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军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 21, 2026

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated that he is open to freezing the current frontline in Ukraine to achieve a ceasefire.

ISWStefaniia Bern查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年10月21日

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in a prominent interview on Fox News on October 21, reiterated his long-standing position since November 2024 that he is open to freezing the current frontline in Ukraine to achieve an immediate ceasefire. Zelensky stated that he is open to accepting freezing the current frontline in Ukraine, which he also referred to as a ceasefire, and noted that Ukraine will ask for security guarantees from the US President Donald Trump and Europe after the ceasefire.[1] Some sources inaccurately presented Zelensky’s October 21 Fox News statement as a new Ukrainian concession despite Zelensky long offering this concession since 2024. Zelensky first publicly spoke about a ceasefire deal that would include de facto Russian control of Ukrainian territories without de jure recognition on November 29, 2024, and has since reiterated his openness to an immediate ceasefire.[2] Zelensky has repeatedly presented various ceasefires and peace proposals, which the Russian officials have continuously rejected and have not yet offered any meaningful concessions toward peace negotiations.[3]

Senior Kremlin officials reiterated Russia’s long-standing unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations while attempting to present Ukraine and Europe as the main obstacles to peace in Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov provided his commentary following the October 21 meeting between US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.[4] Ushakov stated that Witkoff briefed Putin on the Ukrainian and European peace proposals from Witkoff’s meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders in Oslo, Norway, on October 20, and Putin noted that those proposals have “little that was useful” in resolving the war in Ukraine. Ushakov separately told Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on October 21 that Russia “is not completely satisfied” with the “nuances” in European behavior.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 21 that Russia’s position on an energy ceasefire with Ukraine has not changed and added that Russia “needs peace, not a ceasefire.”[6] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee member Denis Kravchenko claimed on October 21 that progress on resolving the war in Ukraine is possible but only if Russia’s “fundamental demands are met.”[7] The Kremlin officials’ October 21 statements effectively rejected Ukraine’s and Europe’s peace proposals by labeling them as insufficient, indicating Russia’s intransigence in its war objectives and continued unwillingness to accept Zelensky‘s concessions. The Kremlin officials continue reiterating the Kremlin’s long-standing narrative that Ukrainian and European leaders are the main obstacles to peace, despite Russia’s continuous rejections of Ukrainian and European ceasefire and peace proposals on any terms that fall short of fulfilling Russia’s goals of Ukraine’s complete capitulation despite the fact that the Russian military is unable to achieve those goals on the battlefield.[8]

The Kremlin is attempting to negotiate under the false assumption that Russia holds the strategic initiative on the battlefield in Ukraine, despite ample evidence to the contrary. Ushakov claimed that Putin presented Witkoff with an “objective picture” of the frontline situation, where Russian forces have “complete strategic initiative.”[9] Ushakov further claimed that Russian forces are conducting a “relentless offensive” in all key areas of the frontline. Official Russian claims of Russian successes do not reflect the current battlefield realities, however, and are reflective of the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military. Russian high-ranking military commanders also routinely present exaggerated Russian advances as part of Russia’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian forces as making sweeping advances and Ukrainian defenses as collapsing.[10]

Russia is failing to achieve its battlefield objectives in reality, however, and Ukrainian counteroffensive operations have operationally defeated the planned Russian offensive to complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast – Putin’s self-defined objective since 2022.[11] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces have liberated about 1,080 square kilometers of territory since January 1, 2026. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have net gained about 73 square kilometers since January 1, 2026, and suffered a net loss of about 73 square kilometers since September 1, 2026. Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction defeated the northern pincer of Russia’s planned encirclement of Donetsk Oblast and liberated at least 277 square kilometers, continuing to generate cascading effects for Russian offensive operations in neighboring sectors.[12] Ukraine has proven its ability to contest the operational initiative and disrupt Russian offensive plans on numerous occasions throughout 2026 and will likely be able to continue to do so in the coming months, assuming continued Western military support, intelligence sharing, and unimpeded access to Starlink and Starshield communications technologies. Putin has set no fewer than 16 deadlines for the seizure of Donetsk Oblast since 2022 and Russian forces have failed to meet every single one.[13] Putin’s battlefield perceptions remain divorced from the reality of Ukraine’s defensive abilities, Russia’s own degraded offensive capabilities, and the difficult and expansive terrain that Russian forces must still fight through to achieve Putin’s strategic goal in Donetsk Oblast. Pro-war Russian sources continue to complain about how official Russian reports are deeply exaggerated and are not representative of battlefield reality.[14]

Putin claimed that the first Russian fuel tanker carrying 40,000 tons of diesel will depart from Russia to the United States in two to three days and noted that other shipments will follow.[15] Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Economic Minister Alexander Novak also claimed that the first diesel shipment will depart on October 22, and that the United States and Russia are in the final stages of signing diesel contracts.[16] The US decision to import Russian diesel represents a unilateral concession in the US negotiating posture to Russia when Russia has offered no substantive concession to the US in return. The sale also primarily benefits Russia by providing the Kremlin with additional funding to protract the war in Ukraine while offering the US no significant price relief.[17]

Russia released US citizen Stephen Hubbard during Witkoff’s visit to St. Petersburg on October 21.[18] Russian authorities imprisoned Hubbard on October 7, 2024, for allegedly serving in the Ukrainian Armed Forces (which Russian authorities criminally charged Hubbard for) and sentenced him in 2024 to seven years in prison during closed court proceedings.

The United States, Ukraine, and Russia will likely hold trilateral peace negotiations around November 10. Ushakov claimed on October 21 that Putin told Witkoff that Russia is “in principle” ready to resume trilateral negotiations between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States around November 10 and suggested that such negotiations could take place in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.[19] The United States, Ukraine, and Russia last held trilateral negotiations in February 2026.[20]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in a prominent interview on Fox News on October 21, reiterated his long-standing position since November 2024 that he is open to freezing the current frontline in Ukraine to achieve an immediate ceasefire.

Senior Kremlin officials reiterated Russia’s long-standing unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations while attempting to present Ukraine and Europe as the main obstacles to peace in Ukraine.

The Kremlin is attempting to negotiate under the false assumption that Russia holds the strategic initiative on the battlefield in Ukraine, despite ample evidence to the contrary.

The United States, Ukraine, and Russia will likely hold trilateral peace negotiations around November 10.

Russian forces recently advanced south of Dobropillya.

Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Iskander-K cruise missiles and 186 drones and loitering munitions against Ukraine overnight on October 20 to 21.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Two Russian Su-30 multirole fighter jets crashed on October 21. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed on October 21 that a Su-30 crashed in Kaliningrad Oblast while conducting a planned training flight.[21] Geolocated footage published on October 21 shows the Su-30 crash and subsequent explosions near Timofeyevka, Kaliningrad Oblast.[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that a second Su-30 crashed on October 21 in an unspecified location.[23]

Satellite imagery provided an updated battle damage assessment (BDA) of a recent Ukrainian strike on Russian oil infrastructure. Satellite imagery published on October 20 indicates that Ukraine’s October 10 strike against the NZNP oil-loading terminal in Rostov Oblast damaged eight oil storage tanks, each with a capacity of 5,000 cubic meters.[24]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 21 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[25]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions east of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City). A Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast posted on October 20 footage showing a Ukrainian flag in central Karaichne (east of Vovchansk) and stated that Ukrainian forces control the settlement, contrary to Russian claims.[26]

Russian forces conducted infiltration missions north of Kharkiv City on a prior date. Russian forces conducted flag-raising missions on the northern outskirts of and in southeastern Vysoka Yaruha, according to geolocated footage published on October 1, during what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[27]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 20 and 21 but did not advance.[28]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction. Ukrainian forces struck Russian servicemembers on the northern outskirts of Kupyansk, according to geolocated footage published on October 21, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[29]

A Russian milblogger claimed on October 21 that Russian forces advanced north of Kupyansk.[30]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces continued ground operations in the Borova direction on October 21 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces recently conducted counterattacks in the area.[31]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Russian forces concentrated attacks east of Lyman near Zarichne on October 20 and 21 but did not advance.[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission east of Slovyansk. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in western Rai-Oleksandrivka, according to geolocated footage published on October 21, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in northern Kostyantynivka, according to geolocated footage published on October 20 after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces have reportedly conducted infiltration missions south, southeast, and northeast of Dobropillya and are conducting limited infiltration missions into Dobropillya itself. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 21 that Russian forces managed to have not been able to consolidate positions in Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya), contrary to Russian claims.[35] Mashovets stated that Russian forces seized Matyasheve (south of Dobropillya) and infiltrated throughout Stepy and Novyi Donbas (both south of Dobropillya) and in areas between the settlements, but do not maintain full control over these areas. Mashovets stated that Russian forces have also infiltrated towards Svitle, Vodyanske, Chernihivka, Krasnopodillya, Dobropillya (the smaller of two settlements of the same name), and Novohryshyne (all south of Dobropillya). Mashovets stated that Russian forces have infiltrated along the Byk River into Hannivka (just northeast of Dobropillya) and reached the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway, and that Russian forces infiltrated several positions in northeastern and central Dobropillya.[36]

Russian forces are taking advantage of temporary weather conditions to conduct mass infiltrations in the Dobropillya area, but these are unlikely to enable significant Russian gains. Mashovets noted that Russian forces have largely taken advantage of favorable weather conditions like fog and rain to increase their offensive tempo, but that Russian forces will face less dense foliage and fewer options for concealment as the fall continues.[37] Mashovets emphasized that Russian presence in and around Dobropillya does not mean that Russian forces will soon seize Dobropillya, as the seizure of the settlement will require significantly more resources, manpower, and time.[38] Mashovets noted that Russian forces’ current rate of advance is not sufficient to achieve the Russian military command’s goal of a rapid encirclement of the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the south.

Russian forces are also intensifying offensive operations southwest of Dobropillya in support of their efforts directly toward Dobropillya from the south. Mashovets reported on October 21 that elements of the Russian 41st CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) have sharply intensified their tempo of offensive operations towards Serhiivka (southwest of Dobropillya), in the area along the M-30 Pavlohrad-Pokrovsk Highway.[39] Mashovets noted that the Russian 41st CAA’s offensive activity in this area from Hryshyne towards Serhiivka is likely meant to support and protect the left (western) flank of the Russian 2nd CAA’s offensive efforts towards Dobropillya immediately from the south.

Russian forces continue to use AI-altered footage to assert territorial control in the Dobropillya direction in areas that they do not control. A Russian source published footage on October 20 purporting to show Russian forces operating in Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya), which ISW has reason to suspect is AI-altered.[40] Russian sources are documented to have used AI-doctored footage to make exaggerated claims of Russian advances.[41]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 21.

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on October 20 but did not advance.[42]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continue to prioritize the Hulyaipole direction compared to other areas of the southern sector of the frontline. Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps Spokesperson Colonel Volodymyr Polevyi reported on October 21 that Russian forces continue to prioritize offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction compared to other sectors of the southern frontline with the primary goal of reaching the outskirts of Zaporizhzhia City.[43] Polevyi stated that Russian forces are accumulating armored vehicles and personnel, including elements of the Russian 5th Separate Tank Brigade, 37th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 64th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD). Polevyi added that Russian forces continue to rely on flag-raising missions and AI-altered footage to exaggerate advances in areas that Russian forces do not control. ISW continues to assess that Russian sources are engaging in a sophisticated cognitive warfare effort that aims to portray Ukrainian forces as on the brink of collapse and assert that Russian forces are continuing to advance across the frontline.[44]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in the fields southwest of Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv), according to geolocated footage published on October 20 following what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[45]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to make blatantly false claims of advance in the Hulyaipole direction and western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed on October 21 that Russian forces seized Chervonyi Yar (west of Hulyaipole and roughly 17 kilometers from ISW’s furthest assessed extent of Russian advances) and Yulivka (northwest of Orikhiv and roughly 17.5 kilometers from the assessed frontline).[46] The Russian MoD’s reporting patterns are consistent with the Kremlin’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to fabricate claims of Russian advances and falsely portray the frontline as collapsing, contrary to available evidence.[47]

Russian forces recently conducted a mechanized assault in the Orikhiv direction. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Orikhiv direction confirmed on October 21 that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault towards Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) on October 17 using one armored vehicle, ATVs, and 20 Russian servicemembers, and that Ukrainian forces repelled the assault.[48]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian forces continue to rely on newly produced missiles rather than drawing from existing stockpiles to conduct missile strikes against Ukraine. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 20 that Russian forces have stockpiled up to 700 ballistic missiles and several thousand cruise missiles as of October 2026.[50] GUR data suggests that Russia’s Iskander-M ballistic missile stockpile in October 2026 increased by 13 percent compared to August 2026 and maintained the production rate of 65 Iskander-M missiles per month.[51] The data shows that Russia maintained the production rate and stockpiles of RM-48U ballistic missiles and Kh-101 cruise missiles between August and October 2026, indicating that Russian forces continue using newly produced missiles without expending existing missile stockpiles.[52] GUR reported that Russian forces stockpiled over 450 Kalibr cruise missiles, over 600 Onyx anti-ship missiles, and over 120 Zircon hypersonic missiles. GUR reported that Russian forces have modernized their Onyx anti-ship missiles, increasing their range and warhead payload to increase their effectiveness against ground targets. GUR reported that Kh-101 cruise missiles have experienced several technical defects, including aircraft carrier ejection problems that prompted Russian forces to return some batches to factories. GUR estimated that the Russian defense-industrial base (DIB) has reached its planned production figure of roughly 10,000 drones per month, including 4,000 jet-powered drones and 2,000 Geran-2 drones, and that Russian forces have accumulated an operational reserve of about 6,200 Geran-type drones, including jet-powered ones. Russia has increasingly reprioritized its drone production toward faster jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones that are harder for Ukraine to intercept.[53]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www [dot] foxnews [dot] com/world/ukraines-zelenskyy-open-freezing-front-lines-ceasefire-russia

[2] https://news [dot] sky dot com/story/zelenskyy-suggests-hes-prepared-to-end-ukraine-war-in-return-for-nato-membership-even-if-russia-doesnt-immediately-return-seized-land-13263085; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2025/

[3] https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_19-4/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2026/

[4] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81046

[5] https://t [dot] me/tass_agency/401558; ; https://www [dot] vesti dot ru/ns/ushakov-ssha-pochuvstvovali-koe-kakie-nyuansy-v-povedenii-liderov-evropy-ek-i-nato

[6] https://tass dot ru/politika/28235943 ; https://t [dot] me/tass_agency/401411

[7] https://news dot ru/vlast/v-gosdume-ocenili-perspektivu-vosstanovleniya-biznes-dialoga-ssha-i-rossii

[8] https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2026/;https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/

[9] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81046

[10] https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/;

[11] https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/the-ukrainian-defense-of-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-to-change-its-approach-in-eastern-ukraine-2/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russia-ukraine-warning-update-russia/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_30-19/

[12] https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=UkraineDisruptsOffensive ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=UkraineDisruptsOffensive

[13] https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2026/

[14] https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/

[15] https://t [dot] me/MID_Russia/94343; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81044;

[16] https://t [dot] me/tass_agency/401444

[17] https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2026/ ; https://www [dot] reuters [dot] com/business/energy/global-diesel-prices-seen-staying-high-despite-trumps-deal-with-russia-2026-10-21/ ; https://www [dot] spglobal [dot] com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/101226-russian-diesel-imports-unlikely-to-ease-us-fuel-prices

[18] https://apnews [dot] com/article/russia-american-released-stephen-hubbard-ukraine-witkoff-2c7e34d6606be242ed4a7473e57110c7 ; https://news [dot] sky [dot] com/story/american-72-jailed-for-nearly-seven-years-in-russia-for-fighting-as-a-mercenary-in-ukraine-13229685

[19] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81046

[20] https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/

[21] https://t [dot] me/tass_agency/401513

[22] https://x [dot] com/99Dominik_/status/2112892171800227928?s=20 ; https://t [dot] co/vobxUs0yxe ; https://t [dot] me/soniah_hub/18765

[23] https://x [dot] com/Osinttechnical/status/2112957819141988383 ; https://t [dot] me/warhistoryalconafter/288480

[24] https://x [dot] com/Exilenova_plus/status/2112707728905060707; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/udar-po-naftovomu-terminalu-v-rostovi-poshkodzheni-visim-rezervuariv/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2026/

[25] https://t [dot] me/wargonzo/37772 ; https://t [dot] me/DnevnikDesantnika/49027 ; https://t [dot] me/severnnyi/9673

[26] https://x [dot] com/Brokenarrow42/status/2112645559802847422?s=20 ; https://t [dot] me/ombr159/119

[27] https://x [dot] com/johnspectator/status/2112790726580772997 ; https://t [dot] me/warriorofnorth/22339

[28] https://t [dot] me/GeneralStaffZSU/42640 ; https://t [dot] me/GeneralStaffZSU/42638 ; https://t [dot] me/wargonzo/37772 ; https://t [dot] me/severnnyi/9673

[29] https://t [dot] me/talion_army/384; https://t [dot] me/creamy_caprice/13285

[30] https://t [dot] me/divgen/84680

[31] https://t [dot] me/grvZapad/20159

[32] https://t [dot] me/GeneralStaffZSU/42640 ; https://t [dot] me/GeneralStaffZSU/42638

[33] https://t [dot] me/barnastepan/2085; https://t [dot] me/creamy_caprice/13286

[34] https://t [dot] me/WarArchive_ua/39053; https://t [dot] me/polk_210/7322

[35] https://t [dot] me/zvizdecmanhustu/3661

[36] https://t [dot] me/zvizdecmanhustu/3662; https://t [dot] me/zvizdecmanhustu/3661

[37] https://t [dot] me/zvizdecmanhustu/3662

[38] https://t [dot] me/zvizdecmanhustu/3663

[39] https://t [dot] me/zvizdecmanhustu/3661

[40] https://t [dot] me/Sib_army/11651; https://t [dot] me/Osintpen/3711

[41] https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/geospatial-intelligence/russia-is-integrating-ai-models-into-its-cognitive-warfare-campaign-against-ukraine/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/; https://www [dot] criticalthreats [dot] org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026

[42] https://t [dot] me/GeneralStaffZSU/42638

[43] https://armyinform dot com [dot] ua/2026/10/21/do-realizacziyi-planiv-yim-yak-do-neba-rachky-na-gulyajpilskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-zajmayutsya-flagovtykingom-i-generuyut-videofejky/; https://www [dot] youtube [dot] com/live/8pQahjLwPVY?si=FylqqV9IRlpDw92L

[44] https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/geospatial-intelligence/russia-is-integrating-ai-models-into-its-cognitive-warfare-campaign-against-ukraine/

[45] https://t [dot] me/creamy_caprice/13280; https://www [dot] facebook [dot] com/reel/1627373368852516

[46] https://t [dot] me/mod_russia/68392 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/28237147; https://t [dot] me/mod_russia/68394 ; https://t [dot] me/sashakots/65293; https://t [dot] me/mod_russia/68404

[47] https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/

[48] https://armyinform dot com [dot] ua/2026/10/21/tuman-ne-dopomig-su-zupynyly-mehanizovanyj-shturm-rosiyan-na-orihivskomu-napryamku/; https://youtu [dot] be/8pQahjLwPVY?t=2686

[49] https://www [dot] bloomberg [dot] com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[50] https://nv dot ua/ukr/ukraine/events/ozbroyennya-rosiji-gur-ocinilo-zapasi-balistiki-droniv-tempi-vorozhogo-virobnictva-50651655 [dot] html

[51] https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026

[52] https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/

[53] https://www [dot] criticalthreats [dot] org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026

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