F FEICELL News全球新闻 · 本地动态 · 实时更新
← 返回新闻首页
军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 6, 2026

President Putin reiterated Russia’s unwillingness to make any meaningful compromises in the peace negotiations process to end the war.

ISWNadia Sleiman查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年9月6日

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s unwillingness to make any meaningful compromises in the peace negotiations process to end the war in Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on September 6 that Putin reasserted his commitment to reach all of Russia’s war aims through military means and emphasized Russia’s commitment to addressing the so-called “root causes” of the war during Putin’s meeting with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner on September 5.[1] Putin outlined his uncompromising demands for Ukraine’s full capitulation as a prerequisite for “peace” negotiations in Ukraine on June 14, 2024. Those demands require Ukrainian withdrawal from the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, including areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy; the demilitarization and “denazification” of the Ukrainian government and society by which Putin means the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian one; and future Ukrainian neutrality, specifically excluding NATO membership.[2] Ushakov’s statement following Putin’s meeting with Witkoff and Kushner indicates that the Kremlin remains unwilling to make any meaningful compromises to Russia’s maximalist demands.

Putin is doubling down on the fictional battlefield situation that he defines as “reality” and insisting that his misrepresentation of the actual state of the war become the basis for any peace negotiations on Ukraine. Ushakov claimed on September 6 that Putin provided a comprehensive assessment to Witkoff and Kushner of Russian “significant advances” along the frontline — an exaggerated claim that does not match realities on the ground.[3] A person close to the Kremlin stated prior to Witkoff’s and Kushner’s Moscow visit that there would not be a peace agreement until Russian forces seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and noted that Putin is confident that Russian forces could seize the whole of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026 — the most recent Kremlin deadline for accomplishing that goal.[4]

The Russian military systematically misinforms Putin about the state of the front line in part due to the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian armed forces that milbloggers refer to as “beautiful reports.”[5] Russian high-ranking military commanders also routinely present exaggerated Russian advances as part of Russia’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian forces as making sweeping advances and Ukrainian defenses as collapsing.[6] The lies and distortions of Russian military commanders at many levels are likely leading Putin to harden his perception that Russian forces can achieve his intended objectives in Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026 and thus that he need not make any compromises in his aims.

Russia is failing to achieve its battlefield objectives in reality, however, and is specifically failing in its priority objective of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026. Putin has set no fewer than 15 reported deadlines for the seizure of Donetsk Oblast since February 2022, and Russian forces have failed to meet every one.[7] Russian forces will not meet Putin’s new deadline of seizing all of Donetsk Oblast by December 31, 2026.[8] Russian forces have been fighting for Kostyantynivka since October 2025 and have not seized it in 11 months.[9] Russian forces have not reached, much less entered or seized, the other Fortress Belt cities of Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka, and will not be able to seize all three within the remaining four months of 2026, considering that they have failed to complete the seizure of even one in nearly a year. Putin’s battlefield fiction remains divorced from the reality of Ukraine’s defensive abilities, Russia’s own degraded offensive capabilities, and the difficult and expansive terrain Russian forces must still fight through to achieve Putin’s strategic goal in the region. Putin’s many deadlines to seize all of Donbas reflect in part his need to provide a significant informational victory to the Russian people. Putin has promised Russians victory in exchange for enduring the burdens of war without bringing Russian society to a full wartime footing.[10]

Russian forces will not seize Donetsk Oblast until 2032 at their current rate of advance — if they can seize it at all. The Russian rate of advance across the theater was 2.91 square kilometers per day in August 2026, a slight increase compared to recent months.[11] The average Russian rate of advance for Russian forces’ priority effort in Donetsk Oblast was lower at only 2.36 square kilometers per day in August. Russian forces would take until October 2, 2032, to seize the remaining 19 percent of Donetsk Oblast at this rate — over a year after the next State Duma elections, which will likely be held in September 2031.

ISW is not prepared to assess that Russian forces will be able to take the rest of Donetsk Oblast on any timeline, however. Russian forces will have to fight attritional urban battles through the cities of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt before attempting to advance across fields — terrain that Russian forces have historically struggled to advance through. The Russian rate of advance has slowed significantly across the theater since 2025, when Russia’s rate of advance had already begun to slow.[12] Ukraine has proven that it can contest the tactical initiative in several areas of the frontline and hinder Russian logistics in 2026, and Russia has struggled to counter these Ukrainian efforts.[13] Neither the trajectory nor any likely dynamics of the current conflict suggest that Russian forces will be able soon to accelerate their rate of advance dramatically as long as Western support for Ukraine continues at roughly current levels.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Witkoff and Kushner in Kyiv City on September 6 and agreed on fundamental principles for ending the war in Ukraine, including security and economic guarantees for post-war Ukraine. Zelensky reported that he held two bilateral rounds of talks with the US delegation and one round of multilateral talks with the national security advisors of the UK, Germany, and France about how to end the war in Ukraine.[14] Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian and US delegations discussed security and economic guarantees for Ukraine and territorial issues as part of a peace plan and agreed to hold Ukrainian-European-US talks in the near future. Zelensky stated that he also discussed European air defense and energy assistance to Ukraine with US and European partners if the war continues through the upcoming winter, which Zelensky assessed to be the most likely scenario. Zelensky noted that Ukrainian forces have grown stronger on the battlefield, which puts Ukraine in a stronger negotiation position with the US and Russia.[15]

Russia’s September 6 strikes against airports near Kyiv prevented the US delegation from flying to Kyiv City and forced it to travel instead by train.[16] Ukraine and Russia have previously agreed to halt long-range strikes against Kyiv and Moscow cities until the end of the day on September 7 to facilitate the delegation’s travel.[17] No Russian regional officials reported Ukrainian strikes against Russian territories on the night of September 4 to 5 ahead of Witkoff’s and Kushner’s arrival in Moscow.[18] Russian forces hit objects in Bucha Raion and Fastiv, Kyiv Oblast on the night of September 5 to 6 ahead of the US delegation’s arrival to Kyiv City, however.[19] Bucha Raion and Fastiv are 38 and 60 kilometers from central Kyiv, respectively. Russian sources acknowledged that Russian forces continued strikes near Kyiv City despite the three-day ceasefire to which Moscow is only very narrowly adhering.[20]

Witkoff and Kushner reportedly stated that they wanted to return to a trilateral Ukrainian-US-Russian negotiations format following their discussion with the Ukrainian and Russian sides.[21] President Donald Trump will consult with Witkoff and Kushner on their meeting with Putin and Zelensky and will call Putin and Zelensky on September 7, according to a US official.[22] Zelensky stated that the issue of Donbas is the issue of Russia’s entire war of attrition against Ukraine because Putin has made it the focus of his immediate demands.[23]

Putin’s demands transcend Donbas, however, as both his 2024 speech (to which Russian officials constantly allude) and Russia’s military operations demonstrate. Russian forces have been conducting offensive operations across the entire frontline in Ukraine in ways that are unnecessary if their focus is only, or even primarily, on seizing the rest of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces are conducting significant offensive operations in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts explicitly in an effort to create a “buffer zone” along the international border — one of Putin’s repeated demands.[24] Russian forces are simultaneously conducting offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast in order to join the Orikhiv and Hulyaipole directions to advance on Zaporizhzhia City, bypassing south-facing Ukrainian defenses.[25] These offensives are larger and more costly than would be needed simply to fix Ukrainian forces away from the defense of Donbas, and neither do they directly support Russian efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast. They do, however, pursue other explicitly stated Putin objectives, which is why they continue and why Putin is unlikely to halt the fighting even if Russian forces manage to seize all of Donetsk Oblast, which itself remains unlikely.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s unwillingness to make any meaningful compromises in the peace negotiations process to end the war in Ukraine.

Putin is doubling down on the fictional battlefield situation that he defines as “reality” and insisting that his misrepresentation of the actual state of the war become the basis for any peace negotiations on Ukraine.

The lies and distortions of Russian military commanders at many levels are likely leading Putin to harden his perception that Russian forces can achieve his intended objectives in Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026 and thus that he need not make any compromises in his aims.

Russia is failing to achieve its battlefield objectives in reality, however, and is specifically failing in its priority objective of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026.

Russian forces will not seize Donetsk Oblast until 2032 at their current rate of advance — if they can seize it at all.

ISW is not prepared to assess that Russian forces will be able to take the rest of Donetsk Oblast on any timeline, however.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Witkoff and Kushner in Kyiv City on September 6 and agreed on fundamental principles for ending the war in Ukraine, including security and economic guarantees for post-war Ukraine.

Putin’s demands transcend Donbas, however, as both his 2024 speech (to which Russian officials constantly allude) and Russia’s military operations demonstrate.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and the suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign in Rostov Oblast on the night of September 5 to 6. Russian forces launched 108 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian forces have achieved tactically-significant advances in the Hulyaipole direction in the past several months.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of September 5 to 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 6 that Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Ryazan, Ryazan Oblast (roughly 485 kilometers from the international border), which has a processing capacity of about 17 million tons per year and is one of Russia’s largest oil refineries.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces raised an unspecified attack helicopter in an attempt to prevent the strike but failed to do so. The strike damaged the ELOU AVT-6 and AVT-1 crude oil refining units at the refinery, according to geolocated footage published on September 6.[27] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the “Izomalk-2-LIN-800” industrial unit at the refinery.[28] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov acknowledged on September 6 that Ukrainian drones caused a fire at the refinery.[29]

Ukrainian forces continued their suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign against Rostov Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 6 that Ukrainian forces struck the Rostov-on-Don Airfield, causing a fire; a Podlyot radar station; and two Pantsir-S1 air defense systems in Rostov Oblast.[30] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuriy Slyusar and Rostov-on-Don Mayor Alexander Skryabin acknowledged Ukrainian strikes in Rostov Oblast.[31]

Open sources provided updated battlefield damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against targets in Rostov Oblast and Sochi, Krasnodar Krai. Ukraine’s August 30 strike against the Millerovo Airfield, Rostov Oblast, damaged two radars, the technical and operational unit (TEC), and an ammunition depot, according to satellite imagery published on September 5.[32] Ukraine’s September 3 strike against Sochi airport, Krasnodar Krai, destroyed Russian Mi-28 and Ka-52 attack helicopters and damaged an Mi-8-type multi-role helicopter, according to geolocated footage published on September 6.[33] Ukraine’s September 4 strike against the Rosneft oil depot in Sochi reportedly destroyed nine oil tanks and struck Russian air defense assets, according to satellite imagery published on September 5.[34]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 5 and 6 but did not advance.[35]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position north of Kudiivka (north of Kharkiv City) after what ISW assessed was a Russian infiltration mission, according to geolocated footage published on September 5.[36] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) reported that Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) remains contested, with neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces having control over the settlement.[37] The source reported that Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks near Hoptivka and Kudiivka (both north of Kharkiv City), while Russian forces are attempting to consolidate positions south of Starytsya (northeast of Kharkiv City).

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 5 and 6 but did not advance.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 5 and 6 but did not advance.[39]

Russian forces continue infiltration missions and attempts to consolidate positions in and south of Kupyansk. A Ukrainian officer operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on September 5 that Russian forces crossed the Oskil River and are infiltrating into Kupyansk and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk) but noted that Ukrainian forces control both settlements.[40] A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that Russian forces consolidated positions near an area of an industrial production plant in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi as Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward northern Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 5 and 6 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Korovii Yar and Hlushchenkove (south and southeast of Borova, respectively).[42]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian National Guard Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Pivnenko reported on September 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Zhitel electronic warfare (EW) system near Severodonetsk (roughly 38 kilometers from the frontline) from a depth of 55 kilometers.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on September 5 and 6 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 6 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked between Mykolaivka and Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk).[45] A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Stavky (northeast of Lyman), from the Drobysheve forest area toward the outskirts of Zarizhne (northwest and northeast of Lyman respectively), and north of Lyman.[46]

Russian forces recently intensified their offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction. A Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile division personnel group chief reported on September 6 that Russian forces intensified their assault in the Slovyansk direction over the past several days following a noticeable decrease.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 5 and 6 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[48] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger refuted the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) September 5 claim that Russian forces seized Kurtivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka) and stated that there is no objective evidence of Russian presence in Kurtivka.[49]

Russian forces continue attempts to infiltrate into Ukrainian rear positions north and northwest of Kostyatynivka. A Russian milblogger claimed that Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka) has become a contested gray zone and that Russian forces bypassed Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka from the south and reached Kindrativka (just northwest of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka).[50] The milblogger further claimed that Russian forces advanced from Izhivka and consolidated positions near Kurtivka (both southeast of Druzhkivka) and are continuing advances along the railway from Mykolaivka to Bezimyane (northeast and north of Kostyantynivka respectively).

Kramatorsk City Military Administration Head Oleksandr Honcharenko stated on September 6 that Russian forces struck a bridge near Kramatorsk.[51]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Dobropillya tactical area. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in central Dobropillya (the smaller of two settlements named “Dobropillya” southwest of the larger settlement) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission, according to geolocated footage published on September 6.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Matyasheve (south of Dobropillya) and advanced into western Dobropillya (the smaller of the two settlements).[53]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Pokrovsk direction. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in eastern Serhiivka (northwest of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission based on geolocated footage published on September 2.[54]

Russian forces appear to be experimenting with different tactics in the Pokrovsk direction, despite the resulting high casualties. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on September 6 that Russian forces are using a new tactic of sending “opening” small assault groups toward Ukrainian positions and drawing fire to reveal the location of Ukrainian positions and then subsequently heavily striking the area.[55] The brigade noted that Russian forces do not care about manpower losses during these tactics.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on September 5 and 6 but did not advance.[56]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Hulyaipole direction. Ukrainian forces likely hold positions south of Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole) and control Lisne, Rivne, Dolynka, and Kopani (all northwest of Hulyaipole), areas where Russian forces had either advanced or claimed to advance, according to geolocated footage published on September 5 and likely captured in mid-August 2026.[57] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets indicated on September 6 that Ukrainian forces likely control the area west of the Vozdvyzhivka-Verkhnya Tersa line (northwest of Hulyaipole).[58]

Russian forces have achieved tactically significant advances in the Hulyaipole direction over the past several months, but the rate of Russian advance remains slow and could slow further. Mashovets reported on September 6 that Russian forces have advanced between seven to eight kilometers and as far as 11 kilometers north and west from Hulyaipole since Spring 2026.[59] Mashovets stated that Russian forces seized Myrne and Luhivske (both southwest of Hulyaipole); reached the southeastern outskirts of Vozdvyzhivka and the Tsvitkove-Krynychne line (east of Verkhnya Tersa); and advanced to within 1.5 kilometers of Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole) from the east. Mashovets’ reporting indicates that Russian forces have likely also seized Svyatopetrivka, Staroukrainka, and Zaliznychne (all east to south of the Tsvitkove-Krynychne line), Varvarivka, and Pryluky (both northeast of Tsvitkove). Mashovets reported that Russian forces also infiltrated beyond these advances, including within Vozdvyzhivka, Verkhnya Tersa, and Hirke (west of Hulyaipole); into southern Dobropillya (northwest of Hulyaipole), Hulyaipilske, and Verkhnya Tersa; east of Nechaivka (north of Hulyaipole and south of Oleksandrivka); northwest of Luhivske (southwest of Hulyaipole and southeast of Orikhiv), and near Pishchane (northwest of Nechaivka) and Charivne (southwest of Hulyaipilske); and between Chervona Krynytsya and Yehorivka (both southwest of Hulyaipole and northeast of Orikhiv).

The Russian military’s failure to focus on the Orikhiv drive from the west and inability to sustain offensive operations west of Hulyaipole will likely constrain its rate of advance. Mashovets stated that Russian forces have concentrated enough personnel and assets for a drive on Orikhiv but that the diverging Russian effort northward along the Haichur River is widening the frontline and diluting the force concentration for the Orikhiv effort, limiting its effectiveness.[60] Mashovets noted that the Russian command likely redeployed elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) from the area west of Hulyaipole to support operations north of Hulyaipole, likely referring to the neighboring Oleksandrivka direction where Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking. Mashovets noted that Ukrainian forces are continuing counteroffensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction — directly into the rear of the Russian forces in the Hulyaipole direction — and that any further advances could hinder that Russian offensive. Mashovets noted that Russian forces have not been able to sustain a consistent rate of advance west from Hulyaipole because these forces need to regroup and rest at times.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 5 and 6 but did not make confirmed advances.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Orikhiv, in southern Preobrazhenka (just north of Orikhiv), and in southern and north of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[62]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 6.

Russian forces continued to employ “human safari” tactics targeting civilians in Kherson Oblast. The Kherson Oblast Police Department reported on September 6 that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a public transport stop in Molodizhne (just northeast of Kherson City), injuring three civilians.[63]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11. [64]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 108 Shahed-type strike drones, including jet-powered drones, Gerbera-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and S8000 Banderol loitering munitions from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Oryol and Kursk cities; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[65] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 82 drones and six Banderol loitering munitions, that an unspecified number of air targets struck 11 locations, and that debris fell on seven locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, industrial, energy, logistics, and border infrastructure in Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Kyiv oblasts.[66]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80700 [2] https://tass dot ru/politika/24771955 [3] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80700 [4] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putins-envoy-dmitriev-meet-witkoff-kushner-upon-their-arrival-moscow-sources-say-2026-09-05/ [5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/ ; [6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/; [7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/ [8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/ [9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2025/ [10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/putin-on-track-to-disappoint-multiple/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/hiding-russias-weakness/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_8-23/ https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/ https://understandingwar.org/research/cognitive-warfare/putins-internet-crackdown-is-rooted-in-weakness-and-a-need-to-demand-greater-war-sacrifices/ [11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/ [12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/ [13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/ [14] https://www dot president.gov.ua/news/zayava-prezidenta-ukrayini-pid-chas-spilnogo-z-predstavnikam-106269 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20722 ; [15] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2096683955365855456 [16] https://kyivindependent dot com/us-envoys-witkoff-kushner-arrive-in-ukraine/ ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/09/06/stiv-uitkoff-i-dzhared-kushner-priehali-v-kiev-eto-ih-pervyy-vizit-v-ukrainu [17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2026/ [18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2026/ [19] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/73849 ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1396344-masstabna-pozeza-spalahnula-na-promislovomu-obekti-kiivsini-pisla-ataki-rf/ ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2818 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/56234 [20] https://t.me/dva_majors/98570 ; https://t.me/arx_spn/30949 [21] https://x.com/HromadskeUA/status/2096682625867915525 ; https://x.com/HromadskeUA/status/2096650888060244336 [22] https://kyivindependent dot com/trumps-first-call-after-peace-talks-briefing-will-be-putin-source-says/ ; https://kyivindependent dot com/us-envoys-witkoff-kushner-arrive-in-ukraine/ [23] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2096685388555333767 [24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-5/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_10-7/ [25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2025/ [26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42137 [27] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8126; https://x.com/GarbuzYe/status/2096550718702235860; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/2096563629852160153 [28] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/drony-atakuvaly-ryazanskyj-npz/ [29] https://t.me/pavelmalkov_official/7134; https://t.me/pavelmalkov_official/7135 [30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42137 [31] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/09/06/ukrainskie-bespilotniki-atakovali-rostov-na-donu-povrezhdeny-zhilye-doma-postradali-chetyre-cheloveka-v-ryazani-gorit-npz ; https://t.me/tass_agency/394000; https://t.me/tass_agency/394005 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/394034 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/394006 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/394019 [32] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8121 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/suputnykovi-znimky-urazhennya-myllerovo/#google_vignette ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2026/ [33] https://t.me/absolutely_reliable/56 ; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/2096557538065908053; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30434 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/znyshhyly-ka-52-i-my-28-ta-my-8-v-sochi/ [34] https://t.me/absolutely_reliable/48 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/drony-urazyly-dev-yat-rezervuariv-u-sochi/ [35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42131 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42133 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36729 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9246 [36] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12890; https://t.me/jacksons_dairy/13315 [37] https://t.me/severnnyi/9246 [38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42131 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42133 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98596 [39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42131; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42133; https://t.me/wargonzo/36729 [40] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/32947 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eP4oBNrmiRc [41] https://t.me/grvZapad/19685 [42] https://t.me/grvZapad/19685; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42131 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42133 [43] https://t.me/Pivnenko_NGU/4746 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1396682-55-kilometriv-u-glibinu-tilu-okupantivukrainski-vijskovi-znisili-rosijskij-kompleks-reb-zitel/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/06/znyshhyly-zhytyelya-za-55-km-u-tylu-protyvnyka-naczgvardijczi-spalyly-ridkisnyj-vorozhyj-reb/ [44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42131; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42133 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36729 [45] https://t.me/wargonzo/36729 [46] https://t.me/grvZapad/19685 [47] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1396666-na-slovanskomu-napramku-vijsko-rf-aktivizuvalo-sturmi-ale-jogo-ambicii-ne-vidpovidaut-mozlivostam-54-ombr/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9TAM-eohLW8 [48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42131; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42133; https://t.me/wargonzo/36729 [49] https://t.me/rybar/82919; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2026/ [50] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/74676 [51] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1396726-armia-rf-zavdala-aviaudaru-po-mostu-u-kramatorsku/ [52] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12893; https://t.me/Borsuky_503/556 [53] https://t.me/motopatriot78/55759 ; https://t.me/divgen/83721 [54] https://www.instagram.com/reels/Dcvy59uN5hI/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12895 [55] https://t.me/rubizh3018/5506 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/06/vorog-nakopychuye-pihotu-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-ta-vyprobovuye-novu-taktyku/ [56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42131 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42133 [57] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2096307326923813265; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2096307331470356929; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/38198 [58] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3585 [59] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3585 [60] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3586 [61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42131 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42133 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36729 [62] https://t.me/motopatriot78/55764 [63] https://t.me/khersonpolice/25184 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/06/vorog-ne-zupynyaye-teror-hersonshhyny-vorog-vdaryv-fpv-dronom-po-zupynczi-gromadskogo-transportu/ [64] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [65] https://t.me/kpszsu/76746 [66] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31870 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31869 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31867 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31866 ; https://t.me/AlexsAlexs_G/2056 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1396738-litnij-colovik-zaznav-poranen-cerez-vlucanna-rosijskoi-molnii-u-malij-danilivci/ ; https://www.facebook.com/faceprok/posts/pfbid02kH9kP3jecT3DtV6u3JAnMNjYedJyD139XKQU5V5Qn1wuMXegqePophLYXrh94sdSl ; https://suspilne dot media/khmelnytskiy/1396512-semero-travmovanih-ta-poskodzeni-civilni-obekti-naslidki-rosijskoi-ataki-5-veresna-fiksuut-na-hmelniccini/ ; https://suspilne dot media/khmelnytskiy/1396452-vibiti-vikna-u-zitlovomu-budinku-ta-poskodzeni-avtomobili-fotoreportaz-naslidkiv-ataki-na-hmelniccini/ ; https://suspilne dot media/khmelnytskiy/1396540-zemla-zdrignulas-ak-zemletrus-na-hmelniccini-likvidovuut-naslidki-obstrilu-5-veresna/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/73843 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/06/vnaslidok-rosijskoyi-ataky-na-hmelnychchyni-postrazhdaly-semero-lyudej/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/73849 ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1396344-masstabna-pozeza-spalahnula-na-promislovomu-obekti-kiivsini-pisla-ataki-rf/ ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2818 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/56234 ; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid02JLg2JL9VEaWXLysnA6RxotBAws1JC9JFQk6Xt395VY7TejwvXdbktdD5Vho9SxK4l? cft [0]=AZg5r5Wxzt-WAfQ9rUeixQH1tYZgdIcYU9WBhtSKfs6LYkvQhLPX7-7MFW9cmSv3pMEEC_bdCqCsbpy_zqL9vHlSmST58DFE8dqEB3tSGO7Bi_jouCxdIRSHrhznMeGr_oww3Ap8-zVqYLD9aw-Vwpw7w9cal5_7uuQPm8dLRmBby-AJx342_SCa2LM& tn =%2CO%2CP-R ; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1396600-zaginuv-vodij-poskodzeni-budinki-ta-transport-naslidki-atak-na-mikolaivsinu/ ; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34605 ; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1396626-u-lubenskomu-rajoni-rosijskij-bpla-vluciv-u-teritoriu-privatnogo-pidpriemstva/ ; https://www.facebook.com/izmail.rda/posts/pfbid0pVg3x3VCfRztHuarjdy53hVr1y7gRBVmqVAJx9brZAHCR1kpauSb2XR8ydyN2oJFl? cft [0]=AZh7GbqCqc7io88h3jfNKyhpyPpEImOplePiWKE3aUwIgcD4BWh1MgCrk199I9q85YHQuNLQAyZaBXN-tKBs-rzzPh_6zlE_gJDEBfRhYctGuMFDp7HNvvQnfeUF84ULbRRzFpbeLcfivMD5sncuUmMN90R45Qku& tn =%2CO%2CP-R ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1396594-rf-povtorno-atakuvala-punkt-propusku-orlivka-na-odesini/ ; https://t.me/odessakoval/318 ; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/62878

手机左右滑动，电脑按 ← → 键，也能切换新闻