Five priorities for advancing NATO’s space mission

NATO has been throttling up its efforts in the space domain. In relatively fast order, the alliance has moved from recognizing the growing role of space — developing a formal Space Policy and defining space as an operational domain — to operationalizing NATO’s role in space. This latter stage has focused on efforts to improve the alliance’s space domain awareness and information sharing. The allies have turned NATO’s Space Operations Center into a focal point for allied space coordination, established two initiatives to collect and share space data, and are developing a NATO Space Doctrine that is expected to be published by 2026.

NATO’s progress in the “final frontier” is notable, but insufficient given the degrading security environment, the breakneck speed at which the commercial space industry is evolving, and the high level of interest in space from allies. We believe that the next months will present a critical opportunity to advance NATO’s space mission and we offer five recommendations.

1. Update NATO’s space deterrence and defense policy playbook

NATO should update its 2019 Space Policy to better reflect the current threat environment and to complement the upcoming NATO Space Doctrine. The threat environment remains contested in Europe, on Earth and in space, amid concerns that Russia could put nuclear weapons in orbit or engage in other malicious activities. Additionally, China’s space activities, including the deployment of dual-use satellites with both military and civil applications, remain of concern.

NATO allies should also intensify efforts to develop internal response playbooks to a variety of Article 5 space scenarios and socialize them across the alliance via studies, wargames, and briefings. These playbooks would help map national and international authorities, capabilities, response options, red lines, and differences in allied priorities. The playbooks should explore several particularly thorny space contingencies: NATO’s transition from peacetime to conflict in case of a space-based crisis; NATO’s role in defending allied commercial space assets targeted by adversaries; NATO’s role in individual allied satellite and ground station protection; cross-domain deterrence and escalation; and potential targeting of adversary capabilities in third-party nations in response to an attack.

NATO may further benefit from extending these coordination efforts to select member and non-member states and socialize its thinking when preparing for specific contingencies. For example, NATO exercises could both learn from and reinforce Multinational Force Operation Olympic Defender. Additionally, NATO partners with significant space equities and synergies such as Japan could be invited to assist in exercises and discussions where relevant. These playbooks can help allies become more familiar with each other’s threat perception and develop “space IQ” on how to anticipate and coordinate actions, while maintaining the strategic ambiguity undergirding Article 5. While calls for establishing specific “red lines” against adversary action in space are understandable, we maintain that calculated ambiguity can support deterrence and retain allied sovereign political decision-making.

2. Implement NATO’s Commercial Space Strategy

NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations Thomas Goffus noted that as a result of the explosion of commercial space capabilities, space is no longer “too expensive, too exquisite, and too classified.” NATO needs to understand how to employ these assets to enhance its military edge. Commercial space capabilities can enable states to satisfy mission requirements more efficiently, at lower cost, with potentially more opportunities for upgrades. NATO recognizes this dynamic. Soon, the alliance plans to publicly release its first Commercial Space Strategy.

While a valuable step in affirming the role of commercial space, the plan’s success will hinge on its strategy, and especially the model NATO develops for its engagement with industry. Past RAND research highlights several recommendations. First, NATO should develop robust partnerships and communication channels with space industry actors. Building on the positive example of SPACENET, a NATO platform for engaging space providers, NATO should continue bringing transparency to its communications and focus on including small- and medium-sized enterprises and non-traditional firms, which represent the backbone of allied defense industries.

Second, NATO should identify, authorize, and resource an institution to oversee engagement with commercial space providers. Currently, responsibilities are split among the NATO Space Operations Center, Space Center of Excellence, and others, which could lead to insufficient coordination.

Third, engagement with industry must be action-oriented to build trust and ownership. Initial conversations should seek ways to ease regulatory burdens that slow acquisition timelines. NATO and industry leaders should share information on the acceptable levels of risk in space operations, and how to build resilience for assured access. The use of commercial space capabilities is as much a cultural shift as a technical one. As Lt. Gen. Michael Guetlein recently said: “In the past, we didn’t believe we could count on our commercial partners and international partners during times of crisis. That has completely changed.” NATO’s Commercial Space Strategy implementation plan presents an opportunity to deepen this engagement and keep up with an industry that changes drastically every six months.

3. Fund the allied space enterprise

NATO allies have very tight budgets dedicated to space within their own military services despite the recent and expected increases in overall defense spending. Further, only around 0.3% of allied defense spending is dedicated specifically to NATO via common funding for items of shared interest such as operational costs, capabilities, and joint facilities. Common funding remains difficult to disburse, and many times requires a nation to “own” the start-up costs of even a jointly approved program. Rather, we suggest the model of project-based funding in support of multinational capability cooperation efforts as an alternative, such as the one established through the Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS) program to integrate allied defenses.

EU efforts could also offer an additional source of funding. EU members have finalized the agreement for the SAFE €150 billion loan as part of the broader EU Commission package (ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 Plan) to support the EU’s rearmament. Funding through the loan program could be used to expand and integrate European space capabilities by NATO states, including those who are members of the EU and those, like Norway, Canada, and the U.S., who are not but can participate in SAFE. Additionally, NATO may consider expanding cooperation with the European Space Agency, which is increasingly focusing on dual-use capabilities and redefining its defense role.

4. Develop interoperable space capabilities and effects

Ensuring credible deterrence means fielding appropriate capabilities. For the first time, this year’s NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) cycle will include space requirements for allied militaries. Notably, NATO is also shifting its space capability targets to an effects-based approach for each ally, focusing on quantifying the available “firepower” for allies. NATO should build on that progress by assisting allies to identify areas of joint interest for coordinated space capability development .

Second, allies should consider mainstreaming the multinational capability cooperation format, which allows for common procurement and acquisitions of capabilities in areas of immediate need. Increasingly, NATO is using a model of project-based coalitions to kick-start action in areas of immediate interest — NORTHLINK, STARLIFT, “Project Asgard”, Sky Fortress are positive examples, with APSS arguably the most successful one.

Seeded by Luxembourg with $17.7 million to launch the integration effort that would be available for all 32 allies, the program has now attracted more than $1 billion in allied contributions in the form of data, PED, and cash over the next five years. This model can be mainstreamed for particularly critical space enablers such as Satellite Comms, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and Command and Control, but also emergent capability areas such as space logistics, or In-Space Manufacturing and Assembly.

To maximize returns on investments, NATO allies should also identify where they can pursue joint, complementary capabilities over sovereign, redundant ones. For example, high-resolution imaging constellations easily fall under the former, whereas satellites used for nuclear command and control will certainly be owned and operated by individual states. Not all space capabilities can be categorized so easily, however, so there is a long list of assets for which discussion is warranted. Relatedly, while European allies are understandably concerned about their overreliance on U.S. defenses and security guarantees, an active effort to complement U.S. space constellations rather than replace them may remind U.S. policymakers of the benefits of allied cooperation in this domain.

5. Reaffirm NATO’s role as a space broker

NATO’s primary value proposition is to serve as a convening space for allies to discuss, debate, coordinate, and align defense activities. NATO leaders often promote global norms that benefit collective defense and strategic stability, such as responsible space behaviors. They may help national policymakers create technical and operational standards for developing and employing military space assets so that allies can invest in indigenous military systems while still maintaining interoperability. NATO can also be a catalyst to streamline intelligence sharing, conduct joint exercises, and facilitate capability development.

We argue that NATO should focus on what it generally does best and apply it to space by serving as a broker for the 32-member alliance across multiple dimensions. NATO should continue bringing its platform to bear in critical areas, such as setting space standards; building the “space IQ” among allied nations and their staff; enabling better coordination and readiness; and wargaming and exercising the space enterprise.

As the role of space grows in NATO’s architecture, a more forward-leaning role for the alliance may also be possible. However, this alternative route is significantly more complex. For example, proposals for “NATO-operated” space architectures are limited by extremely small funds available for pooled resourcing and significant political challenges for maintaining such multinational efforts.

NATO’s space efforts have evolved massively since NATO’s Space Policy was launched five years ago. We believe that by pursuing these five priorities, NATO can continue making progress in this critical domain.

Anca Agachi is the co-Lead of RAND’s Alliances Portfolio in the National Security Research Division, and a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative focusing on NATO issues. Shaan Shaikh is a defense analyst at RAND with expertise in air and missile defense. Retired U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Bruce McClintock is a senior policy researcher at RAND, where he leads its Space Enterprise Initiative.

北约一直在加大在太空领域的投入。该联盟迅速从认识到太空日益增长的作用——制定正式的太空政策并将太空定义为作战领域——过渡到将北约在太空中的作用付诸实践。后一阶段的重点是提升联盟的太空领域感知能力和信息共享。盟国已将北约太空作战中心打造为盟军太空协调的中心，启动了两项收集和共享太空数据的计划，并正在制定预计将于2026年发布的《北约太空条令》。

北约在“太空”这一“最终前沿”取得的进展固然显著，但鉴于日益恶化的安全环境、商业航天产业的飞速发展以及盟国对太空的高度关注，这些进展仍远远不够。我们认为，未来几个月将是推进北约太空任务的关键时期，并提出以下五项建议。

1. 更新北约太空威慑和防御政策手册

北约应更新其2019年太空政策，以更好地反映当前的威胁环境，并与即将出台的北约太空战略相辅相成。在欧洲、地球和太空，威胁环境依然复杂多变，人们担忧俄罗斯可能将核武器送入轨道或从事其他恶意活动。此外，中国的太空活动，包括部署兼具军事和民用功能的两用卫星，也令人担忧。

北约盟国还应加大力度，针对各种第五条款太空情景制定内部应对方案，并通过研究、兵棋推演和简报等方式在联盟内部推广。这些方案将有助于梳理各国和国际机构的权限、能力、应对选项、底线以及盟国优先事项的差异。方案应探讨几个特别棘手的太空突发事件：北约在发生太空危机时如何从和平时期过渡到冲突时期；北约在保护遭受敌方攻击的盟国商业太空资产方面的作用；北约在保护盟国卫星和地面站方面的作用；跨域威慑和冲突升级；以及在遭受攻击后，针对第三方国家敌方能力的潜在打击。

北约若能将这些协调努力扩展到部分成员国和非成员国，并在应对特定突发事件时普及相关理念，则可从中获益更多。例如，北约演习既可借鉴又可加强“奥林匹克卫士多国部队行动”。此外，北约还可以邀请在太空领域拥有重要利益和协同效应的伙伴国，例如日本，参与相关的演习和讨论。这些行动方案有助于盟国更好地了解彼此的威胁认知，并培养“太空智商”，从而更好地预测和协调行动，同时维护《北约》第五条所规定的战略模糊性。虽然呼吁在太空领域划定明确的“红线”以遏制敌对行动是可以理解的，但我们认为，审慎的模糊性既能增强威慑力，又能维护盟国的自主政治决策权。

2. 执行北约商业航天战略

北约负责行动的助理秘书长托马斯·戈夫斯指出，随着商业航天能力的爆炸式增长，太空不再是“过于昂贵、过于精密、过于机密”的领域。北约需要了解如何利用这些资源来增强其军事优势。商业航天能力能够帮助各国以更低的成本更高效地满足任务需求，并可能带来更多升级机会。北约认识到这一趋势。该联盟计划很快公开发布其首个商业航天战略。

尽管该计划是肯定商业航天作用的重要一步，但其成功与否将取决于其战略，尤其是北约与航天工业合作的模式。兰德公司过去的研究提出了几项建议。首先，北约应与航天工业参与者建立稳固的伙伴关系和沟通渠道。借鉴北约航天供应商合作平台“太空网”（SPACENET）的成功经验，北约应继续提高沟通透明度，并重点关注中小企业和非传统企业，因为它们是盟军国防工业的支柱。

其次，北约应指定、授权并配备一个机构，负责监督与商业航天供应商的合作。目前，相关职责分散在北约太空作战中心、太空卓越中心和其他机构之间，这可能导致协调不足。

第三，与业界的合作必须以行动为导向，以建立信任和所有权。初步对话应寻求减轻监管负担的方法，以加快采购进度。北约和业界领导人应分享太空行动可接受的风险水平，以及如何建立韧性以确保准入。商业太空能力的运用既是技术上的转变，也是文化上的转变。正如迈克尔·盖特莱因中将最近所说：“过去，我们不相信在危机时期可以依靠我们的商业伙伴和国际伙伴。现在情况已经彻底改变了。”北约商业太空战略实施计划为深化这种合作以及跟上每六个月就发生巨大变化的行业步伐提供了契机。

3. 为盟军太空事业提供资金

尽管北约盟国近期和预期中整体国防开支有所增长，但其各自军种中用于太空领域的预算却非常紧张。此外，盟国国防开支中仅有约0.3%是通过共同拨款专门用于北约的，用于诸如作战成本、能力建设和联合设施等共同利益项目。共同拨款的拨付仍然困难重重，而且很多时候，即使是联合批准的项目，也需要某个国家“承担”启动成本。因此，我们建议采用基于项目的拨款模式来支持多国能力合作，例如通过联盟持续太空监视（APSS）计划整合盟国防御而建立的模式。

欧盟的努力也可能提供额外的资金来源。欧盟成员国已最终敲定一项1500亿欧元的“安全、先进和未来”（SAFE）贷款协议，该协议是欧盟委员会旨在支持欧盟重新武装的一揽子计划（“重整欧洲/2030年准备计划”）的一部分。通过该贷款计划获得的资金可用于北约国家（包括欧盟成员国以及挪威、加拿大和美国等非欧盟但可以参与SAFE计划的国家）扩展和整合欧洲太空能力。此外，北约可能会考虑扩大与欧洲航天局的合作，后者正日益关注军民两用能力并重新定义其国防角色。

4. 发展可互操作的空间能力和效应

确保可信的威慑意味着部署相应的能力。今年的北约防务规划流程（NDPP）周期将首次纳入盟军的太空需求。值得注意的是，北约正在将其太空能力目标转向基于效果的方法，重点量化盟国可用的“火力”。北约应在此基础上，协助盟国确定共同感兴趣的领域，以协调发展太空能力。

其次，盟国应考虑将多国能力合作模式纳入主流，以便在迫切需要的领域开展共同能力采购和获取。北约正越来越多地采用基于项目的联盟模式，以在当前关注的领域迅速启动行动——“北方链路”（NORTHLINK）、“星际运输”（STARLIFT）、“阿斯加德计划”（Project Asgard）、“天空堡垒”（Sky Fortress）等都是积极的例子，其中“空中战略支援”（APSS）可以说是最成功的案例。

该项目由卢森堡出资1770万美元启动，旨在为所有32个盟国提供一体化支持。目前，该项目已吸引盟国在未来五年内以数据、性能增强设备（PED）和现金形式提供超过10亿美元的资金。这种模式可以推广到卫星通信、情报、监视与侦察以及指挥与控制等关键太空赋能领域，也可以应用于太空物流或太空制造与组装等新兴能力领域。

为了最大限度地提高投资回报，北约盟国还应明确哪些领域可以发展联合互补能力，而非各自独立发展冗余能力。例如，高分辨率成像星座显然属于前者，而用于核指挥控制的卫星则必然由各个国家拥有和运营。然而，并非所有太空能力都能如此轻易地归类，因此还有许多资产值得探讨。此外，尽管欧洲盟国对过度依赖美国国防和安全保障感到担忧是可以理解的，但积极寻求与美国太空星座互补而非取而代之，或许能够提醒美国决策者，在这一领域开展盟国合作的益处不容忽视。

5. 重申北约作为太空斡旋者的角色

北约的主要价值在于为盟国提供一个交流、辩论、协调和统一防务活动的平台。北约领导人经常倡导有利于集体防御和战略稳定的全球规范，例如负责任的太空行为。他们可以帮助各国决策者制定开发和运用军事太空资产的技术和操作标准，从而使盟国能够在投资本土军事系统的同时，保持互操作性。北约还可以促进情报共享、开展联合演习和推动能力发展。

我们认为，北约应发挥其优势，将其应用于太空领域，在多个层面为这个拥有32个成员国的联盟扮演协调者的角色。北约应继续在关键领域运用其平台，例如制定太空标准；提升盟国及其人员的“太空素养”；促进更好的协调和战备；以及开展太空领域的兵棋推演和演习。

随着太空在北约架构中的作用日益增强，北约或许可以扮演更加积极主动的角色。然而，这条替代方案要复杂得多。例如，由于可用于资源共享的资金极其有限，以及维持此类多国合作面临巨大的政治挑战，建立“北约自主运营”的太空架构的提议受到诸多限制。

自五年前北约太空政策启动以来，北约的太空努力已发生巨大变化。我们相信，通过推进这五项优先事项，北约能够在这一关键领域继续取得进展。

安卡·阿加奇是兰德公司国家安全研究部联盟项目负责人之一，同时也是大西洋理事会跨大西洋安全倡议的非常驻研究员，主要研究北约问题。沙恩·谢赫是兰德公司的国防分析师，专长于防空和导弹防御。美国空军退役准将布鲁斯·麦克林托克是兰德公司的高级政策研究员，负责领导其太空企业倡议。