reservoir near Pisky-Radkivski (south of Borova and roughly 16 kilometers from the frontline) on September 2, for example.[6]

Russian forces attempted to assassinate Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) head Oleksandr Poklad with a Geran-type drone strike on September 4. Russian forces conducted a strike against the SBU headquarters in Kyiv City on September 4, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces specifically targeted Poklad’s office.[7] Zelensky held an in-person meeting with Poklad following the strike.[8] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov stated on September 4 that a Russian remote-controlled Geran-type drone struck the SBU building.[9] Beskrestnov added that Russian forces likely maintained connection with the drone through a device with a mesh network repeater and internet access that a Russian agent activated within a five-kilometer radius of the SBU headquarters during the strike.[10] Russian forces similarly attempted to assassinate Beskrestnov in a targeted strike with four Shahed drones on April 20, 2026.[11]

The Russian Geran drone platform adaptations are improving their ability to conduct successful high-precision strikes. Beskrestnov stated on September 4 that Russian forces are prioritizing the production of jet-powered Geran-4 drones that can reach speeds up to 550 kilometers per hour — significantly faster than Geran-3 drones — complicating Ukrainian interception efforts.[12] Beskrestnov added that Russia is attempting to increase the speed of low-cost strike vehicles that increasingly reach speeds comparable to subsonic cruise missiles, including Geran-5, S8000 Banderol, Dan-T and Dan-M, and the new UMPB-5R glide bomb. Ukrainian sources also estimated that Russian forces can maintain live operator control via a chain of mesh-controlled Geran-type drones up to 150-175 kilometers from the furthest mesh ground control station, a twofold increase in the technology’s previous range compared to 2025.[13] The increasing Russian jet-powered drone speed and flight range at which Russian operators can remotely control them are allowing Russian forces to conduct high – precision strikes against valuable and dynamic targets.

The Kremlin’s behavior indicates Russia’s unwillingness to guarantee the safety of the US delegation during their reported upcoming visit to Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 4 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner will visit Ukraine on September 6 following a visit to Russia.[14] Kremlin newswire TASS confirmed the US delegation’s upcoming visits to Russia and Ukraine.[15] Witkoff and Kushner reportedly had concerns about their safety during their trip to Ukraine, according to sources close to US President Donald Trump’s Administration.[16] Ukraine ceased its long-range strikes against Moscow Oblast during CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow City on August 26.[17] Russian President Vladimir Putin has made no indication that Russia will cease its strikes against Ukraine during Witkoff and Kushner‘s visit to Ukraine. Putin’s apparent unwillingness to guarantee the safety of the US delegation in Ukraine indicates the Kremlin’s unwillingness to accept the United States as a mediator in peace negotiations and highlights Russia’s efforts to coerce the United States to negotiate solely with Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears committed to his existing expensive and inefficient force generation mechanism through volunteer recruitment. Putin again denied any plans for mobilization and claimed that Russian forces are not experiencing personnel shortages during an address to the Eastern Economic Forum on September 3.[18] Putin claimed that Russian people voluntarily sign military service contracts with the Russian MoD and that rumors about military mobilization are attempts to influence the State Duma elections slated for September 18-20. Putin is likely attempting to appease and reassure Russian society amidst growing fears of involuntary mobilization, as it remains unpopular in Russia.[19] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev similarly denied the need for Russia to conduct involuntary reserve call-ups on August 28.[20]

Russia’s expedited efforts to establish its Rassvet satellite constellation as a replacement for Starlink are facing significant challenges which may degrade the constellation’s lifespan. ISW assessed on August 31 that Russia will need to significantly increase the number of successful Rassvet satellite launches in order to achieve capabilities analogous to SpaceX’s Starlink constellation.[21] Russia’s development and use of the Rassvet constellation reportedly already presents significant risk for Ukraine as the constellation enhances the accuracy of Russian strike and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in real time. Stable and 24/7 connectivity over Ukraine, however, will require significant expansion of the constellation.[22] Russia remains constrained by both its launch capacity and the success rate of its satellite launches despite efforts to expedite satellite deployment. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on September 4 that half of Russia’s 36 satellites failed to reach their intended orbits, reportedly due to engine defects, but noted that Russia is already preparing the next batch of satellites for launch.[23] ISW initially assessed — and available data continues to indicate — that Russia’s most recent Rassvet satellites have not yet reached their planned orbital altitude, with some satellites exhibiting signs of technical issues.[24] Satellites orbiting at lower altitudes have shorter operational lifespans due to increased atmospheric drag from upper layers of Earth’s atmosphere and greater fuel expenditure than satellites operating at higher altitudes. Rassvet satellites’ slow — but incomplete — ascension thus may negatively impact the planned service life of the constellation.

Russian sources falsely and baselessly claimed that Russian forces encircled 2,000 Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City.

Russian forces attempted to assassinate Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) head Oleksandr Poklad with a Geran-type drone strike on September 4.

The Russian Geran drone platform adaptations are improving their ability to conduct successful high-precision strikes.

The Kremlin’s behavior indicates Russia’s unwillingness to guarantee the safety of the US delegation during their reported upcoming visit to Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears committed to his existing expensive and inefficient force generation mechanism through volunteer recruitment.

Russia’s expedited efforts to establish its Rassvet satellite constellation as a replacement for Starlink are facing significant challenges which may degrade the constellation’s lifespan.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military, oil, and defense-industrial infrastructure on September 3 and 4. Russian forces launched one Kh-31P anti-radar missile and 121 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Ukrainian forces advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military, oil, and defense-industrial infrastructure on September 3 and 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a radar station in Bobrik, Bryansk Oblast (either 10, 25, or 44 kilometers from the frontline) and a mesh network repeater antenna in Gustomoy, Kursk Oblast (approximately 50 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of September 3 to 4.[25] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300 or S-400 air defense system, two oil depots, and an ORL-A air traffic control radar in Adler, Krasnodar Krai (approximately 560 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 3 and 4.[26] Open sources reported on September 4 that Ukrainian forces struck the Sterlitamak Petrochemical Plant and Avangard defense-industry plant in Sterlitamak, Republic of Bashkortostan (approximately 1,300 kilometers from the international border).[27] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that an August 26 Ukrainian strike on the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod (approximately 775 kilometers from the frontline) caused the facility to suspend its operations and that a September 1 Ukrainian strike on the NOVATEK Ust-Luga oil refinery in Slobidka, Leningrad Oblast (approximately 1,100 kilometers from the international border) damaged the facility’s pipelines, a primary gas condensate processing unit, and two columns of the hydrocracking unit, and also caused oil spillages.[28]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

A Ukrainian official source refuted Russian claims of advances northeast of Sumy City. A Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Sumy Oblast refuted an August 29 Russian MoD claim that Russian forces seized Khrapivshchyna (northeast of Sumy City), stating that Russian forces have not made any breakthroughs in this area.[29] Ukrainian and open sources have repeatedly refuted Russian claims of control over Khrapivshchyna.[30]

The Russian military command is reportedly planning a rotation of units operating southeast of Sumy City. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 4 that the Russian military command is planning a rotation of the 19th Battalion of the 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) operating near Ryasne and Taratutyne (southeast of Sumy City), gradually replacing them with elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control) (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces).[31] This is the first evidence ISW has observed of the 80th Tank Regiment having a 19th Battalion operating in Ukraine.

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast

See topline text for Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Odradne (east of Kharkiv City), according to a Ukrainian unit operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast, indicating that Ukrainian forces control Odradne contrary to Russian claims.[32]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kharkiv Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post in occupied Petrivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian milbloggers claimed on September 4 that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[34]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 3 and 4 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Ridkodub-Nove area (southeast of Borova) is a contested “gray zone” where Ukrainian forces are counterattacking.[36]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast but did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricants storage site in occupied Rovenky, Luhansk Oblast (roughly 125 kilometers from the frontline).[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continue to infiltrate the area south of Lyman, as Russian forces are struggling to enter the town itself and likely aim instead to threaten Ukrainian positions and supply lines in and near Lyman and Slovyansk through gradual infiltration missions. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position south of the northern section of Dibrova (south of Lyman) according to geolocated footage published on September 1, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[38]

Ukrainian officials refuted official Russian claims about the Russian seizure of Svyatohirsk (northwest of Lyman). Russian milbloggers continued to claim on September 4 that Russian forces are clearing Svyatohirsk, with one milblogger assessing that the alleged seizure of the settlement and potential future advances northward will allow Russian forces to establish firmer fire control over the M-03 Izyum-Slovyansk highway.[39] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated, however, that Russian infiltrators are still far from the Siverskyi Donets River and Svyatohirsk.[40] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking on the southern outskirts of Lyman and near Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman and east of Svyatohirsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions significantly east of Svyatohirsk and that Russian forces have likely not advanced west of Drobysheve.[41] Russian President Vladimir Putin baselessly claimed on September 1 that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces seized Svyatohirsk — an extreme claim disconnected from all available evidence.[42]

Russian forces will likely intensify their attacks in the Lyman direction as the weather worsens in coming weeks and months. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction forecasted that Russian forces would intensify their attempts to advance as cold and rainy weather sets in, as they have done in the past.[43] The spokesperson added that the Russian military command is regularly replenishing elements of the 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) in the area but that the soldiers are poorly trained.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Slovyansk, as Russian forces have been trying to seize local tactical heights in the area to create more favorable conditions for a future offensive against Slovyansk.[44] Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position in northwestern Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk) according to geolocated footage published on September 3, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 4 that Russian forces seized Nykonorivka (southeast of Slovyansk and east of Kramatorsk).[46]

Evidence continues to contradict Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s August 27 claims about alleged Russian advances east of Slovyansk. Geolocated footage published on September 3 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in Orikhuvatka (west of Rai-Oleksandrivka) and along the western bank of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal southeast of the settlement, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area contrary to Gerasimov’s August 27 claim that Russian forces seized Orikhuvatka.[47] A Russian milblogger acknowledged on August 27 that Russian forces do not maintain a presence in Orikhuvatka.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 3 and 4 but did not advance.[49]

Ukrainian forces continue to maintain positions that pose a challenge for Russian forces’ attempts to advance in and near Kostyantynivka. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on September 3 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Stinky, Chervone, and Mykolaivka (all northeast of Kostyantynivka).[50] The milblogger assessed that a Russian advance in this current Ukrainian pocket would straighten the front and free up reserves for a continued push toward Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (west of Stinky), the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal, and the Maiske-Markove line (north of Stinky).

A Russian milblogger assessed that Russian forces are employing the same tactics that they have been using in the Kostyantynivka area in order to threaten Ukraine’s ability to maintain supplies to positions in Druzhkivka. A milblogger assessed that Russian advances near Mykolaipillya (west of Kostyantynivka) would allow Russian forces to move their drone repeaters closer to Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Druzhkivka in order to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and threaten Ukraine’s ability to hold positions — as Russian forces have been trying to do to seize Kostyantynivka.[51]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Dobropillya direction. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in eastern Dobropillya, according to geolocated footage published on September 3, after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[52] The Russian MoD claimed on September 4 that Russian forces seized Hruzke (northeast of Dobropillya).[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 3 and 4 but did not advance.[54]

Russian forces are reportedly intensifying operations in the Pokrovsk direction after deploying additional personnel to the area. A Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion reported on September 4 that Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction from August to September 2026 and have almost doubled the amount of Russian infantry personnel deployed in the area.[55]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction. Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Kotlyarivka (just east of Novopavlivka) according to geolocated footage published on September 3.[56]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on September 3 and 4 but did not advance.[57]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone launch site in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline) and a Russian command post in occupied Fedorivka (one of several settlements between six and 100 kilometers from the frontline).[58]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 3 and 4 but did not advance.[59]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 4.

Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics targeting civilians in Kherson City. The Kherson Oblast Military Administration reported on September 4 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian minibus in Kherson City, killing one civilian and injuring 12.[60]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea, as gas stations in Crimea continue suffering from gasoline shortages. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck posts for Grenadier APTS automated technical reconnaissance in Suvorovo (roughly 224 or 98 kilometers from the frontline) and Rysove (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline) on September 3 or 4.[61] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from September 3 and 4 shows heat anomalies at the airfield and railway near occupied Dzhankoy (roughly 153 kilometers from the frontline), a parking lot near the Kerch Bridge ferry crossing near Kerch (roughly 331 kilometers from the frontline), and west of the Hvardiivske Air Base near Hvardiivske (roughly 203 kilometers from the frontline) — all locations that Ukrainian forces reportedly struck.[62] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Bastion missile system that can carry Zirkon and Onyx missiles, two fuel tankers, and a command and staff vehicle in occupied Crimea in August 2026.[63] Geolocated footage from the GUR confirms that Ukrainian forces struck a Bastion coastal defense missile system in northern Feodosia (approximately 274 kilometers from the frontline).[64] A local Crimean-based Telegram channel claimed on September 4 that many gas stations in occupied Crimea are out of stock despite Russian government promises to increase AI-95 gasoline supplies from September 1.[65]

Russian forces are struggling to locate a safe seaport for ship maintenance. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Second Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on September 4 that Russian forces are looking for ports beyond Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, to which they can transfer Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) ships and vessels involved in Russia’s military-economic activities.[66] Pletenchuk noted that Russian forces cannot use their main ship repair base in occupied Crimea and that a ship staying in one place for a prolonged period places it at risk — both likely due to the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes. Pletenchuk added that Russian submarines — which can launch Russian cruise missiles — have not been active in the area “for a long time,” possibly due to the need to conserve resources and problems with submarine maintenance, but noted that Russian forces are now striking Odesa Oblast from the Black Sea with Banderol loitering munitions instead of submarine-launched cruise missiles. Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces are increasingly trying to protect the submarines at their home bases from Ukrainian strikes.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11. [67]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Kh-31P anti-radar missile from over the Black Sea and 121 Shahed-type strike drones (about half of which were jet-powered), Gerbera-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and S8000 Banderol loitering munitions from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Oryol and Kursk cities; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 103 drones and Banderol loitering munitions, that an unspecified number of air targets struck 15 locations, and that debris fell on six locations.[69] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, commercial, and logistics infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Poltava oblasts.[70] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy stated on September 4 that Russian strikes in part caused power outages in Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Odesa oblasts.[71]

Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper stated on September 4 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against Ukrainian food and industrial warehouses in Odesa Oblast.[72]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2026/; [23] https://dou dot ua/lenta/interviews/flash-about-jet-drones-and-attacks-on-kyiv/?from=tg [24] https://militarnyi/ dot com/en/news/second-batch-of-rassvet-satellites-was-prematurely-declared-failure-analysis-of-their-altitude-gain/ [25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42120 [26] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2095662060948316326; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2095640052781228109?s=20; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2095752279718539665?s=20; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2095638887104385231; . https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2095773605120352719; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30337; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2095849337892810856; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13463; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30370; [27] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30323; https://t.me/supernova_plus/59334 [28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42119; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/ [29] https://t.me/brygada47/2552 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/ [30] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/ [31] https://t.me/severnnyi/9226 [32] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EG422ppHn/ [33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42120 [34] https://t.me/dva_majors/98503 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36680 [35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42116 ; https://t.me/red_war_machina/885 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/29600 [36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47252 [37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42120 [38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12869; https://t.me/trozsusumy117/2190 [39] https://t.me/wargonzo/36680; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47252 [40] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/09/04/holodiv-vony-chekayut-ne-prosto-tak-shho-zadumaly-rosiyany-na-lymanshhyni/; https://youtu.be/TXXOv27KdzM?t=1738 [41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47252 [42] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/ [43] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/09/04/holodiv-vony-chekayut-ne-prosto-tak-shho-zadumaly-rosiyany-na-lymanshhyni/; https://youtu.be/TXXOv27KdzM?t=1738 [44] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/ [45] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2095552233886843032; https://t.me/OMSBr_123/2635 [46] https://t.me/divgen/83690 [47] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2095805705584312788; https://t.me/omsbr_88_official/584; https://t.me/mod_russia/6680; [48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/55521 [49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42114; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42116; https://t.me/rybar/82877 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36680 [50] https://t.me/rybar/82877 [51] https://t.me/rybar/82877 [52] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2095676345388769508; https://t.me/pravytsia_sirka/160 [53] https://t.me/mod_russia/67034 [54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42114 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42116 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/122580 [55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/04/rosiyany-majzhe-vdvichi-posylyly-shturmy-vovky-da-vinchi-rozpovily-pro-sytuacziyu-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/ [56] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2095536796562252017?s=20; https://t [dot] me/urga_74/9564; https://t [dot] me/zvizdecmanhustu/3580 [57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42114 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42116 [58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42120 [59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42114; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42116; https://t.me/voin_dv/20971; https://t.me/dva_majors/98503; https://t.me/wargonzo/36680; https://t.me/rybar/82883 [60] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/66658; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/14975; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/66657; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/66650; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/66648 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/66659; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/66648; https://t.me/astrapress/124227; https://t.me/astrapress/124241 [61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42120 [62] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@34.398,45.679,12.760z; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/108683; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/108678; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/108709; https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@36.56,45.26,10.77z; https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@33.978,45.123,13.276z [63] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9314; [64] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2095793341392658901; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2095767567537250773 [65] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/108712 [66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hVzUW1v6xjE; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/04/novorosijsk-ne-gumovyj-dmytro-pletenchuk-poyasnyv-chomu-rosiyany-hovayut-flot-i-ne-mozhut-normalno-remontuvaty-korabli/ [67] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [68] https://t.me/kpszsu/76336 [69] https://t.me/kpszsu/76336 [70] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31558; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/73679; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31822; https://t.me/synegubov/25434; https://t.me/kirovogradskaODA/15342; https://t.me/mykolaiv_ova/3500; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34572; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/73692; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/20365; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/20366; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/20367 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7428;https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7412; https://t.me/kyivoda/56072; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/20348; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7425; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid09CgBH4kyvkEkABCCeqz5jRtYTpWhQjfs2p6bBaWrnNQ9jdAePMmcrsXVDcBvcZjFl; https://www.facebook.com/dtekoem/posts/pfbid02iuyQyeGqs5VUQ7h1H5MP8F2Mwj7yhRT9U9T7BPbexYppeF11jgTmaLQJZc4d5JAil; [71] https://t.me/energyofukraine/7758 [72] https://t.me/odeskaODA/19643

俄罗斯方面毫无根据地声称，俄军在哈尔科夫市东北部包围了2000名乌克兰士兵。俄罗斯国防部于9月3日宣称，俄罗斯北方部队的部分兵力占领了瓦西里夫卡、布拉霍达特内和多夫赞卡（均位于哈尔科夫市东北部）。[1] 俄罗斯北方部队还在9月3日宣称，俄军占领了斯利兹涅韦（位于哈尔科夫市东北部），并毫无根据地声称俄军完成了对2000名乌克兰士兵的包围。[2] 一些俄罗斯军事博客作者也散布了关于俄军在9月3日和4日沿国际边界包围哈尔科夫市东北部乌克兰军队的说法。[3] 俄罗斯方面并未提供任何视觉证据来支持他们的说法，一些俄罗斯方面甚至对大规模包围的说法表示怀疑。一位与克里姆林宫有关联的军事博主于9月3日承认，关于俄军完全包围乌克兰军队的说法需要进一步证实。[4] 乌克兰第16军于9月3日直接驳斥了俄罗斯关于占领上述定居点的说法，并直接否认了俄军在其责任区内包围任何乌克兰军队的说法。[5] 第16军强调，俄罗斯捏造包围乌克兰的说法，是在俄罗斯石油危机日益加剧、乌克兰对俄罗斯炼油厂和仓库发动袭击以及即将举行国家杜马选举的背景下出现的。包括俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京在内的俄罗斯高级官员和俄罗斯国防部不断夸大俄罗斯在战场上的表现——包括关于大规模包围乌克兰军队的虚假说法——这是俄罗斯系统性认知战的一部分，旨在将俄军描绘成取得全面进展、乌克兰防御崩溃的形象。例如，普京最近毫无根据地声称，9月2日，俄罗斯西部军区在皮斯基-拉德基夫斯基附近的奥斯基尔水库东岸（博罗瓦以南，距前线约16公里）包围了13个乌克兰营，总计约5000名士兵。[6]

9月4日，俄罗斯军队试图使用“格朗”型无人机暗杀乌克兰安全局（SBU）局长奥列克桑德·波克拉德。当天，俄罗斯军队袭击了位于基辅市的乌克兰安全局总部，乌克兰总统泽连斯基表示，俄罗斯军队的袭击目标明确指向波克拉德的办公室。[7] 袭击发生后，泽连斯基与波克拉德举行了会面。[8] 乌克兰总统国防技术顾问谢尔盖·“闪电”·别斯克列斯特诺夫于9月4日表示，一架俄罗斯遥控的“格朗”型无人机袭击了乌克兰安全局大楼。[9] 别斯克列斯特诺夫补充说，俄罗斯军队很可能通过一个带有网状网络中继器和互联网接入的设备与无人机保持联系，该设备是由一名俄罗斯特工在袭击期间于乌克兰安全局总部五公里半径范围内激活的。[10] 2026 年 4 月 20 日，俄罗斯军队也曾试图用四架“沙赫德”无人机对别斯克列斯特诺夫进行定点清除。[11]

俄罗斯“格朗”（Geran）无人机平台的改进提升了其执行高精度打击的能力。贝斯克列斯特诺夫9月4日表示，俄军正优先生产喷气式动力“格朗-4”（Geran-4）无人机，其速度可达每小时550公里，远超“格朗-3”（Geran-3）无人机，这将使乌克兰的拦截行动更加复杂。[12] 贝斯克列斯特诺夫补充说，俄罗斯正试图提高低成本打击飞行器的速度，使其速度逐渐达到亚音速巡航导弹的水平，其中包括“格朗-5”（Geran-5）、S8000“班德罗尔”（Banderol）、“丹-T”（Dan-T）和“丹-M”（Dan-M），以及新型UMPB-5R滑翔炸弹。乌克兰方面估计，俄军可以通过网状控制的“格朗”系列无人机链，在距离最远地面控制站150-175公里处保持实时操作员控制，与2025年相比，这一控制范围将扩大一倍。[13]俄罗斯喷气式无人机的速度和飞行范围不断提高，俄罗斯操作员可以远程控制这些无人机，这使得俄罗斯军队能够对有价值且动态的目标进行高精度打击。

克里姆林宫的行为表明，俄罗斯不愿保证美国代表团在即将访问乌克兰期间的安全。乌克兰总统泽连斯基9月4日表示，美国中东问题特使史蒂夫·威特科夫和美国总统前高级顾问贾里德·库什纳将在访问俄罗斯后于9月6日访问乌克兰。[14] 克里姆林宫通讯社塔斯社证实了美国代表团即将访问俄罗斯和乌克兰。[15] 据接近美国总统特朗普政府的消息人士透露，威特科夫和库什纳对访问乌克兰期间的安全感到担忧。[16] 8月26日，美国中央情报局局长约翰·拉特克利夫访问莫斯科期间，乌克兰停止了对莫斯科州的远程空袭。[17] 俄罗斯总统普京没有表示俄罗斯会在威特科夫和库什纳访问乌克兰期间停止对乌克兰的空袭。普京显然不愿保证美国代表团在乌克兰的安全，这表明克里姆林宫不愿接受美国作为和平谈判的调解人，也凸显了俄罗斯试图胁迫美国只与俄罗斯进行谈判的努力。

俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京似乎坚持沿用其现有的昂贵且低效的志愿兵征召机制。9月3日，普京在东方经济论坛上再次否认了任何动员计划，并声称俄罗斯军队不存在人员短缺问题。[18] 普京声称，俄罗斯民众自愿与俄罗斯国防部签署兵役合同，有关军事动员的传言是企图影响定于9月18日至20日举行的国家杜马选举。由于强制动员在俄罗斯仍然不受欢迎，普京此举很可能是为了安抚和安抚日益担忧的俄罗斯社会。[19] 俄罗斯联邦安全会议副主席德米特里·梅德韦杰夫也于8月28日否认了俄罗斯需要进行强制预备役征召的必要性。[20]

俄罗斯加快部署“曙光”（Rassvet）卫星星座以取代“星链”（Starlink）的努力正面临诸多挑战，这些挑战可能会缩短该星座的使用寿命。ISW于8月31日评估认为，俄罗斯需要大幅提高“曙光”卫星的成功发射次数，才能达到与SpaceX“星链”星座类似的能力。[21] 据报道，俄罗斯开发和使用“曙光”星座已对乌克兰构成重大风险，因为该星座能够实时提高俄罗斯打击和侦察无人机（UAV）的精度。然而，要实现乌克兰境内稳定且全天候的网络连接，需要大幅扩展该星座。[22] 尽管俄罗斯努力加快卫星部署，但其发射能力和卫星发射成功率仍然受到限制。乌克兰总统国防技术顾问谢尔盖·“闪电”·别斯克列斯特诺夫于9月4日报告称，俄罗斯36颗卫星中有一半未能进入预定轨道，据称是由于发动机故障所致。但他同时指出，俄罗斯已在准备下一批卫星的发射。[23] 国际空间研究组织（ISW）最初评估认为——现有数据也持续表明——俄罗斯最新的“曙光”（Rassvet）卫星尚未达到预定轨道高度，部分卫星出现技术故障迹象。[24] 由于地球大气层上层阻力增大以及燃料消耗增加，低轨道卫星的运行寿命较短。“曙光”卫星缓慢且未完成的上升过程可能会对该星座的预期使用寿命产生负面影响。

俄罗斯方面毫无根据地谎称，俄军包围了哈尔科夫市东北部的 2000 名乌克兰士兵。

9月4日，俄罗斯军队试图用“格朗”式无人机袭击暗杀乌克兰安全局（SBU）局长奥列克桑德·波克拉德。

俄罗斯 Geran 无人机平台的改进提高了其成功执行高精度打击的能力。

克里姆林宫的行为表明，俄罗斯不愿保证美国代表团在即将访问乌克兰期间的安全。

俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京似乎仍然坚持他现有的昂贵且低效的通过志愿兵招募来组建军队的机制。

俄罗斯加快建立“曙光”卫星星座以取代“星链”的努力正面临重大挑战，这些挑战可能会缩短该星座的使用寿命。

9月3日和4日，乌克兰军队继续对俄罗斯的军事、石油和国防工业基础设施发动远程打击行动。俄罗斯军队连夜向乌克兰发射了一枚Kh-31P反雷达导弹和121架无人机。

乌克兰军队在多布罗皮利亚战术区推进。

我们不会详细报道俄罗斯的战争罪行，因为西方媒体已对此进行充分报道，而且这些罪行不会直接影响我们正在评估和预测的军事行动。我们将继续评估并报道这些犯罪活动对乌克兰军队和乌克兰民众的影响，特别是对乌克兰城市地区战斗的影响。我们强烈谴责俄罗斯违反武装冲突法和日内瓦公约的行为以及反人类罪行，尽管我们并未在这些报告中详细描述这些罪行。

乌克兰在俄罗斯联邦的行动

9月3日和4日，乌克兰军队继续对俄罗斯的军事、石油和国防工业基础设施进行远程打击。乌克兰总参谋部9月4日报告称，乌克兰军队在9月3日夜间至4日凌晨袭击了布良斯克州博布里克的一个雷达站（距离前线10公里、25公里或44公里）和库尔斯克州古斯托莫伊的一个网状网络中继天线（距离前线约50公里）。[25] 根据9月3日和4日公布的地理定位视频，乌克兰军队还袭击了克拉斯诺达尔边疆区阿德勒的一个俄罗斯S-300或S-400防空系统、两个油库和一个ORL-A空中交通管制雷达（距离前线约560公里）。[26] 9月4日，公开消息来源报道称，乌克兰军队袭击了位于巴什科尔托斯坦共和国斯特利塔马克（距国际边界约1300公里）的斯特利塔马克石化厂和阿万加德国防工业厂。[27] 乌克兰总参谋部证实，8月26日乌克兰军队袭击了位于下诺夫哥罗德州克斯托沃（距前线约775公里）的卢克石油-下诺夫哥罗德石油合成炼油厂，导致该炼油厂停产；9月1日乌克兰军队袭击了位于列宁格勒州斯洛比德卡（距国际边界约1100公里）的诺瓦泰克乌斯季卢加炼油厂，破坏了该炼油厂的管道、一个初级凝析油处理装置和两个加氢裂化装置的塔架，并造成石油泄漏。[28]

俄罗斯的支持行动：北方轴心

乌克兰官方消息人士驳斥了俄罗斯关于在苏梅市东北部取得进展的说法。一支在苏梅州北部作战的乌克兰旅驳斥了俄罗斯国防部8月29日关于俄军占领赫拉皮夫什奇纳（苏梅市东北部）的说法，称俄军在该地区并未取得任何突破。[29] 乌克兰方面和公开渠道也多次驳斥了俄罗斯关于控制赫拉皮夫什奇纳的说法。[30]

据报道，俄罗斯军方指挥部正计划对在苏梅市东南方向作战的部队进行轮换。9月4日，一位消息人士援引俄罗斯北方集团军的消息称，俄罗斯军方指挥部计划对驻扎在雷亚斯内和塔拉图季涅附近（苏梅市东南方向）的第80坦克团第19营（隶属中央军区第41集团军第90坦克师）进行轮换，并逐步用俄罗斯第1摩托化步兵团（领土控制）（隶属俄罗斯空天军[VKS]，据称受俄罗斯北方集团军作战指挥）的部分兵力替换该营。[31] 这是ISW首次发现第80坦克团下辖第19营在乌克兰作战的证据。

俄罗斯主要行动：乌克兰东部

俄罗斯下属主要行动#1——哈尔科夫州

请参阅有关俄罗斯在哈尔科夫州北部发动进攻行动的概要文本。

乌克兰军队最近在哈尔科夫州北部推进或巩固了阵地。据在哈尔科夫州北部作战的一支乌克兰部队称，乌克兰军队在奥德拉德内（哈尔科夫市以东）附近击退了俄罗斯的进攻，这表明乌克兰军队控制了奥德拉德内，这与俄罗斯的说法相反。[32]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的哈尔科夫州的俄罗斯军事目标进行前线打击行动。乌克兰总参谋部9月4日报告称，乌克兰军队袭击了位于被占领的佩特里夫卡（库皮扬斯克东北部）的一个俄罗斯指挥观察哨。[33]

俄罗斯下属主要行动#2——奥斯基尔河

9 月 4 日，俄罗斯军事博客作者声称，俄罗斯军队继续向库皮扬斯克方向发动进攻，但 ISW 没有观察到俄罗斯军队推进的证据。[34]

9月3日和4日，俄军继续在博罗瓦方向进行有限的进攻行动，但由于乌克兰军队的反击，俄军并未取得进展。[35] 一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，里德科杜布-诺韦地区（博罗瓦东南部）是一个有争议的“灰色地带”，乌克兰军队正在那里进行反击。[36]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的卢甘斯克州的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击，但没有取得进展。乌克兰总参谋部9月4日报告称，乌克兰军队袭击了位于被占领的卢甘斯克州罗文基（距前线约125公里）的俄罗斯燃料和润滑油储存点。[37]

俄罗斯下属主要行动#3——顿涅茨克州

俄军继续向莱曼以南地区渗透，由于俄军难以进入莱曼镇本身，因此可能转而通过逐步渗透行动，威胁莱曼和斯拉维扬斯克及其附近地区的乌克兰阵地和补给线。根据9月1日公布的地理定位视频，乌克兰军队袭击了迪布罗瓦北部（莱曼以南）以南的一个俄军阵地，ISW评估认为这是一次俄军渗透行动。[38]

乌克兰官员驳斥了俄罗斯官方关于俄军占领斯维亚托希尔斯克（位于莱曼西北部）的说法。9月4日，俄罗斯军事博客作者继续声称俄军正在肃清斯维亚托希尔斯克，其中一位博主评估认为，俄军占领该定居点以及未来可能向北推进，将使其能够更好地控制M-03伊久姆-斯拉维扬斯克公路。[39] 然而，在莱曼方向作战的乌克兰旅发言人表示，俄军渗透者距离西顿涅茨河和斯维亚托希尔斯克仍然很远。[40]一位俄罗斯军事博客作者还声称，乌克兰军队正在莱曼南部郊区和德罗比舍韦附近（莱曼西北部，斯维亚托希尔斯克东部）进行反击，这表明乌克兰军队在斯维亚托希尔斯克以东相当远的地方保持着阵地，而俄罗斯军队可能没有推进到德罗比舍韦以西。[41] 俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京在9月1日毫无根据地声称，俄罗斯北方集团军占领了斯维亚托希尔斯克——这一极端说法与所有现有证据都脱节。[42]

随着未来几周和几个月天气恶化，俄军可能会加强在莱曼方向的进攻。在莱曼方向作战的乌克兰旅发言人预测，随着寒冷多雨天气的到来，俄军将像以往一样加大推进力度。[43] 该发言人补充说，俄军指挥部正在定期向该地区的第25合成集团军（中央军区）补充兵力，但这些士兵训练不足。

乌克兰军队近期在斯拉维扬斯克以东推进，与此同时，俄罗斯军队试图夺取该地区的局部战术高地，为未来对斯拉维扬斯克发动进攻创造更有利的条件。[44] 根据9月3日发布的地理定位视频，俄罗斯军队袭击了位于斯拉维扬斯克以东的赖-奥列克桑德里夫卡西北部的乌克兰阵地，表明乌克兰军队近期在该地区取得了进展。[45] 一位俄罗斯军事博主于9月4日声称，俄罗斯军队占领了尼科诺里夫卡（位于斯拉维扬斯克东南，克拉马托尔斯克以东）。[46]

证据持续与俄罗斯总参谋长瓦列里·格拉西莫夫陆军上将8月27日关于俄军在斯拉维扬斯克以东推进的说法相矛盾。9月3日公布的地理定位视频显示，俄军袭击了奥里胡瓦特卡（赖-奥列克桑德里夫卡以西）以及该定居点东南部的西维尔斯基顿涅茨-顿巴斯运河西岸的乌克兰阵地，表明乌克兰军队在该地区驻扎，这与格拉西莫夫8月27日关于俄军占领奥里胡瓦特卡的说法相悖。[47] 一位俄罗斯军事博客作者在8月27日承认，俄军并未在奥里胡瓦特卡驻扎。[48]

9月3日和4日，俄军在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡-德鲁日基夫卡战术区继续进行进攻行动，但并未取得进展。[49]

乌克兰军队继续坚守阵地，对俄军在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡及其周边地区的推进构成挑战。一位与克里姆林宫有关联的俄罗斯军事博主于9月3日承认，乌克兰军队在斯廷基、切尔沃内和尼古拉耶夫卡（均位于科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡东北部）设有阵地。[50] 该军事博主评估认为，俄军若在乌克兰军队目前的包围圈内推进，将有助于拉直战线，并腾出预备队继续向奥列克谢耶沃-德鲁日基夫卡（斯廷基以西）、西维尔斯基顿涅茨-顿巴斯运河以及迈斯克-马尔科夫线（斯廷基以北）推进。

一位俄罗斯军事博主评估认为，俄军正在采用与在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡地区相同的战术，以威胁乌克兰向德鲁日基夫卡阵地维持补给的能力。另一位军事博主评估认为，俄军在尼古拉皮利亚（科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡以西）附近的推进将使俄军能够将其无人机中继器部署到更靠近德鲁日基夫卡附近乌克兰地面交通线的位置，从而扰乱乌克兰的后勤保障，并威胁乌克兰守住阵地的能力——正如俄军为夺取科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡所做的那样。[51]

俄罗斯军队近期在多布罗皮利亚方向进行了一次渗透行动。根据9月3日公布的地理定位视频，乌克兰军队袭击了多布罗皮利亚东部的一个俄军阵地，ISW评估认为这是一次渗透行动。[52] 俄罗斯国防部于9月4日声称，俄军占领了赫鲁兹克（位于多布罗皮利亚东北部）。[53]

9月3日和4日，俄军继续向波克罗夫斯克方向发起进攻，但并未取得进展。[54]

据报道，俄罗斯军队在向波克罗夫斯克方向增派人员后，正在加强在该方向的军事行动。乌克兰一个无人系统营于9月4日报告称，俄罗斯军队在2026年8月至9月期间加强了在波克罗夫斯克方向的进攻行动，并将部署在该地区的俄罗斯步兵人数增加了一倍。[55]

根据 9 月 3 日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队最近向新巴甫洛夫卡方向推进。[56]

9月3日和4日，俄军继续在奥列克桑德里夫卡方向进行有限的进攻行动，但并未取得进展。[57]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的顿涅茨克州的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部9月4日报告称，乌克兰军队袭击了位于被占领的顿涅茨克市（距前线约55公里）的俄罗斯无人机发射场和位于被占领的费多里夫卡（距前线6至100公里之间的几个定居点之一）的俄罗斯指挥所。[58]

俄罗斯的支持行动：南方轴心

9月3日和4日，俄军继续在胡利亚伊波列方向和扎波罗热州西部进行进攻行动，但并未取得进展。[59]

9月4日，俄罗斯和乌克兰方面均未报告赫尔松方向有地面活动。

俄罗斯军队继续在赫尔松市对平民实施“猎杀式”战术。赫尔松州军事管理局9月4日报告称，俄罗斯军队在赫尔松市袭击了一辆乌克兰小巴，造成一名平民死亡，12人受伤。[60]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的克里米亚境内的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击，与此同时，克里米亚的加油站仍然面临汽油短缺的问题。乌克兰总参谋部报告称，9月3日或4日，乌克兰军队袭击了苏沃罗沃（距前线约224公里或98公里）和雷索韦（距前线约105公里）的掷弹兵自动技术侦察系统（APTS）哨所。[61]美国国家航空航天局（NASA）的“资源管理系统火灾信息”（FIRMS）9月3日和4日的数据显示，被占领的詹科伊附近的机场和铁路（距前线约153公里）、刻赤附近刻赤大桥渡口附近的停车场（距前线约331公里）以及赫瓦尔季耶夫斯克附近的赫瓦尔季耶夫斯克空军基地以西（距前线约203公里）均出现热异常——据报道，所有这些地点都遭到了乌克兰军队的袭击。[62] 乌克兰军事情报总局（GUR）于9月4日报告称，乌克兰军队于2026年8月在被占领的克里米亚袭击了俄罗斯的“堡垒”导弹系统（该系统可携带“锆石”和“缟玛瑙”导弹）、两辆油罐车和一辆指挥参谋车。[63]乌克兰国家安全局 (GUR) 提供的地理定位视频证实，乌克兰军队袭击了费奥多西亚北部（距前线约 274 公里）的一个“堡垒”海岸防御导弹系统。[64] 9 月 4 日，一个位于克里米亚的当地 Telegram 频道声称，尽管俄罗斯政府承诺从 9 月 1 日起增加 AI-95 汽油的供应，但被占领的克里米亚的许多加油站仍然缺货。[65]

俄罗斯军队正努力寻找安全的海港进行舰船维修。乌克兰海军发言人德米特罗·普列琴丘克上校9月4日表示，俄罗斯军队正在寻找克拉斯诺达尔边疆区新罗西斯克以外的港口，以便将俄罗斯黑海舰队（BSF）的舰船以及参与俄罗斯军事经济活动的船只转移到这些港口。[66] 普列琴丘克指出，俄罗斯军队无法使用其位于被占领的克里米亚的主要舰船维修基地，而且舰船长时间停留在同一地点会使其面临风险——这两种情况都可能是由于乌克兰无人机袭击的威胁。普列琴丘克补充说，俄罗斯潜艇——能够发射俄罗斯巡航导弹——“很久”以来在该地区没有活动，这可能是由于需要节省资源以及潜艇维护方面存在问题，但他指出，俄罗斯军队现在正使用“班德罗尔”巡飞弹从黑海袭击敖德萨州，而不是使用潜射巡航导弹。普列琴丘克表示，俄罗斯军队正日益努力保护其母港的潜艇免受乌克兰的袭击。

俄罗斯空袭、导弹和无人机行动

注：自 8 月 11 日起，乌克兰军方停止定期报告俄罗斯发射的导弹数量和拦截的导弹数量。[67]

9月3日至4日夜间，俄罗斯军队对乌克兰发动了一系列导弹和无人机袭击。乌克兰空军报告称，俄罗斯军队从黑海上空发射了一枚Kh-31P反雷达导弹，并从罗斯托夫州米列罗沃、奥廖尔和库尔斯克市、被占领的顿涅茨克市以及被占领的克里米亚赫瓦尔季斯克方向发射了121架“沙赫德”型攻击无人机（其中约一半为喷气式）、“格贝拉”型攻击无人机、“帕罗迪亚”型诱饵无人机和S8000“班德罗尔”巡飞弹。[68] 乌克兰空军报告称，乌克兰军队击落了103架无人机和“班德罗尔”巡飞弹，15个地点遭到不明数量的空中目标袭击，另有6个地点落有碎片。[69]乌克兰官员报告称，俄罗斯军队袭击了切尔尼戈夫州、第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州、哈尔科夫州、基辅州、基洛沃格勒州、尼古拉耶夫州、敖德萨州和波尔塔瓦州的居民区、商业区和物流基础设施。[70] 乌克兰能源部于9月4日表示，俄罗斯的袭击导致哈尔科夫州、切尔尼戈夫州、苏梅州和敖德萨州部分地区停电。[71]

敖德萨州军事管理局局长奥列格·基佩尔于9月4日表示，俄罗斯军队对敖德萨州的乌克兰食品和工业仓库进行了双重打击。[72]

白俄罗斯的重大活动

没有什么重大事项需要报告。

注：ISW 不接收任何来源的机密材料，仅使用公开信息，并广泛参考俄罗斯、乌克兰和西方媒体的报道和社交媒体，以及市售卫星图像和其他地理空间数据作为报告的基础。所有参考资料均列于每份更新报告的尾注中。

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https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid09CgBH4kyvkEkABCCeqz5jRtYTpWhQjfs2p6bBaWrnNQ9jdAePMmcrsXVDcBvcZjFl; https://www.facebook.com/dtekoem/posts/pfbid02iuyQyeGqs5VUQ7h1H5MP8F2Mwj7yhRT9U9T7BPbexYppeF11jgTmaLQJZc4d5JAil; [71] https://t.me/energyofukraine/7758 [72] https://t.me/odeskaODA/19643