F FEICELL News全球新闻 · 本地动态 · 实时更新
← 返回新闻首页
军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 22, 2026

The Kremlin's seeming interest in negotiations aims not to end the war in Ukraine but rather to secure economic concessions from the US.

ISWAllan Saunders查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年10月22日

The Kremlin’s seeming interest in negotiations aims not to end the war in Ukraine but rather to secure economic concessions from the United States such that Russia can continue funding its war. Various Russian officials tried to present the October 21 meeting between US Special Representative to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Russian President Vladimir Putin as evidence that Russia is willing to engage in meaningful negotiations to end the war while simultaneously attempting to extract economic concessions from the United States so that Russia can continue funding the war.[1] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev, for example, claimed on October 21 that Witkoff and Putin used the October 21 meeting to agree to expand Russian-US economic cooperation and to “continue communicating.”[2] A Kremlin domestic policy official told Russian opposition source Verstka that the Kremlin does not expect negotiations to resolve the war in Ukraine but that Russian officials hope to extract economic concessions, which could boost Russia’s budget and give Russia a military advantage.[3]

Other Russian officials meanwhile demonstrated Russia’s unwillingness to make any meaningful concessions toward ending the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 22 that Putin did not present any Russian peace proposal to Witkoff during their meeting and that Putin has not considered the composition of a potential Russian delegation for a future Russia-US-Ukraine trilateral meeting.[4] Russian State Duma deputies expressed skepticism on October 21 and 22 that negotiations could end the war and reiterated claims that freezing the current frontlines would be detrimental to Russia’s own efforts to end the war.[5] A source close to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) told Verstka on October 22 that the Kremlin has been working for over 1.5 years to try to sway the Trump administration to Russia’s side and that the Kremlin’s current negotiation efforts are emphasizing Ukraine’s alleged hopelessness. These are similar to the Kremlin’s earlier negotiation tactics which tried to convince the United States and the West generally that Ukrainian defenses were going to collapse such that Ukraine should preemptively capitulate.[6]

The Kremlin is fundamentally only interested in buying time to resolve the war on the battlefield while Russia simultaneously reaps the benefits of economic cooperation with the United States. State Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov stated on October 21 that Russia must “press” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the battlefield and force Ukraine to “capitulate.”[7] Zhuravlyov added that Russia should not rely on diplomacy with the United States because Russian “successes on the ground” will strengthen Russia’s negotiating position.[8] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov similarly claimed that Russian forces maintain the “complete strategic initiative” and are conducting a “relentless offensive” in all key areas of the frontline.[9]

Russian forces are not winning on the battlefield, however, particularly as Ukrainian forces have stymied the planned Russian offensive to seize Donetsk Oblast. ISW has observed evidence that Russian forces suffered a net loss of 241 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine since September 1, 2026. The average rate of daily Russian advances has significantly declined since 2025, with an average of 0.25 square kilometers per day so far in 2026. Ukrainian forces have, comparatively, been contesting and seizing the operational initiative across several sectors of the frontline throughout 2026, including most recently in the Lyman direction with Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi which liberated over 270 square kilometers of territory and thwarted the Russian military command’s plan to encircle the Fortress Belt.[10] Russian forces are also facing mounting monthly casualties while the Russian recruitment rate continues to fall short of its loss rate.[11] Russian forces have suffered almost 37,000 casualties thus far in October 2026 — much higher than the 31,270 casualties for all of October 2025.[12] The Kremlin may face mounting challenges in the coming months, should Ukraine continue to contest the operational initiative and disrupt Russian offensive plans, potentially further pushing Russian commanders to urge Putin to conduct a mobilization in some form.[13]

The Kremlin is likely actively seeking economic cooperation with the United States as Russia faces significant financial strain. Sources familiar with the matter told Bloomberg on October 22 that even a few more months of continued war could exact lasting financial damage on Russian state-owned oil company Rosneft, as Ukrainian strikes against Rosneft’s oil refineries have significantly reduced the company’s profits and increased its debt.[14] Bloomberg added that repeated Ukrainian strikes have prevented Rosneft from completing repairs and restarting refinery operations and that strikes against complex secondary units that often include Western-sourced parts, like catalytic crackers, reformers, and hydrocrackers, are particularly difficult to repair. Russia remains highly susceptible to international sanctions that restrict its access to the technologically advanced components needed to repair the equipment damaged after Ukraine’s strikes.[15] The Kremlin is therefore pushing the United States for various forms of economic relief, so that Russia can continue funding its war against Ukraine.[16] The Kremlin has continuously sought to extract economic concessions during negotiations to alleviate the pressure on its oil industry — including restrictions on Ukrainian strikes against refineries and the relaxation of US sanctions against diesel exports — while expressing little real interest in ending the war.[17]

Russian forces conducted a massive missile and drone strike against Ukraine overnight on October 21 to 22 following the October 21 meeting between Witkoff and Putin — a continuation of Russia’s pattern of launching large strike packages in the days before and after major peace talks. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces conducted a massive combined missile and drone strike primarily targeting Kyiv City and using an unspecified number of Iskander-M, S-400, Zircon, and Onyx missiles and 210 long-range drones, 110 of which were jet-powered.[18] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces conducted three waves of ballistic missile strikes against Kyiv City using 21 missiles, damaging residential, energy, railway, and commercial infrastructure.[19] Zelensky stated that Russian strikes targeted 12 Ukrainian oblasts, killing at least two people and injuring at least 34 people. Russian forces regularly conduct massive strikes in the days right before and after bilateral and trilateral talks, such as the August 2025 US-Russia Alaska summit, the November 2025 US-Ukraine talks in Geneva, the November 2025 US-Russia talks in Moscow, the December 2025 US-Ukrainian-European and US-Russian talks, and the January-February 2026 US-Ukrainian-Russian talks in Abu Dhabi.[20]

Russian forces struck Kyiv City with cluster munitions to purposely harm the civilian population, likely as part of wider Russian efforts to distract from Ukraine’s recent battlefield successes and ultimately force Ukraine into capitulation by making daily life untenable. Zelensky stated that Russian forces struck Pechersk Raion, the historic center of Kyiv City, with three ballistic missiles with cluster warheads that have a dispersion diameter of 400 meters.[21] The strikes damaged monastery buildings and other civilian infrastructure near the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra and the Holy Presentation Monastery. Zelensky noted that there were no military targets in the area and that the objective of the strikes was to cause widespread destruction.[22] Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko stated that Russian forces also struck metro infrastructure on the Southern Bridge over the Dnipro River in Kyiv City and damaged six ambulances at an ambulance station in the city.[23] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov stated that each Iskander-M ballistic missile’s cluster warhead releases 45 submunitions that detonate in the air and noted that the objective of the strikes was to destroy a portion of the historic center and injure as many people as possible.[24] Cluster munitions have a wide area of effect and are designed to kill enemy personnel or destroy light vehicles, underscoring Russia’s intent to maximize civilian harm and suffering. Cluster munitions historically have a high failure rate, and unexploded bomblets can cause lasting danger for civilians living in affected areas, further demonstrating Russia‘s aim to terrorize civilians.[25]

Russian strikes against Kyiv City are intended to make daily life untenable heading into Winter 2026-2027. Zelensky stated that Russian forces have struck more than 170 Ukrainian energy facilities since October 11 — the date when US President Donald Trump announced that Russia and Ukraine had agreed to an “energy ceasefire.”[26] The increasing intensity and brutality of Russia’s long-range strike campaign ahead of Winter 2026-2027 highlights the urgency of providing Ukraine with sufficient air defense munitions, reliable low-latency satellite access over Russia, and other Western assistance that allows Ukraine to defend its skies from Russian missiles and drones.

The Kremlin’s seeming interest in negotiations aims not to end the war in Ukraine but rather to secure economic concessions from the United States such that Russia can continue funding its war.

The Kremlin is fundamentally only interested in buying time to resolve the war on the battlefield while Russia simultaneously reaps the benefits of economic cooperation with the United States.

Russian forces are not winning on the battlefield, however, particularly as Ukrainian forces have stymied the planned Russian offensive to seize Donetsk Oblast.

The Kremlin is likely actively seeking economic cooperation with the United States as Russia faces significant financial strain.

Russian forces conducted a massive missile and drone strike against Ukraine overnight on October 21 to 22 following the October 21 meeting between Witkoff and Putin- a continuation of Russia’s pattern of launching large strike packages in the days before and after major peace talks.

Russian forces struck Kyiv City with cluster munitions to purposely harm the civilian population, likely as part of wider Russian efforts to distract from Ukraine’s recent battlefield successes and ultimately force Ukraine into capitulation by making daily life untenable.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Vovchansk and in southern Kostyantynivka.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets on October 21 and overnight on October 21 to 22.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets on October 21 and overnight on October 21 to 22. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on October 22 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian 75th Arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) air defense system storage and repair facility in northern Serpukhov, Moscow Oblast (roughly 371 kilometers from the international border), which reportedly repairs Russian air defense systems including the Buk-M1, Buk-M2, and S-300V systems.[27] Geolocated footage published on October 21 and 22 shows a large explosion at the Russian 75th Arsenal following a Ukrainian strike.[28]

Russian authorities continue to construct air defense structures at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to defend drone production facilities from Ukrainian strikes. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported that satellite imagery collected on October 21 of drone production facilities at the Alabuga SEZ in the Republic of Tatarstan shows 33 newly constructed air defense positions, including concrete towers and new pads for Pantsir and Tor air defense systems.[29] Russian authorities had constructed two perimeters of lattice towers as part of passive drone defensive structures surrounding Geran drone production facilities at the Alabuga SEZ by Summer 2026.[30]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Several Russian milbloggers and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 21 and 22, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[31]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian electronic warfare station near Gulevka, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 32 kilometers from the international border) on October 21 or overnight on October 21 to 22.[32]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City. Russian forces struck Ukrainian positions south of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), according to geolocated footage published on October 21, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[33]

Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 22, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[34]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

The Ukrainian Khartyia Corps reported on October 21 that its Operation Veles is clearing a pipeline near Kupyansk that Russian forces use to infiltrate into Kupyansk, likely referring to the Trans-Balkan pipeline.[35] The success of Operation Veles may allow Ukrainian forces to clear Kupyansk of Russian infiltrators. The Khartiya Corps reported on October 22 that Ukrainian forces combined this underground offensive with ground operations and drone strikes, advancing more than 15 kilometers through the pipeline into the Russian near rear and potentially denying Russian forces the ability to conduct infiltration missions in the Kupyansk direction in the future.[36] The Khartiya Corps spokesperson reported that the pipeline runs two to four meters underground and is between one and 1.2 meters high.[37] The spokesperson stated that Russian servicemembers maintained positions in the tunnels for more than a month building barricades and awaiting further orders from the Russian military command.[38] Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on October 22 that Russian forces used a pipeline, which travels north from Kupyansk and across the Oskil River through Holubivka (northeast of Kupyansk), to move covertly into Kupyansk and evacuate Russian troops and sometimes used civilians as human shields in these efforts.[39] Trehubov stated that the main objectives of the Ukrainian operation were to deny Russian forces the ability to covertly enter and exit the areas north of Kupyansk and across the Oskil River, as Ukrainian forces could previously only exert partial control over the pipeline’s exit. The Khartiya Corps reported that Russian forces lost over 100 personnel as a result of Operation Veles. The all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) reported that it also participated in Operation Veles.[40]

Ukrainian forces’ various efforts to eliminate Russian forces’ use of the pipelines were unsuccessful such that Ukrainian forces have now turned to fighting underground. Russian forces have been using pipelines in the Kupyansk direction as their primary supply lines and infiltration routes since at least September 2025.[41] The Wall Street Journal reported on October 22 that Russian forces cut holes in tunnels and dug their way to the surface in order to launch drones against Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk.[42] Ukrainian forces previously struck these pipelines with drones, dropped munitions onto the pipelines with heavy bomber drones, and used unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to bring explosives to the area in order to disrupt Russian activity in the pipeline.[43] The Khartiya Corps spokesperson stated that Ukrainian strikes did not fully prevent Russian forces from using the pipelines, however, because Russian forces would dig into the soil and cut new entries into the tunnels, forcing Ukrainian personnel to themselves go underground to physically push Russians from the pipeline.[44]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on October 22.

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

The Russian military command appears to have deployed unmanned systems elements to the Lyman direction after Operation Vivaldi, likely to compensate for the withdrawal of the elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems from the area. The commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Lyman direction stated on October 22 that the Russian military command transferred elements of the elite Rubikon Center to the area during Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in order to increase Russian reconnaissance and strike capabilities.[45] The commander reported that Ukrainian forces heavily targeted these drone operators, ultimately leading the Russian military command to withdraw Rubikon elements from the area. ISW has now observed reports that first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 50th Varyag Brigade (Unmanned Systems Forces [USF]) are striking Ukrainian forces in the area of responsibility (AoR) of the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) north of Lyman.[46] A Ukrainian OSINT account assessed that the presence of the 50th Varyag Brigade in this area indicates that elements of the brigade redeployed to the 20th CAA’s AoR to stabilize the situation amid ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks.[47] The 50th Varyag Brigade traditionally conducts Geran-type drone strikes against the Ukrainian rear and more limited Geran-type and FPV drone strikes against frontline areas.[48] The presence of 50th Varyag Brigade FPV drone operators in the 20th CAA’s AoR indicates that the Russian military command may be looking for alternate ways to stabilize the situation in the Lyman direction, particularly after the withdrawal of Rubikon elements.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Slovyansk on October 21 and 22 but did not advance.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Kostyantynivka. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position in southern Kostyantynivka, according to geolocated footage published on October 21, indicating that Ukrainian and Russian positions are intermixed in the area.[50]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces recently infiltrated southeast of Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces conducted an airstrike on a Russian-occupied building in southeastern Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya), according to geolocated footage published on October 21, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[51] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 21 that Russian forces infiltrated to the line between Bilytske and Svitle (both southeast of Dobropillya).[52]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka and Novopavlivka directions on October 21 and 22 but did not advance.[53]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continued to make aggrandized claims of Russian advances in Hulyaipole direction. The Russian MoD alleged on October 22 that Russian forces seized Myrivka (northwest of Hulyaipole, roughly 16 kilometers from ISW’s furthest assessed Russian advances).[54] Several Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 104th Guards Airborne (VDV)Regiment (76th Guards VDV Division) with the seizure of Myrivka.[55]

Ukrainian forces recently either advanced or maintained positions west of Orikhiv. Russian forces struck Ukrainian positions north of Mali Shcherbaky, according to geolocated footage published on October 21, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area contrary to Russian claims.[56]

Several Russian milbloggers expressed skepticism about the Russian MoD’s claimed seizure of Yulivka (northwest of Orikhiv) on October 21. [57] Russian milbloggers stated that the Russian MoD’s October 21 claim about the seizure of Yulivka is “surprising” because Yulivka is 10 or more kilometers from the known line of contact.[58] Another Russian milblogger stated that the Russian MoD’s false claims about Yulivka are likely a deliberate exaggeration in order to deliberately misrepresent the battlefield situation to US negotiators.[59] ISW assesses that Yulivka is roughly 17.5 kilometers from the assessed frontline. A Russian milblogger credited 104th VDV Division with the alleged seizure of Yuliv.[60]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian air defense systems in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported on October 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M1 air defense system and another unspecified Russian air defense system near occupied Dmytrivske, Zaporizhia Oblast (roughly 32 kilometers from the frontline).[61] The 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported that it is becoming increasingly difficult for Russian forces to camouflage expensive equipment from drone operations, particularly as foliage decreases in the fall.

Russian forces one attack in the Dnipro direction on October 22 but did not advance.[62]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[63]

See topline text for further reporting on Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukraine

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 22 that Russian forces began to use the new Filin cruise missile in late Summer 2026.[64] The GUR reported that the Filin cruise missile has a 3.5-meter-long carbon-fiber and fiberglass composite fuselage, a three-meter wingspan, and some 3D-printed parts and may have a maximum speed of 800 kilometers per hour and a range of up to 1,200 kilometers. The GUR reported that the Filin cruise missile comes in variants with 50- and 100-kilogram warheads (similar to the payload of a Geran-type drone) and launches from a ground launcher using a solid-propellent booster. The GUR noted that the Filin cruise missile uses a Chinese-made inertial navigation system and a 16-channel Kometa controlled reception pattern antenna (CPRA) for targeting and has a Russian R500 engine. The Russian development of the Filin cruise missile indicates Russia’s continued focus on producing scalable and more cost-effective ground- and air-launched cruise missiles that are difficult for Ukrainian forces to intercept at scale.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin on October 22 to discuss deeper military cooperation.[65] Belousov and Khrenin met in Minsk, Belarus to discuss the coordination of military command bodies, cooperation between defense industries, joint air defense, and opportunities for the Russian and Belarusian militaries to conduct joint training. Belousov stated that both states will continue to work to create a unified defense and security state. Increased military cooperation between the Russian and Belarusian militaries is part of Russia’s efforts to maintain its de facto annexation of Belarus, as ISW has long assessed.[66]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/401731 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/28241855 ; https://ria dot ru/20261022/dmitriev-2126154629.html ; https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/2113058010851316148 ; https://t.me/kadmitriev/746 [2] https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/2113058010851316148 ; https://t.me/kadmitriev/746 [3] https://verstka dot media/rossiiskie-elity-ne-zhdut-proryva-ot-novogo-peregovornogo-treka-s-ssha [4] https://t.me/tass_agency/401731; https://t.me/tass_agency/401732 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/401733 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/401734 [5] https://lenta dot ru/news/2026/10/21/v-rossii-vyskazalis-o-perspektivah-novyh-peregovorov-s-ssha-i-ukrainoy/ ; https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/16636 ; https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2026/10/22/29580085.shtml [6] https://verstka dot media/rossiiskie-elity-ne-zhdut-proryva-ot-novogo-peregovornogo-treka-s-ssha; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2025/ [7] https://news dot ru/vlast/professionalnyj-manipulyator-deputat-o-mirnom-predlozhenii-zelenskogo ; https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/16638 [8] https://lenta dot ru/news/2026/10/21/v-rossii-vyskazalis-o-perspektivah-novyh-peregovorov-s-ssha-i-ukrainoy/ [9] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81046 [10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/ [11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/ [12] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42653; [casualty data taken from the Ukrainian General Staff daily 0800 sitrep] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29670 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30271 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30879 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42433 [13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=UkraineDisruptsOffensive [14] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2026-10-22/the-burden-of-putin-s-war-is-mounting-on-russian-oil-giant-rosneft [15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2026/ [16] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/9793 [17] https\://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2026/; https\://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2026/; https\://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/; https\://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/; https\://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2026/; https\://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2026/; https\://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2026/; https\://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2025/; https\://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ [18] https://t.me/kpszsu/89404 [19] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2113173153807569079 [20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2026/ [21] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2113247024518684864 [22] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2113247024518684864 [23] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7956; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7954 [24] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7823 [25] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/06/world/europe/ukraine-cluster-munitions.html [26] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2113247024518684864; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2026/ [27] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/11274 [28]https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2113084944822022349 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/33178 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/33156?single [29] https://t.me/svoboda_radio/49695 [30] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/ [31] https://t.me/wargonzo/37807; https://t.me/severnnyi/9688; https://t.me/dva_majors/100814 [32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42657 [33] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2112927533456924990 ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/7022 [34] https://t.me/wargonzo/37807 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/100814 [35] https://t.me/khartiia/4841 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/21/koly-drony-bachat-use-vijna-jde-pid-zemlyu-hartiya-povidomyla-pro-provedennya-operacziyi-veles/ [36] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/22/15-km-tunelyu-u-vorozhyj-tyl-korpus-%c2%abhartiya%c2%bb-pro-pershu-u-sviti-pidzemnu-kontrnastupalnu-operacziyu-%c2%abveles%c2%bb/ [37] https://www.armyfm dot com.ua/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/22/%c2%abpoky-ne%c2%a0zakinchylasya-yizha-sydily-i%c2%a0chekaly-na%c2%a0komandu%c2%bb%c2%a0%e2%80%94-desyatky-rosiyan-vzyaly-v%c2%a0polon-v%c2%a0kup%e2%80%99yanskyh-tunelyah/ [38] https://www.armyfm.com.ua/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/22/%c2%abpoky-ne%c2%a0zakinchylasya-yizha-sydily-i%c2%a0chekaly-na%c2%a0komandu%c2%bb%c2%a0%e2%80%94-desyatky-rosiyan-vzyaly-v%c2%a0polon-v%c2%a0kup%e2%80%99yanskyh-tunelyah/ [39] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1433757-teper-voni-zivij-sit-vikoristovuvati-navrad-ci-zmozut-tregubov-pro-operaciu-veles-na-kupansini/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2025/ [40] https://www.facebook.com/legionofrusliberty/posts/pfbid02M78RkAETP8vQAevnBRzoCw3Gy4TpmXv3pwXKXnC5wxqxyDaJqohoH96PLcm3c8Uol?rdid=Tf4XcXb0liIiTfKf# [41] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/ [42] https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/the-subterranean-battle-playing-out-deep-in-ukraines-soviet-era-pipelines-49dcc260 [43] https://t.me/brigade71/2407 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2025/ [44] https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/the-subterranean-battle-playing-out-deep-in-ukraines-soviet-era-pipelines-49dcc260 [45] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/22/pereyihaly-rubikon-yak-3-j-korpus-zdobuv-perevagu-v-povitri-a-teper-polyuye-na-reaktyvni-drony/ [46] https://t.me/endspiell/4860 [47] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2112877602377449624; https://t.me/endspiell/4860; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiyan-perekynula-50-brygadu-na-lyman/ [48] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/ [49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42652 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42649 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37807 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/100814 [50] https://x.com/juss_men/status/2112978186065649939 ; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/2938 [51] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2112952195045834984 ; https://t.me/soniah_hub/18780 [52] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2026 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3661 [53]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42652 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42649 [54] https://t.me/mod_russia/68431 [55] https://t.me/epoddubny/29571; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/49069; https://t.me/voin_dv/21696 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/49084 ; https://t.me/sashakots/65316v [56] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2112942957762633921 ; https://t.me/Russki_Medved/6027 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/ [57] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2026/ [58] https://t.me/mod_russia/68394 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56997 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/100814 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/100814 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2026/ [59] https://t.me/milinfolive/181897 [60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/49069 [61] https://www.facebook.com/reel/3164266803770431; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/22/ukrayinski-vijskovi-znyshhyly-dorogovartisnyj-zrk-%c2%abbuk-m1%c2%bb-rosiyan/ [62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42652 [63] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [64] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9775 [65] https://t.me/modmilby/59628; https://t.me/modmilby/59633; https://t.me/modmilby/59639; https://t.me/mod_russia/68433; https://t.me/tass_agency/401730 [66] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Russia27s20Quiet20Conquest20Belarus.pdf; : https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2026/

手机左右滑动，电脑按 ← → 键，也能切换新闻