Espionage threats blur lines between security and dissent in Iran间谍威胁模糊了伊朗安全与异议之间的界限
Iran is using the threat of spy networks to detain and execute political opponents, analysts say.
![Traffic moves past an installation depicting butterlies forming the Iranian national flag in Tehran on October 21, 2026 [Atta Kenare/AFP]](https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/AFP__20261021__D3YC8TK__v1__HighRes__IranWarDailyLife-1792942826.jpg?resize=770%2C513&quality=80)
Iran is using the threat of spy networks to detain and execute political opponents, analysts say.
Traffic moves past an installation depicting butterlies forming the Iranian national flag in Tehran on October 21, 2026 [Atta Kenare/AFP]
While two wars on Iran by the United States and Israel have exposed serious vulnerabilities in Iran’s intelligence and security institutions, Iran is using the threat to crack down on dissent, analysts have said.
Saeid Golkar, an associate professor in political science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, said the genuine espionage threats faced by Iran were illustrated by the killing of high-level figures, including former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on the first day of the latest assault by Israel and the US on February 28.
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“At the same time, the regime has historically used real or, most of the time, perceived security threats to justify political repression and expand its coercive apparatus,” Golkar told Al Jazeera.
“The current crackdown appears to reflect both legitimate counterintelligence concerns and the regime’s broader efforts to suppress dissent and intimidate society.”
Former Israeli spy chief David Barnea recently said that in the weeks before Israel launched its 12-day war on Iran in June 2025, he had approved the entry into the country of dozens of agents with clear intelligence or sabotage assignments.
“I can’t say that they are here with us. But they are there in Tehran, living their lives,” he told a conference in Israel on October 22.
According to Barnea, who was the director of Mossad for five years until June 2026, Israeli intelligence tried to maximise the number of Iranian citizens arrested by local authorities in order to shield its genuine agents inside Iran.
Just hours after launching the war and killing senior commanders and nuclear scientists, they deliberately released footage of agents inside Iran with a Mossad logo, leading to the arrests of thousands of people with no links to the Israeli intelligence service.
Barnea claimed the strategy worked, and almost all of their assets remained unidentified. Eight months into a second war launched by Israel and the US against Iran, with the stated aim of overthrowing the Islamic republic, Iran’s paranoia remains.
Iranian authorities have significantly accelerated judicial punishments for cases linked to national security since the 2025 war. That has entailed mass arrests, expedited prosecutions, lengthy imprisonment, asset confiscations and executions.
The people targeted include alleged spies but also protesters, journalists, lawyers and minorities. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented cases involving coerced confessions, the denial of effective defence and national security charges applied to dissenters.
“The espionage threat facing Iran is very real. The two US-Israeli wars exposed serious vulnerabilities in Iran’s intelligence and security apparatus… Tehran has legitimate concerns about foreign infiltration, sabotage, and intelligence operations inside the country, especially as the threat of another military escalation remains high,” Negar Mortazavi, a senior fellow with the Center for International Policy, said.
“But there is a fundamental distinction between espionage and dissent,” she added. “Espionage involves covertly gathering sensitive intelligence or assisting foreign intelligence operations. Criticising the government, reporting on its failures, engaging with foreign media, or challenging official narratives does not, in itself, constitute espionage. The Iranian authorities have increasingly blurred this distinction, treating political opposition and independent reporting as extensions of foreign intelligence activity.”
Iranian authorities argue that foreign intelligence operations are aimed not only at overthrowing the government but also fragmenting the country.
Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence said in May that “enemies” were combining espionage, sabotage, hostile media, exploitation of economic crises and fuelling ethnic and sectarian tensions as part of a “hybrid war”.
Judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei has repeatedly invoked wartime conditions and domestic laws to argue for urgent security measures, and accelerated the punishment of alleged collaborators as a means of protecting the country.
Judiciary spokesman Ali Kazemi said earlier in October that there were active cases involving at least 1,895 people, including 94 media workers, accused of cooperation with Israel or other hostile states. Police had announced at least 21,000 arrests following the June 2025 war, while at least 50,000 people were detained in connection with the nationwide protests in January 2026. Thousands of civilians were killed in the crackdown against antigovernment protests across Iran, according to US-based rights organisation HRANA.
The authorities have referred to the nationwide protests as a “coup” orchestrated entirely by Israeli and US intelligence agencies. The Iranian government also claims that Mossad and other intelligence agents killed protesters. But an independent United Nations fact-finding mission said the authorities committed crimes against humanity during their most violent crackdown since the revolution.
Executions linked with security charges have also increased following the wars and protests. At least 19 people were hanged in espionage-related cases between June and December 2025, according to the UN.
Iran Human Rights, an Oslo-based nonprofit group, said it recorded 16 espionage defendants executed between January and September 2026, alongside 33 protesters and 13 prisoners affiliated with banned groups. The group had tracked at least 604 executions by early October.
Amnesty International reported at least 34 executions this year linked to the January nationwide protests by October 13, including five between September 30 and October 5.
‘Securitising every aspect of life’
Iranian authorities have warned the public about Mossad and other intelligence agencies running cyber-operations to expand their influence in Iran, accusing them of recruiting people through social media and online offers.
Sending images or information to networks deemed to be hostile to the Iranian government – including BBC Persian – could result in sentences of 10 to 15 years in prison and heavy fines. Combined with other offences, it could lead to potential charges of “corruption on Earth”, which carry the death penalty.
The authorities also regard the Starlink satellite internet service as a “tool of war” used for espionage, information gathering and even operating drones by “enemy” agents inside Iran. Tens of thousands of Starlink terminals have been smuggled into the country despite severe punishments for distributing and using the service. Iranian authorities have tried to confiscate or jam them.
For several days during the 12-day war, 20 days during the January protests and 88 days at the start of the current war, Iran imposed a near-total internet shutdown on 90 million Iranians. The official reasons ranged from protecting national assets against cyberattacks to disrupting hostile drones. The global internet remains severely filtered in Iran, and authorities have warned it could be disrupted again in case of military escalation.
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga’s Golkar said that by blurring the line between espionage and political opposition, authorities increasingly treat protesters, journalists and ordinary citizens as potential threats to national security.
“Ultimately, the Islamic republic increasingly treats regime security and national security as interchangeable concepts. While counterespionage is a legitimate state function, it has also become a tool to protect the ruling establishment and expand the influence of security institutions,” he said.
“In brief, and over time, the Islamic republic has transformed into a security-dominated regime that increasingly securitises nearly every aspect of political and social life, including peaceful civic activism, treating even nonviolent expressions of dissent as potential threats to regime survival”.
分析人士称,伊朗正利用间谍网络的威胁来拘留和处决政治对手。
2026年10月21日,在德黑兰,车辆驶过一个描绘蝴蝶组成伊朗国旗的装置。[Atta Kenare/AFP]
分析人士表示,虽然美国和以色列对伊朗发动的两场战争暴露了伊朗情报和安全机构的严重漏洞,但伊朗却利用这种威胁来镇压异议。
田纳西大学查塔努加分校政治学副教授赛义德·戈尔卡尔表示,伊朗面临的真正间谍威胁可以从以色列和美国在2月28日最新一轮袭击的第一天就发生的多起高级人物被杀事件中看出,其中包括前最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊。
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“与此同时,该政权历来利用真实的或(大多数时候)被认为是安全威胁的借口来为政治镇压辩护,并扩大其强制机器,”戈尔卡尔告诉半岛电视台。
“目前的镇压行动似乎既反映了合理的间谍活动考量,也反映了该政权压制异议和恐吓社会的更广泛努力。”
以色列前情报局长戴维·巴尼亚最近表示,在以色列于 2025 年 6 月对伊朗发动为期 12 天的战争之前的几周,他批准了数十名特工入境,这些特工的任务很明确,包括情报收集和破坏活动。
“我不能说他们和我们在一起。但他们就在德黑兰,过着他们的生活,”他在10月22日于以色列举行的一次会议上说。
据曾任摩萨德局长五年(直至 2026 年 6 月)的巴尼亚称,以色列情报部门试图最大限度地增加被地方当局逮捕的伊朗公民人数,以保护其在伊朗境内的真正特工。
在发动战争并杀害高级指挥官和核科学家几个小时后,他们故意发布了带有摩萨德标志的伊朗境内特工的视频,导致数千名与以色列情报部门没有任何联系的人被捕。
巴尼亚声称该策略奏效,几乎所有资产都未被识别。以色列和美国对伊朗发动的第二次战争已持续八个月,其公开目标是推翻伊朗伊斯兰共和国,但伊朗的疑虑依然存在。
自2025年战争以来,伊朗当局大幅加快了对涉及国家安全的案件的司法处罚力度。这包括大规模逮捕、加快起诉、长期监禁、没收资产和处决。
被针对的人群包括被指控的间谍,但也包括抗议者、记者、律师和少数族裔。国际特赦组织和人权观察组织记录了一些案例,涉及强迫认罪、剥夺有效辩护权以及以危害国家安全为由对异见人士提出指控。
“伊朗面临的间谍威胁非常真实。两次美以战争暴露了伊朗情报和安全机构的严重漏洞……德黑兰对外国渗透、破坏和情报活动在伊朗境内的发生有合理的担忧,尤其是在再次发生军事冲突的威胁仍然很高的情况下,”国际政策中心高级研究员内加尔·莫尔塔扎维表示。
她补充说:“但间谍活动和异议之间存在根本区别。间谍活动涉及秘密收集敏感情报或协助外国情报行动。批评政府、报道其失误、与外国媒体接触或质疑官方说法本身并不构成间谍活动。伊朗当局日益模糊这一界限,将政治反对派和独立报道视为外国情报活动的延伸。”
伊朗当局认为,外国情报机构的行动不仅旨在推翻政府,而且旨在分裂国家。
伊朗情报部在5月份表示,“敌人”正在将间谍活动、破坏活动、敌对媒体、利用经济危机以及煽动种族和教派紧张局势结合起来,发动一场“混合战争”。
司法部长戈拉姆·侯赛因·莫赫塞尼·埃杰伊多次援引战时状况和国内法律,主张采取紧急安全措施,并加快对涉嫌合作者的惩罚,以此作为保护国家的手段。
司法发言人阿里·卡泽米10月初表示,目前至少有1895人面临指控,其中包括94名媒体工作者,他们被控与以色列或其他敌对国家合作。警方宣布,在2025年6月的战争之后,至少有21000人被捕;而在2026年1月的全国性抗议活动中,至少有50000人被拘留。据总部位于美国的人权组织HRANA称,在伊朗各地镇压反政府抗议活动中,数千名平民丧生。
伊朗当局将全国范围内的抗议活动称为完全由以色列和美国情报机构策划的“政变”。伊朗政府还声称,摩萨德和其他情报人员杀害了抗议者。但联合国一个独立的实况调查团表示,伊朗当局在自革命以来最残酷的镇压行动中犯下了反人类罪。
战争和抗议活动之后,与安全指控相关的处决数量也有所增加。据联合国统计,2025年6月至12月期间,至少有19人因间谍罪被处以绞刑。
总部位于奥斯陆的非营利组织“伊朗人权”表示,他们记录到2026年1月至9月期间,共有16名间谍罪被告被处决,此外还有33名抗议者和13名与被禁组织有关联的囚犯也被处决。截至10月初,该组织已追踪到至少604起处决事件。
截至 10 月 13 日,国际特赦组织报告称,今年至少有 34 起处决与 1 月份的全国性抗议活动有关,其中包括 9 月 30 日至 10 月 5 日期间的 5 起处决。
“将生活的方方面面都纳入安全保障”
伊朗当局已向公众发出警告,摩萨德和其他情报机构正在开展网络行动,以扩大其在伊朗的影响力,并指控他们通过社交媒体和网络招募人员。
向被视为对伊朗政府怀有敌意的网络(包括BBC波斯语频道)发送图片或信息,可能面临10至15年监禁和巨额罚款。若与其他罪行合并,则可能被控“世界腐败罪”,该罪名最高可判处死刑。
伊朗当局还将星链卫星互联网服务视为一种“战争工具”,认为其被“敌方”特工用于间谍活动、情报收集,甚至操控无人机。尽管分发和使用该服务会受到严厉惩罚,但仍有数万个星链终端被走私入境。伊朗当局曾试图没收或干扰这些终端。
在12日战争期间,伊朗曾连续数日、1月抗议活动期间连续20天、以及当前战争初期连续88天对9000万伊朗民众实施近乎全面的互联网封锁。官方给出的理由包括保护国家资产免受网络攻击以及干扰敌方无人机等。目前,伊朗境内的全球互联网仍然受到严格过滤,当局警告称,如果军事冲突升级,互联网可能再次遭到封锁。
田纳西大学查塔努加分校的戈尔卡表示,通过模糊间谍活动和政治反对派之间的界限,当局越来越将抗议者、记者和普通公民视为对国家安全的潜在威胁。
“归根结底,伊斯兰共和国越来越将政权安全和国家安全视为可以互换的概念。虽然反间谍是一项合法的国家职能,但它也已成为保护统治集团和扩大安全机构影响力的工具,”他说道。
“简而言之,随着时间的推移,伊斯兰共和国已经转变为一个以安全为主导的政权,该政权日益将政治和社会生活的几乎每个方面都安全化,包括和平的公民活动,甚至将非暴力的异议表达视为对政权生存的潜在威胁。”